Conflict Prevention

Diplomatic tensions between China and its neighbors have been rising in recent months, reaching a new high when China announced on June 21, 2012 that it had formally approved the establishment of a prefecture level administration, called Sanshashi in Chinese, for disputed territories in the South China Sea. The fear in neighboring countries is that China’s growing naval power is emboldening it to become more aggressive. The United States released an official statement on August 3 criticizing China’s new administrative measures, prompting an angry response from Beijing.   

EWI Professorial Fellow Greg Austin, who is the author of China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development (1998), offers some essential background on this dispute and then comments on two key questions: What is China’s intent with the Sansha City announcement, and what are the implications of Washington’s reaction to it?

Islands or Rocks?

There is an important distinction to be made between the Paracel Islands in the north and the Spratly Islands in the south. The Paracel Islands include some relatively big islands that can naturally support at least minimal human habitation (one of the tests whether they qualify for an economic zone). For this reason, they are susceptible to administrative actions or human activities, like guano collection, that might allow a state to claim to have exercised sovereignty over the land in the past. If a settlement could be reached between two states (China and Vietnam) over sovereignty, few other states would object to the sovereign state from extending an exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from these islands. China has controlled the Paracel Islands completely since  it evicted military forces of South Vietnam from them in 1974. In 1958, the government of North Vietnam had recognized Chinese claims to the Paracel Islands and had made no claim of its own until after the unification of Vietnam. (The Vietnamese claim relies in part on acts by France as a colonial power in Vietnam prior to 1954.)

The Spratly Islands present a very different picture from the Paracel group. Those islands are not really a distinct group that might be accorded consideration as a single administrative unit under the international law of territorial acquisition. It is an agglomeration of reefs and rocks with a spread from end to end of around one thousand kilometers, including a handful of very small, scattered islands. Chinese sources have identified 193 named reefs, shoals, submerged reefs or hidden shoals. Western charts recognise as many as twelve distinct island groups; Chinese terminology refers to at least five separate groups as well as numerous individual islands not associated with the five groups There are so many claimants to all or some of these islands that it is almost impossible to envision any meaningful legal settlement between the parties that would serve as the basis for determining an EEZ boundary. 

All of the features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are in fact submerged reefs or rocks that have been built up with concrete to enable a handful of military personnel to be stationed there. China has had few other options because other claimants have occupied all of the natural islands and China has chosen not to try to evict them. This set of circumstances is very important. China and other claimants will probably only reach a settlement on maritime boundaries in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands that ignores them as base points for devising EEZ boundaries. China might negotiate away its claim to this or that reef or rock in the Spratly Islands, as it has given away small amounts of territory in settlements of border disputes with contiguous states on its land borders. China is unlikely ever to negotiate away its claim to the Paracel Islands, for reasons outlined in my book, China’s Ocean Frontier.

 

The Taiwan Connection

China’s policy in the South China Sea island disputes is intimately connected with the Taiwan issue. Taiwan claims the same island groups claimed by China. In fact, when the Chinese government in Beijing came to power in 1949 it inherited the claims from the Republic of China.  Taiwan was the first government to send military forces to occupy islands in the Spratly group, first in 1946 and then again in 1956. Taiwan has maintained a small military unit or administrative presence on one island in the Spratly group continuously since 1956. China was so circumspect about this situation in the Spratly Islands that it waited until 1988 to station any military personnel on the small number of reefs and rocks it occupies. The Chinese military forces have avoided any clash with Taiwanese counterparts in the island group. As long as Taiwan maintains a full claim to all of the islands on behalf of a unitary China, it will be impossible for the Chinese government in Beijing to negotiate any settlement. For third parties there is also a complicating factor to the Taiwan claim. Under international law, Taiwan can probably not be accorded any standing since it is not recognized by states committed to the “one China” policy.

 

What is China doing with the Sansha City announcement and related PLA move?

On July 21, 2012, China’s State Council announced the establishment of the prefectural-level administration, Sanshashi (which has been translated by numerous sources as Sansha City) to administer island groups that it claims in the South China Sea. The government seat will be stationed on Woody Island, part of the Paracel group. This upgraded the level of administration from that announced in 1988, when China set up the county-level Administrative Office for the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and Macclesfield Bank (a wholly submerged marine feature). On July 23, the PLA announced that it would set up a new garrison level command of ground force personnel responsible for managing the city's national defence mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations, with subsequent information that the garrison would be led by a senior colonel.

According to Chinese sources, the moves were in retaliation for administrative measures taken by two rival claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines, in recent years. In 2009, the Philippines issued a new law on its territorial sea which reiterated its claim to part of the Spratly group. At that time, a Chinese military analyst was cited by a pro-China Hong Kong paper, Ta kung pao, as advocating three measures in response:

• speeding up the process of demarcating the baselines of China's territorial waters;
• tightening up effective administrative management and control of the islands; and
• intensifying readiness for naval operations, such as training with operating weaponry.

On June 21, 2012, Vietnam passed a new law on its maritime jurisdiction, including a reiteration of its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The anticipated passing of that law was the subject of an official meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese officials in October 2011. China’s failure to convince Vietnam to change course in those talks prompted it to take two of the measures foreshadowed by the military commentator in 2009 as mentioned above. (In fact, the Sansha City announcement was foreshadowed in December 2007, but shelved after street demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City against China that led to consultations a month later between the two countries. According to a Chinese official statement, the two countries agreed then to settle the “maritime” disputes by dialogue and consultation. Both sides refuse to negotiate on the territorial disputes.)

The new moves announced by China are largely symbolic in character and will not alter China’s calculation about the use of force. Since moving its units into the Spratly Islands in 1988 when there was a minor clash with Vietnamese forces, China has avoided combat operations. It has engaged in a range of other pressure tactics, as have other claimants. The new army garrison is small, administrative in character and not likely to affect any military balance in the South China Sea. It is on an island in the Paracel islands at least 400 nautical miles away from any island where rival claimants have military units. According to an Associated Press report of August 3 2012, the responsibility for triggering the latest round of tensions between China and the Philippines “began after Chinese fishing boats were stopped by Philippine vessels.” The A.P. dispatch then described the following sequence of events: “Manila deployed a navy ship, supplied by the U.S. the previous year, leading China to send more vessels of its own and quarantine Philippine fruit exports to China. Manila says Beijing has not fully complied with a June agreement, supported by the U.S., for a mutual withdrawal and has used barriers to block Philippine access to the reef.”

China has promoted cooperative measures to protect international merchant shipping at the global level, and at the regional level in supporting anti-piracy measures. As a trade-dependent economy, China has very strong vested interests in protecting sea-borne trade. China does have naval and air forces based on or near Hainan Island that could interfere with international merchant shipping, but it has fewer submarines in its entire navy in 2012 (46) than the 47 that were lost by Germany in just the month of May 1943 at the height of the war on shipping in the Atlantic in World War II. Moreover, the naval balance of power, like the overall military balance in the maritime regions of the Western Pacific, is very heavily tilted in favor of the United States and its allies, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. China could try to disrupt shipping, but the United States and its allies have made plain their very strong intention to oppose, with force if necessary, any such action.

