Conflict Prevention

Donya Aziz, Pakistani lawmaker and member of the Executive Council of EWI's Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention, is leading a parliamentary battle to end "anti-women practices" in Pakistan.

"Economic security is really considered by everyone as very much part of security itself," said Christian Masset, Director General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The government of France, in its capacity of chair of the G8 and G20, co-convened the conference.

According to the host organization’s report of the meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mullen went on to suggest that it would be in the American national interest to resume contact with Tehran at either a political, diplomatic, or military-to-military level.

On 14 September, as reported by the Pentagon, Mullen said that Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and wants regional hegemony in the Middle East; and the lack of contact between the United States and Iran could be dangerous to the region and the international community.

One could see these views more or less as a statement of the obvious – the United States needs to be talking to countries that give it concern. However, given the negative political sentiment in the United States toward Iran and given the rigid policy position of the U.S. government, then Mullen’s statements seem to indicate a division of some sort in the Obama Administration about the wisdom of continuing to isolate Iran diplomatically.  Another possible meaning of the remarks, though less likely, is that Mullen is just expressing U.S. frustration that as far it is concerned, Iran has not conducted itself properly to allow re-establishment of contact; and that it is Iran’s behavior that leads to the lack of contact.

Assuming the former interpretation (and not the latter) is correct, Mullen’s views open up the obvious question of what is it that the United States has to do or can do to start meaningful bilateral conversations on both nuclear issues and regional security issues.

Any restoration of formal relations seems highly unlikely in the next 2-3 years. The United States has, at least in a practical sense, made that conditional on a number of significant policy reversals by Tehran. In U.S. policy, Iran is more or less where it was when George Bush gave his “axis of evil” speech in 2002.  That said, the route of informal diplomatic “contacts” would be relatively easy if Iran and the United States were both willing.

Yet Mullen’s mention of military and political contacts in contrast to diplomatic efforts suggests a complete roadblock on one side or both to unofficial diplomatic contact. Military contacts would seem even more difficult. It is almost impossible to imagine that the State Department would agree to the idea that military officers would conduct any part of the diplomacy with Iran while diplomatic relations are so strained.

Moreover, at least as far as the public record is concerned, there does not seem to be much of a foundation for military to military contacts. So what about “political contacts”? In the run up to a Presidential election in the United States in 2012, this would seem at first glance to be extremely high risk.

Then there is the problem of who in Iran to talk to. The level of the contact would need to be finely set, and at a fairly middle level, to minimize political risk. Any prediction of what might come from Mullen’s statements would be foolhardy. Yet the ground-breaking significance of his comments as a very direct and unusually public opening to talk with Iranian leaders cannot be discounted.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

With progressing globalisation, borders have become increasingly irrelevant, thus reducing the probability of external aggression. Conversely threats to a country’s security emanate internally because of lack of economic development, unemployment, failing internal security because of religious, sectarian and/or ethnic strife, shifting of identities in the wake of globalisation, radicalisation of society and growing terrorism thereof being recent additions. It has not been possible in our relatively new nation state to properly work out the national identity and borders, both traditional (external) and internal security threats have started to overlap. Societal security is the prime responsibility of the state; our rulers have generally cold-shouldered this to our lasting detriment, as we can now see on graphic display. Societal threats undermine national cohesion and identification with the state, the resultant radicalisation and extremism results in law and order situations, rioting, rise of criminal gangs and gang wars, due to money-laundering and easy availability of weapons because of the nexus between corruption, organised crime and terrorism.

A credible accountability system is missing, without proper investigation, effective prosecution and delivery of swift, untainted justice is not possible. Perjury is not only rampant but is the order of the day, credible witnesses are in short supply and even they are susceptible to influence, by use of money and/or the force of public office. Our Supreme Court (SC) has become captive to endless bureaucratic manoeuvring, fighting a losing battle against a virtual bag of administrative tricks to defy and/or frustrate their judgments and instructions. Both the NICL and Haj cases are likely to enter the “Guinness Book of Records’, sophisticated filibustering making them into an endless exercise without a likely outcome. Failure to fulfil the main function of maintaining law and order to protect lives and properties of its citizens and ensure impartial, even-handed justice hastens the deterioration of the state and its institutions. The failing identification with the state impacts negatively on the connection between citizen, the government and the army. This dissolution of the Pakistani identity results in growing influence of foreign interests, this spawns intervention and support for secessionist movements like in Balochistan.

