Conflict Prevention

Seghal considers the “defining limitation of hard power is that those who project ‘Hard Power’ will always be held to fickle public cynosure in the long-term.”  Not all actors have the capacity to engage in Hard Power and are eager to judge those that do, based on weaknesses to the strategy.  States wishing to engage in hard power strategies are crippled, according to Seghal, by the relatively small number of tools at their disposal, namely, military intervention, economic pressure, and now, cyber war, which limits their options.  Seghal believes that when Hard Power policy fails, a country’s “credibility deteriorates [and] international cooperation diminishes as attitudes of distrust tend to grow.”  This, in turn, makes it less likely that states will engage in Hard Power when a justifiable need arises.

Seghal argues that the continued reliance upon Hard Power by nations such as the United States stems from an inability “to admit that military dominance generally does not always work.”  This perpetuates the myth that military strength can ultimately assure security – a myth that Seghal believes to be false.

Despite maintaining that  there is a time and place for Hard Power to be used, Seghal ultimately warns that “advocates for Hard Power must remember that its use in the ‘global village’ will have adverse consequences about their image, however just the cause.”

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Many people heaved a sigh of relief when United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, cited to CNN on 12 January 2011 a statement of the outgoing head of Israeli intelligence that a “combination of sanctions and covert actions have significantly slowed down the Iranian [nuclear] program”. This appeared to take the much vaunted (possible) military strike by Israel and/or the United States off the table as a near term risk. Yet, the covert action has not eased tension in the strategic confrontation. Risks of escalation have increased.

There were probably several elements to the covert action. The most well known is that sometime before September 2010, a country or countries unknown attacked Iran’s uranium enrichment systems using a cyber “weapon” (Stuxnet) that rendered up to 30 percent of the centrifuges unusable.

The cyber attack was an act of sabotage across state borders and therefore it was – prima facie – a breach of international law. Even if this were a declared war, Iran would have the right of retaliation for self-defense under international law if it could determine which state actor or actors were involved in the attack. This right is not diminished because of the sanctions resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Those states which oppose Iran’s nuclear program could hardly argue that a military attack by Iran against them was imminent, thus giving them a right, based on the principle of their own self-defense, to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. (The assumed position of the perpetrator state or states would be that the attack was a justifiable act since Iran cannot be trusted to keep nuclear weapons – if it had them – out of the hands of terrorists.)

In January 2010, Hillary Clinton, laid out her country’s position on the unlawfulness of cyber attacks: “Countries or individuals that engage in cyber-attacks should face consequences and international condemnation," she said.

So who will punish the perpetrator(s) of the cyber attack on Iran? What actions of cyber self-defense by Iran would be permissible under international law? Retaliation is a time honored convention and recognized as lawful in certain circumstances under customary international law. There is considerable debate about what form retaliation might take, but proportionality is one of the main considerations. There are other considerations, such as absence of recourse to other measures, last resort and, where it applies, “hot pursuit” of the attackers.

Law aside, it is not unreasonable to imagine that some in the Iranian government are arguing for a cyber retaliation. According to some sources, Iran’s cyber warfare capability is in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. Will Iran retaliate? What form might a cyber response take? If there was retaliation, it could represent an escalation of cyber conflict, and possibly provoke military clashes between Iran and the assumed perpetrator(s).

At the least, this widely-publicized offensive use of the “Stuxnet” cyber weapon may represent a turning point – is the “genie out of the bottle”? Does the use of stuxnet herald a period of uncontrolled tit-for-tat offensive cyber strikes for sabotage and economic disruption in an environment where there are no common international understandings for regulating cyber conflict. This is no longer simply a debate about a gap in international law that needs to be addressed to control conflicts that might arise. Offensive cyber operations are already occurring and on a large scale.

Iran is developing cyber warfare capability, like other major powers. Is its capability good enough to mount a damaging cyber strike in response to the Stuxnet attack? The answer according to some sources is yes. We can only hope that Iran’s leaders lead by example here, exercise restraint and disavow a cyber retaliation, or any retaliation for that matter.

Click here to read Austin's piece online

“There are common problems that we need to face,” said Dr. Attiya Inayatullah, Former Minister of Women’s Development, Social Welfare and Special Education of Pakistan, identifying the need to challenge extremism for women to take a truly active role in government.

