Politics and Governance

This piece has been republished on The Diplomat.

With 2014 marked by unprecedented protests in both Taiwan and Hong Kong and continued demonstrations in Hong Kong earlier this month, media and analysts alike point to a disconcerting trend for Beijing: an increasingly localized sense of identity among residents in both locales that correlates with a decreasing sense of a national “Chinese” identity. 

The New York Times reported that the Umbrella Movement protests, which took over major Hong Kong city intersections for several months last fall, were emblematic of poll results from earlier in the year revealing a significant increase in people’s self-identities as “Hong Kongers” while identification as either “Chinese” or a “citizen of the People’s Republic of China” fell to their lowest levels since 1997 and 2007, respectively. Polls conducted in Taiwan last year similarly reported record-high percentages of residents considering themselves to be “Taiwanese” only, rather than “Chinese” or “both Taiwanese and Chinese.” Perhaps most significant is that this shift has occurred alongside unparalleled growth in cross-strait economic ties, which mainland Chinese leadership had anticipated would have just the opposite effect on Taiwan residents’ sense of identity. And Taiwan’s local elections last November seemed to further reinforce this point, with voters delivering a resounding defeat to the very party that had made increased cross-strait ties the mainstay of its current policy since it regained the presidency in 2008.¹  

The trends towards localized “Hong Konger” and “Taiwanese” identities, in other words, do not bode well for mainland China, which seems to be losing ground in this battle of identities with each passing day. Whereas Beijing initially anticipated that the passage of time—accompanied by increasing Chinese economic strength and overall standing in the world—would be to its advantage, it now appears that Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s estrangement—and, on Taiwan’s side, desire for independence—is only increasing as more time passes.

Return to a “Chinese” identity?

However, one piece of good news for Beijing may be that national “identity” is not static, nor does it only trend in one direction. Whereas the recent shifts could be seen as a source of concern, it should also be recognized that the current lack of “Chinese” identity among those in Hong Kong and Taiwan is at least in part a natural by-product of over a century of historical separation. Since the colonization of Hong Kong and Taiwan by the British and the Japanese, respectively, in the 1800s, the collective historical memory and experience of people in those locales—all of which has contributed to defining characteristics in the two societies today—has diverged from those in mainland China. Perhaps even more critical is that the term “Chinese” used today—referring to that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), ruled by the Communist Party of China (CPC)—is a characterization of “Chinese” that is largely foreign to both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Up until 1997, neither had ever been ruled by the CPC, nor had much exposure to its ideologies or directives. 

Political values and systems aside for now, the life experience over just the past five to six decades—not to mention the century before that—of residents in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan differed drastically as a result of these varying ruling governments. For example, while Hong Kong and Taiwan were embarking on rapid industrialization and economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, mainland Chinese residents were undergoing distinctive historical experiences of their own, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Not until the late 1970s did mainland China begin on its own path of significant economic growth—meaning that only then did at least some of its residents begin to encounter the modernizing effects on their lives that those in Hong Kong and Taiwan had been experiencing for decades. Conversely, those in Hong Kong and Taiwan did not—and never will—experience the monumental impact of movements like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. These various affairs, among others, contribute significantly to the characteristics, values, perspectives and overall psyche of Hong Kong’s, Taiwan’s, and mainland China’s society and culture today. In light of this, it should be neither astonishing nor necessarily concerning that those in Hong Kong and Taiwan do not feel “Chinese,” which today is by and large construed to mean “mainland Chinese.” Rather, what would be surprising is if less than two decades of rule by the mainland government—in the case of Hong Kong—and five or six years of increased cross-strait exchanges—in the case of Taiwan—could bridge differences that had been established and engrained in people over decades and even centuries of markedly distinct, deeply impactful and society-changing historic events.
 
Thanks to the PRC’s own economic “miracle” of the last few decades, life for residents in mainland China today is already beginning in broad terms to resemble that in Hong Kong and Taiwan much more so than before the 1970s. As wealth enables more and more residents to receive universal education, to purchase modern technologies and conveniences and to be exposed to ideas and experiences outside China through travel, exchanges and migrations—experiences that those in Hong Kong and Taiwan have known for over half a century—it is not inconceivable that the stark differences the “Hong Kongers” and “Taiwanese” see between themselves and the “Chinese” will begin to recede. In that vein, prospects for Beijing’s battle to win the “hearts and minds” of those in Hong Kong and Taiwan may not be as dire as recent events and identity trends may lead one to think. 