Duly fanned by a well-meaning but immature media, paying little attention to core national interests, the vacuum provides a robust platform for promoting radical ideas, readymade for religious exploitation by extreme elements, making an alternative form of a purely Islamic state with all its ramifications resonating with the public. The spread of terrorism is detrimental to economic growth, the bad investment climate and the lack of development is extremely detrimental to the economy. The diminishing value of individual lives makes killing condonable and justifiable (Karachi killing, collateral damage). Despite the so-called truce between the warring political parties within the coalition government, hundreds of people have died during the past month alone. The consequent ugly cycle of unemployment and high inflation leads to stagflation. There is flight of both capital and manpower from the country, weakening the economy further. The failing economy destroys jobs and incomes, creates more poverty and destabilises society leading to fuel riots, electricity riots, water riots, food riots, etc, desperation in the mass psyche of citizens, suicides, destruction of families, etc. This creates favourable conditions for criminals and terrorists, further impacting negatively on the overall security. This diverts the right amount of attention and the material support necessary for external security. A whole process of cataclysmic changes is taking place in the political, economic and social transformation in South Asia. The structures of governance being diversified and differentiated, only lip-service is given to poverty reduction and improving governance. In such conditions corruption is rampant.

The Anna Hazare backlash we are seeing in India was waiting to happen, the more violent form being manifest in the four decades-old Maoist Naxalite movement. With an economic transition in the region, the majority of countries have inculcated globalisation to address their economic crisis. This has accelerated the process of growth but the impact of globalisation has not been accompanied by the reduction in poverty or improvement in human development through the formation of social capital. Increases in population growth is by itself a time-bomb. Pakistan’s security interests can be best served if elements having disruptive potential to our socio-political profile are contained, thereby giving no excuse or opportunity to our detractors and enemies to take undue and adverse advantage. Factors responsible for the declining social and human security and strengthening of extremism have to be identified. The human element remains the biggest resource for Pakistan, the government must utilise this to promote safety of the population and counter the threat of extremism engulfing this nation. The political leadership and all other stakeholders (who have a vital role to play) must agree to cooperate and formulate a national strategy to eradicate this menace. To cope with external threats, Pakistan has to keep up both conventional and nuclear deterrence necessary but should at the same time aim at socio-political solutions for long-term sustainable alleviation of our problems. The army has had increasingly to deal with internal strife instead of securing the borders. Other than drawing crucial reserves away from countering the aggressive defence postures of the Indians, they are forced to devote time and effort to burgeoning internal problems of different dimensions. Fighting against ones own population can put stress on any army in the world, raising adverse perceptions among the populace, extremely dangerous for a country that thrives on glorifying its armed forces.

The international media is fully mobilised against Pakistan’s critical national security assets, but of more serious concern is not only the erosion of local media support, but rather an antagonistic view from some motivated sections. The compromise of the media’s integrity is extremely detrimental to the national aims and objectives. The concerted campaign against the ISI, and by extension the army, is deliberately motivated despite our sacrifices not being matched in the war against terror by all the coalition partners in Afghanistan put together. The unfortunate irony is that an instrument of war – the armed forces – is also the ultimate guarantor of internal peace. One can understand it not being part of the decision-making process where democracy is institutionalised, in less developed countries this is a paradox. This leaves absolute power, at least in democratic theory, in the hands of a pre-modern feudal and agrarian mindset elected through a tainted process on fraudulent votes, as the ultimate arbiters of nation security and societal society, and by default, the destiny of the nation. Who will make the change? (Extracts from Part-II of the Talk on ‘Linkages between Socio-Political Factors and National Security” given recently at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad).

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

In an interview on For Your Ears Only Franz-Stefan Gady discusses the possible causes of violent extremism in Europe, in light of the most recent terrorist attack in Oslo.

The full episode of the program is available here.

Writing for the Journal of Foreign Relations, Franz-Stefan Gady analyzes the historical overlap of literature and politics.

Click here to read Gady's piece in the Journal of Foreign Relations

Gady also analysed the latest tensions around the South China Sea disputes in an interview with Der Standard.

You can read the full interview here.

One of the biggest mistakes in decision-making for war and peace is over-simplification. This is one conclusion of a profound and sadly overlooked book from 1984 called “Ideology of the Offensive” by Jack Snyder. Europe and the United States appear to have fallen into this trap of over-simplification with their Iran policy.

The danger is that policy-makers overlook the limits of their knowledge and discount the possibility that they may be inflexible. According to the book, “most public policy problems entail considerable complexity and uncertainty”. We know most elements of the problem “only in an approximate way”. The strategist develops “relatively simple but effective techniques for scanning and organizing information about the problem and for structuring and evaluating different options”. “Discrepant information is either ignored or incorporated into the belief system in a way that minimizes the need to change the system’s structure”.

The belief system (orthodox doctrine) about Iran is dominated by the idea of a “rogue state”. In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration would put Iran and Libya in that category, with others. George Bush put Iran, Iraq and North Korea into the “axis of evil”. These terms may be rhetorically useful for speech writers but they are desperately unhelpful and counter-productive for policy-makers.

President Obama tried to break the hold of such a rigid and doctrinaire approach to Iran in his Nowruz speech of 19 March 2009 but failed to do so. The explanation for failure of that overture lies not in Iran’s lack of meaningful response, but because it was just easier for senior officials in the United States and Europe to continue with the doctrinaire approach.

The suppression of anti-government demonstrations in Iran after the 2009 presidential elections only stiffened the appeal of the orthodoxy for Western officials. The persistently rejectionist approach and bellicose language of a handful of Iranian leaders toward Israel also buttressed the power in the West of the single orthodoxy about Iran. In the Western official view, the only way to deal with Iran is to see it as a rogue state. No other perspectives should intrude.

The main reason why policy-makers prefer a doctrinaire and rigid approach to Iran is that it usefully disguises the basic weakness of their position, both in respect of Iran and in respect of the region as a whole. The United States and Europe now have very few levers of power and influence anywhere in this strategically vital region and appear to many people to be in retreat, both through withdrawal of military forces and through alienating key allies on the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, domestic political orthodoxies in Europe and the United States (about subjugating foreign policy to human rights issues) and domestic interest groups (Iranian expatriates and pro-Israel groups) make it so much easier to stick with the Iran orthodoxy in foreign policy.

But by any objective standard, our policy toward Iran is lazy, is stuck in a rut and simply does not correspond to our needs. A change in policy is urgently needed. It has to be driven by a reassessment of those needs. Iran’s importance today to the West is several degrees of magnitude greater than it was a decade ago, but we have more rigid confrontational policies than at that time and we have even less room for maneuver. In addition to a reassessment of our needs, we need to search more robustly and creatively for new levers of influence. Continued and intensifying isolation of Iran defeats any opportunity for influence. Can we afford to treat Iran as a pariah state or do we need it? If we waiting and hoping for regime change, that may be bad policy because we have no way of knowing whether it will come before or after the next crisis.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

Click here to read the article in Der Standard

For years, instability and militancy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have threatened not only Pakistan’s internal security, but also stability in Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan’s tribal territories has become a growing concern, with coalition troop withdrawal approaching and transition of security to Afghan forces slowly gaining momentum. Current Pakistani military efforts to combat militancy in the FATA have been very weak, as indicated in early June in South Waziristan, where 150 militants seemingly effortlessly attacked a Pakistani security check post.

Pakistan must step up its military efforts and improve security in FATA. As this article argues, the strength of militancy in the tribal belt is largely due to insufficient Pakistani troop presence there, due to the deployment of Pakistani troops on the India border at the expense of sufficient troop strength at its western border. As so often is the case in Pakistan’s history, an important Pakistani interest is being held hostage by the country’s difficult relationship with India. The India-Pakistan rivalry is diverting Pakistan’s military resources, undermining the country’s stability and its chances for economic development.

The latest chapter in Pakistan’s troop deployment began with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which deteriorated India-Pakistan relations just as they had begun to show very shy first signs of détente after the departure of President Pervez Musharraf. The Mumbai attacks were conducted by Lashkar-e-Taiba agents with close connections to Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The resulting outrage in India and internationally led the Pakistani government to fear that the Indian government would retaliate with a ground attack across the border. These fears prompted the Pakistani government to move about 20,000 ground troops fighting militants in the tribal areas to the Indian border. With these troops gone, extremist groups gained freedom to maneuver, expanding their influence and ability to wage attacks on both sides of the Durand Line.

In April 2010, almost one-and-a-half years after the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan finally began moving about 10,000 troops back to the Afghan border. While this may have signaled the Pakistan government’s commitment and desperate need to solve the domestic insurgent threat, the violence of the past months indicates that it may be too little too late for success in FATA.

Impact of Pakistani Military Operations in FATA

In his April 2011 bi-annual report on Afghanistan, President Barack Obama highlighted the ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s military in FATA. The report stated that the 147,000 Pakistani troops involved have been unsuccessful fighting the tribal belt militants and that the Pakistani government needs to commit more resources to FATA.

A closer look at the impact of recent Pakistani military operations in the region, particularly North Waziristan, demonstrates the price Pakistan has paid for diverting its resources to the Indian border.
Over the past few years, the military cleared some tribal agencies of militants in FATA only to lose the territory shortly after, due to the lack of troop strength.

In early 2010, the Pakistani military claimed they had cleared Mohmand Agency in FATA. These claims were undermined by Taliban-led attacks in the agency as early as July 2010, which killed over 100 civilians. The Taliban once again controlled the Mohmand agency in 2011, which forced the Pakistan military to again conduct major operations there in February 2011. These operations displaced 25,000 people.

In June 2011, the Pakistani military claimed that Orakzai Agency was clear of extremist militants after hundreds were killed. However, the history of military claims in Mohmand Agency raises doubts that this claim is true. Orakzai Agency had only recently become home to insurgent group – groups that fled there when the Pakistan military launched operations against militants in South Waziristan.

The conclusion is clear: even if the Pakistani Military clears a tribal agency of extremists groups, it is merely a matter of time until the militants regain power in a neighboring agency. There are simply not enough troops to secure the entire FATA region. The movement of insurgent groups in FATA from one agency to another proves that the Pakistani military is unable to maintain any security in the seven tribal territories as a whole. This demonstrates that the Pakistani military needs to a holistic approach to the tribal territories and to increase overall military strength there. This demonstrates that the Pakistani military needs to use a holistic approach to the tribal territories and to increase overall military strength there.

Lack of Financial Resources for FATA Operations

The Pakistani government’s concern over India’s intentions has not only diverted troops to their shared border – it has also tied up major financial resources related to that troop deployment. In 2009, Islamabad continued to ignore warnings from the World Bank that the millions of dollars being spent on maintaining troops on the border threatened Islamabad’s economic capability. In this context, it is worthwhile pointing out that troop expenses and additional services that the Pakistani military gives to the families of soldiers deployed along the Indo-Pakistani border has directly drained financing for military operations in FATA. The World Bank also noted that an improved relationship with New Delhi would boost economic prosperity.

Recent developments have confirmed that the World Bank’s warnings were accurate.  In January 2011, as the Pakistan military was preparing for military operations in the insurgent hotbed of North Waziristan, the Federal Finance Ministry stated that Pakistan’s struggling economy could not handle any more substantial military operations. This further delayed the crucial military operations in North Waziristan, one of the most dangerous and unstable regions in Pakistan. Instead, the money meant for operations in North Waziristan went to stationing Pakistani troops and resources on the Indian border.

In March 2011, the Pakistani military deployed around 20,000 troops to North Waziristan in preparation for military engagement. Ironically, the number of troops was the exact same amount of troops moved from the tribal territories to the Indian border in 2008 after the Mumbai attacks. Even so, Islamabad leaders continued their claims that they would not make a decision on the operations, due to lack of resources. It is not surprising that the Obama administration’s bi-annual report on Afghanistan in April 2011 concluded that Pakistan’s economic situation poses the country’s greatest short-term threat to its stability.

Overall Effect of Troop Redeployment

Pakistan’s inability to clear FATA of insurgents has only led to increased speculation over the ISI’s involvement with the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. Although it is difficult to determine the exact extent that Pakistan’s troop redeployment had on the Pakistani government’s ability to take control of FATA, it is clear that the move crippled the country’s ability to combat the extremist insurgent groups on their western frontier.

Moving forward, it will be very important that leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan come to terms with a role for India in Afghanistan that takes into account the legitimate strategic interest of both countries. Such an understanding will first and foremost have to be found between Afghan and Pakistani leaders. If achieved, this may also lead to more detente in the troubled relationship between Pakistan and India.

In December 2009, when announcing the “surge” of an additional 30,000 US troops into Afghanistan President Obama had simultaneously promised the beginning of the draw down of American forces in July 2011. This artful decision was tailored to satisfy those wanting the US to stay the course in Afghanistan and those demanding an end to this wasteful war during a period of a dreadful recession. Whatever its political dexterity in terms of domestic politics, the decision to induct more troops and announce a reduction in advance must have seemed militarily viable too.

The “surge” was intended to give the US and NATO forces the required means to degrade the Taliban militarily, enough to induce them to negotiate a political solution. This goal  does not seem to have been adequately achieved. US political and military representatives had also begun annotating the President’s July 2011 draw down commitment by stating that there was nothing sacrosanct about it, and that any decision would be taken after a careful assessment of the ground situation at the appropriate time. President Obama’s June 22 address on the Af-Pak situation was therefore important in this context.

