Conflict Prevention

When recently discussing the war in Afghanistan with a former high-level Pakistani official, I was whisked from the streets of Kabul by my interlocutor’s jaunty conclusion: “We’ve had the devils own day, haven’t we?”; to which I instantly replied: “ Yes – lick’em tomorrow though.”

With this brief, apparently enigmatic, exchange we both acknowledged our membership in a rather obscure subculture: non-American Civil War buffs. The dialogue we quoted was an actual exchange between Ulysses Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman after the first day of the battle of Shiloh, the bloodiest battle fought in the western theater of the war.

Rather than further musing on the progress of the war in Afghanistan, we spent the next two hours talking about Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Gettysburg campaign, the siege of Petersburg, and Stonewall Jackson’s bold exploits in the Shenandoah Valley. Before we parted, my companion confessed that the US Civil War was the conflict he studied most for one simple fact: It is virtually the only civil war in human history which did not end in dictatorship or monarchy. As we approach the 150th anniversary of the last "gentleman’s war," this fact is often forgotten.

There is indeed no equivalent in European history to parallel how democratically elected governments handle internal strife without becoming autocratic. Ancient Rome’s civil war ended after Octavian declared himself emperor. The English Civil War ended with Oliver Cromwell’s dictatorship. The French Civil War resulted in the first Empire. Francisco Franco established a fascist government in 1939 at the end of the Spanish Civil War, as did Austria at the end of a brief war in 1934.

Enduring lessons for democracies in times of war

Consequently, the Civil War in the United States holds valuable lessons for democracies in times of war. It answered fundamental questions about the durability and resiliency of democratic governments in times of existential crisis.

Fought primarily by amateur soldiers, neither side questioned the inherent truth of democratic government in spite of military commanders publicly displaying their reservations regarding government’s conduct of the war. For example, Joseph “Fightin Joe” Hooker, the momentary commander of the Army of the Potomac, advocated dictatorship to end the military cul-de-sac into which the Union had wandered. Lincoln famously replied: “I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator…. Only those generals who gain success can be dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.”

A year later, Lincoln appointed General Ulysess S. Grant to command all Union forces, investing him with unprecedented military powers. Only in the last months of the war was Jefferson Davis willing to appoint General Robert E. Lee commander of all Confederate forces, fearful of the consequences of uniting the aggregated military power of the Confederacy in one person. Political leaders of both North and South were aware of the intrinsic dangers military leaders can pose to a democratically elected government.

To non-Americans, it matters little whether the war was fought over slavery or states’ rights or what battles were won or lost by which side. More important to us should be the practical lessons we can derive from the conflict, for example, how a democratically elected president dealt with public opinion, the press, and censorship under the extreme duress or war. Further lessons to be taken from the Civil War are how the American president, a lawyer by profession, could suspend habeas corpus and arrest agitators without due process of law, what role the opposition played in the conflict, how governments in both the North and South reacted to war weariness, and how a national election could be completed successfully amid civil strife.

The Civil War also holds enduring lessons for democracies in times of war. This monumental rupture of the greatest democracy in human history provides valuable insight into the manipulative power of the press, the often zigzagging contradictions of elected leaders reconciling military strategy with electoral politics, and the seminal importance of public opinion and the home front. Most important, the Civil War affords a unique perspective on defending liberal democratic principles without compromising them and, above all, how a country that fought for four bloody years and suffered more than 600,000 deaths could emerge as one nation.

America: a living rebuttal to famous political philosophers

Political philosophers from Plato to Jean Jacques Rousseau were convinced that democracy could not be extended beyond the boundaries of a small city-state and would collapse due to internal strife in times of crisis. European history seemed to prove them right. The US Civil War, however, showed that this is not a historical dictum. The United States emerged out of the conflict as a stronger nation and more integrally than ever bound to its democratic liberal principles.

While there is little danger for most Western democracies to turn toward autocracy, the Civil War illustrates inherent dangers facing democracies at war.

