Conflict Prevention

Writing for The News, EWI board member Ikram Sehgal examines how Osama Bin Laden's hideout compromised the credibility of Pakistani intelligence agencies—and the current challenge for the Pakistani leadership.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Writing for India Today, EWI board member Kanwal Sibal recommends that the U.S. shift its political and military tactics in Pakistan in the wake of Osama Bin Laden’s death.

Click here to read Sibal's piece in India Today

In 2010, EWI held talks in Kabul to build trust between Afghan and Pakistani leaders, and hosted an international conference at the European Parliament to strengthen preventive action worldwide. To learn about that work and more, we invite you to read EWI’s 2010 Annual Report:

In his bestselling memoir, Little Princes: One Man’s Promise to Bring Home the Lost Children of Nepal, Grennan recounts how he came to care for 18 rambunctious orphans who, as it turned out, were not orphans at all. Rather, they were trafficked children from remote Humla district, a Maoist stronghold during Nepal’s decade-long civil war. Grennan learned that, to prevent Maoists from conscripting their children, parents paid traffickers to take them to safety in Kathmandu. Once there, they were abandoned or sold into service.  

Little Princes is the story of Grennan’s efforts to reunite the trafficked children with their families. The most dramatic chapters describe Grennan’s dangerous trek through mountain villages with a badly injured knee, made all the more suspenseful by the prospect that winter snows might strand him far from Kathmandu, where Liz Flanagan, his future wife, had come for a first visit.

It’s also the story of how Grennan founded the NGO Next Generation Nepal (NGN), to reconnect trafficked Nepali children with their families – a story Grennan elaborated on in a recent conversation.

“I realized I didn’t know how to start an organization,” Grennan says. But he knew who did: his former colleagues at EWI. Grennan reached out to EWI alumni Antje Herrberg and Sasha Havlicek, both of whom are now on NGN’s board along with fellow alumni Mark Shulman and Wayne Harvey. He also had long, encouraging conversations with EWI President John Mroz.

Grennan says that in an early draft, Little Princes began with a detailed account of his six years at EWI, starting in 1996 when, fresh out of college, he met EWI Executive Vice President Stephen Heintz—now a Director—and began work in the Prague office. He explains, “EWI was my entrée into both life and adventure, and furthermore into Nepal.”

While beginning the book in Nepal makes sense, the reader misses out on seeing Grennan start a project aimed to harmonize Balkan parliaments’ legislation, including laws on human trafficking – a problem that, of course, would become Grennan’s life work.

Although Nepal’s civil war ended in 2006, Grennan says that trafficking in regions like Humla remains a big problem. “There are thousands of children who are still abandoned in Kathmandu, half a dozen years later,” he says.

Today, Grennan and his wife Liz live in Connecticut, with their son Finn. While Grennan is the chairman of NGN’s board, he has stepped down from leading operations in Nepal, which now include a new orphan’s home in Humla, built with the book’s proceeds. 

“They don’t need me back there,” Grennan laughs. In addition to a professional staff, several of the original boys Grennan cared for in 2004 – now older teenagers – are working for NGN. 

“They are helping to find families. It’s an amazing thing,” Grennan says,

Any reader of Little Princes will agree with him.

Click here to learn more about Grennan's NGO, Next Generation Nepal

The most serious threat of all was from nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. To address this threat, the United States and the Soviet Union relied in large part on mutual assured destruction and the deterrence imagined to flow from it. The two sides also developed large second strike capability for retaliation as extra insurance. The surprising aspect of this balance of terror was that in 1972 both sides had agreed by treaty to forego large scale development of actual defences against missiles in flight – what is called now ballistic missile defence (BMD). The idea was that by foregoing a comprehensive system of defence against in-flight missiles, the two sides would strengthen mutual deterrence.   

The international agenda for BMD is now significantly different. We are a decade into recurring controversies between Russia and the United States over the role of missile defence and tactical nuclear forces in national deterrence strategies. These disputes have been caused in large part by the United States withdrawal in 2001 from the 1972 missile defence treaty mentioned above. In Russian eyes, this move upset the balance between offence and defence in mutual nuclear deterrence since it was made by the Americans to allow them to drive towards a comprehensive system for destroying ballistic missiles in flight. In December last year, NATO announced its intention to set up a comprehensive system for missile defence, and thereby to formalize the emerging American “missile umbrella” over Europe.

Russia indicated then its readiness to work with NATO to create a pan-European system that extends well beyond NATO. The joint political decision has been taken. All parties are now working out if and how that might be executed. If the details can’t be agreed, all say they are prepared to walk away from the original consensus.

One stumbling block is that Russia does not want to be subject to a “missile umbrella” commanded or dominated by Americans. According to a January 2011 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, that motivation may be shared by a number of NATO members too.
Another stumbling block is that Russia needs a BMD system with global reach and wants the NATO-Russia joint effort to cover its Asian territory and potential threats across all of Asia. Since the Americans have theatre missile defence systems in East Asia, that should not be too hard. NATO members should readily accept that they can defend better against missiles coming from Asia if they rely on direct Russian involvement in the defence system. A third stumbling block is Russian insecurity about American dominance in BMD technology in coming decades.

