Conflict Prevention

In Syria, a dictator is waging war against his own people, targeting men and women standing in line at bakeries. By now, according to UN reports, more than 60,000 people have lost their lives. There is no telling when the terror will end. Those who have witnessed the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s are reminded of the helplessness and powerlessness they felt during those years. At that time, the international community began to develop the idea that it would not be acceptable any more for a regime to turn on its own civilian population. The result: the “responsibility to protect.” And today, two years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, we still hardly have a clue how to live up to this obligation. Perhaps a look back at the wars in former Yugoslavia – during which we had to learn our lesson the hard way – can help.

In the 1990s, it took us a long time to understand that the threat or even the use of military power is sometimes necessary to reach political goals and advance peace: In Bosnia, without the intervention of NATO, the Dayton accords that ended the civil war never would have been possible. Understandably enough, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made Western societies tired of intervening. The West has come to realize that military interventions – as morally justified as they may be in individual cases – are rarely effective if they are not embedded in a sustainable political strategy. But hasn’t our skepticism gone too far? Could we not have saved many thousands lives with, for instance, a no-fly-zone and the suppression of Bashar al-Assad’s air force? Could the mere presence of NATO missile batteries a year ago have demonstrated the resolve of the West?

The experience in Yugoslavia has also underlined the importance of a joint position of the members of UN Security Council. The NATO air strikes alone could not end Milosevic’s regime. The Serbian president was not run from power until Russia turned its back on him as well. Today, the disunity of the UN Security Council allows Assad’s killings to continue unabated. For more than a year, the veto powers Russia and China have been blocking all efforts to pass a resolution.

It would, however, be too simplistic to attribute responsibility to Russia alone. To some degree, the West is also to blame. From Moscow’s perspective, the Western nations have time and again disregarded Russian interests. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer once said that it was very difficult to cooperate with somebody who thinks of himself as a victim. Moscow feels that it is not being taken seriously as a partner. Again, the memories of the Yugoslav wars play a role: In Russia’s view, the West would ask Moscow for concessions when these were indispensable. Yet after Russia had cooperated, the West would, as seen from Moscow, again ignore Russian interests. Moscow knows that while its power to shape is limited, it still has a considerable power to obstruct.

Of course, the West is aware of that power. At the Munich Security Conference in 2009, just days after President Obama’s first inauguration, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden announced a reset of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Promising results ensued: Obama and then-President Medvedev adopted the most important arms reduction treaty in the past two decades – “New START” – and agreed to cooperate on missile defense. However, the relationship cooled for a number of reasons. As the West grew more concerned over the domestic situation in Russia, Moscow insisted on full partnership in missile defense cooperation – on terms that NATO could not accept.

The case of Syria again reveals the fundamental underlying issue: If the West does not want to undermine the authority of the United Nations, it will have to find a way to convince Moscow. The fact that Russia is not fundamentally opposed to any kind of intervention became clear when it abstained on the Libya resolution 1973. Nonetheless, with respect to Syria the Russian government will only agree to sanctions or even the use of military force when it feels it won’t – again – regret changing positions.

Thus, we should hope for a clear signal towards Moscow from the second Obama administration. After all, the U.S. president now does have “more flexibility”, as he had said in the “open mic” incident with Dmitri Medvedev last year. If the U.S. decided not to re-engage Russia, it would be a missed opportunity. No one wishes to gloss over or ignore deplorable domestic developments in Russia. But the fact remains that our foreign-policy interests require that we finally address the obstacles in the NATO-Russia relationship. This includes an agreement on missile defense cooperation: The base lines for a compromise are, in principle, known, yet neither side has dared to make a real move.

Without progress in our relationship, a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community that includes Russia will not become reality. Or, to put a positive spin on it: As the NATO-Russia relationship grows stronger and deeper, conflict resolution outside the Euro-Atlantic region will become more likely – not only in Syria.

