Conflict Prevention

In the podcast, Miller discusses the obstacles that prevent North and South Korea from achieving peaceful political reunification and examines China's perspective on the divisions between Seoul and Pyongyang. 

For the podcast by Asia News Weekly published on The Korea Observer, click here. 

In the article, Miller outlines the extent of security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. He explains how "Manila and Tokyo have joined hands on the security front to add weight to their joint narrative that Beijing is looking to use might to alter well-established norms and laws."

For the full article published by The Asahi Shimbun, click here.

I served two tours of duty in Afghanistan. During my first deployment in 2009, I was the Chief of Plans for ISAF Joint Command working under U.S. Generals David M. Rodriguez and Stan McChrystal. During my second tour in 2010, I assumed command of combined Team Uruzgan, a diverse force of coalition soldiers from ten countries, including Australia, Singapore, France, New Zealand, and the United States (see:“Shades of Gray in Afghanistan”).

These two deployments in the country revealed to me the extent to which fear of Pakistan permeated all Afghan discussions pertaining to national security and that such a pervasive angst had the potential to undermine our joint efforts in combating Taliban insurgents. Here are two brief examples.

In October 2009, the Afghans were in the process of training and equipping their sixth Afghan National Army Corps, the 215th Corps.  With the support of ISAF and NATO, this major combat unit represented a significant increase in combat capability.  The unit was designed to help bring security to the southern and eastern regions in Afghanistan and serve as a counter balance to the Taliban safe havens in Pakistan.  The deployment location and mission of the 215th Corps was a critical strategic decision worthy of significant analysis and debate at the highest levels in Kabul.

After exhaustive analysis which examined the Taliban disposition, Afghan National Army force allocation, and a review of critical information associated with the most pressing threats to the Afghan government, the recommendation of the Afghan Army staff, supported by ISAF, was to station the 215th Corps in the vicinity of Helmand Province. This decision was made to relieve the hard pressed 205th Corps in Kandahar and double the Army’s effort in the most threatened area of Afghanistan. Eliminating the Taliban presence in Kandahar was seen as essential to the success of the over-all mission.  Establishing a major Army headquarters in Helmand with the new 215th Corps would enable to 205th Corps to concentrate its forces on the most critical region.

The plan as designed was approved and executed, achieving dramatic results in Kandahar. After two years of fighting with the 205th Corps focused in Kandahar and the 215th focused in the adjacent Helmond province, the Taliban had largely been eliminated from Kandahar. Yet, the plan as briefed by the Afghan Army staff was approved only after heated exchanges and pointed discussions centered on whether the Corps should be focused on Taliban insurgent activity or against a potential armored attack from Pakistan directed at seizing Kabul.

The deep seeded mistrust and historical animosity between Afghan and Pakistan leaders directly influenced the planning for critical Army unit mission assignments and could have prevented what turned out to be a substantial gain against the Taliban.

In August 2010, Provincial Governor Khoday Rahim was holding a district wide Shura the isolated village of Chora in southern Afghanistan. This was his first visit since the accidental death of the district governor, Rosie Khan, and it turned into what seemed like a giant episode of the “Jerry Springer Show.”  Rosie Khan’s son, Mohammad Dawood Khan, had taken over as the district governor and the provincial governor was going to discuss challenges to local security and economic growth. At the Shura, the tribal elders and other leaders of the district met with the governor and other Afghan and Coalition leaders, including the police chief, Brigadier General Gul, the army commander, Brigadier General Hamid, and the National Directorate of Security chief, General Zakaria. The pointed discussions lasted four hours in the shade of the district center building in temperatures in excess of 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Chora’s leaders raised issues about Taliban influence, water sharing agreements, the need for education and health care requirements.  The Provincial Coalition leaders — myself included — received these points, offered updated information and pledged to do everything possible to help the city improve to the maxim extent possible.