The underlying obstacle however is lack of trust. In large part, the insecurity arises from Cold War stereotypes, but there is also a Russian neuralgia caused by American and NATO use of military force for political purposes other than national defence. A strategic signal is needed, one that can sweep away the remnants of the Cold War, address current sensitivities and establish a modicum of trust at an operational level of missile defence. It may need to be as radical as stationing of joint missile defence units on each other’s territory. 

 But there does have to be a new treaty too, one that re-connects missile defence to broader but contemporary needs of all parties for deterrence. By insisting on a treaty, Russia is not re-living the past, it is very much concerned to obtain some guarantees about its security in the future. NATO could look more closely at how it might benefit from such a treaty.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

In his recent visit to EWI, Plesch discussed his latest project, which aims to export confidence and security building measures associated with conventional weapon control in Europe to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

”There is a continued and growing threat to sustainable development from the uncontrolled proliferation, possession and production of major conventional armaments,” said Plesch. “There is also an increasing awareness in the international community that has risen out of the development of ongoing conventional disarmament work in the area of arms trade, landmines and small arms.”

Plesch believes that European agreements on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the associated Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and Open Skies regime provide a strong and unprecedented institutional model for a major expansion of collectively improved international security.

Plesch explained, “These agreements, though under threat, have provided the basis in security terms for a peace dividend where European publics pay a historically low level of around 1% of GDP on the military; it is regrettable that such agreements are one of the few sets of regulations that neither NATO nor the EU have exported to the East and South.”

Plesch’s project is intended to adopt a phased approach that expands over time. He identified the key participants in that process as regional and military experts, academics, government officials and civil society. The project’s aim, he added, is to help re-energize an international constituency capable of carrying through a realistic risk-based global confidence building and disarmament agenda based on applied international and development studies and public policy. It is also intended to put CSBMs and conventional weapons disarmament back on the international agenda to facilitate nuclear and other WMD disarmament.

“The project intends to build on humanitarian campaigns on specific weapons and on the Arms Trade Treaty,” Plesch said. Moderating the discussion, EWI Senior Associate Jacqueline McLaren Miller asked if the uniqueness of the European process and especially its Cold War roots, would hinder its applicability in other regions. In his response, Plesch explained that, as part of insuring the applicability of the European measures and the success of the project, CISD plans to host annual large scale international scoping workshops. It will also organize annual “Conferences on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone,” a “Common Security and a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East Workshop,” and conduct regional feasibility studies looking at regions such as Sudan and the Cambodian-Thai border. His team also plans to develop a non-OSCE observer inspections program, and an active education and knowledge sharing program.

As part of this effort, Plesch and SOAS have been invited by the EastWest Institute (EWI) to present a panel at the Annual Worldwide Security Conference (WSC8). The conference is a platform to reframe perceptions of international security threats and opportunities, and mobilizes experts from governments, businesses, NGOs, and academia to make practical recommendations for policy change.

Plesch also briefly discussed his new book America, Hitler, and the UN, which traces the history of the United Nations from its conceptual origins in 1942 through the defeat of the Axis powers to the present.  

First, Libya is the seventeenth-largest nation in the world. Its expanses and its desert leave military forces vulnerable and often draw them into overextending their advances; resupply, not terrain, limits military operations. Its coastline, 1770 km long, is the largest of any African country bordering the Mediterranean. The major Libyan highway runs in close proximity to this coast, affording sea access and baring exposure. One of the least forested countries in the world, it presents very few natural obstacles to military forces, a factor in the recurrent shifting of frontlines during the Libyan campaigns of the Second World War. News of rebel conquests and Qaddafi’s reconquests should therefore be treated with caution. The main questions will be: How long can any force hold ground and what are the source and delivery routes of supplies?

Second, Libya’s cities and oases are islands in a sea of sand and of pivotal importance as supply depots. When the Afrika Korps was advancing in April 1941 and a new frontline was established along the Libyan-Egyptian border, the city of Tobruk was left behind in the rear of the Axis advance. The town was besieged for 240 days until relieved by the British Counteroffensive Operation Crusader. It was again besieged the following year and fell during the battle of Gazala with 35,000 men of the British Empire taken prisoner. During the same battle, another siege of a small Free French garrison in defense of the remote oasis, Bir Hakeim, substantially slowed the Axis advance and cost the Germans and Italians dearly. The Axis powers could not replace their casualties for the crucial battle of El Alamein—the turning point of the war in North Africa. Today, rebels and troops loyal to Qaddafi are battling over control of various cities including the stronghold of Surt—“Qaddafi’s Tobruk.” Holding these towns dotted along the principal Libyan highway will be pivotal. Once the rebel army establishes clear leadership, a Rommel-like strategy, with a force surrounding Surt while a mobile column of troops heads to Tripoli, is not unimaginable. It all depends how quickly the rebels can organize and build momentum and whether Qaddafi has a Montgomery-like counterstrategy up his sleeve.