China’s official claims to the geographic extent of its maritime jurisdiction (territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) conform to the letter of international law. The possible exception is that official Chinese maps of the South China Sea show a dotted line that encompasses the entire South China Sea. This line first appeared in maps released by the Republic of China in 1946 and has been interpreted by many observers to imply a territorial waters claim to the entire South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China has never officially asserted such a claim, and it has made declarations and passed laws which suggest that it has no such claim. The United States and other countries have called on China to clarify its view on this dotted line in the South China Sea.

 

What are the implications of the United States official reaction?

On August 3, 2012, the U.S. Department of State reacted to the news with a statement that called on all parties to settle their disputes, singling out China for its Sansha City announcements. The statement said: “Recent developments include an uptick in confrontational rhetoric, disagreements over resource exploitation, coercive economic actions, and the incidents around the Scarborough Reef, including the use of barriers to deny access. In particular, China's upgrading of the administrative level of Sansha City and establishment of a new military garrison there covering disputed areas of the South China Sea run counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve differences and risk further escalating tensions in the region.” This statement marked a clear departure by the United States in singling out one of the parties for escalating tensions through a direct challenge of domestic legislation and a minor deployment of troops.

For its part, China demanded to know why the United States had singled it out: “Why has the United States chosen to turn a blind eye to the acts of some country marking out a large number of oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea and making domestic legislation claiming as its own China's islands, reefs and waters? Why has the United States chosen on the one hand not to mention the acts of some country using naval vessel to threaten Chinese fishermen?” China went on to charge that the U.S. statement “showed total disregard of facts, confounded right and wrong, and sent a seriously wrong message. It is not conducive to efforts by the parties concerned to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region at large. The Chinese side expresses strong dissatisfaction of and firm opposition to it.” These views were conveyed by the Chinese government a day earlier when it summoned U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission, Robert Wang, to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing,

 

What Next?

The pressure on China to be less adamant about its claims in the Spratly Islands is mounting. China does have an obligation under international law to try to settle disputes peacefully, but since that applies to all parties, China is unlikely to back down without some equivalent gesture from other claimants. In the Spratly Islands, China will continue to avoid combat operations because a number of larger interests would be adversely affected for no significant gain. But it will retaliate with military force if attacked. A minor skirmish with loss of life cannot be ruled out. Trying to keep the dispute at a low level, China has so far avoided drawing any baselines around the Spratly Islands. In the Paracel Islands, which China has controlled fully since 1974, the situation is very different. For China, this dispute is definitively over and settled. China has drawn baselines around the Paracel Islands. Since Vietnam is the only other recognized claimant to the Paracels, China feels that it has a very strong hand, much stronger than in the sprawling and dispersed Spratly Islands where some 40 islands, rocks and reefs are occupied by three other states – and one is occupied by Taiwan.

 

 

 

中国在南中国海的城市?*

近几个月来，中国和其邻国间的外交关系日益紧张起来，达到一个新的高度。2012年6月21日，中国宣布它已正式批准在南中国海有争议的领土成立地级行政管理机构——三沙市。周边国家的恐惧在于中国日益增长的海军力量使中国更加强悍。八月三日，美国发布官方声明批评中国的新的行政措施，促使北京方面的情绪非常愤怒。

重要智库——东西方研究所教授级研究员格雷戈·奥斯汀，他是《中国海洋边界：国际法，军事力量和国家发展（1998）》一书的作者，为此提供了关于此争议的一些必要背景，然后在两个关键问题做出评论：1.中国设立三沙市的公告究竟有何意味？2.华盛顿对此通告的反应又有何暗示？

一、岛屿或者岩石？

在位于北部的西沙群岛和位于南部的南沙群岛之间有一个重要的区别。西沙群岛包括一些相对较大的岛屿，自然可以支持至少最低限度的人类居住（借此可以测试一下他们是否有资格享受经济区）。出于这个原因，它们很容易发起行政行为或人类活动，比如上岛收集粪类，这可能使一个国家声称在过去就对这块土地行使主权。如果有方案可以达成，以解决两国（中国和越南）对这块土地的主权问题，也就不会有其他国家反对其主权国从这些岛屿延伸200海里专属经济区。中国控制了西沙群岛，完全因它在1974年将南越军事力量从这些岛屿驱逐出去。1958年，北越政府已经认识到中国声称对西沙群岛拥有主权，而它是在越南统一以后才发出自己的主权声明。（越南声明的理由部分在于法国制定的法律里，法国是1954年前在越南的殖民力量。）

南沙群岛呈现出和西沙群岛完全不同的面貌。这些岛屿都不是真正的一个确切的群体，在领土确认国际法下，这些岛屿不会被认定为一个单一的行政单位。这里积聚了一些礁石与岩石，两端长约为一千公里，包括一些很小的分散的岛屿。中国已确定并命名了193处暗礁、礁石、浅滩。西方图表识别了多达十二个不同的岛群；中国术语则是指称至少五个不同的岛群，以及与他们不相关联的不计其数的单个的小岛。有那么多方面对所有这些岛屿或其中部分岛屿宣称主权，要在相关各方间设想一种有意义的合法的解决方案，作为界定专属经济区边界的基础，这几乎是不可能的。

中国占领南沙群岛的所有特征在于，礁石或岩石上用混凝土修建了设施，使少数军事人员驻扎在这里。中国很少有其他选择，因为其他主权宣示方已经占据了所有的天然岛屿，中国选择了不试图驱逐他们。这一系列情况是非常重要的。中国和其他主权宣示方可能只会达成南沙群岛附近的海上边界的和解，而忽略他们作为主权宣示方专属经济区界限的设计基点。中国可能在谈判中对南沙群岛中的这个或那个暗礁或岩石放弃主权，正如它在与陆上毗连的国家解决边界争端时舍弃极少部分领土一样。基于我在1998年的《中国的海洋边界》一书中的理由，中国是永远不可能放弃西沙群岛的主权的。

二、链接台湾

中国在南中国海岛屿争端的政策是与台湾问题密切联系在一起的。台湾就中国所宣称主权的同一岛屿群体也宣称主权。事实上，当北京的中国政府在1949年掌权，它就从中华民国继承了主权宣示。台湾是第一个派遣军队占领南沙群岛的政府，第一次是1946年，然后是1956年。从1956年以来，台湾在南沙群岛一直维持一个较小的军事单位或行政存在。中国对于南沙群岛这种情况非常慎重，直到1988年才开始在它所占领的少数礁石与岩石上驻扎了军事人员。中国的军事力量避免在这些群岛上与台湾同行产生任何冲突。只要台湾代表一个统一的中国，对所有这些岛屿保持主权宣示，北京的中国政府就不可能商谈任何解决方式。对于台湾的主权声明，任何第三方也必须面对这种复杂的因素。根据国际法，台湾将不会被给予任何主权国家地位，因为它是不被信守“一个中国”政策的国家所承认的。