The questions on the minds of observers would have been the size of the initial draw down, the subsequent troop reductions, the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to take over security responsibilities, progress in the reconciliation process with the Taliban, and US ability to effectively manage the essential but problematic Pakistan factor, especially after the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a safe-haven in Pakistan and his elimination by US Special Forces. 

The state of play with the Taliban has been the subject of considerable interest and speculation, and, in India’s case, concern. On this subject the speech recycles known formulations and reveals little. The US, according to Obama, will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban, with the process being led by the Afghan government and those joining agreeing to break with the Al Qaida, abandon violence and abide by the Afghan Constitution. He says, without elaboration, that there is reason to believe progress can be made.

Some have detected a new openness in these words towards the reconciliation process. But then, as far back as December 1, 2009, Obama had in his Af-Pak address stated that the US “will support efforts by the Afghan government to open doors to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect human rights of their fellow citizens”. Using similar language in his second Af-Pak address on December 16, 2010, he said that the US “fully supports an Afghan political process that includes reconciliation with the Taliban who break ties with the Al Qaida, renounce violence and accept the Afghan Constitution”.

Obama is resorting to familiar formulations, except for expressing this time the belief that progress can be made in the reconciliation process. The basis for this cautious optimism could be actual progress in the contacts with the Taliban, or the intention may be to strengthen President Karzai’s hand as well as encourage “moderate” Taliban leaders to come forward, or it could simply be an expression of hope that the developing circumstances, with bin Laden eliminated, might have improved the chances of reconciliation.

Many observers believe, however, that contacts with the Taliban have been at low level, the military situation is stale-mated, the size and location of US bases in Afghanistan suggest not a military withdrawal but an Afghanization of the conflict, the Taliban’s refusal to open an office in Turkey or elsewhere indicates an unwillingness to bite the bait of negotiation easily and, above all, reconciliation cannot be reconciled with the declared intention to eliminate Haqqani and Mullah Omar.

Obama has been very cautious in his draw down decision, which he was obliged to take  for his own credibility. The actual scaling down has been fitted into his re-election strategy,  not what may be objectively required. Only 10,000 troops will be withdrawn by the year-end, with as little as 5000 troops by September. Later, when winter arrives and military activity declines, he will withdraw another 5000. To extract the maximum political capital, by next summer, closer to the elections, Obama intends to bring the 30,000 “surge” troops back home. That will still leave 68,000 US troops in Afghanistan- twice the number there when he became President. 

With the “surge” reversed, US troops will be withdrawn at a “steady pace” until 2014 when they will move from combat operations to a supportive role for the Afghan forces. Meanwhile, at the May 2012 Chicago summit, NATO will discuss the next phase of transition in Afghanistan. This forward looking approach, with flexible time-tables and fluid commitments, gives Obama political space in the context of the electoral calendar.

Obama does not, in any case, have a complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan in mind. In his December 2010 speech Obama had spoken about forging a new strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011 that would commit the US to the “long term security and development of the Afghan people”. Indications are that the US intends  to acquire a number of permanent bases in Afghanistan, retaining 25,000 troops according to some reports, as part of US’s larger regional strategy.

In the wake of the bin Laden episode, references to Pakistan in Obama’s speech assumed   more than usual importance. The President spoke of terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan, of working with Pakistan to root out the cancer of violent extremism and insisting that Pakistan keeps its commitments, and emphasizing that he will not tolerate a safe-haven for those targetting the US. While recognizing Pakistan’s role in decimating the Al Qaida leadership, he pointedly gave the credit for the bin Laden operation only to US intelligence professionals and Special Forces.

Lest anyone views this as a hardening of tone towards Pakistan, it is worth recalling that in December 2009 Obama had spoken of the cancer of extremism having taken root in the border region of Afghanistan, and the need for a strategy to “work on both sides of the border”. He warned then that he would not “tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear”. In his December 2010 address he again warned that the US will “continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders must be dealt with”. All Obama has done is to repeat his earlier admonitions which, as we know, did not deter Pakistan from sheltering bin Laden. Pakistan is now posturing as the wronged party!

Obama’s June 22 speech was notable for containing nothing new; it carefully treaded known ground. With the end-game in Afghanistan approaching, many may have hoped that his latest discourse would break some new ground, explain more clearly how he intends to deal with the several uncertainties that still dog the situation in Aghanistan, and answer to an extent the many unanswered questions in the minds of non-western observers about some crucial aspects of US policy. In the event, not only the substance of the speech, even the obligatory high sounding rhetoric of US Presidential speeches was a recycled echo of the President’s two earlier addresses.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary

Click here to read Sibal's piece in India Today