Democratic government is not immune to excesses, misjudgments, and violations of the law. No government, however, should ever abandon its republican principles for the sake of expediency or necessity even in times of severe national crisis. That’s a lesson my Pakistani friends and many other citizens of the world should learn from the great American Battle Cry of Freedom.

Franz-Stefan Gady is an Austrian foreign policy analyst. He works for the EastWest Institute.

Conflict prevention will only succeed once it becomes headline news, an election issue and a mark of great statesmanship, EWI associate Matthew King writes in New Europe.

Speaking for New Europe, Dr. Kanwal Sibal, EWI Board member and former Foreign Secretary of India, gives his perspective on India's incrising role in global preventive action.

Afghan women politicians spoke directly about their experiences, from the real personal risks they took running for office to the difficulties of making policy in a society traditionally ruled by men.

“We women are challenged daily in our lives inside and outside the parliament,” said Shinkai Karokhail, a two-term MP. She cited the difficulty of assuring education for girls (female literacy in Afghanistan is under 20%) and women’s own lack of confidence in themselves as leaders after years of disenfranchisement.

Karokhail also pointed out that the pres­ence of Afghan women in Parlia­ment, as­sured in part thanks to a constitution­ally-mandated quota, should not be mis­tak­en for po­lit­ical power. Accord­ing to sev­eral partic­ipants, the prospect of rec­on­cil­iation with the Tal­iban – with the po­lit­ical compro­mises that might entail – could un­der­mine the fu­ture of Afghan women in Parlia­ment and society.

One of the strongest recommendations to emerge from the conference was the idea of creating a standing regional group to connect Afghan women with women from other Muslim countries.

“We’re a little more familiar with the culture and context of what the Afghan women are facing and we have similar backgrounds, so we’d be able to help them enact the kind of changes that we’ve had in our countries towards women’s empowerment,” said Donya Aziz, an MP from Pakistan.

The conference also explored how people in the West—in particular, women parliamentarians--can support women in Afghanistan. Recommendations ranged from helping women build their own capacities as conflict mediators to rebuilding necessary infrastructure.

Margareta Cederfelt, an MP from Sweden, said that she and her counterparts can offer knowledge and help rebuilding civil society, but that perhaps the most immediate help they can offer is an e-mail address. She explained, “It’s hard to be a politician without a network.”

Nasim Zehra, a television journalist from Pakistan, said that there was a consensus for raising the accountability of the Afghan government toward women. She added: “ From our Afghan colleagues, there was the general feeling that it’s about time that there are less words and more action.”

Click here to read New Europe's interviews with conference participants.

“In recent years, conflict prevention has gotten bogged down in long, expensive peacekeeping and development missions,” says Matthew King, head of the EastWest Institute’s Preventive Diplomacy Initiatives. “We need actions that are effective, immediate and responsive, using the resources that we have at our disposal right now.”

The conference, which continues today, aims to produce concrete recommendations, many focused on the United Nations. Participants broadly agreed that the U.N. needs to work more collaboratively with regional organizations and NGOs, some pointing out that effective cooperation already exists on the ground.

Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, As­sistant Sec­retary-General for Po­lit­ical Affairs in the United Nations, said that pre­ventive diplomacy in the U.N. needs flexible funding to respond rapidly to conflicts. Of his de­part­ment, he said, “We rely enor­mously on extra bud­getary spending. What we do need is pre­dictable, secure sources of funding.”

More funding for preventive action was a theme that resonated throughout the conference, with many participants pointing out that while preventive action costs a fraction of peacekeeping operations, it often lacks financial support.

Nick Mabey, advi­sor to for­mer British Prime Min­is­ter Tony Blair, proposed that to identi­fy partic­ularly unsta­ble regions and help show the val­ue of pre­ventive action, a mech­a­nism for cred­ible, independent risk as­sess­ment and mon­itor­ing should be estab­lished. “If well man­aged, such a process would pro­vide a crit­ical way of stim­u­lating me­dia and po­lit­ical inter­est and emerg­ing crises,” Mabey explained.