三、中国成立三沙市及其相关的军事部署，意欲何为？

2012年7月21日，中国国务院宣布成立三沙市，以管理它在南中国海宣示主权的群岛。市政府将选址建立在西沙群岛中的一部分永兴岛上，这是对中国在1988年对西沙、南沙、中沙群岛建立县级管理办事处的一次管理规格的升级。7月23日，中国人民解放军宣布将成立一支新水平的地面力量的守备部队司令部，负责管理国防动员、军事储备和实施军事行动。后续信息表明这支队伍将由一名大校领导。根据中国的文献，此举是为了应对越南和菲律宾两个对手近年来所采取的行政举措。2009年，菲律宾就其领海颁布了新的法律，重申其对南沙群岛部分岛屿的主权。当时一个中国的军事分析家提到了力挺中国的香港大公报的三条应对建议：1.加快划分中国领海基线的进程；2.对岛屿加强有效的行政管理和控制；3.加紧准备海上作战，如培训武器使用。

2012年6月21日，越南对其海事管辖权通过新的法律，包括重申其对西沙群岛和南沙群岛的主权。这部法律的预期通过是中越两国官员在2011年官方会谈的一个主题。在这些会谈中，中国未能说服越南改变颁布新法的进程，促使中国采取了上述军事评论员在2009年提到的两条措施。（事实上，三沙市的成立在2007年12月就已经预示了，但当时由于河内和胡志明市举行了反对中国的街头示威而搁置了。这次示威导致了一个月以后两国的磋商。根据中国官方声明，两国同意随后通过对话和磋商解决海上争议，双方都拒绝就领土争端进行谈判。）

中国所宣告的这些新举措在很大程度上是如所预料的象征性的动作，将不会改变中国动用武力的打算。中国自1988年其行政机构入驻南沙群岛以来，除去当时与越南军队有一个小的冲突以外，已经避免了较大作战行动。中国在应用其他较多的策略应对压力，正如其他相关各方一样。新的守备部队驻防规模较小，更多是行政性质，不可能影响南中国海的任何军事平衡。它驻扎在西沙群岛的一个岛上，距离任何一个对手的岛上驻军都至少在400海里以外。据美联社2012年8月3日报道，新一轮中菲间紧张关系的触发开始于中国渔船被菲律宾船只逼停。美联社然后描述了下列事件：“马尼拉方面部署了前一年由美国提供的海军船队，这导致中国派遣出更多船只应对并加强了对菲律宾出口到中国水果的检疫。马尼拉方面说北京没有完全遵守美国支持的要求双边撤退的六月协议反而设置障碍，阻止菲方接近这些礁石。”

中国在全球范围内促进了合作措施以保护国际商业船运，而且在区域层面支持反盗版措施。作为一个以贸易为主的经济体，中国在保护海上贸易上有很大的既得利益。中国在海南或者海南附近确实拥有海军和空军力量，这些力量足可以干扰国际商业船运，但它的整个海军到2012年只拥有较少的潜艇，46艘，这比德国在1943年5月份二战当中大西洋航运之战高潮时仅仅一个月损失的总量47艘还少。此外，海军力量的平衡，如西太平洋地区的海上整体军事实力平衡，是非常严重倾向于美国及其盟友的力量，包括台湾、日本和韩国。中国可以尝试破坏航运，但美国及其盟友已将反对意图表露无遗，如果必要将采用武力等诸如此类行动。

中国官方声称的海事管辖权的地理范围（领海、毗连区、专属经济区和大陆架）符合国际法的字面意义。可能的例外是，中国南中国海的官方地图显示出一条虚线，这条虚线的范围涵盖了整个南中国海。这条虚线首次出现在中华人民共和国1946年发布的地图，许多观察家把它解读为中国暗示其领海主权适用于整个南中国海。中国人民共和国从未正式提出这样的要求，它所通过的声明和法律也没有暗示这样的要求。美国和其他国家呼吁中国阐明其在南中国海地图上这条虚线的真实意义。

四、美国官方反应有何意味？

2012年8月3日，美国国务院对中国成立三沙市这则新闻的反应是发表了一条声明，呼吁各方针对中国关于成立三沙市的公告解决纠纷。声明说：“最近的时局进展包括对抗性辩论的升级，资源开发上的分歧，经济胁迫措施的出台，斯卡伯勒礁周边的事故，包括使用障碍拒绝接近。特别是，中国升格三沙市的行政管理级别和建立一个新的军事守备部队，覆盖南中国海有争议地区，违背了通过外交合作解决分歧和风险的努力，进一步加剧该地区的紧张局势。”这段声明是美国针对当事一方通过直接挑战国内立法和小规模部队部署而使得局势紧张的情况所做出的分道扬镳的明确表态。

就中国而言，中国要求知道为什么美国那么针对它：“为什么美国对有些国家在南中国海标记出大量的石油和天然气区域以及制定国内立法将中国的岛屿、暗礁和水域宣布为它自己所有的行为视而不见？另一方面为什么美国并没有提到一些国家使用舰艇威胁中国渔民的行为呢？”中国继续指责美国的声明：“美国声明完全不顾事实、混淆正确和错误、并传递了一个严重的错误信息。这不利于通过各方努力维护南中国海乃至亚太地区的和平与稳定，中方对此表示强烈不满和坚决反对。”北京的外交部在前一天召见美国公使王晓岷时把中国政府的这些意见转达给了美方。

五、下一步呢？

对于中国在南中国海不顽固坚持主张的压力在增加。中国确有义务根据国际法努力和平解决争端，但由于这些基本原则适用于相关各方，如果其他各方没有对应的姿态，中国是不可能退让的。在南沙群岛，中国将继续避免作战，因为没有明显的收获，就会对许多较大的利益产生不利影响。但如果遭受攻击，中方将武力报复，一场小的冲突与生命的损失将不能排除。为了试图将争议维持在低水平，中国到目前为止避免在南沙群岛周边划定基线。在西沙群岛，中国自1974年就已经完全控制，情况是非常不同的。对于中国，关于西沙群岛的争议已经确定过去并解决好了。中国已经在西沙群岛周边划定了基线。由于越南只是唯一被认可的对西沙群岛宣示主权的另外一方，因而中国认为它自己在西沙群岛拥有强大实力，远远强于它在庞大而又分散的南沙群岛上的情形。在那里，大约40个岛屿，岩石和珊瑚礁被其他三个国家或者地区占领——其中一个就是台湾。

 

 

“The dynamic of change is the people themselves, which is what makes this exciting and unpredictable at the same time,” said Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center and fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. “This is a process that is long overdue.”