 “The international communities are helping,” said Dr. Husn Banu Ghazanfar, Minister of Women Affairs, Afghanistan, who delivered the keynote address. “But I request help from the international community for the education and capacity-building.” Ghazanfar also emphasized the need for western help rebuilding infrastructure, like roads, schools and hospitals, damaged in the war.

The symbol of American power, the aircraft carrier, is at risk; at least that's what some recent reports suggest. In a current article in Defense News, U.S. Vice Admiral Jack Dorsett, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, states:

The technology that the Chinese have developed and are employing in their DF-21 D missile system has increased their probability of being able to employ a salvo of missiles to be able to hit a maneuvering target.

Dorsett consented that the U.S. Navy underestimated the capacity of the Chinese military to develop a land-based anti-ship ballistic missile that could penetrate the layered defense of an aircraft carrier group. The sinking of a single carrier will cost the lives of thousands of young Americans, not to mention the symbolism of such a disaster amidst talks of American decline and cuts in defense spending.

For students of warfare, this development is nothing new. The Chinese military eventually developed countermeasures to deter the most formidable threat (i.e., the aircraft carrier) in a future crisis over Taiwan. It is a classic example of a cost imposing strategy--a strategy in which the adversary is incentivized to spend substantially more money and resources on defense than the attacker spends on offense.

It works like this. The Chinese military essentially is exploiting the strict adherence of the United States to a naval doctrine based on the carrier by indirectly imposing costs, i.e., costs that the United States Navy is imposing on itself to retain supremacy. Whether a missile like the DF-21 D can penetrate carrier defenses (over which there is some controversy) misses a key point: The mere presence of anti-ship missiles imposes a heavy cost on U.S. Navy offensive capabilities as well as on its budget.

Aircraft carriers will be in service at least until 2050 and constitute the main U.S. instrument with which to project global power. In a sense, its defense is tantamount to defending U.S. global hegemony. They are as much of a political symbol of U.S. dominance as they are an actual means used to project American power around the world. Scrapping the carrier fleet is therefore out of the question.

Hence, the U.S. Navy is forced to deploy an enormous defensive perimeter built around the carrier. Today, each aircraft carrier group fields 24-long range fighter interceptors supported by four early warning radar aircraft, four jamming aircraft, four tanker aircraft, between two and four Ticonderoga (CG-47) or Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyers, cruisers, a SSN-688 class submarine as an underwater escort, and 16 planes scanning the area for enemy submarine threats to counter anti-ship missiles. Out of 90 aircrafts, only 34 remain for actual offensive capabilities--not a very cost efficient way of doing business.

With the ongoing advancement of missile technology, it will become increasingly more expensive and difficult to destroy any missiles before they are launched. For example, the cost of modernizing 84 Aegis cruisers and destroyers to counter missiles such as the DF-21 D will be about $10 billion according to Congressional testimonies. China and Russia are developing jointly an improved missile system with an increased range of 200 km, making it impossible to destroy the missile before it is launched in both the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Taiwan (the two main hotspots for a future naval confrontation involving carriers) because of the inability of current U.S. defense systems to react in time.

In the future, defending a carrier group will lead to an increase in marginal costs in terms of launching air strikes, a decrease of operational mobility due to over-cautious protection, and a diversion of resources from offensive to defensive capabilities. China and Iran certainly anticipate rapid countermeasures and currently are trying to diversify their weapons portfolio. Even if the United States succeeds in countering the DF-21 D, however, its adversaries already will have succeeded in imposing tremendous extra costs on the United States Navy and scored a victory of sorts.

How can the United States Navy reduce extra costs? One idea would be that a reduction in size of the aircraft carrier battle groups as well as outsourcing certain duties (i.e., air strikes) to submarines and cruise missiles would reduce the exposure of carriers. For example, the capacity of 34 combat aircrafts available for sorties in an aircraft carrier strike force certainly could be matched by an Ohio class Trident nuclear submarine and its 154 cruise missiles. A doctrinal shift away from the aircraft carrier also would potentially discourage U.S. competitors to continue working on single carrier counter measures such as anti-ship missiles and split their resources to build adequate cruise missile defenses, for example.