Some of the most positive points emerged from a discussion on regional organizations like ASEAN and the African Union, which reported on mechanisms they use to prevent violent conflict -- in particular, the A.U.’s right to intervene.

“The more we learn about what the oth­er regional orga­ni­zations are do­ing and how they have been successful, the more confident we can be to fol­low some of these estab­lished steps,” said Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, for­mer Sec­retary General, ASEAN; Di­rector of Pol­icy Stud­ies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Pol­icy at the National Uni­versity of Singapore.

Partic­ipants explored how the United States and the Eu­ropean Union can better work togeth­er to pre­vent conflicts. Ambassador Guenter Overfeld, Vice Pres­ident of Regional Secu­rity and Conflict Pre­vention, EWI, says working togeth­er on pre­ventive action can be a val­uable way to reinvig­orate the trans-Atlantic relation­ship. “The U.S. and Eu­rope need more co­op­eration on the strate­gic lev­el on this agenda,” he added.

While the day saw a great deal of consensus, a discus­sion on the role of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – in conflict pre­vention generated more debate. Some partic­ipants doubted that BRIC can op­erate as a po­lit­ical unit, giv­en exis­t­ing differ­ences. Still oth­ers pointed out that BRIC countries already show support for pre­ventive action and perhaps their full role is just be­ginning.

Today’s conference could be the beginning of a permanent review process for conflict prevention.

Dr. Franziska Katharina Brantner, MEP, who co-hosted the conference, said, “A lot of speakers have been mentioning a platform that galvanizes more political action. It would be great to institutionalize an annual gathering and, of course, it would be great if it could happen at the European Parliament.”

The conference continues today with a special focus on women’s role in stabilizing Afghanistan and regional approaches to preventive action.

A full report of the conference and its recommendations will follow.

Click here to view New Europe's special supplement on the Global Conference.

Since assuming the highest US office two years ago, only one issue has warranted rousing President Barack Obama in the middle of the night: North Korea. The first was on 25 May 2009 when he was informed that Pyongyang had just conducted another nuclear test. The second was on 23 November 2010 when he was woken up at 3.55am and told that North Korea had just shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, perhaps the most serious military incident since the end of the Korean war 57 years ago.

The US reaction was predictable: It condemned North Korea’s actions; offered support to the South by dispatching the nuclear-powered and, possibly, nuclear-armed George Washington carrier battle group; and called upon China to reign in the military adventurism of its communist ally. Some US commentators, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser, accused the North Korean regime of “insanity” and lamented that Pyongyang’s “actions are difficult to fathom in rational terms”.

The recent antics of the Kims—who established the world’s first dynastic communist state—can be explained in light of the succession process of Kim Jong-un, the chubby 20-something son of Kim Jong-il, who has been disparagingly referred to as the “cute leader”. The series of provocative acts reportedly carried out by Pyongyang—the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, the preparations for a third nuclear test, the building of a new uranium enrichment plant, and the artillery barrage on the South Korean island—were clearly designed to supplant the cherubic demeanour of the Hermit Kingdom’s youngest anointed heir with one of fiery disposition. The latest exercise in brinkmanship was also aimed at getting concessions from Washington and Seoul.

However, this does not mean there is no justification for North Korea’s paranoia. While the Korean war ended in 1953, it could be rationally argued that in the absence of a formal peace treaty, North Korea still considers itself at war with South Korea and the US. This perspective is manifest in the regular joint exercises, the continued presence of nearly 30,000 US troops and, until recently, nuclear weapons in South Korea. In July, the US and South Korea conducted a naval exercise off the port of Busan to “deter future aggression” by North Korea, which Pyongyang saw as a “provocation aimed to stifle” it. A similar exercise scheduled for October and “meant to send a message to the North Koreans about their behaviour” was cancelled when China loudly protested about the location of the exercise. Even last Tuesday’s barrage coincided with the ongoing US-South Korean Hoguk military exercise and was reportedly provoked by South Korean test-firing from the nearby Baengmyeong Island.