The most memorable comment came from an older leader, who looked to be in his eighties.  As is the custom, he got up from his seated position on the floor to address the assembled Shura. He began by stating that the source of all problems in Chora stemmed from Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, he asserted that the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency was responsible for the Taliban, created all internal challenges with the Afghan government and was at the heart of problems with development and governance throughout Afghanistan. After a 45-minute monologue, he concluded with the conviction that the only reason Pakistan had nuclear weapons was to use them on Afghanistan prior to an all-out invasion and occupation.

The distrust of Pakistan permeates discussions and drives decision making from the outer districts like Chora to the highest levels of government. The accusations regarding Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, ISI support and manipulation of critical Afghan functions, and long standing territorial disputes are forefront in the minds of political, military and citizen thinking.

President Ashraf Ghani attacked this notion head on. Prior to assuming the presidency of Afghanistan he recognized that peace and stability in Afghanistan was only to be achieved with full cooperation with the Pakistan military establishment as well as the civilian government. His landmark visit to the Pakistan Minister of Defense in November 2014 exemplifies his dedication to reversing the friction between the two Central Asian countries.

Ghani has made several additional visits to Pakistan. He has empowered his ministries to engage closely with their Pakistani counterparts. Working to bring a regional approach to economic development as well as military cooperation against both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are at the forefront of his aspirations. Reducing the 16 day transit time for fresh produce to get from Kandahar to Karachi; approving long term multi entry visas; improving the transshipment process and border crossing point operations; capitalizing on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural opportunities; and improving cooperation on implementation of  the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000), the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline (TAPI) Project, and the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) among others, are all on the president’s economic high priority list.

On his military priority list, he has pledged to work with Pakistan on reducing the Taliban’s safe havens on both sides of the border. He must eliminate or at least reduce the influence and perception of influence of the ISI. The cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani militaries has improved dramatically but needs to be expanded to the Haqqani network and other insurgents who are not yet targeted. Leaders of both countries acknowledge these challenges and pledged to work toward mutually beneficial solutions.

During a recent trip I took with the EastWest Institute to Islamabad, senior leaders at the ministerial and presidential level confirmed the necessity and the commitment to move forward together to improve cross border cooperation against common enemies and to make demonstrable progress toward regional economic cooperation. Much work needs to be done. Each Pakistani ministry recognized that the window of opportunity opened by Ghani would stay open only so long. They all understood that the Afghan President had taken significant risks in reaching out to both Pakistani military and civilian leaders. These risks must be rewarded quickly by concrete and verifiable actions that could be used as compelling evidence of Afghan and Pakistani cooperation in both military and economic terms.

The Pakistani ministries and senior political leaders are committed to achieving increased cooperation with Afghanistan and taking advantage of the excellent opportunity afforded them. Afghanistan’s patience and Ghani’s political capital are not infinite. Cooperation across the border is a vital component to long-term regional security. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan need to demonstrate commitment to mutually beneficial actions by achieving tangible results quickly.

For the full article published by The Diplomat, click here. 

Pictures from the event: 

In the interview with ANW's Steve Miller, Greg Austin notes that "Cyber operations and information warfare are a normal part of modern military planning." He suggests that all countries face cyber threats and that diplomatic alliances need to account for the changing climate of modern informational warfare.

(Greg Austin speaks with Steve Miller at 6:40)

To see the full interview published by Asia News Weekly, click here. 

On 27 May 2015, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr, the newly promoted Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said that one of his main challenges, alongside a nuclear armed and erratic North Korea, would be “China’s preposterous claims to and land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.” So now a coral reef with an airfield is as dangerous as a nuclear weapon?

Harris’ statement was widely interpreted as meaning that China was engaged in an unjustified land grab, tantamount to coercion of or even aggression against the country’s southern neighbors. Three days later, a Chinese general repeated to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that China has shown “great restraint” in defending its territorial claims against unreasonable derogation by its southern neighbors. China sees its actions as defensive and in no way constituting aggression. There is a highly significant discrepancy between the two assessments. If Harris is wrong about the Chinese motivation, this must represent a significant intelligence failure by the United States. There is nothing more essential to national security intelligence than a correct assessment of a potential adversary’s motivations (intent) in the military sphere.

For the record, China is a country with more than 4,000 km of coastline in the South China Sea. Under international law, it is entitled to claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nm from the baselines of its territorial sea. On a rough estimate, it is entitled to around one million sq km of EEZ in the South China Sea based just on its mainland coast and the coast of Hainan Island.

A country’s international law claims to territory or maritime jurisdiction are only those articulated by its government in a formal manner. Beyond its South China Sea coast and Hainan (and minor islands close to these coastlines), and associated territorial sea and contiguous zones, China’s claims in the South China Sea have the following elements.

Territorial Claims

1. A claim to Pratas islands which is identical in character with the claim of Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
2. A territorial claim to the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands which is identical in character with the claims of Vietnam and Taiwan and which, as a claim, is fully compatible with international law. Someone must own the islands. (Scarborough Shoal, which has rocks above sea level of a type that other countries have claimed as subject to sovereignty, is part of the Spratly group in Chinese claims. It is not claimed by Vietnam.)
3. A territorial claim to the Macclesfield Bank, a small submerged featured known in Chinese as Zhongsha Islands, which does not qualify as land territory under international law and cannot be subjected to territorial sovereignty.

Of these, only the claim to Macclesfield Bank would not be in conformity with international law. Otherwise, China’s claims to territory are nor more or less preposterous than those of Vietnam. Based on research for my 1998 book, China’s Ocean Frontier, I have concluded that China’s claims to at least some of the islands are less preposterous than those of Vietnam and the Philippines, but that China’s claims to the entire Spratly group are probably not, in respect of each and every natural island, superior to those of other claimants.

One unusual problem about sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands is that Taiwan, a political entity not recognized as a state, is an active claimant.  This is further complicated by the likely implication that states which recognize Taiwan as part of “one China” are probably obliged to recognize Taiwan’s territorial rights as also adhering to “one China,” although that entity has an indeterminate status in international law.

Maritime Resource Jurisdiction

1. A 200 nm EEZ jurisdiction from the baselines of its land territory in full conformity with international law.
2. A claim to continental shelf jurisdiction from its land territory in full conformity with international law.

In addition, China has used the so-called nine-dashed line enclosing almost the entire South China Sea on many official maps since 1947 but it has not yet decided what, if any, legal force to ascribe to it. If it did ascribe any legal force, that would not be compatible with international law (verging on “preposterous”). Chinese officials have from time to time referred to China’s historic rights within this area but have not clarified what these might be beyond the territorial claims. The only possible historic right China could claim compatible with international law would be related to traditional fishing in another state’s recognized economic jurisdiction.

Preposterous or Not?

On balance, it is hard to see how Admiral Harris would justify use of the undiplomatic term “preposterous” in respect of the China’s current claims in the South China Sea. He may be justified in using it (in private) if China did go ahead and claim legal force of any kind to the u-shaped line.  China went close to this (being “preposterous”) by including the line without any explanation or discussion in a sketched map attached to its submission on the extent of its claimed resource jurisdiction on the continental shelf which it submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.  Since the line bears no relationship to the legal criteria outlined in the required submission, it would only be fair to leave open any suggestion as to what it means. The State Department made plain in December 2014 that “China has not clarified through legislation, proclamation, or other official statements the legal basis or nature of its claim associated with the dashed-line map.” The Philippines has brought a case against China in the Court of Arbitration to seek clarification of the Chinese intent behind the dashed-line in that submission.

It is now widely known that the nine-dashed line was first used (in a slightly different form) in a map released by China in 1947 (before the Communist Party came to power). What is not widely discussed is that the Chinese move followed by less than two years the Truman Declaration in which the United States broke with pre-existing international law by claiming resources jurisdiction in the seabed of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea. Perhaps China in 1947 was staking out a similar claim as other states rushed to emulate the revolutionary and expansionary U.S. claim.

Sources in China close to the government say that it has been unable to decide what to do about this nine-dashed line left over from history. Some constituencies in China have argued that China has “sovereignty” over all of the sea areas enclosed by the line, but the government has not endorsed this view–ever. So it has become a sensitive domestic political matter in which leaders face the accusation of being a traitor if they surrender the line. Such a charge has been publicly levied by Chinese hawks against former President Jiang Zemin for his border agreement with Russia. At the same time, there are more than a few Chinese official statements that appear to limit China’s claims to maritime resource jurisdiction to those embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention.

Land Reclamation

Admiral Harris also characterized China’s land reclamation activities as “preposterous.” By contrast, it should be noted, China regards these reclamations as examples of its “great restraint.” What significance should we attach to the reclamations?

For the record, to my knowledge, all of China’s current land reclamation is on submerged features in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands that have been the subject of Chinese physical presence for over two decades, so China has not permanently occupied new features in the last eighteen months, or even the last 20 years. A list of these features was noted in my 1998 book on the subject, China’s Ocean Frontier, as follows:

Between 1987 and 1996, the PRC occupied eight features in the Spratly group. These included Fiery Cross Reef, a totally submerged feature where the PRC in early 1988 conducted major engineering works to construct an 8000 square metre platform of concrete and steel rising two metres above the sea. It erected structures on Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Subi Reef, Dongmen Reef and Johnson Reef in 1988 and 1989 and on Mischief Reef in late 1994.

In September 2014, when new construction was revealed on Johnson Reef, a Chinese commentator echoed the Foreign Ministry by saying that the country needed to improve facilities there to make the lives of its occupants easier, but he added that China also needed an airbase to prepare for emergencies. He noted that this would be a breach by China of the 2002 Code of Conduct but that Vietnam and the Philippines had consistently breached it, and that China had shown great restraint by not using force to evict their forces form the islands and submerged features they occupied. On 9 April 2015, as CSIS in Washington observed, China acknowledged for the first time an unspecified military purpose to the reclamations.

It is hard however to credit the extreme view published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that a 10,000 ft. runway that China appears to be building on Fiery Cross Reef “could enable China to monitor and potentially control the airspace over the South China Sea, which would provide greater capability to exert sea control.” This to me is hypothetically possible (in terms of monitoring) but preposterous in terms of practical realities (controlling all South China Sea air space from one reef airfield against the might of the United States and its allies). This sort of  overblown assessment reflects the mood in Washington and in U.S. Navy circles that borders on rage at what they see (mistakenly) as China’s destabilization without any willingness to consider that actions of Vietnam, the Philippines or the United States itself might be contributing to the instability.

The Philippines has expressed concern in 2015 that China may be planning reclamation activity in Scarborough Shoal, an underwater feature that China took control of in 2012 after repeat confrontations with Philippines vessels.

Propaganda and Intelligence

The propaganda tactic being repeatedly used by those who see China as the only provocateur is to blur complex matters of law, dates and sequencing of events to paint China in the worst possible light. China is not blameless but the hysteria coming from the anti-China camp might be seen as laughable were it not so serious. It has been well summarized by a Chinese commentator in 2014: “Manila and its Western supporters have a rather ludicrous logic that the Philippines and Vietnam can do anything on the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and China can’t take any countermeasures.” The U.S. State Department position has consistently been relatively measured and restrained. It needs to reassert some control over PACOM’s public diplomacy.

But this is not simply an institutional coordination problem in Washington. It is a serious intelligence failure on the part of the U.S. Navy leaders in the Pacific. They are expert in the Law of the Sea but they have far less expertise on the law of territorial acquisition and sovereignty. The Pentagon, and PACOM in particular, have appeared on too many occasions deeply inexpert or biased on China. In public and in private, PACOM officers too often rush to ascribe the most silly intentions to China without offering any sort of reasoned and empathetic assessment of how the Chinese might see the problem.

A new and more empathetic study of the issue from the United States government might also evaluate the reliability of the repeated reassurances from Chinese leaders that their activities in defence of the Spratly claim represent no threat to international commercial shipping. The U.S. intelligence community is capable of such a balanced study. It may exist already. The world would be a safer place if it could see such a balanced study by the U.S. intelligence community in the public domain.

To read the article published by The Diplomat, click here.