The institutional focus and infrastructural outlays devoted to maintaining the elaborate Great Wall protecting America's carrier fleet is ultimately an ill-fated extension of an encrusted Maginot Line. The United States as the dominant power must apply various strategies and weapons systems to retain its global standing whereas China as the ostensibly weaker player only has to channel its resources towards very specific objectives, deterring U.S. naval forces in East Asia. What these different strategies imply for the overall strategic situations remains to be seen. However one thing is certain: for the U.S. to continue defending the aircraft carrier is not only detrimental in terms of monetary and other resources but will also allow other nations to catch up faster with U.S. military might.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a defense analyst. He works for the EastWest Institute

Click here to read Gady's piece on the Huffington Post

Currently, governments and the United Nations devote a great deal of resources to peacekeeping, but not necessarily to conflict prevention. According to many conference speakers, this gap in spending is the result of a lack of public awareness about the importance of preventive action – and the consequences are dire.

Summary report of the EWI seminar held in Brussels on December 6, 2010

The growing potential for ethnic and religious conflict in Eurasia in large part lies in the deficit of proper inter-ethnic integration policies at national and international levels in government-led active economic modernization efforts.

This is the basic analytical conclusion of the seminar on Ethnic and Religious Risks of Modernization organized by EWI in cooperation with Leo Gumilev Center (Moscow), a new think tank focused on issues of multiculturalism.  The seminar was held in Brussels on December 6, 2010, as a sideline event of the EWI’s Global Conference on Preventive Action (European Parliament, Brussels, December 6-7, 2010).

The policy context of the seminar, bringing together 30 independent and government experts from Russia, the EU and the  U.S.,  was largely determined by the Russian President Medvedev’s initiative on national technological and economic modernization. International “partnerships for modernization” are becoming a major element of Russia’s ongoing rapprochement with the EU, the U.S. and other developed Western democracies, and are seen by the Russian leadership as an important source of advanced technologies and innovative management know-how. 

In his introductory remarks Vladimir Ivanov, Director of EWI Russia Branch, pointed out that these governmental efforts largely focus on the development of several critical technologically advanced sectors (e.g. energy efficiency, space technologies, bio and medical science, advanced IT, etc). In the meantime, it is obvious that sooner or later promoting technical innovations will lead to deep social, cultural and political changes. As the Russian federal government is planning massive public investments in such industry clusters, competition among regions for these centrally disbursed funds will increase. In such a multiethnic country as Russia, social and economic transformations on the regional level will inevitably provoke the rise of regional cultural identities. Conflict potential based on ethnic and religious values bears the risk of breaking out into outspoken nationalistic movements, religious radicalism and violent extremism. Increased migration flowing from the conflict regions like the Caucasus will feed instability in megacities and centers of accelerated development. Eventual counter-modernization reactions in Eurasia may well become inspired by anti-Western slogans, as modernization is largely perceived as “westernization” of traditional societies. These trends will challenge domestic and international security of Russia and its neighbors, both in west and east. 

The importance of the seminar was highlighted by an unprecedented wave of inter-ethnic clashes in Russia, which rolled through major Russian cities from Kaliningrad to Vladivosto. The clashes started on December 11, 2010, with a 5,000-person demonstration of nationalistic football fans near the Kremlin walls, who protested against growing ethnic criminality and the inability of authorities to stop it.  For the first time since the end of the 1990s, these events forced the Russian leadership to acknowledge inter-ethnic tensions as a serious domestic issue requiring systemic policy action.

The purpose of the seminar, as defined by the organizers, was to explore new policy ideas for addressing these risks in the globalization of Eurasia, including such issues as soft security responses to religious radicalization and violent extremism, and cultural and economic conflicts caused by the influx of migrating populations into centers of dynamic development. The participants sought to develop a multiculturalism policies agenda for modernization initiatives, both in their domestic dimension and in the framework of international development aid and cooperation programs (e.g. the Eastern Partnership, the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, post-war recovery programs for Afghanistan, etc). 

Discussion centered around: comparative analysis of ethno-political and religious effects of  modernization experiences in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus, the Baltic States, Turkey and  China; the role of migration flows in fuelling national and religious radicalization in the EU and Eurasia; and practical policy implications.

Key presentations were delivered by the following experts: Evgeni Bakhrevsky, Coordinator, Peoples' Rights Movement (Russia); Jean-Pierre Devos, Superintendent of the Belgium Federal Police (Belgium) and Project Manager for Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPPRA project); Irina Ivakhnyuk, Deputy Head, Department of Population, Economic Faculty of the Moscow State University (Russia); Kirill Koktysh, Senior Fellow, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (Russia); Pavel Levushkan, Chief Editor, Christian Portal “Baznica” (Latvia); Christopher Marsh, Director, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University (United States); Andrey Marudenko, President, Aurora Expertum Club (Russia); Kirill Serebrenitsky, Director, Eastern Bureau for Ethnic and Political Studies (Russia); Denis Sokolov, Head of the Center for Regional Social and Political Studies RAMCOM (Russia); Pavel Zarifullin, Director, L.Gumilev Centre (Russia).

Experts identified the following major factors leading to ethnic and religious radicalization in the framework of modernization initiatives:

• Accelerated urbanization and disaggregation of traditional societies, especially transformation of labor and consumption into market values;
• Perception of modernization initiatives by local communities as externally imposed  in the absence of targeted efforts by authorities to harmonize social innovation with indigenous mythology and traditions; often governmentally imposed secularism associated with modernization (as in the USSR, Kemalist Turkey, Communist China, Iran under the White Revolution);
• Massive financial injections of government funds into institutionally unstable regions with strong population growth rate, leading to the development of regional “economies of violence” which, through the mechanisms of corruption and migration, expand into the national centers of decision-making (e.g. Caucasus vs. Moscow);
• Lack of proper integration policies (observed in Russia, particular EU countries and at the  EU level in general) for migrating populations;
• Strong presence of alternative ideologies (e.g. fundamentalist Islam) in the modernizing countries and regions.

Exposure of particular regions to these factors is even stronger if they are situated in the “critical frontal zones” where different civilizations geographically meet each other, as in: the long-lasting divide between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon identities in the UK; the divide between Romans and Germans in Belgium; the great African chain of conflict zones, from Western Sahara and Southern Senegal through Sierra-Leone, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Northern Chad, Southern Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, marking the neighborhood of the Arab Muslim world and Christian and polytheistic Tropical Africa;  and the Asian civilizational frontal -- Palestine and adjacent Arab territories, Iraq, Kurdistan, Northern Caucasus, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Chinese Turkestan and Xingjiang.
Another contemporary conflict multiplier, according to experts, is the recent global economic crisis: it increased the fight for resources between ethnic groups and fostered transformation of tensions caused by social inequality into inter-cultural identity conflicts, which was particularly demonstrated by cases of growing nationalistic tensions in the North Caucasus, Southern Russia and major Russian cities. 
Turning to practical ideas on how to address ethnic and religious risks of modernizations in Eurasia, experts suggested a broad series of recommendations for policymakers on national and international levels:

1. Include ethnic, religious and migration risk analysis in the modernization programs and relevant international partnership agreements, and develop appropriate preventive concepts and action plans focused on protecting regional cultural identities, and devise flexible integration policies for migrants. Eurasianism, a historic school of thought in Russia dating back to the end of the 19th century that explores ways of managing regional cultural diversity as a basis for sustainable development, can serve as one of the key methodological sources for such policies.
2. Develop networks of independent monitoring centers in critical conflict zones in Russia and CIS countries with the following major roles:
   • Permanently conduct field analysis of cultural identity trends, including through ethnographic expeditions;
   • Create and permanently update a map of ethnic and religious risk zones;
   • Advise policymakers on conflict prevention and mitigation strategies and  methods taking into account local cultural specifics;
   • Mediate local conflicts on behalf of the civil society.
3. Undertake analysis of legal practices in conflict regions and devise measures to harmonize state legislation and customary law and dispute resolution practices (e.g. Shariah law, adats, traditional ethics and norms of the Caucasus). Russian Northern Caucasus could serve as a pilot zone for such efforts.
4. Explore ways to strengthen  international legislation on protection of peoples’ rights on the basis of existing UN documents (UN Charter, the UNGA Declaration of 2007 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UNESCO Universal Declaration of 2001 on Cultural Diversity, etc.) to reflect new requirements for preventing ethnic conflicts in the 21st century.
5.  Establish the institute of Ombudsman for Peoples’ Rights, on national and regional levels, in Russia and other CIS countries, with the role to oversee and preserve protection of ethnic cultural identities.
6. Promote best practice sharing (e.g. the EU-supported CoPPRA project) in Eurasia, involving UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, CSTO, SCO and respective national authorities and NGOs, in training enforcement agencies in order to enhance their capacity to identify members of radical movements and to cooperate with local communities in preventing violent extremism at early stages of engagement of frustrated individuals by organized radical groups. 
7. Develop political and spiritual leadership training programs in cooperation with moderate Muslim institutions, targeting potential young radical leaders, with the purpose of providing them with attractive alternative career opportunities within the normal, non-violent political field.

On December 7, 2010 recommendations of the seminar were reported at the concluding session of the Global Conference on Preventive Action at the European Parliament. EWI has established a special project series under the rubric “Modernizations and Security” and will continue cooperation with its partners to further consider the conclusions of the seminar  in view of developing them into specific action-oriented projects.

Funding for preventive diplomacy is notoriously tough to secure, particularly in times of tight budgets. But preventive action can save both lives and money. A war in Sudan would cost the international community an estimated $100 billion, according to a recent report by the Aegis Trust – a great argument for preventive action by the United States and others. But arguing how much money you will save by funding a war that doesn’t happen is a tough political sell for Washington policymakers.

Still, legislators looking to support preventive action can point to retroactive cost-benefit analyses that show just how much money timely spending saves: The First Gulf War cost foreign governments $114 billion, while effective preventive action might have cost between $10 and $30 billion, according to The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, from the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.  Conversely, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force kept the Albanian and Yugoslav crises out of Macedonia from 1995 and 1999 for a mere $300 million -- a drop in the bucket compared to what a full-blown Macedonian crisis could have cost: $140 billion.  According to those calculations, the combined savings for those two conflicts approached $230 billion.

At the EastWest Institute’s First Global Conference on Preventive Action in Brussels last month—in reality, more a mobilization meeting than a conference--global parliamentarians discussed how to build political support for preventive action. Delegates broadly agreed that intergovernmental organizations must spearhead the movement and that greater collaboration is needed between the United Nations, regional organizations and NGOs.  However, the intergovernmental organizations will be hampered by the fact that they are funded by the very states currently cutting their budgets.

The United States government takes the lead in funding the UN, currently assessed at 22% of the UN regular budget, and the Obama Administration is requesting around $500 million from Congress for Fiscal Year 2011. The figure, while substantial, pales in comparison to the American share of the UN peacekeeping budget, which is expected to be almost $2 billion in 2011 or about a quarter of UN peacekeeping funding. As Washington readies itself for a more conservative 112th congress in January, the last thing anyone expects is enthusiasm for upping UN funding.

But despite the obstacles, Washington has acknowledged the importance of preventive diplomacy in some instances. In August 2009, Senator Mark Begich [D-AK] introduced the United States Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs Act. Begich’s Chief of Staff, David Ramseur, told EWI, that it “is an attempt to manage Arctic resources and transportation in the Arctic, both of which are becoming more accessible as a result of global warming.” While violent confrontation between the Arctic states is unlikely, the proposal to appoint an ambassador for the Arctic shows a commitment to preventing any protracted diplomatic or economic stand-offs over resource ownership or shipping rights. The bill has gone nowhere, but it at least signaled an attempt to anticipate and defuse future tensions in an increasingly important area of competing economic activity.   

On the other side of the aisle, the 111th Congress marked the third straight session that Congressman Mac Thornberry [R-TX] introduced legislation titled the Quadrennial Foreign Affairs Review Act (H.R. 490 in 111th Congress), with the intention of obligating “a quadrennial review of the diplomatic strategy and structure of the Department of State…to determine how the Department can best fulfill its mission in the 21st century and meet the challenges of a changing world.” After Congress took the lead, Hillary Clinton announced the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review as an official initiative of the State Department in July of 2009.

Released in December by the Department of State, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) provides some insight into how State and USAID will “determine how to use our resources most efficiently in a time of tight budgets.” The QDDR emphasizes a civilian-based approach to leadership in regards to foreign policy -- more consulates and an enlargement of the foreign service and civil service. Moving forward, the QDDR also calls for the development of a “standing interagency response corps” and “a single planning process for conflict resolution” that will strengthen the capacity of State and USAID “to anticipate crisis, conflict, and potential mass atrocities.”

At EWI, we are strongly positioned to promote preventive diplomacy–in particular, with our active global parliamentarian network working for conflict prevention. We plan to invite more American policymakers into that network. EWI DC will continue to try to keep this issue on the discussion boards in Washington and elsewhere, and work towards tangible, timely and cost-effective results.