Clearly, the deep hostility is exacerbated by the actions taken by both sides. In this spiral of confrontation, Washington is fast running out of options and may even find itself confronting China. While Obama’s call to China to help curb North Korea is a step in the right direction, Beijing is unlikely to oblige. Chinese observers described the latest escalation as an “accidental occurrence” and the leadership is unable or unwilling to put pressure on North Korea during this crucial period of transition for fear it might lead to the collapse of its ally. In addition, the reported involvement of Chinese companies and agencies in the “ultramodern” North Korean centrifuge plant might also make Beijing reluctant to cooperate too closely with the US. In fact, it is likely to increase tensions between Washington and Beijing. Obama can no longer ignore the North Korean issue and none of the options looks promising. He would do well to work out a cohesive strategy for the next time he is woken up in the middle of the night.

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

Land borders are not what they used to be. Finance and investment values are traded through the ether in what often seems like a new borderless world. Even in terms of physical borders, which of course still exist, the air borders of most countries now seem more important. High value trade comes by air cargo as do the tourist dollars. The new threats, such as pandemic and terrorism, also come across the air border more often than across dry ground. In 2009, EU countries refused entry to more than 50,000 people at their air borders.

But this relationship between air frontiers and the land is worth a second look. In 2009, Spain turned away almost 400,000 people at its land borders, and Poland just over 25,000 people. The bigger pressure for illegal migration is on the ground not by air. And of course pandemics and terrorists do cross land borders.

We can look at the changed military strategic significance of ground and air borders in a similar way. Only a few countries of the world guard their ground borders with divisions and tanks. The ground borders have definitely become much less important, relatively speaking. Modern aircraft and missiles allow attack from remote distances with little effective warning time. And as American military leaders remind us, cyber warfare capabilities allow “global strike in milliseconds”.

How do these changed relationships between air and land boundaries play out in geopolitical terms for Europe? For the moment, Europe (the EU) looks very comfortable. There are no strategic military threats from any bordering country and almost no military defence of any kind for ground borders. The one low intensity exception is Cyprus.

For NATO Europe, the picture is very different. Turkey has land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria that present a range of low level and high level strategic risk, and an active cross-border threat of terrorism and insurgency.

For OSCE Europe, the picture becomes even more complicated. Not only does that include the Turkish frontier’s challenges, but it raises the stakes considerably. Suddenly there are “European” land borders with Afghanistan, China and North Korea.

What then is the fundamental geopolitical character of Europe’s land borders and where in strategic terms, do these borders actually sit? Few would imagine in strategic terms that the EU is the geopolitical essence of “Europe”. Surely, at the very least, Turkey is part of Europe’s land frontier.  But “strategic Europe” (OSCE Europe) might also include Russia and Ukraine at least, even if more conservative views would be ambivalent or negative about including the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan.

Who is looking after border security of “strategic Europe”? What are the common plans or concepts for geopolitical security in the arc from Antakya to Almaty (via Kirkuk and Kunduz)? As we go into the summit season (NATO in November and OSCE in December), who will take up this question?

It is very plain that the United States will not. It would be seen to be against US interests to do so. That is perhaps understandable at one level. For countries of Europe, however defined, continued collective disregard of the security of their geopolitical land borders on the east and south of both Turkey and Russia, or on the OSCE border with Afghanistan in terms of hard security planning can no longer be justified.

In the 20-30 year time frame to which defence planners must look, these frontiers may well be the biggest source of potential land-based threat to Europe. The prospects of war may remain remote. But, on a balance of reasonable probabilities, in the coming decades, this is the area where Europe’s ground forces will most likely be needed.

In August 2003, NATO took over the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under the mandate of the United Nations. As the ISAF website notes: “The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force.”

But who is running this Alliance? Where is the Allied command at political level that binds together these allies around a political strategy agreed by all of the Allies? According to ISAF, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) “provides overall coordination and political direction”, working “in close consultation” with non-NATO troop-contributing countries. The NAC meets at least weekly, often more frequently, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels, and twice yearly at Ministerial level, and occasionally at Head of State level. Is the NAC really making the political command decisions for the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan? Should it be?

The answer is no, on both counts. The NAC is not and cannot be a supreme decision making body for the politics of war inside Afghanistan. This gap in political control and accountability for war waged by the international community needs to be fixed.

Everyone accepts the need for a clear transition from the massive intervention by NATO and other allies to a politically sustainable future premised on a self-confident and secure Afghanistan. To do this, we need a new (a genuine) political command council that is dominated not just by a handful of NATO members but by the key political players in the war, of which the Afghanistan government has to be one.
Because support from inside NATO for Afghan combat operations is weakening, the UN Allies and the NAC need to think rather urgently about creating a new structure that provides for a durable, representative and workable political command. The United States has been the pre-eminent policy designer for NATO in this war (and still runs its own independent forces in Afghanistan) but it is not a credible long-term leader for the political transition we now need. The United States, like NATO, has to pass the baton, but to whom and to what?

The answer may lie in how the main actors address the need for a second requirement: effective regional security arrangements that can counter the violent extremists using Islam as their cover. That problem has to be solved primarily by Muslim states and Muslim communities.
The only answer may be to create a new standing Council at head of state level that brings together key stakeholders from the region and the major external powers. It might comprise the UN Secretary General (as chair), Afghanistan, Pakistan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and India. There would have to be a place for Iran at the table. This Council would not be a command authority for Afghanistan alone, but a political stabilization council and allied command authority for the South and West Asia regions.

The Council could devise, fund and execute a clear set of complementary political, military and economic action plans for these regions in their entirety, even if discrete elements might need to be packaged country by country according to political sensitivities and practicalities. These measures could include a Muslim Peace Corps building on the OIC’s youth initiative from 2003. The Council could serve under UN mandate for renewable periods.

This might be a path marked by controversy, division and failures, but it is the only sustainable path. Such a step would serve to force the pace on regional security cooperation in a part of the world where it is so embryonic, so mistrusted and so visibly needed.

Negotiating with the Taliban: Lessons from Vietnam

Despite many critical voices of the overuse of the Vietnam War metaphor when talking about the war in Afghanistan there are many striking similarities between the last years of the Vietnam War and the Obama administration's attempt to extract U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan. I therefore think it is important, given the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon in November and the looming withdrawal of NATO forces from the region, to examine the Nixon administration’s effort to win the Vietnam War on the negotiation table and to have, in Nixon’s words, “Peace with Honor."

Just like President Obama in 2009, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon came into the White House in 1969 to end the war which, at that point, was already a “bone to the nations throat,” to quote a former White House speech writer. Talks with the North Vietnamese had already started under the Johnson administration in Paris but come to no satisfactory conclusion. The main objectives of the United States on the negotiation table were the territorial integrity and independence of South Vietnam, a withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops from South East Asia and a withdrawal of Vietcong insurgents in South Vietnam.

Similar to today’s situation in Afghanistan, the Nixon administration had to deal with a largely unpopular leader, Nguyen Van Thieu, who was reelected in 1969 after winning a fraudulent election and whose regime was infamous for its corruption. North Vietnam’s strategy in a nutshell, again similar to insurgents in Afghanistan, was to outlast the Americans, get rid of the Thieu regime and to take over the country once the United States withdrew.

Comparable to President Obama’s surge strategy, Nixon decided to increase military pressure on Vietnam. Henry Kissinger insisted that, “A fourth rate power like North Vietnam must have a breaking point.” Upon taking office in 1969, Nixon secretly conveyed to the North Vietnamese that he was seeking peace and willing to negotiate, but that the United States was willing to escalate the conflict should its demands not be met. Over a period of 15 months, the United States Air Force dropped more than 100,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. Nixon’s first attempt to gain concessions from the Vietnamese on the negotiating table failed. The major stumbling blocks, the integrity of South Vietnam and the preservation of the Thieu regime, were to stall negotiations for the next three years.

Despite what current proponents of escalating U.S. engagement in Afghanistan claim, North Vietnam in 1969 shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy. They did this by limiting offensive operations in the South and even withdrawing troops across the demilitarized zone, not due to military setbacks, but to wait Nixon out until public opinion at home forced the U.S. to withdraw combat troops, something sources in Kabul claim is precisely the Taliban’s strategy. Frustrated by North Vietnam’s unwillingness to make any substantial concessions at the secret negotiations in Paris, Nixon ordered the formation of a secret National Security Council Study Group to come up with “savage punishing blows” for the North Vietnamese. However, the conclusion of the Study Group, chaired by Henry Kissinger, showed that increased military pressure would not yield additional concessions from Hanoi.

The insurgents in Afghanistan, despite being battle weary, will certainly also not be willing to make any major concessions with U.S. troop withdrawal a few months away. This is happening in spite of an increase in drone strikes and special forces operations activities throughout the country. The North Vietnamese, by cleverly manipulating U.S. negotiators, essentially bought time by making vague proposals that amounted to little substance and complaining about procedural matters such as the size and set up of tables at the negotiations in Paris. Their real goal until 1972 was to buy time for North Vietnamese Forces to get resupplied and strengthened for the final military blow against the Thieu regime. The insurgents in Afghanistan, although in no way comparable in size, equipment and capabilities to the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese Army, will probably employ similar delaying tactics until the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces. Any initial “willingness” by Taliban leaders to talk has to be seen in this critical light.

The famous Vietnamization policy was a direct consequence of the United States' failed attempt to break the deadlock at the negotiating table with military force and domestic pressure to start withdrawing U.S. combat troops. Without consulting his South Vietnamese ally, Nixon unilaterally announced this policy, frustrated by the lack of military progress and mounting US casualties. Within months the South Vietnamese Military became one of the largest and best equipped Armies in the World (by 1974 South Vietnam’s Air Force was the fourth largest in the world). At the same time the United States stepped up its Phoenix program headed by the CIA, and just like its modern successor, the drone strike campaign, aimed at decapitating the leadership of the Vietcong and destroying Vietcong strongholds in the South. The United States claimed big successes and the elimination of over 20.000 Vietcong targets in South Vietnam. However, the Vietcong’s command structure and ability to conduct operations remained intact. So far the same is true for Taliban safe havens in Pakistan, which have been targets of drone strikes.

Indeed, there are also striking similarities between Obama’s decision to step up the drone strikes into Pakistan and Nixon’s controversial decision to invade and bomb Cambodia to buy time for Vietnamization, and destroy North Vietnamese safe havens. In the end, despite having claimed to have killed 2000 insurgents and substantially disrupted North Vietnamese supply bases and “treasure troves” of intelligence (according to Henry Kissinger), it did not alter the outcome of the conflict, but led to the massive destabilization of Cambodia. Events in Pakistan today illustrate the danger of undermining a government’s authority on their own territory. The strategic military impact of recent drone strikes remains to be seen, but so far have not influenced the Taliban’s offensive capabilities substantially.

In October of 1970 Nixon launched a “major new initiative for peace” which was promptly rejected by Hanoi. More U.S. troops were withdrawn and the process of Vietnamization sped up. Nixon also expanded the war into Laos in 1971 to disrupt enemy supply line and to force a military decision. Talks failed over the same fundamental issue: the future of the South Vietnamese government under Thieu. Later in 1971,  Kissinger made yet another secret proposal to the North Vietnamese: Complete US withdrawal in exchange for US POWs held in Hanoi. Again North Vietnam rejected the offer. POWs were one of the few bargaining chips they had when negotiating with the United States and only would give it up last. North Vietnam again insisted on the removal of the Thieu regime, which the U.S. dismissed. North Vietnam proposed open elections in September 1971, on the condition that the United States withdraw support for Thieu. Kissinger and Nixon refused.

In March 1972, North Vietnam launched a large scale invasion of South Vietnam with conventional forces, having carefully prepared its offensive capabilities over the previous two years and stalled negotiations in Paris. Despite some initial progress, North Vietnam was beaten back by massive U.S. air raids in the demilitarized zone on Hanoi and Haiphong. For the first time, Kissinger made secret concessions to North Vietnam that would allow North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam after a cease fire, undermining the sovereignty of South Vietnam, but still insisting on the future existence of the Thieu regime. North Vietnam rejected them and Nixon further escalated the air war, and mined Haiphong harbor. In June 1972 alone the US dropped 112.000 tons of bombs.

North Vietnam estimated that it would need three years to recover from the losses incurred during the Easter Offensive (which proved correct) and agreed to shift their war strategy to a “strategy of peace” to buy time and guarantee the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. A tripartite electoral commission comprising the Thieu regime, the Vietcong (Provisionary Revolutionary Government), and neutralists such as the Buddhists was to come up with a political solution to the conflict after the U.S. withdrawal. Nixon ordered additional bombing raids over North Vietnam over Christmas 1972 to force the Vietnamese to agree to a settlement and to save face vis-à-vis Thieu and the American people. Despite massive air raids it did not set back North Vietnam’s capacity to conduct war in the South. When the United States and North Vietnam finally came to an agreement in Paris in January and February 1973, Thieu who had the least interest in an agreement and withdrawal of US troops did not sign the treaty. The Paris agreement was a compromise agreement securing the return of the majority of US POWs, guaranteeing the US troop withdrawal from South Vietnam and leaving the Thieu regime in power. North Vietnam still had forces in the South and the large question of the political future of Vietnam was unresolved.

Describing the Nixon administration’s year-long struggle to extract the United States from Vietnam holds some valuable lessons for the Obama Administration. First and foremost, it shows that there can be no solution to the conflict if the underlying fundamentals causing the insurgency are not addressed. North Vietnam could not accept the Thieu regime. The Taliban will not accept the Karzai regime, especially with the looming withdrawal of NATO-led forces. The only answer will be unconditional Afghan-led talks between the warring factions should any agreement ever be reached.

Second, military escalation of the conflict will not fundamentally influence the negotiation process; it will only prolong the fighting. Temporary military setbacks by either side may delay talks, but the essential issues will remain unchanged: How can the United States extract itself with protecting its core security interests and how can Afghanistan be stabilized?

Third, one of the reasons why Thieu proved a very difficult partner in negotiations was because Nixon and Kissinger never consulted him on major changes in U.S. foreign policy such as Vietnamization. President Karzai was also presented with a fait accompli with the July 2011 withdrawal deadline, and voiced his deep concern that it will empower the Taliban in the long term. An increasingly insular perception of the White House is gaining a foothold in Kabul and among NATO allies. Whether true or untrue when it comes to making peace, allies and partners need to be informed of every aspect of U.S. strategy, since any reconciliation of warring factions has to be based on consensus.

Fourth, the United States in any negotiation should stick to its core national security interests in Afghanistan. The United States made the critical mistake of equating the preservation of the Thieu regime with rolling back communism in South East Asia because it lacked a clear perception of its core national security interest in the region. Supporting Karzai may or may not guarantee the dismantling of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the United States has to insist that a future government, which may include insurgent/Taliban representation, disassociate itself completely from Al Qaeda. Destroying Al Qaeda is the core national security interest of the United States in Afghanistan. Reconciliation, on the other hand, should be entirely left to the Afghans.

Last, and most important: Afghans on both sides, the government and the Taliban, know that Western Forces will eventually leave. This alone undermines any military credibility sought for the purpose of having a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the Taliban and guarantees that the United States and its allies may win every battle but in the end lose the war. Vietnamization had its limits, as the United States painfully learned with the fall of Saigon in 1975 and defeat of the South Vietnamese Army. The current capabilities of the Afghan National Army leave little doubt how the tide will turn once U.S. forces have left Afghanistan.

Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute. He has previously worked as an adjunct research assistant at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., focusing on regional security issues. He was also an analyst for the Project on National Security Reform, a congressionally funded nonprofit organization founded to reform the national security structure of the United States. He holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and has served in the Austrian Army and the Austrian Foreign Ministry, working on various security issues.