Politics and Governance

So far, international aid has been directly largely at the crucial task of helping the flood’s victims survive from day to day. But as the flood waves recede, we must recognize that the country faces a tide of unfolding challenges. Only by understanding the economic devastation wrought by the floods can we begin to reckon the kind of long-term assistance Pakistan requires for true recovery.

Pakistan’s struggling economy depends heavily on its huge swathes of rich farmland, much of which has been wiped away by the floods. Water has caused damaged to homes of 4.6 million farmers.  More than 100,000 cattle have perished and seven million hectares of agricultural land are submerged. World Bank president Robert Zoellick estimates that crops worth $US1 billion have been destroyed. For a country where agriculture accounts for more than 21 percent of gross domestic product and employs 45 percent of the labor force, the long-term consequences will be dire, writes The Sunday Telegraph’s Nicola Smith, adding: “For farmers the destruction of crops, cattle and land has crippling financial consequences, plunging many into debt and deep poverty.”

Moreover, floods have inflicted widespread damage on infrastructure. In cities, flood waters have destroyed electricity installations, roads and phone lines.  About 1,000 villages in flood-hit districts of southern Punjab are without power. The destruction could set Pakistan back many years (if not decades), further weaken its feeble civilian administration and add to the burdens on its military. More than 5,000 miles of roads and railways have been washed away, along with some 7,000 schools and more than 400 health facilities, according to the The New York Times.

In the past, friends and allies of Pakistan have asked the country to do more to secure its borders; the flood threatens those efforts. “Pakistan's floods have not just devastated the lives of millions of people, they now present an unparalleled national security challenge for the country, the region and the international community,” The Telegraph’s Ahmad Rashid warns. “Lest anyone under-estimate the scale of the disaster, all four of Pakistan's wars with India combined did not cause such damage. It has become clear this week that, unless major aid is forthcoming immediately and international diplomatic effort is applied to improving Pakistan's relations with India, social and ethnic tensions will rise and there will be food riots.”

While extending a temporary lifeline to rescue the victims may help them survive from one crisis to another, assistance facilitating a gradual recovery is necessary to revive the country’s economy. Such a strategy would see Pakistan’s trade partners easing restrictions and raising import quotas. Allowing greater market access for Pakistan’s textile goods in particular would be a significant step, as the textile sector comprises over 50% of the country’s export and about 40% of the its manufacturing jobs. Additionally, countries importing manpower for their service sector should consider recruiting laborers from Pakistan’s flood-hit area as a means to support the affected families. Such measures will ease the pain of losses and facilitate a smooth rehabilitation.

“The international community needs to be ready to support Pakistan in a lasting manner,” states the European Union’s Foreign Affairs chief Catherine Ashton, adding “This will be a significant element for the long-term recovery. A safe, secure, stable and prosperous Pakistan is in the interests of the EU and the wider international community.” Underlining a sense of urgency, Ashton points out: “You have vast parts of Pakistan affected by floods; it’s immensely, strategically significant, and the situation will sadly get worse and worse. There’s a real need to demonstrate the international community as a whole can react.”

Thus, the pressing question is not only how the international community will provide immediate relief for Pakistan’s 20 million affected people, but whether and how it will mobilize resources for their long-term recovery. The nature of the aid Pakistan receives and how it is used will determine if the nation heads towards decades of dependency or towards a path of recovery, revival and sustainability.

 Mr Abbas spoke on BBC Arabic about the costs and consequences of Pakistan's floods and their national and regional implications. 

For Miller, the report reveals that “concern in the United States is not just focused on China’s remarkable economic rise, but also on the modernization and expansion of its military.” Miller highlights the report’s concerns over sophisticated new Chinese weaponry, the evolution of military thinking toward protecting China’s economic interests abroad, and China’s perceived lack of transparency. Although the report expresses the hope that China’s increased military capabilities could be used for peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts, Miller argues that “the unavoidable takeaway is that China’s military rise is harmful to U.S. strategic interests.” And while the report is not likely to greatly impact the bilateral relationship, it does little to advance the Obama administration’s ultimate challenge: to work with China while advancing America’s strategic interests.