Third, the most important axis of operation, as during the Second World War, is the old colonial route Via Balbo, a highway running from east to west through all of Libya. Rebel and government forces are engaging along this route. Due to the exposing nature of the terrain, air power is critical in controlling this major artery. Erwin Rommel remarked about campaigning in Africa that, “Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success.” His adversary Berhard Montomery concurred: “If we lose the war in the air we lose the war and we lose it quickly.” During the North Africa campaign, whichever side had air superiority had the upper hand. The German position on the Libyan-Egyptian border became untenable in June 1941 because all the Luftwaffe squadrons but Fliegercorps X were transferred to the Russian front; this meant an end to close air support. When the Afrika Korps was pushed back to its defensive line around El Agheili—where rebels and Qaddafi loyalists are currently clashing—it was just in time for the German Luftwaffe to re-establish its air superiority. Hitler had ordered Fliegercorps VII to Sicily which provided the direct air-ground support needed to push back the British forces once again all the way to the Egyptian border. For the rebels, air superiority will be the key in massing enough ground forces to take the capital of Tripoli. For Qaddafi, it is the most lethal asset at his disposal to retain power.

The Libyan campaign of the Axis and Allies during the Second World War, with its rapid advances, retreats, sieges, overextended supply lines, and mobile maneuvers, illustrates the peculiar nature of warfare in Libya. Should the forces loyal to Qaddafi not disband themselves, a prolonged struggle featuring some aspects of the North African campaigns could ensue. The end of Qaddafi, however, is not likely to come as quickly as the end of the Panzer Armee Afrika in 1943. As Bernard Montgomery stated, “The defeat of the enemy in the Battle of El Alamein, the pursuit of his beaten army and the final capture of Tripoli . . . has all been accomplished in three months. This is probably without parallel in history.” A beaten dictator on holding on to his power, however, is a sight not uncommon in modern times.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute.

Click here to read Gady's piece in The National Interest

In a follow-up to last week’s commentary on Hard Power strategies, Ikram Sehgal explores Soft Power, which he defines as “the ability to make others do what you want, what they otherwise would not have done,” based on what an actor represents.  The currencies of Soft Power are “values, culture, policies and institutions,” as opposed to the currency of money and military strength used in Hard Power strategies.

Sehgal argues that the use of Soft Power has been on the rise in the years since 9/11 and attributes the increasing prevalence of Soft Power strategies to their success at uniting actors, as well as globalization and the diffusion of media power.  Sehgal envisions that, in the future, Pakistan could increase its projection of Soft Power by focusing first regionally and then globally.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

The sense of alarm can only have been heightened when, this past week, the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, invoked the United States Congress to "put aside the humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in.” She said, “Let's just talk straight realpolitik. We are in competition with China." While this is not news to the Japanese government, their sense of heightened alarm will come from an understanding of the way China’s leaders will react to the Clinton statement. It represents a fundamental abandonment of the soft rhetoric that the United States kept up for more than two years in the run-up to the state visit of China’s President Hu Jintao in January this year. The neo-cons in Washington, who spent so much effort in the first Bush Administration to compete with China in realpolitik terms, will be smiling.
The United States has hardened its position on China because of the latter’s growing cyber warfare and space capabilities. "Advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific," Defense Secretary Robert Gates told a Japanese audience on 13 January in Tokyo.

That anodyne statement brings out into the open the growing mistrust of China in the United States because of its relentless cyber operations against American targets.
Japan and the United States have formalized a cyber alliance which, according to one source, commits both sides to renouncing cyber operations against the other. If true, and it may not be, this would be a significant first in international relations. Japan’s 2010 Defense Guidelines elevate cyber warfare capabilities to a new level. In a white paper issued in May 2010 by the Information Security Policy Council, Japan made plain its need to prepare for cyber war directed at its critical infrastructure.

One reference point for Japan’s heightened concern is a series of coordinated attacks on its allies in 2009. According to Professor Motohiro Tsuchiya: “In 2009, massive scale of cyber attacks was recorded in the U.S. and South Korea, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Congress, the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Washington Post, among others.”

The right response to cyber threats of any kind, according to Professor Eva Vincze of George Washington University, has many levels. Affirming that technology by itself is insufficient, and emphasizing the human factor, she calls for international consultations with stakeholders with a view to improving communication based on span trust.

So where does that leave Japan? It must work, as other countries are also now realizing, to mount a diplomacy of cyber security, or cyber diplomacy. This will need to engage the countries, like China, North Korea and Russia, that Japan mistrusts most. Japan will need to construct a cyber arms control agenda, including confidence building measures, with its neighbors.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe