Politics and Governance

On August 31, Poland will commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Gdansk agreement that gave birth to Solidarity, the first independent trade union in the Soviet bloc.

By staging strikes and occupying the Lenin shipyard, Lech Walesa and other activists pressured the communist government into legalizing their movement. Fifteen months later, the regime reversed itself, declaring martial law and outlawing Solidarity--but this only delayed rather than averted the looming crisis of the communist system. In 1989, the collapse of that system in Poland triggered a domino effect throughout the region.

Looking back at those events, we usually focus on the politics of those struggles rather than the economics. But it's worth remembering that the abysmal state of the Polish economy was what fueled the protests from the very beginning. And it's worth considering what that says about the relationship between economics and politics in America today, despite the enormous differences in these two situations.

"Economic Security" is suddenly the hot term of the moment, with its implicit concern about economic insecurity--and the political fallout. This underscores one lesson from pre-1989 Poland that applies to the United States now: if you ignore or paper over underlying economic problems, you will eventually pay a high political price.

After the Soviet Union took over Poland and its neighbors at the end of World War II, the initial Stalinist-era repression gave way to a milder brand of communism. Protests that threatened the system were still brutally suppressed, but a tacit understanding developed: the rulers promised that the basic needs of their peoples would be met, with modest but steady improvements in living standards, so long as the ruled remained politically passive.

The centralized system insured that the gap between West and East kept growing, but the average citizen could get by--just barely. And officially there was no such thing as unemployment. As a popular saying put it, "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work." To maintain those pretences, Poland's 1970s ruler Edward Gierek borrowed heavily from the West. This produced an illusory boom, but the infusion of capital had only boosted consumption or was wasted on nearly bankrupt state industries--or disappeared into the pockets of corrupt officials.

Throughout the 1980s, Poland was a basket case, with $40 billion in foreign debt, an inflation rate of Latin American proportions, and rationing combined with shortages of everything from basic foodstuffs to medicine. A young couple could expect a waiting period of anywhere from twenty to forty years to get an apartment, and hospitals began running out of anesthesia for some routine operations. Little wonder that the young were increasingly ready to risk everything to follow Solidarity leaders like Walesa.

To be sure, the American and most European economies still operate on a far more rational basis than the pre-1989 economies of Central and Eastern Europe. And the good news is that the polnische wirtschaft--German for the Polish economy--is no longer a term of derision precisely because Poland operates according to free market principles now. Last year, Poland was the only EU country to register positive economic growth, and the country is almost unrecognizably different and dramatically more prosperous than its earlier incarnation.

Where there is a connection between the Poland of the old days and the United States now is the heightened awareness that governments must create conditions that give their citizens a sense of economic security. The failure of communist regimes to do so at the most basic level led to their eventual collapse. If Americans begin to feel that their economic system can't provide a degree of security for their much higher living standards, the consequences won't be as spectacular as the upheavals of 1989. But they shouldn't be underestimated either.

Budgets are produced that don't come close to suggesting a course that will curb the country's addiction to massive deficit spending; China keeps underwriting us to an unhealthy degree; and basic decisions on applying common sense solutions are shelved repeatedly because there's always another election coming up. And, of course, politicians from both parties always blame their opponents for the fact that nothing serious is getting done.

The rap on Democrats is that they never encountered a spending proposal they didn't love, and on Republicans that they never saw a tax cut they didn't adore. That may be an oversimplifying, but not by much. In the meantime, yet another presidential commission will study the problem.

The reason the term "economic security" is gaining acceptance is precisely because there's the sense that, with every passing day of inaction, our economy is increasingly insecure. You can pretend that's not the case, as Poland's leaders tried to do for a long time. Or you can start tackling the fundamental problem of how we can start living roughly within our means. Solidarity's 30th birthday party offers a clear indication which is the better course.

Andrew Nagorski is vice president and director of public policy at the EastWest Institute. A former Newsweek foreign correspondent and editor, he is the author of "The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of World War II."

Reviewing EWI board member Christine Loh’s Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong, the Financial Times praises this “fascinating book” that expertly explains the history and operations of the party. Loh also explains why, even after Hong Kong became Chinese territory again, the Hong Kong communists still operate as if they were a clandestine movement.  

As Europeans head for the beaches and mountains over summer, they might recall anniversaries this week of two major events some 65 years ago – the opening of the Potsdam Conference in 1945 on 17 July and the first test of the atomic bomb in Alamogordo New Mexico the previous day.

At the Cecilienhof Palace in Germany, Truman, Churchill and Stalin met to map out the future of Europe after the Second World War and to show Allied unity in the final stages of the war against Japan. Many of the agreements signed then shaped the course of history in Europe for the generations that followed. But the conference also set the course of events in Asia in the coming decade. The Declaration signed by the three war-time allies was in fact about ending the war in Asia, where all three had territorial interests and geopolitical ambitions.

The first article said that Japan would be given an opportunity to end the war, and the second warned that “The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan.”  The ultimatum called for the unconditional surrender of Japan and, if it did not, threatened the “prompt and utter destruction of Japan”.

The Allies did not need the atomic bomb to make such a threat. The fire bombing of Tokyo over just two days in March destroyed almost 300,000 buildings and killed almost 100,000 people. Bombings led by Air Force General Curtis LeMay destroyed more than 50 per cent of all building in 30 Japanese cities in the six months before Potsdam. But the United States did use the atomic bomb just days after the Potsdam Conference concluded.

Well, 65 years later, the Americans and Europeans are still making history in Asia, and in some of its most remote parts. In Kabul on 20 July, the Afghanistan government will host the first ever international conference of its kind in the country itself on national reconstruction and development. According to the Afghanistan government, the meeting of more than seventy countries “marks a new phase in Afghanistan’s engagement with the international community”. One aim is to “mobilize international confidence and resources for a new generation of “bankable” national programs”, albeit in accordance with “ President Karzai’s inaugural speech of November 2009”. The clear message of that speech was that the future security of Afghanistan will be determined more by what the people of Afghanistan and neighboring countries want, rather than by the United States or its NATO allies. That is of course the ideal. What the Afghanistan government would prefer is that those distant countries retreat from political interference in the country while still providing aid. President Karzai is more comfortable with support from Asian countries.

Japan and the Asian Development Bank each provide more aid to Afghanistan then the European Commission, while India, Iran, Pakistan, the UAE and China are also important donors. But the UK provides more and military forces than any Asian country and the United States contribution to civilian is more than ten times that of the top Asian donor, Japan.

The question Asia’s leaders must ponder going into the Kabul Conference is just how much they want their region’s history to continue to be shaped so profoundly from Washington and London. Many Asians are comfortable with the “old” powers playing this role. But 65 years after the beginning of the end of imperialism and colonialism, wealthy Asian governments need to get organized among themselves and shoulder more responsibility for regional security.

A New York Times article features Louise Richardson, a member of EWI's Board of Directors, who is the first woman, the first non-Brit, and the first Roman Catholic to head St. Andrews University. The article highlights her role desegregating several institutions in St. Andrews and making them accessible to women.

Members of the U.S. delegation included EWI President and CEO John Edwin Mroz; retired General Eugene Habiger, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command; retired General Charles F. Wald, former Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command; former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Timothy Stratford; Joel Cowan, a member of the EWI Board of Directors; David Firestein, EWI's Director of Track 2 Diplomacy; Piin-Fen Kok, EWI's China Program Associate; and Karl Rauscher, EWI's Chief Technology Officer and Distinguished Fellow.

The delegation engaged in a day and a half of discussions with Chinese experts hosted by CIIS and met with Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, Vice Minister Liu Jieyi of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, and Vice Minister Sun Yafu of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office.  The group also visited the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Horizon Research Consultancy Group (a public opinion polling firm) and the China Social Entrepreneur Foundation.
The main purpose of the Dialogue was to explore concrete ways to increase strategic trust between the United States and China.  Topics addressed included:

• Critical concerns in U.S.-China political, military and economic relations, including Taiwan, Tibet and barriers to the bilateral trade-and-investment relationship.
• Public diplomacy:  Identifying and debunking the main myths about the U.S.-China relationship, clarifying strategic perceptions of each other, and addressing how each country can make itself better understood.
• The situation in the Middle East, including the Iran nuclear issue and opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation to promote socio-economic development in the region.
• Strategic stability in the 21st century: Balancing strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems.
• Potential U.S.-China cooperation on outer space.

The dialogue produced important new institutional partnerships for EWI in China and laid the groundwork for continued U.S.-China Track 2 activities.

EWI Senior Fellow Najam Abbas, an expert on Central and South Asia, has made several appearances on BBC Arabic television to explain the causes of the crisis in Kyrgyzstan and possible international action that can help address it.

Clips of his appearances, all in Arabic, are below

June 13, 2010

June 14, 2010

June 17, 2010

June 18, 2010

The Smolensk tragedy was an event of enormous importance for the Poles, and may also be a key event for the EU as it awaits the results of the Presidential election. How will the deaths affect the result of this vote brought forward by three months, which at one point had looked like a shoo-in for the ruling Civic Platform’s Bronislaw Komorowski?

He is now facing the late Lech Kaczynski’s twin brother Jaroslaw, whose PiS party had looked out of the running until Lech’s death boosted it in the polls. Jaroslaw’s campaign slogan is “Poland is the most important.” Komorowski is far more pro-European, and wants early adoption of the euro single currency.
The accident has brought two fomer sworn enemies closer: Poland and Russia, and one of the stated ambitions of Poland’s EU presidency, in a year’s time, is to improve relations with the east.

“The Poles feel this acutely, the need to stabilise their relationships with the east, particularly with Russia, and to bring Russia into a more regular dialogue with the European community, with NATO,” says the EastWest Institute’s Andrew Nagorski.

Poland has long been considered pro-American above being pro-European. It hosts US missiles, and its EU membership in 2004 came five years after joining the NATO club. But that is not the whole picture says Poland’s representative at the EU

Jan Tombinski;
“The EU is where our future challenges lie. NATO membership was dictated more by our past fears, but both represent our integration into the western world’s institutions.”

Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski agrees;

“I think the circumstances have changed. The USA no longer feels threatened by a European defence identity, quite the contrary, they would like to see a more capable europe to share the burden.”

Poland’s European identity is also bound up in its adoption of the Euro. Warsaw had previously said it would like to make the change in 2012, but the economic crisis has pushed that date back.

Jan Tombinski explains why;

“Two years ago we committed to announcing a timetable but today we’d prefer to wait a little while to benefit from a more stable and confident eurozone, and build the best entry conditions we can. I also don’t think that today the eurozone is ready to take us in.”Where Poland stands in Europe depends to a large extent on Sunday’s election, because the Polish presidency can veto legislation, and has power in the realms of defence and foreign affairs.

Copyright © 2010 euronews

Osh, the southern Kyrgyz town where the violence is concentrated, lies in Central Asia’s ethnically volatile Ferghana valley, close to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Although the violence appears to be ethnic, pitting Kyrgyz youth against ethnic Uzbeks, a closer examination suggests that many other factors are at play.

Much of the conflict stems from a crisis of competence and confidence in the Kyrgyz government. The popular uprising in April that ousted former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev brought about a change in government, but little change in substance. The interim regime has been unable to provide the governance or the stability Kyrgyzstan needed to recover from the coup. Corruption is rampant, crippling many essential government services. Meanwhile, many appointees of previous governments still in the Kyrgyz administration – who have an interest in the failure of the current government – have been complacent in their duties, further aggravating the country's crisis of confidence.

The authorities have been unable to act promptly and effectively, creating a yawning gap between the government and its people. As one observer puts it, with the people's trust in their authorities irreparably lost, the situation poses increased challenges to the state's sovereignty and the susceptible government's political survival in the long run.

Meanwhile, a combination of ethnic, commercial and criminal interests are capitalizing on frustration with the government's shortcomings and the country's power vacuum. While the new ruling elite struggle to establish their writ, many such forces are clamouring for influence to ensure a stronger bargaining position once the crisis subsides. The country's drug lords, for example, have jumped into the fray, using the chaos to conceal criminal activity and preying on the displaced and dispossessed. Instigated by supporters of the ousted Bakiyev regime, miscreant elements are eager to turn the tables altogether and jeopardize the scheduled June 27 referendum that aims to shift the balance of power from a presidential to a parliamentary system.

External interests further complicate the picture. Neighbouring states such as Uzbekistan and regional powers, mainly Russia, may also be seeking to profit from the crisis to extract concessions from Kyrgyzstan's inexperienced government and to force it into partnerships according to their liking.

Uzbekistan's authorities are between a rock and a hard place. Displaced Uzbeks have been fleeing the violence in Kyrgyzstan and streaming into Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan would like to see them safe and cared for, but at the same time remains wary of any influx or external intervention that could destabilize the precarious political balance in its own border town of Andijan, which witnessed mass protests and shootings in 2005.

Russia's role is equally complex. Although Kyrgyzstan’s interim President Roza Otunbayeva is insisting on immediate Russian intervention to stabilize the situation, Moscow is seen as cautious and calculating. Russia first expressed concern over the situation, then announced that it was seriously reviewing response options, and has since maintained that it will only consider helping through a multilateral forum such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. So far, Russia's only promises have been to provide transport for relief supplies and to help evacuate the affected population.

It is becoming increasingly evident that deployment of a peacekeeping force will eventually be necessary. In the meantime, every delay raises the cost of the conflict, not only in terms of life and blood, but also in added concessions the Kyrgyz government will have to make in return for cooperation with the interim president. It also exposes the interim authorities’ incompetence, leading pundits to predict yet another change in the government.

The longer Russia waits to help restore stability, the greater the chances that the next Kyrgyz government's fate will become welded to Kremlin's goodwill and support.

An inevitable question arising from Russia's diplomacy of delay is whether this reluctance to act is related to the U.S. air force base in Manas in northern Kyrgyzstan, long a cause of concern in Moscow. Some speculate that Russia may prefer to let the crisis continue, and exploit the Kyrgyz government's weakness to distance Bishkek from Washington.

When calm is restored, the balance of power in Kyrgyzstan will have shifted. Internal and external forces will no longer be aligned as they have been. New loyalties and regional partnerships will have emerged and will require new terms of engagement. Kyrgyz leaders will find themselves more dependent on Moscow than ever.

Dormant sparks of ethnic friction fanned to rise into flames will not be put off easily or soon. The scars will prove deeper and will take much longer to heal. The exodus of over 100,000 people from Southern Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan risks destabilizing the volatile Ferghana valley where Kyrgyzstan's borders meet with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A peacekeeping force is required now, before peaceful ethnic coexistence is further jeopardized, Kyrgyzstan becomes ungovernable, and threatens to plunge an already volatile region into greater instability.

The Ferghana valley, because of its complicated ethnic composition and arbitrary border divisions, has been on the radar of the international organizations for long. Recent events demand that such organizations take stock of past and current risk management solutions, which solutions could have been offered to the newly independent states of Central Asia, and how effectively they can address the real needs of ordinary Central Asians in those vulnerable valleys The international community must learn from this crisis, develop insights and put into place conflict prevention and resolution measure to help ensure that such a tragedy never unfolds again.

Photo: "20141011_Kyrgyzstan_1280 Bishkek" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Dan Lundberg

It seems the lawmakers in Belgium are "fiddling while Rome burns." In April this year, 136 members of Belgium’s lower house voted to ban the burqa in public, while two abstained. No one voted against the measure. The move followed by one week the collapse of the country’s government over electoral boundaries based on language criteria, forcing the country to new elections.

With a national debt equal to 100 percent of GDP, this is an interesting set of priorities. Statistics on how many women in Belgium wear burqas are unavailable, but in nearby Denmark, the parliament there stopped its move toward a burqa ban when, according to Der Speigel, it found there were only a handful of women in the country who actually wore a burqa. 

There is reason to beleive that the near-simultaneous actions of Belgian politicians to deepen their linguistic disputes while banning burqas are intimately connected. According to Belgian political scientist, Jean-Michel de Waele, commenting on the new elections in an interview for EurActiv, political parties in Belgium have been taken hostage by extremists.

What accounts for this cultural extremism in Belgium? It may actually have been aggravated simply by the "invasion" of the country by foreigners. Even though non-nationals in Belgium account for only 9 percent of the total population, among EU countries Belgium is near the top of the list for the percentage of its population represented by nationals of other countries.

In Belgium's case, according to Eurostat, the larger share of these foreigners are from other EU countries – most notably Italy (17 percent of the foreign population), France and the Netherlands (around 13 percent), and Spain (around 4 percent). Moroccans make up only 8 percent of the foreign population (or less than one percent of the total Belgian population).

This dominance of non-nationals in the Belgian population mix is not caused by its being host to the European Institutions. According to Eurostat, the European Union as a whole has a "relatively high net migration rate, which in 2008 was almost three times higher than the rate of natural population growth."

Europeans are on the move. EU internal migrants across national borders are increasing in percentage terms faster than immigrants into the EU from outside. Belgium's population is one of the most adept in Europe when it comes to foreign languages. What explains this contradiction between openness to the outside world evidenced by foreign language use and extremism centred on linguistic "purity"?

Look to the demography of the capital city. Over several decades, the Flemish-speaking population of the Belgian capital has been squeezed out or has chosen to move out, as the non-national population has grown dramatically. In London, there is a similar picture. Based on one analysis of the 2001 census, in large swathes of the north of the British city, the share of foreign-born population is higher than 34 percent. (This figure strangely includes children of immigrants.) Non-national population growth in Barcelona and Madrid has also been spectacular in recent years.

As Belgium this week contemplates its constitutional future and community-based divisions, it and the rest of Europe might ponder just how much the changing face of the capital city under pressure of internal EU migration was the cause of that. The other big factor is that local people are being squeezed out of the property market in their own capital cities by the property boom associated with this more lively market and more open investment regimes.  There is a lesson in the demography of Brussels for the future of other EU capitals. All should note, however, that the immigrants who have changed the capital’s demographics and its politics most are not those very few women wearing burqas.