Kok focuses her analysis on the report’s implications for United States-China military-to-military exchanges. Kok writes that the report, released in a period of heightened tensions, poses another challenge for bilateral military relations. While a section of the report touts the importance of military cooperation, this is undercut by “unflattering references” to China’s motivations for military exchanges: ”They include China’s presumed desire to gain ‘insights into potential U.S. vulnerabilities,” Kok writes, and “to drive a wedge between the United States, its allies, and its partners, including Taiwan.” Kok finds China’s response – a call for the United States to be objective and proactive in mending relations – to be unsatisfying. For relations to improve, Kok writes, both sides will have to replace “rhetoric and posturing” with an honest attempt to communicate. Preferably in time for the 2011 report.

Click here to read Jacqueline McLaren Miller's Piece (66.34K PDF).

Click here to read Piin-Fen Kok's piece (49.89K PDF).

“The news last week that China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy (after the US) coincided with the annual report the US department of defense presents to the US Congress, on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010,” Sidhu writes.  “This happenstance reflects the direct correlation between China’s growing economic strength and its increasing military might and holds important lessons for many countries, notably India.”

While China’s growth is impressive, Sidhu points out the economic and military differences between the U.S. and China: “On the economic front, China’s annual GDP of around $5 trillion is still one-third of the US’ $14 trillion.” China’s defense budget is pegged at somewhere between $80 billion to $150 billion dollars: “Yet even this high figure dwarfs in comparison with the towering US defence budget of over $650 billion,” Sidhu explains.

China plans to expand its growth through new technologies with a focus on cyber warfare, missiles and space technology, and extended-range power projection capabilities.

Sidhu concludes with by looking at India’s progress and the challenges of its future economic and military growth. “Perhaps the most important lesson is to seek to create a cooperative security arrangement, particularly involving China, so that the prospect of war is eliminated,” he asserts. “This might prove to be the most ambitious challenge of them all.”

Click here to read Sidhu’s article on livemint.com

Japan’s political and security calculus has been entirely different from that of India all these decades. Japan has depended on the US for its security through a mutual defence treaty whereas nonaligned India has abjured all military alliances. The two countries have not therefore had a shared security perspective. In foreign affairs Japan has followed the US lead, tuning its relations with India to the tenor of India-US relations.

India’s political closeness with the Soviet Union may not have been a contentious element in India-Japan ties bilaterally, but it certainly impinged on Japanese view of India’s role in south east Asia- a primary area for Japan’s post-war economic effort. India’s closed door economic policies until 1991 discouraged a pragmatic build up of mutual economic ties with an economically focused Japan, despite political divergences. When China opened up economically 12 years before us, India lost out in regional economic stakes, as Japan put its investment and trade energy in building a massive relationship with the giant next door.  The nuclear question has bedevilled India-Japan relations more than it need have because of peculiar Japanese sensitivities as the only victim of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

This Japanese squeamishness has seemed politically and morally dubious as Japan has hung on tenaciously to the nuclear weapon guarantee of the very country that martyred it with nuclear devastation. Japan has, with twisted logic, disregarded the nuclear threat to an India without any external nuclear shield from two collaborating nuclear neighbours, and irritatingly lectured India on the virtues of nuclear abstinence.

Major changes- all welcome- have taken place in the quality and content of India-Japan relations in recent years. India’s transformed ties with the US has prompted Japan to modulate its policies toward India. With India and the US stepping up their defence cooperation, India and Japan announced enhanced defence cooperation between them in a joint statement issued during Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Japan in May 2006.   With India and US establishing a strategic partnership, the Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers also announced a Strategic and Global Partnership in December 2006. It envisages stepped-up defence and technological cooperation, annual summit meetings, dialogue between National Security Advisors, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, working together for the security and safety of international maritime traffic, pursuit of the G-4 agenda for Security Council reform and close collaboration in the East Asia Summit(EAS) as well as in the East Asia Community(EAC).

As India-US understanding has grown, so has India-Japan bonding. In December 2009, during Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit, a New Stage of Strategic and Global Partnership was announced, with agreement on an Action Plan containing specific measures to advance security cooperation, such as deepening the annual strategic dialogue between the two Foreign Ministers, holding an annual Defence Minister level dialogue, instituting a combined foreign affairs and defence 2+2 dialogue(held in July this year) that Japan has only with two allies- the US and Australia, and, calling, in addition, for an open and inclusive East Asian Community as distinct from China’s exclusivist approach that would   impair India’s Look East Policy.