Russia and the West share key interests in Syria. Nobody really sees a future for Assad, nobody wants to have Syria become a failing state, nobody wants an Islamist regime in Damascus. Considering the strong historical ties between Moscow and Damascus, a solution for the Syrian conflict will have to go through Moscow. The Russian secret service is superior to those of the West when it comes to information on the Assad regime. Again, a similarity to Yugoslavia.

In 2012, we jointly failed in solving the Syrian conflict – the West and Russia. Now we can and must better prepare for the time after Assad – but only if Russia is part of the solution, not part of the problem. This makes new U.S. impetus on a missile defense compromise necessary. In addition, Russia must be integrated more closely into the efforts for Syria. Similarly to the contact group on Yugoslavia, we need a contact group for Syria. The group would have to focus on strengthening the moderate opposition forces, developing a joint peace plan, and aiding refugees.

Only with the help of all Security Council members, the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will be able to succeed. Those who do not want to be forced to intervene militarily after all (as in Mali) need to strengthen the UN Security Council. The path goes through Moscow.

National security can be undermined because of the socio-political environment prevailing. The critical elements are: (1) the state and the political system, representative democracy, basic values, ideology, economy and the decision-making process. Because they impact beyond the boundaries of a single society, socio-political issues require ethical and responsible solutions.

However, if the aim of the rulers is only to make money for themselves and manipulate the system to enhance their own rule, the resultant endemic bad governance endangers the state as well as the safety, comfort and welfare of the people.

Nations seldom abide by moral codes when their national security is threatened. Consider the debate within the US about the legality of drone strikes in the territory of another sovereign nation, well knowing that innocents will be killed along with militants. Such a ‘doctrine of necessity’ glosses over the public conscience about ‘collateral damage’ in a country where normally it would be condemned as morally repugnant.

Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry very rightly maintains that national security in modern times cannot be confined to aggression or external threat. Conversing with a study group from the National Management Course in Islamabad, he said: “Gone are the days when stability and security of the country was defined in terms of missiles, tanks and armoury as a manifestation of hard power available to the state.”

He went on: “States are now bound to provide its citizens security and protect their civil rights at all costs. Progress of the state is impossible without eliminating anarchy from the system. Failure of administration and implementation structure is visible everywhere, steps against the law and the constitution will push society and the environment towards turmoil and unrest.”

Bemoaning the present state of governance in Pakistan, Justice Chaudhry posed the following questions: “Do we reward merit and hard work? Are the term principles of rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution being strictly enforced? Do the citizens of the country trust the system and think it provides them fair opportunity to realise their driven in a transparent manner?

“Does the present system have the capacity to discourage the corrupt? Do we have a system where civil and property rights are protected and contracts are fully enforced?” He added: “Unfortunately, the answer to the above questions is no, the system is distorted and does not provide a level playing field for the people to achieve in life whatever they are capable of.”

The chief justice’s concerns about threats to national security are very much commensurate with the remedy given in the First Amendment to the 1789 U.S. constitution derived from the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence (holding true for all democracies everywhere): “Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”

The armed forces cannot remain blind to the deliberate mis-governance, but this must not be misconstrued as an exhortation for military intervention. Armies have no business to be in the business of running the country, nor are they capable of that, at least not for an extended period. Power is only handed over under judicial cover in ‘aid to civil power’ when it becomes impossible for civilian rule to function. This extreme stopgap short-time measure resorted to restore civilian authority is to enforce rule of law and avoid anarchy.

How does one balance the equation between avoiding military intervention, while ensuring that the rulers do not use the convenient cover of democracy and the constitution to deliberately criminalise society? Can the armed forces remain oblivious if national security linkages with the social-political environment erode the basic foundations of society? When it is threatened, it becomes not only the moral duty but an obligation for the men in khaki to act in the spirit in which the constitution evolved.