Others saw both opportunities and perils in the new situation. Egyptian Foreign Ministry official Tamim Khallaf described the changes as part of a larger process of de-militarization of Arab governments, and he hailed the first free presidential elections in his country. Turkish economist Gökhan Bacik called the Arab Spring “a great economic opportunity for Turkey.”

But others warned of the dangers of populism when the early euphoria turns to disappointment as economic problems persist, and expressed concerns about new divisions, particularly within Islamic movements. “We are witnessing centrifugal forces at work that are pulling at the old religious and tribal divides,” said Isobel Coleman of the Council on Foreign Relations.

While some panelists disagreed on whether to call the upheavals in the region a revolution or an awakening, there was consensus that, whatever label is used, the magnitude of the changes cannot be denied. “This is not something seasonal or brief,” said Dan Arbell, Minister of Political Affairs at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. “I see this as a tectonic shift.”

Predictably, there were sharp disagreements on Iran’s nuclear program. Ambassadior Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who served as Iran’s spokesman during its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005, declared: “Iran is prepared to accept a deal based on maximum transparency measures.” But according to Israeli diplomat Arbell, “The window for the diplomatic option is closing.”

Panelists also discussed the Syrian crisis, the internal disagreements in Israel about that country’s future, the impact of the regional upheavals on women and minorities, and the prospects for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

For more information on speakers and panel sessions, click here to download the agenda.

 

MP3s of panel sessions:

Panel I: Unfinished Transformations in the Middle East and their Effect on the Regional Security Dynamic (1:43:38)

Panel II: The Two-Level Game: How are Current Domestic Politics Affecting Foreign Policy Decision-making? (1:37:34)

Panel III: Chances for Rapprochement: What Role for Multilateral Initiatives? (1:28:18)

 

Portions of the livestream recording are available for viewing here via EWI's Ustream channel:

 

Click here for more coverage of the event by the Inter Press Service.

Tensions between the United States of America and Russia over the deployment of a ballistic missile defence system by the US in eastern Europe are sharpening. Japan is deploying such a system to ward off the North Korean missile threat. With fears of increasing missile proliferation, BMD deployments could take place also in the Gulf region. What stock-taking can one do of the situation in South Asia?

India’s strategic neighbourhood is extremely difficult, with two large neighbours, China and Pakistan, possessing nuclear weapons and a panoply of missiles and collaborating with each other to contain India. No other country faces such a powerful combination of adversarial direct neighbours.

India is therefore compelled to develop technologies and capacities to protect itself. But it faces considerable technological and financial constraints. Its formidable challenge is to develop capacities that are autonomous but also available in reasonable time frames.

India’s political system and domestic economic and social challenges dispose it towards moderation. It seeks to develop the base of high technologies in the country, but without excessive investment of resources and determined acceleration of programmes.

India’s missile development programme began in 1986 and it is only this year that it has successfully launched its 5,000-kilometre range Agni V missile. Its earlier development of Prithvi and Agni III missiles gave it the means to develop a BMD programme, which began in 1999.

India’s BMD programme has a two-tiered system, with the Prithvi air defence for high altitude exo-atmospheric (50 to 80 kms) and advanced air defence for low altitude endo-atmospheric (15 to 30 kms) interception. Future plans include two new anti-ballistic missiles, AD-1 and AD-2, for intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles at a range of around 5,000 kms.

India has carried out seven BMD tests in all, six of them successful, of which two used the PAD exo-atmospheric interceptor and four the endo-atmospheric one. The first was on March 6, 2006, the seventh on February 10, 2012.

India’s BMD system is being developed in two phases: in the first phase against missiles with less than 2,000 km range, like Pakistan’s Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, with 600 km-range radars and missiles at the speed of Mach 4-5 and expected deployment by 2013.

It will be a two-tiered terminal phase interceptor system consisting of a PAD exo-atmospheric interceptor missile, an AAD endo-atmospheric interceptor and the “Swordfish” long range tracking radar developed jointly with Israel. Under phase one, the national capital region will be covered and later other cities will be protected.

The current PAD missile is intended to be replaced by a PDV missile in the PAD/AAD combination by eliminating the liquid-fuel first stage and creating a two solid-fuel stage missile capable of interception at altitudes of upto 150 kms.

Phase two will cater for missiles with a range greater than 2,000 kms, will reach Mach 6-7 speed and have the capability to manoeuvre and deploy decoys. It will require long range radars with a detection range of 1,600 kms with greater indigenous content. Several technologies, such as a space based launch detection system, have to be integrated to make this possible, and all this will take several more years to develop.

A satellite kill vehicle, using Agni III, is reportedly being developed but no test has been scheduled so far, as delicate political considerations are involved. China’s ASAT test in 2007 has spurred Indian concerns because our growing space assets need protection.

While the achievements of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation are impressive, claims that we can deploy an effective BMD system against intermediate range ballistic missiles and ICBMs in the next few years invite some scepticism. Of course, India is not planning a full spectrum BMD system because of technological and financial limitations. Even the US, after spending billions, does not possess such a system and is looking for financial burden-sharing now even for developing and deploying the Standard Missile 3 that can intercept an incoming missile mid-course. The Indian effort is concentrated on the terminal phase which gives limited geographical coverage as compared to mid-course interception.

However, in terms of actual effectiveness in battlefield conditions, like other systems, the Indian system will have to contend with the enemy overwhelming the shield with a large number of warheads or mirved missiles. The Chinese have this capability.

Just as the Russians are developing new missile and reworking systems to defeat the proposed US BMD shield, the Chinese and the Pakistanis will react similarly to India’s BMD system. Chinese experts claim China has never taken India as a strategic rival and that none of its weapons were designed to contain India. Similarly India says that its longer range Agni missiles are intended to deter China and not Pakistan, but this does not deter Pakistan from developing its missile capacities further to counter India. Regional diplomatic initiatives to address these problems are very difficult to work out.

The US BMD deployments are triggering Chinese responses with an impact on our region. China wants to deter the US, India wants to deter China and Pakistan, Pakistan wants to deter India. China will not limit its capabilities to assuage India’s concerns so long as it perceives a threat from the US. India will continue to develop credible deterrent capabilities against China so long as the China threat exists and expands, and will not be able to respond to Pakistan’s calls for a mutual strategic restraint regime that leaves China out.

Significantly, all those countries deploying terminal defence systems are integrated into the US surveillance and tracking capabilities. India and the US have signed a 10-year defence framework agreement that provides for expanding collaboration relating to missile defence. In January 2012, a senior Pentagon official stated that the US was open to collaborating with India on the missile defence shield project and would restart the dialogue with India on the subject.

For many years India and the US have been talking about missile defence issues, without tangible progress so far. India wants to retain its autonomy in this area.

In sum, India is making progress in developing a BMD system even if its effectiveness in battlefield conditions remains open to question. India has little choice in this regard as it cannot allow the strategic gap between it and China to grow irretrievably. It must remain abreast of vital strategic technologies. India has to consider developing ASAT technologies before any international regime is reached that excludes India like the non-proliferation treaty.

India is not a member of any alliance and must rely on itself for its defence. This makes it necessary for it to develop its strategic capacities sufficiently and independently. The conditions for a separate Indian subcontinental deal on such issues do not exist as China would not want to be constrained in its choices vis-a-vis the US by the India factor, apart from its unwillingness to deal with India on the basis of equality in nuclear matters, and India will not want to be constrained in its choices vis-a-vis China by the Pakistan factor.

This is a circular problem and squaring this circle will be exceedingly difficult indeed.

From June 16 to 19, 2012, senior retired flag officers of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force met with Chinese retired senior generals of the People’s Liberation Army to discuss pressing issues in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.  This fourth iteration of the bilateral talks between retired senior officers, known as the Sanya Initiative, spanned two days of private dialogue at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, and two days of meetings with senior elected officials and policy experts in Washington, D.C. 

The six principal Chinese delegates, in order of seniority, were:

• Gen. Li Qianyuan, former Commander of PLA Lanzhou Military Region
• Gen. Zhu Qi, former Commander of PLA Beijing Military Region
• Adm. Hu Yanlin, former Political Commissar of PLA Navy
• Gen. Zheng Shenxia, former President of the Academy of Military Sciences
• Lt. Gen. Wang Liangwang, former Deputy Commander of PLA Air Force
• Lt. Gen. Zhao Xijun, former Deputy Commander of the PLA Second Artillery Force

The six principal U.S. delegates, in alphabetical order, were:

• Gen. James Cartwright, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Gen. Kevin Chilton, Former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
• Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, Former Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
• Adm. William Fallon, Former Commander of U.S. Central Command
• Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Adm. William Owens, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

For the first time in the Sanya Initiative’s four-year history, the EastWest Institute (EWI) was involved in the coordination of this meeting, in cooperation with the Chinese Association for International Friendly Contact.  EWI’s President and CEO John Edwin Mroz, Vice President for the Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy David J. Firestein, Chief of Staff James Creighton, and China Program Senior Associate Piin-Fen Kok also participated in the discussions. 

The Annapolis talks covered a range of topics of military and political importance to the United States and China.  Delegates held sessions on the U.S. rebalancing, or “pivot,” to Asia, North Korea, the South China Sea, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, America’s Air-Sea Battle Concept, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and managing the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.  While there was consensus on some issues and disagreement on others, both sides agreed that cultivating communication and mutual understanding between the militaries of the United States and China is essential for fostering the cooperation between the two nations necessary to address the world’s most difficult issues.

“We are two strategic nations, and we must act in strategic ways because of influences we have around the globe and because of the leadership that we demonstrate around the globe for all other nations,” Gen. Cartwright noted in his remarks in Annapolis. “[But] it’s very important for all of us at this table to realize that if the United States fails as a nation or if China fails as a nation, we both fail.”

 Gen. Li Qianyuan, the Chinese delegation leader, expressed a similar sentiment. 

“The U.S. and China have a shared desire to strengthen coordination and cooperation on most major issues and to develop a new type of state-to-state relationship to the benefit of both of our peoples and the peoples of the world. Coming together through the Sanya Initiative, we will surely help to deepen mutual understanding, build mutual trust, reduce misunderstanding, and promote the great cause of friendship between our two countries.”

The second half of the Sanya Initiative meeting took place in Washington, D.C., where the U.S. and Chinese delegates held discussions with Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ), respectively Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Arms Services Committee, and Representatives Charles Boustany (R-LA) and Rick Larsen (D-WA), Co-Chairmen of the House U.S.-China Working Group.  The delegates visited the Pentagon to meet with Mark W. Lippert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, J5.  At the State Department, the delegates spoke with Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.  The delegates were also invited to dinner by former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and former Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt.  Prior to traveling to Annapolis and Washington, the Chinese delegation held meetings with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Chairman of the Starr Foundation Maurice Greenberg, and the CEO of NYSE Euronext Duncan Niederauer in New York.

The Sanya Initiative meeting was made possible with the generous support of the Starr Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the China-United States Exchange Foundation.

The working group is drawn from U.S.- and Russia-based experts who are producing a joint threat assessment (JTA) on the wide range of challenges posed to both states by narcotrafficking from Afghanistan. The JTA will be followed by a Joint Policy Assessment suggesting cooperative measures that the United States and Russia can undertake to tackle the dangers posed by Afghan narcotrafficking.  This working group is addressing a key security concern to both the United States and Russia and thus aims to aid in the “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations by delivering positive momentum, confidence-building, and policy impact. As the U.S.-Russia relationship faces increased strains and tensions from difficult and increasingly divisive issues like ballistic missile defense and Syria, the need to promote dialogue where there are common interests intensifies.

The working group members met in June at EWI’s Brussels office for three days of discussions. Initial sessions were held with senior officials from the European Union, NATO, and the Russian Mission to NATO on actions, interests, and challenges in Afghanistan. The experts then devoted two days to assessing the key threats that both Russia and the United States face and possible scenarios for these threats after 2014. The discussions touched on economic development, insurgency and criminal groups in trafficking, state capacity, the Afghan national forces, corruption, border management, the role of eradication in counternarcotics strategy, and the function of international organizations in the region.

There was a widespread expectation that in the immediate aftermath of NATO’s withdrawal and a reduced U.S. troop presence, there will be an increase in the amount of poppy produced and the role of opium—already significant—in Afghanistan’s economy. Both the willingness and ability of the Afghan national forces to take on a significant counternarcotics role was also discussed.

Although the supply side of counternarcotics strategy dominated the conversations, the experts discussed how Russia and the United States could do more work on the demand side of counternarcotics strategy, which is fertile ground for continued collaboration. How to reinforce and expand already successful cooperation, such as the already robust Drug Enforcement Agency(DEA)-Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) ties, was also discussed.

The JTA, which should be finalized by September, will include assessments of the following areas:

• the threats that Afghan narcotrafficking poses specifically to Russia and the U.S. and the shared concerns between these two countries
• the opium economy in Afghanistan
• the transnational trade in Afghan opiates and money laundering
• effects of narcotrafficking on state-building in Afghanistan

Working group members are scheduled to convene in New York in the fall to finalize the joint policy assessment.

Members of the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking:

 

Russian Experts

Ilnur Batyrshin, Head of the Scientific Research Center of FSKN 

Viktor Korgun, Head of the Afghanistan department, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Yuri Kroupnov, Director, Institute for Demography, Migration, and Regional Development; Advisor to the Director of Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN)

Aman Saliev, Senior Expert, Institute of Strategic Analysis and Planning, Kyrgyz-Russian University of the Kyrgyz Republic

Konstantin Sorokin, Project Manager, Department of Training and Methodology and Research Projects, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM)

Ekaterina Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit of IMEMO

Georgi Zazulin, Professor at the Chair of Conflictology, St. Petersburg University, specializing on narcoconflictology and anti-narcotics policies in Russia and Europe; Russian representative of the International Organization European Cities Against Drugs 

 

U.S. Experts

Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

George Gavrilis, Executive Director, The Hollings Center for International Dialogue

David T. Johnson, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Senior Advisor, Avascent International; former Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement

John “Jack” Lawn, former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency

David Mansfield, Visiting Fellow, The Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University

Kimberly Marten, Professor, Department of Political Science, Barnard College

Gretchen Peters, author, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs and Crime Have Reshaped the Afghan War; Consultant, Researcher and Advisor of Transnational Crime Issues

Cory Welt, Associate Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs; Adjunct Fellow, Center for American Progress

 

The meeting could not have been more timely, following on the heels of the recently concluded NATO summit in Chicago, which took place without a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. At the heart of the issue is a deep divide between the United States and Russia over what a cooperative BMD program should look like. The Russian government has concerns that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could eventually be directed against Russian ballistic missiles and is insisting on a legal guarantee that NATO's BMD system will not be used against Russia. The United States has repeatedly stated that it understands Russian concerns but that the EPAA will not be directed against Russia .The United States is willing to offer political guarantees matched by cooperative confidence-building actions but that it is unable to provide Russia with legally binding statements. Signaling its frustration with the United States over BMD, Russia did not participate at a high level in the NATO summit. And, as expected, NATO announced at the summit that the EPAA had reached interim operational capacity.

Rose focused his comments on the details and goals of NATO's EPAA plan and the future of U.S.-Russian cooperation on BMD. After his presentation, participants inquired about the divergence between Russian and U.S. assessments of the threat emanating from Iran. Another attendee asked about the political environments in both countries and whether political factors are driving their respective positions. Others focused their questions on the future of the EPAA considering the ever-changing international security concerns.

 

Separately, Rose offered these on-the-record responses to questions posed by EWI’s Thomas Lynch: 

To what extent does the notion of mutually assured destruction factor into current tensions on ballistic missile defense? Additionally, how can NATO and Russia overcome their differences vis-a-vis addressing today's nuclear challenges (e.g. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan)?

Cooperation on missile defense would be a game changer and the next step in expanding U.S.-Russia cooperation.  It would give us the chance to build a true strategic partnership and help us move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

President Obama has said on many occasions that the United States is committed to finding a mutually acceptable approach to missile defense cooperation with Russia.   Such cooperation can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia.

The best assurances for Russia that the U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be achieved through close cooperation with the United States and NATO. 

Through this cooperation Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed and capable of defending against missiles originating from the Middle East and is not designed for or capable of undermining the Russian strategic deterrent.  Cooperation can be difficult, but it will bring benefits to both sides.  We know because cooperation in other areas is producing positive results.  We are successfully implementing the New START Treaty, moving materials to and from Afghanistan and stopping drug traffickers and terrorists.  Our track record with the Russian Government on New START and other issues demonstrates that we can come to agreement on complex issues. We look forward to continuing our dialogue with the Russian government on this issue.

 

What are the best means of addressing the trust deficit between Russia and NATO on BMD issues?

Let me start on the progress we have made with Russia under this Administration.  I'd point to Russian support of U.N. Security Council resolutions that included the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea and Iran, our work together on the New START Treaty, and our work to open up the Northern Distribution Network to get critical supplies to troops in Afghanistan, to name a few.

We are working together to implement a landmark agreement that calls for each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, in total enough material for about 17,000 nuclear weapons.  The United States and Russia have also partnered successfully to remove unneeded highly enriched uranium from several central and eastern European countries, former Soviet republics, Vietnam and Libya, reducing the risk that terrorists could get their hands on dangerous nuclear materials.

There are obviously areas where we've disagreed, but Russia is a committed member of the international nonproliferation community and we will continue to work with Russia and other partners on nonproliferation challenges.

Trying to muddle way out of another unpopular war and loath to concede defeat, US and NATO have been racing against time to build an Afghan army able to fend for itself after 130,000 US and ISAF troops pull out in 2014. The final transition phase, involving the handing over of responsibility for provinces and districts to Afghan authorities, will start from “mid-2013,” Nato secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said. A number of areas and towns have already been handed over since the transition started a year ago. Incidents of Afghan soldiers turning on Nato troops cause apprehension of increased Taliban infiltration of the Afghan police and army.

Nato initially planned to expand Afghan Security Forces to over 350,000. Defining the 2014 exit strategy the Chicago summit set the size and scope after 2014 to be much smaller, roughly 230,000 troops. Without scaling down the future security needs, it simply reflected prevailing economic realities in an era of austerity budgets and defence cutbacks. The US and Nato require $4.1 billion a year to maintain the Afghan military, far less than the cost of maintaining foreign forces in Afghanistan and also, and more importantly, easier for the economically suffering and war-weary US and European publics to sustain.

In keeping with his campaign pledge, incoming French president Francois Hollande said France will withdraw its own forces by the end of 2012. Along with Britain, Germany and Italy, France is among the top five troop-contributing nations with about 3,600 soldiers, dwarfed by the 90,000-strong US force. The 9,500 British forces in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion in 2001 will be reduced by 500 soldiers this year. Two hundred members of Britain’s Special Forces will stay on after 2014 to help combat terrorism in Afghanistan.

As Afghanistan’s largest patron, the US is supposed to share about 25 percent of the cost after 2014 in support of the present Afghan regime for at least a decade (or more), but could well conceivably bear more than half the cost. The recent Obama-Karzai strategic partnership covers everything from security to economic development, to building a functional Afghan government. US special operations forces will have to stay to “mentor the Afghan National Security Force,” says Marine Corps Maj Gen John Toolan, who commanded Nato forces in Afghanistan’s volatile southwest. US gunships and air-to-ground assault planes will continue supporting ground forces. The fledgling Afghan air force which in 2015 will still be unable to do so. The US will also continue maintaining a fleet of intelligence-gathering and surveillance aircraft, Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis claims that “it spells out an important US red line to the Taliban, who have long called for expelling all foreign forces from the country.”

All said and done, will the Afghan Army fight? With a track record over centuries of deserting on masse to whosoever controls Kabul and the treasury, it did not fight for the Soviets against the Mujhahideen, nor for the US and Nato against the Taliban.

President Zardari faced studied but polite cold-shouldering in Chicago. On the one hand are the economic and geo-political considerations of far-reaching consequences for the destiny of the nation, on the other an enraged populace burning with anger against the drone strikes and the US failure to render an apology over Salala. A predator nation that has lived off the Indus Valley for centuries, Afghanistan will continue to live off Pakistan for centuries more.

Commenting on Abid Latif Sindhu’s article “Necessary Roughness – endgame in Afghanistan,” Brig Usman Khalid concludes: (1) The endgame will effect the world balance of power because Pakistan has a crucial role to play. It borders China, is a gateway to Central Asia and is situated on the Western part of the Arabian Sea. This part controls a chokepoint – the Strait of Hormuz, which joins the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf-and not too far to the south is the Gulf of Aden, which leads to the Red Sea via the still narrower Bab el-Mandeb Strait; (2) Pakistan has shown “necessary roughness,” which is a prerequisite for playing its role in the new narrative that would unfold after the exit of NATO from Afghanistan in 2014. Brig Usman Khalid further notes: “It is in Pakistan’s interest to facilitate the withdrawal of Nato forces by the end of 2014 and logistical support until then. The reopening of the supply line to Afghanistan is no longer an issue. Pakistan does not and cannot support the overall design of the US which is now being made in consultation with India. Pakistan-US relations will move along a rough and bumpy road. If Pakistan maintains its strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its warm relations with China, the cost of travelling this bumpy road would be bearable and diplomatic isolation avoided.” The Nato supply line through Pakistan needs resolution but will have emotional ramifications among a populace no longer patient with putting issues on the backburner.

The presence of American “experts” after 2014 with US bases operational at Bagram, Kandahar and Kabul has made the endgame more complex. According to Sindhu, “Pakistan has just shown necessary roughness while dealing with the USA in retaliation for its bashing; it was never an act of defiance. It is precisely what is required in any relationship, may it be one between husband and wife or Hillary’s favourite mother-in-law analogy. So it should be taken in the right context. Pakistan is not a rentier state; the state policy could be lopsided but it does exist. It is both a victim and the player of the new great game with a status of the regional middle kingdom. Afghanistan endgame is being played by increasing the numbers of players in its final hour; this has made the phenomenon global in nature and multidimensional in its texture.”

Sindhu asks whether Pakistan can be ignored with its unique connectivity matrix when Pakistan is fighting an extended insurgency in all of the tribal areas? In essence, he says, “globalism has come face to face with tribalism, one using technology as the main driver and later using the simplicity as the sine qua non for its existence and survival. International conferences, moots and summits without reality checks would be a futile exercise perpetuating the Afghan ordeal. Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA have to reach an operational consensus respecting each other’s sensitivities.” Sindhu left out an inconvenient truth which the West well knows, the best bet against future conflict is not going to be the well-funded ceremonials of the Afghan army but the motivated, battle-hardened disciplined soldiers of the Pakistan Army.

The Chicago Summit recognised the home truth about Pakistan’s being not only critical but central to an Afghan solution. To quote Rasmussen, “there can be no large drawdown of troops from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help.” President Obama said: “It is in our interest to see a successful, stable Pakistan and it is in Pakistan’s interest to have stable relationship with us.” Meeting Zardari briefly, he expressed the desire to stay engaged despite differences. “The US did not want Pakistan to be consumed by its own extremism.”

Beyond Chicago, Pakistan can only hope it will not be consumed by extreme views from the West which fail to recognise the relevance of the Taliban ground reality.

This visit builds on an ongoing two-year effort of EWI’s Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention to strengthen the role of women in political life, and in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Afghanistan in particular.

Over the course of two days the  parliamentarians, led by Shahnaz Wazir Ali, Member of Pakistan's National Assembly and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister,  discussed issues related to reconciliation with the Taliban and regional economic cooperation with Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Masoom Stanikzai, Advisor to the President on Internal Security and Head of the Secretariat for Afghanistan's High Peace Council, Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Lower House, and members of the Wolesi Jirga Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights.

Though Afghan women parliamentarians make up nearly a third of seats in parliament, they struggle to make their voices heard in a male-dominated environment. Pakistani women parliamentarians work in a similar cultural, religious, and social context, yet they have made  far more political headway. Afghan women parliamentarians have called for more support from their colleagues in the region, and EWI’s Parliamentarians Network has facilitated a series of dialogues to answer that call.

This delegation is the first step in implementing the Islamabad Action Plan, a set of commitments outlined by Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians during their previous meeting in Islamabad in June 2011, which was also facilitated by EWI.

In the meeting with President Karzai, the Afghan leader declared: “This initiative is of immense importance to both countries and a great sign of a better future.” He called for more contacts between women parliamentarians in both countries, saying that such visits are “instrumental in strengthening of trust-building between the two nations.”

Women are critical players in the ongoing peace and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often serving as agents of positive change in the region.  “Without women, no progress can be made in society,” Stanikzai added. Participants strongly endorsed the recommendation to ensure greater representation of women in all tracks of diplomacy.

Joint challenges, from extremism and terrorism to economic underdevelopment, should be addressed by joint efforts, according to the participants. The Taliban attacks on Kabul during the parliamentary visit served as a stark reminder of the work that remains to be done. These attacks, the Taliban’s broadest assault on Kabul in more than a decade, fired at the Afghan parliament only hours after the meeting came to a close.

As the international military presence winds down and Afghanistan sets to assume responsibility over its security in 2014, many – including participants in the meetings – fear a return to Taliban rule, and a subsequent retraction of women’s rights. While emphasizing the importance of engaging with those Taliban who are willing to negotiate and constructively discuss a peaceful resolution, Rassoul and Stanikzai both emphasized that the Taliban must accept the 2004 Afghan constitution which recognizes that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities under the law.

Participants suggested that an inclusive forum where Afghan women parliamentarians can develop a common agenda and work jointly, such as a women’s parliamentary caucus, would enable them to maximize their influence. “Only if women work together will they have their voices heard and safeguard their rights,” one participant said.

The Commission on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights, one of eighteen permanent commissions of the Afghan parliament, has made impressive strides – most notably, by its recent successful push for a decree on combating violence against women. But because of the way parliamentary groups are structured, not all women parliamentarians are able to participate in such efforts.  To help change that, participants committed to taking steps towards the creation of an inclusive women’s group in the Afghan parliament, an initiative that has the backing of President Karzai. Participants speaking for Pakistan’s WPC pledged their ongoing support to their Afghan colleagues and invited them to Islamabad for an EWI-facilitated follow-up visit later this year.

Finishing this well-intentioned and important project, which had stalled due to a cumbersome bureaucracy, poor contracting procedures, high leadership turn-over, and a lack of proper supervision, became one of my top priorities.

When I relinquished command and left Afghanistan about a year later, the project was back on track but still incomplete, despite three years of frustrating effort. Next door to the police headquarters, meanwhile, my Australian friends and counterparts had quickly transformed a vacant lot into a gleaming, functioning school for girls – all within a single calendar year.

Though we were successful in some other important development projects, the challenges we faced in bringing this single U.S. project to fruition, and the strategies that allowed other NATO nations to move more quickly, symbolize many of the challenges faced and lessons learned by U.S. and NATO personnel in Afghanistan. These lessons also highlight how outside help, if offered and managed with an awareness of local cultural sensitivities, can help transform whole communities for the better in a much shorter period of time.

Route to Command

I reported to the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan on June 27, 2009. As the lead planner on the newly established ISAF Joint Command (IJC) run by both Americans and Afghans, I supervised planning for the security of Afghanistan, including the role of the 30,000-soldier U.S. “surge,” and the corresponding 10,000 increase in NATO forces.

After a year, planning included how to replace the Dutch when they departed Uruzgan, a province about 100 miles north of Kandahar. The plan called for a NATO command called “Combined Team Uruzgan” (CTU) to take control of Uruzgan from the Dutch. The new team would consist primarily of U.S. and Australian forces and be commanded by a U.S. colonel—in this case me.

When I arrived in Uruzgan as the new commander, I had about a month to meet, train, and prepare my largely ad hoc Australian and U.S. staff for combat. The lessons I learned as a planner in Kabul were essential to preparing my command to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These lessons focused on building solid relationships with Afghans and coalition forces; helping the Afghans build better governance systems; completing development projects; developing the Afghan National Security Forces; and expanding security in the province. Consequently, my first battlefield circulation patrols were intended to determine the status of existing development projects in Uruzgan’s capital city of Tarin Kowt.

The need for the police station

Police in Tarin Kowt clearly needed better facilities if they were to play a major role in an Afghan-led security effort after NATO forces depart in 2014. The Combined Security Transition Command (Afghanistan) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs decided the police headquarters in Tarin Kowt was a high-priority project. They tasked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with its construction.

The project, which included four major buildings and several outbuildings, was 70 percent done when the Afghan contractors from Kabul and Kandahar stopped paying their subcontractors and fled the area, taking with them what was left of the money they received to complete the project. Having spent the budgeted funds on the project without completing it, the Corps of Engineers struck a deal with Matiullah Khan, a local warlord. Matiullah also happened to be the commander of the local militia, the Kandak-e Amniat-e Uruzgan (KAU), and a colonel in the Afghan National Police (ANP). The idea was that he would keep the site secure indefinitely.

The previous Dutch commanders viewed the headquarters as a U.S. project and let it sit unfinished. They also chose not to deal with the local police chief, who, although corrupt, was able to secure the population by resolving conflicts and expanding police presence throughout the province in a professional manner. The lack of ownership, change-over in coalition leaders, and distrust of local officials created a situation where there was no one who felt responsible for the half-completed project. In fact, when I returned to base after my initial reconnaissance patrol and made inquires as to the status of the project, it took several weeks to find documentation on the project and determine exactly how it had come to fail.

A lot can go wrong in Afghanistan, and in the scheme of things you could argue this project was a drop in the bucket. Our frustrated attempts to get the project restarted so that it could be completed are symbolic of the seemingly dysfunctional process the United States has created, making building trust—and constructing buildings—as difficult as possible. The four-acre compound stood as a monument to the coalition’s ineptitude.

Bringing it back on line

To get the project on track, we had to find “back pay” for security services that for two years had guarded the partially built but unoccupied police headquarters. The Corps of Engineers had a dilemma: The original contract was cancelled, but all funds had been paid to the original contractor who left the area. There was no money remaining on the original contract to pay the guards. Even if there were additional construction funds available, the Corps could not pay the guards, as to do so would have violated U.S. regulations on how construction funds can be expended. The Corps tried to solve this problem by initiating a new contract, but it still could not include back pay for two years of security. It took seven months to get the exceptions and authorizations needed for the guards to receive their back pay. The final solution to pay the guards included a deal coordinated with Matiullah, the local warlord.

After two years of inactivity, the contractors were ready to finish the job, but again the Corps of Engineers stepped in and stopped any effort. In Afghanistan, the Corps is required to adhere to certain specifications on construction projects, so parts of the plan had to be redesigned. This continued for several months, with the project commencing in fits and starts.

Then there were the multiple regulations clearly designed for the United States but blindly transferred to such projects in Afghanistan. When hand rails and wheelchair ramps did not meet U.S. codes, the contractors had to stop their work. Accessibility is important, but we lost another two months reworking the plans. Afghan contractors were not prepared to meet the requirements of U.S. plumbing and electric codes either. Insisting on adherence to Western plumbing standards hardly made sense, since most Afghans did not use Western facilities and often ruined the plumbing soon after installation.

Finally, there were the myriad rules and regulations that required Afghan companies to fill out mountains of paperwork, which they simply were not prepared for. After 11 frustrating months, and intervention at the flag officer level, the project had barely restarted and was still several months from completion when I departed in June 2011.

Lessons Learned

Compare the police headquarters with the beautiful school next door, where girls were already getting an education. Without many of the road-blocks that the U.S. experienced, the Australian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was able to build their school in under a year. The Australians tracked the progress with regular check-ins and aggressive quality assurance while coordinating their activity with AusAID (the equivalent to USAID). The U.S. experience with absconding contractors would have been detected quickly. Moreover, unlike the U.S. practice of paying contractors up front, they dispensed funds in phases throughout construction. Finally, they did not face the road-block of construction regulations built for their home country; they constructed their projects in accordance with Afghan standards.

Completing the police headquarters is important not only for the effectiveness of the police, but for gaining the respect for the local government and the Afghan national government. When NATO or the United States promises to make improvements in cooperation with the Afghan government, the people see a more effective, more trustworthy government. When we fail the government, the government fails the people. The success of counterinsurgency operations is contingent on assisting the local government in earning the trust of its people.

I worked with a remarkable multinational group of soldiers and civilians. We worked together across cultures and regulatory structures. Though it was no small task, the group divided labor, and I believe we made a real difference in securing and building infrastructure in Uruzgan by expanding security to new areas and building roads that cut regional travel time dramatically.

The U.S. Army’s obstacles are often self-inflicted. Problems with contracting and money disbursement in Iraq and other theaters are directly related to the massive bureaucracy associated with contracting today. In my opinion, we have gone too far in regulating projects, to the point where we are wasting time and money due largely to our own inefficiency. The U.S. has committed to too many projects to manage and complete effectively given the massive regulatory requirements and turnover of coalition forces. The United States should take the spirit of cooperation in the coalition one step further and learn from the efficient operations of some of our partners.

James L. Creighton served as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army for 30 years, including as commander of Combined Team Uruzgan. He is chief of staff of the EastWest Institute in New York.

Image Credit: Australian Department of Defense

Click here to read an AAP write-up of this article in The West Australian.