To put the bilateral relationship on a higher strategic footing, Japan has removed 11 Indian entities from its end-user list, sent its army, naval and air chiefs to India and participated in the trilateral India-US-Japan Malabar naval exercise and a quadrilateral exercise with Australia’s addition that became politically controversial in India because of concerns about it slipping into US led defence arrangements in East Asia and China’s querulousness about the intent of these exercises, which also made Japan and Australia baulk at quadrilateral initiatives involving democracies in Asia.

Japan has tried to manage China’s rise constructively by creating positive economic linkages intended to blunt potential friction through interdependence, emulating US strategy. China no doubt provided a huge new market for Japanese products and investments, doubly important because of Japan’s stagnant economy. But a rising and confident China, with bulging economic, financial and military muscle, has begun to cause concern to neighbours because its political and strategic intentions remain unclear. Japan and China have already had a face off in the South China sea which China now defines as its “core interest”. In this background, as well as saturation limits on Japanese economic expansion in China, India’s value as a strategic partner is obvious. Neither Japan nor India has any intention to antagonize China or pursue any containment policy, and the leaders of both countries have clarified publicy that their security cooperation is not China-oriented, but hedging strategies against a potential China threat even as that country is positively engaged cannot be ignored.

A third driving factor in the Japan-India relationship is, of course, the economic opportunities that Japan’s stagflation ridden economy burdened by unemployment and an aging population sees in a growing and dynamic Indian economy. India and Japan are working on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement(CEPA), and hope to sign it when PM goes to Tokyo this October. CEPA is intended to enhance reciprocal investments and boost the current low levels of India-Japan trade- $13 billion in 2008-2009- far short of the target of $20 billion by 2010. India could potentially serve as a global manufacturing hub for Japanese industry if projects like the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor financed by Japan are accomplished. For India hi-tech trade with Japan holds great promise in the fields of energy efficient technologies, ultra mega power generation projects based on super critical technologies, and new and renewable energy sources like clean coal, solar and nuclear.

The Indo-US nuclear deal and the NSG waiver for India has opened doors for India-Japan discussions on a nuclear pact. Japanese companies like Mitsubishi and Hitachi which control GE and Westinghouse would no doubt want to capitalize on India’s commitment to the US for the installation of 10,000 MWs of nuclear power in the country by its companies. The first round of talks on the nuclear nuclear pact has followed discussions on the subject between the Indian and Japanese Prime MInisters at the June 20 Toronto G-20 summit. The pitch has been queered by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opposing nuclear cooperation with a non-NPT country like India, prompting Foreign Minister Okada  to state publicy at New Delhi on August 21 that he expected Japan’s philosophy of non-proliferation, including suspension if India tested, to figure in appropriate terminology in the agreement, to conclude which no time lines will be drawn- a signal that it is unlikely to be ready by October when PM goes to Tokyo. Ostensibly, Japan wants India to go beyond the  language of the India-US nuclear deal. One cannot see how India can.
 

The author is a former foreign secretary of India and a member of EWI’s Board of Directors. The article was published in Mail Today.

At last! A new, and unlikely contender steps onto the field of play to take on the reigning champions of Europe. In an unlikely move last month, British Prime Minister David Cameron scored a dazzling goal against the Sarkozy-Merkel camp on the issue of Turkey’s membership of the European Union.

Cameron said on 27 July: “I’m here [in Ankara] to make the case for Turkey’s membership in the EU. And to fight for it.” He was joined by Lech Walesa on 19 August. “There is no Europe without Turkey”, the feisty giant-killer of Gdansk told a journalist.

Nobel Peace Prize winner from 2008, Martti Ahtisaari, leads an international commission that has twice reviewed the relationship between Turkey and the EU. The first report in 2004 confirmed the EU’s legal obligation to proceed with Turkish accession. The second noted the “vicious cycle” of negative public debate and stalling and reaffirmed the importance of seeing a “transformed Turkey” as a member of the European Union.

Citing the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey in 1963, a Customs Union agreement in 1996, and an EU decision in December 2004 that Turkey could join subject to completion of accession instruments, the Ahtisaari Commission went on to note that Turkey is already “broadly integrated into almost all pan-European Institutions”: the Council of Europe, including the European Court of Human Rights, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

According to a 2005 report by the Foreign Policy Centre (London), titled “Turks in Europe: Why Are We Afraid”, the position of Germany’s Angela Merkel reflects the failure of German policies of integration of its Turkish immigrants. More recently, domestic politics in France have led President Sarkozy to make disquieting statements about immigrant communities in his country. His statements have been accompanied by clear indications of state-sanctioned hostility to, or discrimination against certain classes of immigrants (Muslim women wearing burqas) and would-be immigrants (Roma).

I wonder about David Cameron’s motives in joining the debate so vociferously and, as he said, “very passionately”. But this is a fight that I hope he and his new partner, Walesa, can win.

Chancellor Merkel has advocated that Turkey should scale back its expectations and settle for a “privileged partnership”. She is not supported on this by her coalition partner, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who in visiting Ankara on 28 July, left open the door for continuing negotiations. The Independent Commission labeled advocacy of “privileged partnership” as a “populist excuse”.  There are far higher political stakes in the question of Turkey’s relations with Germany and France, and how these two countries view Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. The prospect that the EU would abandon its legally binding commitment to Turkey because of domestic political positions inspired by xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiment at home could be, in the words of a Turkish German politician, a “fatal political signal”.

As Turkey becomes more active on the global political stage, it is becoming a lightning rod for the worst nightmares of conservative American analysts, with one from the American Enterprise Institute recently charging at Congressional hearings that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East “favors the most radical elements”. Thankfully, more considered views are in evidence from the German Marshall Fund’s Ian lesser at the same hearings: “if Turkey’s candidacy proves hollow, this could well interrupt or reverse Turkey’s longstanding convergence with the West, further complicating an already strained relationship with the United States.”  But please note, the fight for Turkey in Europe is a fight for dignity and equality as much as it is a fight for realpolitik. If immigrant bashers win, that could become a fatal political signal for the internal security of the “immigration continent”.

What is different about this latest round of tensions is that its scope has transcended the historical disagreements over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and it is being played out against what is no longer a purely bilateral backdrop.  In late July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose a multilateral forum – an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi – to place the United States squarely in the middle of the South China Sea territorial disputes.  Her remarks – construed by the Chinese as an attempt to internationalize what they see as bilateral issues between China and the littoral states concerned – drew strong rebuttals from Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.

These were followed by more posturing:  at the end of July, China conducted its largest ever military drills in the South China Sea.  And earlier this month, the United States and Vietnam – the ASEAN chair and a party to offshore territorial disputes with China – held a week-long naval exercise; ostensibly, this was to commemorate the 15th anniversary of normalized relations, but in light of recent events, it wouldn’t be far-fetched to interpret it as a shot across China’s bow.

And while visiting the Philippines this week, the head of U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert Willard spoke out on China’s apparent assertiveness in the South China Sea region, denounced the coercive use of force to settle territorial disputes, and made an explicit commitment to a continued U.S. presence in the region for years to come.

Admiral Willard’s remarks coincided with the Pentagon’s release of its latest annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving China.  The report references China’s territorial disputes, including in the South China Sea, and mentions that the Chinese military is building the capacity to attack ships in the Western Pacific Ocean.

The actions of the United States, beginning with Secretary Clinton’s remarks in Vietnam, seem to be a response to the Chinese government’s surprising message to senior U.S. officials in March that the South China Sea issue was now one of China’s “core interests” – a diplomatic code phrase for a matter over which China would fight a war.

At the same time, those actions, while geared toward the situation in the South China Sea, would appear to be part of a broader series of overtures by the Obama administration to reassert the United States’ role in Southeast Asia.  Such overtures include signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, announcing the intention to open a mission and name an ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta, holding the first U.S.-ASEAN summit, and strengthening sub-regional and bilateral cooperation with specific ASEAN countries.

In short, despite being mired in two wars elsewhere in the world and having twice postponed a presidential visit to the region, the United States is issuing a clear reminder that it still is – and plans to remain – a key strategic player in the region.  That this reminder is in large part directed at China – and meant to reassure America’s Southeast Asian allies – begs the question of whether the South China Sea, and by extension Southeast Asia, is fast shaping up to be the next major battleground for influence between the two powers.  This, in turn, has implications for ASEAN unity:  as some countries (for example, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) are affected more than others by the South China Sea issue, there is the potential for individual countries to be pulled in different directions, especially against the backdrop of big power intervention.

On the U.S.-China front, if managed imprudently or left to fester, the current tensions in this region could well develop, in the very near future, into a major source of friction that destabilizes bilateral relations.

There is thus an immediate need, as always, for cool-headed U.S.-China diplomacy, including through military-to-military dialogue.  It would be extremely useful, for example, for each side to clarify its definition of a “core interest” (in the case of China) or a “national interest” (in the case of the United States) in the context of the South China Sea issue; for the United States to explain the policy nuances behind Secretary Clinton’s remarks (as one reason for China’s displeasure is its perception that the United States has significantly changed its position on the South China Sea disputes); and for both countries to clarify their strategic intentions in the region.

There is also a greater need for maritime diplomacy among the key players in the South China Sea region.  While territorial disputes need to be resolved by the relevant parties concerned in accordance with international law, such disputes should not get in the way of the maritime trade and commerce that is critical to the region.

In this regard, stepped-up efforts between China and ASEAN to agree on a code of conduct in the South China Sea would help address freedom of navigation concerns amid conflicting territorial claims.  It would also reflect good faith on the part of China to engage constructively with its regional neighbors, despite their differences.

At the end of the day, however, codes of conduct and other confidence-building measures will not be effective if the root causes of mistrust are not addressed.  As China continues to develop and assess its approach to and public diplomacy pertaining to maritime affairs, it will eventually have to respond to the growing perceptions of its stance and swagger – both in the South China Sea and in the waters further northeast.  This is especially so if China wishes to reassure the world that its rise is indeed peaceful.

“As a country wedged between India and Tibet, Nepal has traditionally played the Chinese card against us,” Sibal writes.  “No matter which government is in power there, to a lesser or greater degree our China problem with Nepal will remain.”  There is a constant struggle between Nepal’s sovereignty and India’s expectations for cooperation, preventing a mutual relationship of trust: “The 1950 Treaty, the reality of the open border, the historical, cultural, linguistic and religious ties between the two countries underpin our expectations.” 

As a result of the historically tumultuous relationship between the two countries, Nepal relies heavily on China, an issue of great concern to India with the rise of the Maoist party in Nepal.  “In general, Nepal has been provocatively testing our China-related sensitivities and we have resorted to fire-fighting to counter its moves, without being able to reach a clear understanding on the self-restraint Nepal should voluntarily practice in its dealings with China out of a recognition of the particular nature and the depth of its ties with India.”

The surprising Maoist victory in Nepal’s 2008 election worried India, contributing to the rising tensions between these three countries.  “The Maoists have constituted the most hostile force in Nepal toward India, backed in the past by the Palace to counter the Nepali Congress seen as pro-India,” explains Sibal. 

Given those political developments, India will continue to wrestle with the dilemma of what to do about its neighbor. “How to find the right balance between engagement and non-intervention is a challenging task,” Sibal concludes.

Click here to read Sibal’s article in Mail Today.

PN: You’re one of only 9 female parliamentarians in the Federal National Council of the UAE, in the country where women have only recently gained access to political life. How difficult was it to establish yourself as a parliamentarian?

NA: I would not say difficult, I would say challenging, and I have always enjoyed challenges.  It might be hard at the beginning, but I’ve grown immensely with each challenge. My time in the Parliament has been an invaluable learning experience; it has given me great insight into the core strategic issues facing our society, as well as a deep understanding of the institutional challenges that we need to work on.

PN: You are the youngest MP, how does this influence your work in the Parliament and the way you are regarded by your older colleagues?

NA: Of course people first assume that I have less experience and ability to work in the Parliament because of my age. But I would like to add, with certain humility, that at this stage I’ve gained the respect of my older colleagues based on the quality of my work in Parliament. I believe in continuous learning and hard work, and these are the principles I have applied during my term in the Parliament. I don’t think much about my young age, I think about how I can be useful for my society.

PN: You’ve stated once, in an interview, that you can serve your country better working as a parliamentarian rather than in the media industry. Now, after three years in the Parliament, do you still hold this opinion?

NA: I sincerely believe that the role of the media and the Parliament are complimentary and fully interconnected. Both should be focused on public service. Mass media can inform and enlighten citizens so that theyeffectively take part in the political life. As a MP I’ve been working on reviewing and improving draft legislation and engaging the government in the dialogue about the core issues facing society and the solutions and policies that need to be addressed and put forward. The areas I am most passionate about, and have been focused on throughout my term, are education, youth and media.

PN: You have an extensive experience in the media industry. How does it help you in your political career?

NA: My experience in the media has given me a lot of insight into how the mass media can influence people’s mindset and their actions. To build a civil society and increase political participation of all our citizens we need to enlighten and inform people by giving them access to unbiased modern mass media. I’ve tried to focus on it during my term in the Parliament, making sure that the MPs contribute to creation of a progressive mass media market in the UAE.  Working in the media has certainly enabled me to understand how it all works, so I am able to put things into perspective.

PN: Female MPs from Afghanistan and Pakistan find it very difficult to make their positions heard and respected. Do you experience the same problem in the UAE? Do female MPs have the same leverage as their male colleagues?

NA: I do believe that women in the UAE have more political leverage than women in Pakistan and Afghanistan, at this stage. Women in the UAE have been privileged to have clear support of the government in their bid to make their voices heard. However, I don’t mean that women in the UAE are on equal footing with men; we still live in a patriarchal society, where men are regarded as inherent and natural leaders, and the role of women is interpreted through that lens. Things are moving on, however, but we have a long way to go before we’ll be able to say that women have reached the stage where they have equal opportunities with men.

PN: You are strongly committed to promoting human rights and especially women’s rights in the Arab countries. Do you maintain any ties with the MPs from other Muslim countries?

NA: Undoubtedly, there must be solidarity between Arab women, whether they are MPs or civil society activists or just women who want to help and make a difference. The cooperation between Arab female MPs should be given a boost. Meetings are constantly held between Arab female parliamentarians to exchange knowledge and law-making experience. But we certainly need to institutionalize these encounters so as to be able to work as a solid movement and try to abolish the inequalities that women face in the whole Arab world.

PN: More and more female MPs want to increase their impact in peace and security issues, as well. How high is conflict prevention on the political agenda in the UAE?

NA: The issue of conflict prevention is extremely high on the political agenda in the UAE. The UAE has always believed in playing a pro-active role in addressing conflicts regionally and globally through diplomacy, dialogue, and support for progressive development agendas of the neighboring countries that need assistance. The UAE is situated in a highly volatile Middle East region, facing many complex challenges, and we live in an interconnected world, so conflict prevention is the key to the strategic interests of our country.  The UAE’s strategy is to be an active player in the global community, using pro-active diplomacy and dialogue.

PN: What are the current security challenges in Bangladesh?

SC: First and foremost, we’re still fighting poverty and trying to provide the basic necessities such as shelter, food, health services to the vast majority of the population of Bangladesh. So food security is a very important challenge for us. We’re very well aware of the Millennium Development Goals and the attainment of these goals is not easy.

From a regional perspective, one of the greatest positive developments in the South Asia is that we have democratically elected governments in almost all the countries. Another challenge is to preserve and build on the peace that we’ve finally reached, for instance, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh and also in Sri Lanka after years of insurgency. And we should also keep in mind a possibility of a nuclear threat; we have two nuclear powers - India and Pakistan - in the region.

But the most formidable challenge, that Bangladesh faces is how to deal with the impact of climate change, which I consider to be our number one national security challenge.

PN: How does climate change affect Bangladesh?

SC:  The effects are multi-dimensional and of such a magnitude that may not apply to any other country.  The most obvious threat is a sea-level rise. If you take a look at the map of Bangladesh, you will see that we have the largest river delta (the Ganges delta) in the south of Bangladesh. And the estimates are that if the water level rises by one meter, 17 percent of our land in the Ganges Delta will submerge.  It will cause the displacement of around 30 million people. The map of Bangladesh will change dramatically because of the sea level rise.

We also have a threat from the North, which comes from the melting of the glaciers in the Himalayas, which serve as the water towers for a large part of the South Asia. The glaciers in the Himalayas are melting at an alarming rate, leading to increased flooding in the immediate future. And in the long-term perspective, we might experience water shortages, because the glaciers are the sources of fresh water.

Therefore, the problem becomeshow to share the limited resources with other countries. This  makes the wise management of water resources in the Himalayasa major challenge for regional security.

Another problem is migration.  There are people who are already migrating from coastal areas to Dhaka City because of the sea-level rise. This problem is likely to aggravate as the number of internally displaced people and families grow.
The frequency of extreme weather events has also increased. In the past we used to have big cyclones once in a decade, now we’re having a major cyclone every two to three years. And if we bear in mind that food security is our primary problem, then you see that the cyclones damage crops and disrupt food supplies

This is quite a grim scenario and confirms that climate change poses formidable challenges for security and governance in Bangladesh.  Climate change is both a threat multiplier and a threat accelerator.  What I would like to emphasize is that climate change is not a distant possibility but a reality in Bangladesh.

PN: Are there any regional initiatives among parliamentarians to tackle these security threats in the region?

SC:  There is an organization in South Asia called SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) which provides a framework for joint actions. But, frankly speaking, we haven’t achieved as much progress in this framework.  Bilateral tensions have limited the cooperation.

Hopefully, now that we have democratically elected governments, there will be a qualitative change and we can move forward. Terrorism is a major security concern in the region and Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, has proposed the formation of a regional task force to combat terrorism.
In Bangladesh, we’re trying to overcome this problem by creating an All Party Parliamentary Group on Climate Change and Environment.  No matter how different our political programs are, we need a consensus as far as climate change is concerned. I think it’s first necessary to achieve a consensus within each particular country and then see if we can extend this accord in a regional perspective.

PN:  Are you satisfied with the level of the international community’s recognition of your security problems?

SC: I must say that there is a lot of talk but not enough action. The Copenhagen conference was not a success. We are still far away from concluding a legally binding agreement.  There are no commitments to cut emissions substantially and there are fears that the process will become irreversible.

What we desperately need is money for adaptation funds.  Adaptation is the main task for Bangladesh. I think technology transfer is going to be challenging because it can infringe on intellectual property rights, so technology should be made much more easily available. It was agreed in Copenhagen to allocate $30 billion over the next 3 years for immediate mitigation and adaptation needs of the most vulnerable countries but  we haven’t seen a cent from this fund flowing into Bangladesh yet.

This sum, however, is not enough to solve the problems. So the Bangladesh government has showed its commitment to adapt to climate change by creating its own fund. $150 million have already been made available by the government to strengthen the country’s resilience. We’re not just asking other countries for help, but we’re trying to contribute to solving the problem ourselves.  I think the message from Bangladesh is loud and clear – we are not just victims but also leaders in terms of adaptation.

PN:  Speaking about national security problems in Bangladesh, what is the most troublesome region in the country?

SC: I would not pick a certain region in the country. We did have some insurgency in the past in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, whichis peaceful now, the implementation of the Peace Accord remains a challenge for us. The current Government’s zero tolerance policy on terrorism seems to yield good results, which leaves the development agenda and adapting to climate change impacts as the the major concerns.

PN: If we speak about purely military security issues, are there any parliamentary initiatives on the regional level to deal with them?

SC:  There is still no official framework for that so far but there is an ongoing discussion to engage more parliamentarians on a regional basis. Since we didn’t have much of parliamentary democracy before and the institution of democracy is relatively new, this process is going slowly. But we hope that we will be able to network more frequently with parliamentarians and people’s representatives from other South Asian countries in the next couple of years.

PN:  Is there any official committee within the Bangladesh Parliament that deals specifically with conflict prevention?

SC: We don’t have a committee that is directly involved in conflict prevention. But as I’ve mentioned before, our number one security problem is climate change, so we discuss security issues in the All-Party Group on Climate Change. Since it’s an all-party group, we are trying to reach a certain level of consistency in implementing the relevant policy no matter what reshuffling occurs in the government. The Bangladesh Parliament has supported the UN SG’s Five Point Plan on Non Proliferation and Disarmament through a unanimous resolution, making Bangladesh the first country to have made the important linkage between disarmament, development and climate change.

PN: Is this All Party Group involved in any joint actions with other parliaments?

SC: We have been cooperating with the UK’s House of Commons. We combined our resources to produce a Joint Report on climate change, which was launched in Copenhagen during COP15. We have also been active in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Task force on Climate Change. We plan to keep on working with the British parliament in the future. The European Union is also actively involved in a climate security agenda, so we hope to be able to get in touch with MPs from the European Parliament on this issue as well.

PN:  You’re familiar with the scope of activities of the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention. How do you think the Network can help Bangladesh to tackle its security problems?

SC: I think it’s just very important to get together and begin networking and discussing. And it’s very important to engage parliamentarians as elected representatives of the people, not just the representatives of the executive branch.

Besides, parliamentarians exercise an important function of supervising the allocation of resources. Once the adaptation fund, for example, is available for Bangladesh, the MPs will have to make sure that the money allocated will reach people that need it most. And speaking more generally, MPs in all countries, from Bangladesh to the U.S., are responsible to ensure that funds are spent properly.

More interaction, dialogue and networking amongst parliamentarians can thus only be positive, constructive and beneficial for all.

PN: Thank you very much for your time, Mr. Chowdhury.