Precedents in Pakistan exist for such recourse under judicial cover, successfully implemented for a short period in Karachi in 2010 when the Rangers, armed with police powers and acting under the direct authority of the Supreme Court, caught many target killers across the political divide. By preventing them from laughing their way out of the police stations within hours due to the inordinate influence of their political handlers, the Rangers brought a modicum of peace and harmony to Karachi for a short period.

After years of heaping insults and hurling dire threats at each other, the PML-N and the PPP are clearly in cahoots as partners manipulating the electoral process to remain in power, as Imran Khan has been claiming for years. Can this country survive five more years of misrule and bad governance?

Without resorting to overthrowing the government, what modus operandi must the army employ to ensure that the system does not dissolve into anarchy? The correct way is to give quiet counsel to the rulers to rectify the wrongs themselves. To his credit, Kayani has done just that for the last five years. Unfortunately, it has been effective only selectively when the rulers felt their hold on power was threatened. This had no effect on the government’s transgressions vis-a-vis nepotism and corruption.

Because these impact on national security, whenever hard evidence comes before the COAS he is duty-bound to refer it to the heads of state and government, verbally at first and, if that does not evoke remedial measures, in writing. Whether the COAS has raised his concerns strongly enough with the rulers one does not know, but the rulers have certainly shown no inclination to correct their blatant wrongdoing.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘redress’ means to “remedy or set right (an undesirable or unfair situation).” A petition for ‘redress of grievances’ is to “make or present a formal request (petition) for such to (an authority) with respect to a particular cause.” Ruling only by the consent of the people, the government has a constitutional obligation to correct such wrongs.

Petitioning for “redress of grievances” means that when the people find either the federal and/or provincial governments exceeding the authority granted to them under the constitution, and not inclined to listen to their grievances affecting their fundamental rights, they have the right to approach the Supreme Court for redress (remedy) of the constitutional wrongdoing. Such a petition of public importance relating to the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution can be filed virtue of Article 187 (I).

If the government continues to ignore his submissions about bad governance, the COAS has an obligation like any other citizen to bring this before the Supreme Court in the form of a petition. Given the chief justice’s deep concern about the impact of bad governance on national security, why not use the given constitutional ways of seeking "redress of grievances?"

Democracy’s fail-safe line is the legal barrier of the Supreme Court, but when bad governance makes democracy delusional, do we have the moral courage to cross that line to save the country from the predators in control?

Click here to read this piece at The News International.

According to a report from AFP, Ahtisaari offered this assessment of the reformist government after Finnish President Sauli Niinistoe announced a pledge of 6.5 million euros in development aid to the country.

Beginning in 2011, Myanmar has continued to take steps towards embracing democratic institutions, such as rolling back press censorship and freeing political prisoners.

Click here to read the AFP article at The West Australian.

“We spot needs and we try to help,” said Otaiba.

The article focused on major UAE contributions to tornado-ravaged Joplin, Missouri, which included a $5 million gift to build a neonatal intensive care unit and $1 million towards student laptops. 

The article noted that the donations "mark a small but remarkable shift in global economic power."

Click here to read the article at The Washington Post.

Zafar Adeel, director of the United Nations University, Institute for Water, Environment and Health, moderated a distinguished panel of experts who helped identify and address global action points for water dialogue and partnerships.

“The time for silo thinking is over,” Ursula Schaeffer-Preuss, chair of the Global Water Partnership, said in her remarks which focused on sustainable approaches. She urged nations to think outside of the traditional ways of tackling water management issues. “This is a global issue that cannot be addressed from one vantage point.”

Olcay Ünver, coordinator of the United Nations World Water Assessment Programme of the UN-Water and director of the UNESCO Programme Office on Global Water Assessment, echoed that sentiment. “Many of the challenges to water security and management come from other sectors and water managers are seldom consulted when dealing with these challenges,” said Ünver.

“Water must become part of the equation,” he continued, stressing that water impacts a huge number of issues in any nation—including public health, jobs, energy, food, sustainability and many women’s issues.

Sanjay Pahuja, senior water resources specialist at the World Bank, stressed the importance of education as key to water cooperation, illustrating his point with an example of Indian farmers, who moderated their own water use after learning pertinent elements of hydrogeology.

“Let the farmers be the scientists,” Pahuja stated, as he elaborated on this bottom-up approach.

Panelists address the crowd at the UN.

He explained further that these farmers did not have much formal education, yet they were able to develop a proficiency that increased their profits and positively impacted their standard of living. “This is how we can alter the course of people’s lives,” Pahuja added.

An additional panelist, Christian Holmes, USAID’s Global Water coordinator, stressed the importance of data exchange as a key catalyst to change. “Bilateral and regional development provide replicable opportunities,” he said.

EWI President John Mroz emphasized that water is key to nation building and that nations must act on it. “We are all aware of this. Now, it’s no longer enough to name the ball, now we have to move the ball down the playing field,” he urged event participants.

The International Year of Water Cooperation is intended to unify all efforts, both undertaken and planned by the UN system, other international and regional organizations, governments, civil society and entrepreneurs, in order to increase people's awareness of freshwater-related problems and ways to resolve them. This follows the 2012 UNGA adopted resolution (A/Res/67/204) on the implementation of the IYWC through convening a series of global high-level events.

Click here to read this piece at WorldPolicy.org.

Tensions between the United States and China over cybersecurity appear to be coming to a head. A recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate singled out China as the country most aggressively engaging in commercial cyber espionage against the U.S. private sector. Shortly thereafter, President Obama, in his State of the Union address, stressed the need to strengthen U.S. defenses against various cybersecurity risks including theft of corporate secrets by “foreign countries and companies” and announced an executive order to protect U.S. critical infrastructure.

Granted, the President didn’t name names, but these developments follow years of media, government, and private sector reports alleging systematic Chinese-backed misappropriation of valuable and proprietary information from the computer systems of American government, commercial, media, and academic organizations.

The latest report, by security firm Mandiant, states that an overwhelming percentage of the attacks on such American entities—commercial and non-commercial alike—can be traced back to hackers affiliated with the Chinese military.

There are many aspects of cybersecurity that beset U.S.-China relations, including on the military front. But commercial cyber espionage remains one of the most—if not the most—intractable, despite attempts by the two governments to address this problem at the last two rounds of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The back-and-forth between both sides has generally played out in several stages. The United States alleges incidents of commercial cyber espionage by Chinese actors. China reacts by denying those allegations. It reiterates its opposition to hacking, emphasizing that it, too, is (only) a victim of such activities. Then, at times, it accuses the United States of using cybersecurity problems (along with several other issues) to demonize and contain China.

The result: Each side is dug into its position and no progress is made.

Clearly, America’s patience is running thin. Speaking before her departure as secretary of state, Hillary Clinton said, “We have to begin making it clear to the Chinese—they're not the only people hacking us or attempting to hack us—that the United States is going to have to take action to protect not only our governments, but our private sector, from [these kinds of] illegal intrusions.”

China, for its part, might want to rethink its standard response to the situation. One has no reason to doubt that, in a country with the largest number of Internet users, Chinese entities have themselves been subject to illicit cyber activities. China also has a right to dispute any allegations against it, but the fact that report after report says the same thing suggests, at the very least, a perceptual problem for China, if not that some or all of those reports may actually be true.

An inability to acknowledge the problem doesn’t help China’s already battered image on cybersecurity matters and will continue to doom the prospect of any real dialogue on this issue. More broadly, it has real implications for China’s attractiveness as a trade and investment partner, and undermines strategic trust between the world’s two largest economies.

Recognizing the potential harm to the bilateral trade relationship, the U.S.-China Business Council has urged the American and Chinese governments to address the cybersecurity problems faced by companies. Meanwhile, these problems only add to a host of policies and practices in China that continue to frustrate the ability of American and other foreign companies to do business on a level playing field, including inadequate protection of intellectual property rights and industrial policies favoring Chinese firms and technologies.

All these only serve to increase the costs of doing business in China, relative to its benefits, over the long run. That would be antithetical to the Chinese leadership’s efforts to boost investor confidence, particularly at a time of slowing economic growth.

Likewise, repeatedly playing the victim will only serve to reinforce perceptions in the United States—and elsewhere—that China isn’t being totally upfront about its role in cybersecurity. As it is, Chinese investors face a major image problem in the United States, especially in the aftermath of the October 2012 report by the House Intelligence Committee referring to Huawei and ZTE as cyber espionage threats to American telecommunications networks.

The leaders of China and the United States have endorsed the notion of building a new type of relationship between the two powers. This new relationship entails not only working on shared interests, but also having the honesty and courage to work on difficult and divisive issues. In that regard, acknowledging the commercial cyber espionage problem for what it is would be a good start.

President Obama registered his serious concern in the State of the Union address over cyberespionage by what he called “our enemies.” His remarks on Feb. 12 came two days after leaks from a U.S. intelligence estimate named China — again — as the most serious menace in the cyberdomain.

Some Obama advisers have recommended harsh action to send a clear signal to China to change its ways. But even if the Americans retaliate, China is unlikely to respond as they might hope. The spying will continue and probably intensify regardless of what the United States does.

One of the two main complaints against China’s espionage is that organizations, both private and governmental, are stealing design secrets from Western corporations on a massive scale.

Click here to read the rest of this piece at The New York Times.

“As the global community is facing unprecedented challenges, we need to begin to marshal expertise in new ways and make sure it has the necessary influence,” said Austin. “EWI is perfectly situated to do that by working with leading figures from around the world on these critical issues.”

EWI Chairman Ross Perot, Jr. welcomed the appointment and the return of Austin to the EWI staff. He noted: “Few experts out there are as practical yet visionary as Greg. His new unit brings a long-needed focus to better using our global network to promote solutions to seemingly intractable problems that threaten peace, stability and the ability of nations to grow their economies and create jobs for their people. We are excited to see the impact that the Policy Innovation Unit will bring.”

Prior to his current position at EWI, Austin served for five years as a vice president of the institute. He is also a senior visiting fellow in the department of War Studies at King’s College London. Prior to joining EWI, Austin served as director of research at the Foreign Policy Center in London (2004-2006) and as a consultant to the UK Cabinet Office and four other government departments (2003-2004). He was the Asia program director, then director of research at the International Crisis Group (2000-2002). He is the author, co-author and editor of several books on China’s strategic policy. He has a doctorate in International Relations and master’s degree in International Law. He is currently writing a book on China’s cyber policies for publication later this year.

1. What were the successes and challenges in the first term in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship?

Miller:

After four years, we’re actually hard pressed to find concrete successes in the vital U.S.-China relationship. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the relationship did not deteriorate further, which is actually no small achievement. The few concrete successes have done little to overcome the mutual mistrust that still prevails. That is the most enduring problem that President Obama will face in his second term.

During his 2008 campaign, Obama offered tough talk about China. Once he took office, he dramatically moderated his tone. His administration initially tried to accommodate Chinese concerns in the hopes of generating good will and greater cooperation in dealing with many of the most pressing bilateral and global challenges. They included the global financial crisis, the currency dispute with China, climate change, and Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs.

But Obama’s efforts at partnership did not lead to the desired results: China was slow to address concerns over its currency and industrial policies; it snubbed Obama at the Copenhagen climate discussions; it was reluctant to apply pressure on North Korea; and it adopted more assertive regional policies. There was some progress on Iran as China supported UN sanctions in 2010, but then China refused to support new sanctions designed to undermine Iran’s continued progress on its nuclear program.

After the conciliatory approach produced little success—a charge critics were quick to make about Obama’s “soft” approach—the administration adopted a tougher stance toward China while continuing to seek expanded opportunities for dialogue. That’s the approach that is largely in place today.

Kok:

I agree that the biggest achievement was that both sides managed not to escalate tensions. Cool heads prevailed in managing the tense confrontation between the Impeccable, a U.S. Navy frigate, and Chinese ships in 2009, offering a stark contrast to the loudspeaker diplomacy and ensuing crisis following a collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet in 2001. And while China has blamed U.S. involvement for exacerbating its maritime disputes with its neighbors, both sides have urged restraint in dealing with the heightening tensions.

One of the successes was the U.S.-China Joint Statement issued by Obama and Hu on January 19, 2011, which defined the U.S.-China relationship in more specific terms than previous joint statements. By describing the relationship as “both vital and complex” and recognizing differences as well as common interests, the Joint Statement laid the foundation for developing the “new type of big-power relationship” that U.S. and Chinese leaders espoused in 2012.

Another significant development was the addition of cybersecurity—an area of growing mistrust between the two countries—to the U.S.-China Track 1 agenda. Also, kudos to the Chinese leadership for showing an increased maturity toward U.S.-China military-to-military relations by not cutting off those contacts in response to the Obama administration’s announcement of a $5.8 billion arms sales/upgrade package to Taiwan.

But there were still plenty of strains, whether over trade, human rights, or Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in the White House.

2. What are the new Chinese leadership’s main priorities vis-à-vis the United States and vice versa?

Miller:

The U.S.-China agenda is as crowded in Obama’s second term as it was in the first: climate change, non-proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea, China’s military modernization, the global economy, trade, industrial policies, human rights and increasing tensions in the South and East China Seas. The administration’s overarching priority is to put the relationship on a new footing—all while trying to manage the change in the Chinese leadership.

Kok:

China’s new leadership under Xi Jinping has stated its commitment to continuing a foreign policy of cooperative engagement with the United States. Some top priorities include:

• Persuading the U.S. to play a more constructive role in facilitating peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, instead of, advertently or not, pitting China’s neighbors against it. China may want to “rebalance” the U.S. strategy in Asia, shifting away from a military focus to an economic agenda.

• Working with the U.S. and other countries to ensure stability and peace in Afghanistan and its surrounding regions after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014.

• Urging the U.S. to get its fiscal house in order, and pushing for the de-politicization of economic relations (especially with regard to Chinese investment in the United States and U.S. trade complaints against China).

3. Is the U.S.’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia sustainable in the second term given continuing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa? And is it clear to China what this policy is?

Miller:

This is not just a question of resources but of intentions. China views the rebalancing—with its concomitant expansion of the U.S. military presence in the region—as containment or military encirclement of China. The Obama administration argues that is not the case, but even a Department of Defense-commissioned assessment has pointed out that the strategy behind its force planning has not been “adequately articulated.” This has certainly contributed to Chinese unease about the rebalancing. But despite the lack of clarity about its intentions and questions about resource constraints, the United States recognizes that its long-term strategic challenges and opportunities will be in Asia: military, foreign, and economic policy will continue to reflect this.

Kok:

If China ever needed additional fuel to fan the already vibrant flames of suspicion over U.S. intentions, the “rebalancing” strategy was it. Chinese officials and experts have been particularly concerned about the U.S.’s moves to strengthen its security and military alliances in the region, despite the U.S.’s explanations that the “rebalancing” isn’t purely military but also encompasses diplomatic, political and economic policies. While I don’t think that anything the U.S. says or does will fully dispel the notion among the Chinese that the U.S. is out to contain them, the U.S. could do a better job of explaining itself.

The turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa will test Washington’s ability to effectively draw down its resources in that region, which is a prerequisite for the “rebalancing” strategy in Asia. That being said, I believe the “rebalancing” strategy in Asia will continue, since the U.S. needs to send a strong signal to its allies in the region—and to China—about its commitments to them.

4. What issues challenge the bilateral relationship most?

Miller:

It depends on who you ask. The Pentagon has serious concerns about China’s growing military capabilities that could threaten U.S. force projection capabilities in the region. Congress, which has become quite effective at inserting itself into foreign policy, would like to see more attention paid to Chinese human rights violations and to China’s currency and industrial policies. Human rights issues are one of the few areas where members of Congress have found common ground. And, of course, members of Congress will continue to press the administration on Chinese currency, trade, and industrial policies—an area where the administration also has significant concerns.

But the fundamental challenge to the relationship lies in the lack of trust on both sides—and this complicates efforts to address U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China. Whether dealing with Taiwan, China’s rapid military expansion and modernization, human rights abuses, the growing use of cyber weapons, intensifying territorial and maritime disputes, nuclear nonproliferation or Syria, the trust deficit undermines the ability of U.S. and Chinese leaders to make significant progress, whether in a bilateral or multilateral setting.

Kok:

Aside from China’s continuing concerns about the U.S.’s “rebalancing” strategy in Asia at a time of maritime tensions in the region, the other challenges will include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. More specifically, the question is whether the Obama administration will announce more sales during the second term and, if so, how it will affect U.S.-China military-to-military relations. Trade, currency, and human rights concerns will continue to surface.

While not bilateral issues per se, the tensions over North Korea, Iran and Syria—and, in all probability, new hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa— will test the ability of the U.S, China and the international community to find common ground. With climate change back on Obama’s agenda, it will also be interesting to see how these two countries manage it—especially at the multilateral level—and avoid a repeat of Copenhagen.

5. Does the new Chinese leadership team offer a new chance to make progress on dealing with key irritants?

Miller:

The new team will not fundamentally alter China’s strategic priorities and concerns, so I don’t see this as a big new opportunity. Xi’s primary focus, like Obama’s, will be on meeting domestic challenges. Yes, Xi, like his predecessors, has noted the need for the U.S. and China to develop a strong cooperative relationship—comments echoed by Obama and his predecessors. But the challenges continue to grow.

Kok:

Xi has expressed a willingness, in principle, to develop relations with the U.S. in a positive and transformative way. However, this willingness is conditioned on China’s expectation that Washington respects its core interests and its status. Like Obama, Xi also faces domestic pressures. These emanate from nationalistic segments of the population, and competing political interests between China’s various policy bureaucracies and within the central leadership. He and his leadership team will feel the need to respond to any U.S. actions that may be seen as jeopardizing China’s domestic stability and territorial integrity.

6. What is the single biggest move that Obama or Xi could make to fundamentally improve the relationship? How likely is that to happen?

Miller:

If we’re dreaming big and thinking of transformative moves, China’s willingness to moderate its actions on the territorial and maritime conflicts in which it is currently embroiled would be a remarkable step in the U.S.-China relationship and regional security as a whole. China will never abandon its claims outright and the United States should not expect it to. But if China agreed to try to resolve these disputes within a multilateral setting rather than bilaterally, which gives China the upper hand, that could do a lot to stabilize the situation and lessen U.S. concerns about Chinese ambitions. I am not convinced another statement or communiqué could have a transformative effect, but it certainly would help to strike a more cooperative tone at this time of increasing tension in the region.

Kok:

In light of the ongoing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama and Xi might wish to consider signing a joint statement or even a joint communiqué on U.S.-China peaceful relations in that region. Both sides could reaffirm their commitment to peace, security, stability and development in the region; articulate their respective strategic interests and objectives; and outline principles for cooperation and open communication. While it will not eradicate the deep-rooted mistrust between the countries, such a move by the Asia-Pacific’s two largest powers would be a signal of assurance toward each other and to the rest of the region.