Identity battle

But alongside this relatively optimistic outlook for Beijing is also the fact that one’s self-identity and that of an entire society is a complicated amalgamation of numerous factors, and economic growth on its own may not be sufficient for restoring a sense of “Chinese” identity to those in Hong Kong and Taiwan. As western analysts and media frequently point out, the political system that governs a locale and the correlating political values its people hold is another significant component in identity formation and in the psyche of both “Hong Kongers” and “Taiwanese” today that they feel differentiate them from the “Chinese.” 

Regardless of the merits or disadvantages of an autocratic or a democratic system, the reality is that the shift from autocracy to democracy in Taiwan is one that residents are distinctly proud of and cherish, arguably even more than people in the United States, because many of those in Taiwan—unlike most Americans—have known what it is like to live under both systems. More importantly, few people in Taiwan, if any, would prefer to return to the previous autocratic political system. And though Beijing had hoped that those in Taiwan would see Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” structure as one they would desire for themselves, the outcome of almost 20 years of this arrangement is that many Hong Kong residents instead have watched Taiwan’s shift from autocracy to democracy and seen that as the system they ultimately desire to emulate. 

In essence, although no one can be sure whether the many factors that contribute to determining identities will work for or against Beijing, one certainty does exist: there’s no going backwards. Just as it would be unfathomable for Hong Kong or Taiwan to return to a point of lesser economic development—like that which mainland residents experienced more recently or even are currently undergoing—in such a way that would help narrow the differences created by economic growth, it is equally unimaginable that residents in either Hong Kong or Taiwan—especially those in Taiwan—would willingly accept or return to a less democratic system that could effectively bridge this current irreconcilable difference with their mainland counterparts. 

¹Although some analysts caution against drawing conclusions regarding the future of cross-strait relations based primarily on the November elections, as the results are not necessarily a reflection of voter discontentment arising solely from the ruling party’s policies towards mainland China (see http://www.dw.de/taiwan-election-results-show-general-disillusionment-with-kuomintang/a-18103585), a predominant viewpoint nonetheless appears to link election results with both the Taiwan and Hong Kong protests and, consequently, prospects for closer cross-strait relations in the short term and mainland China’s reunification plans in the long term (See http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/01/five-lessons-from-taiwans-elections/; http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/02/taiwan_elections_hong_kong_protests_china/; http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/asia/if-it-shrugs-off-chinas-embrace-taiwan-risks-more-than-just-trade-ties.html (especially quote by mainland China researcher Yang Lixian); http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/asia/if-it-shrugs-off-chinas-embrace-taiwan-risks-more-than-just-trade-ties.html?_r=0; http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2014/12/26/internet-referenda-on-taiwans-next-moves-in-sticky-relations-with-china/; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-01/taiwan-s-ma-seeks-domestic-reconciliation-after-china-backlash.html). \

Vice President and Director of Regional Security Ambassador Martin Fleischer presented EWI’s activities in the region, introducing a keynote speech by Ambassador Miroslav Jenča, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Central Asia and head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). The high-level event was enriched by comments from Mr. James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, and Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO; H.E. Mr. Homayoun Tandar, Ambassador of Afghanistan to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg; and H.E. Mr. Rustamjon Soliev, Ambassador of Tajikistan to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg. The roundtable discussion was moderated by Mr. Christian Forstner, head of the Hanns Seidel Foundation’s Brussels Center.

Ambassador Fleischer outlined the prospects for stability and cooperation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, presenting the steps taken by EWI’s Afghanistan Reconnected Process. This initiative aims at forging regional economic cooperation to minimize the economic impact of security transition in Afghanistan in the years to come, by engaging governments, Members of Parliament and private-sector leaders from the region. The Afghanistan Reconnected Process has identified energy trade and transit, cross-border trade facilitation and investment in regional transport infrastructure as most urgent areas of cooperation that can contribute to enhanced cooperation and economic security in the region. In 2015, EWI will undertake comprehensive regional advocacy and outreach missions for the implementation of the priority measures identified, with the private sector as main driver of the economic cooperation agenda.

While recognizing the value of EWI’s initiatives in the region, Ambassador Jenča acknowledged the increasing complexity of Central Asia and the need for more regional cooperation, in the interest of stability. The situation is not only related to the completion of NATO’s combat mandate in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of troops and the potential security implications on Central Asia, but also to other regional and broader challenges. In particular, the presence of Central Asian foreign fighters in the Middle East, the crisis in Ukraine, the falling ruble and prices of oil and gas, as well as the decreasing remittances of labor migrants from Central Asia in Russia also had a significant impact on the region and its stability.

Beyond the issue of regional cooperation, Ambassador Jenča wondered if countries of the region truly identified with Central Asia as a region. The lack of regional structures, limited cooperation, communication, transport links and cross-border trade, which stagnates at about 6 percent of total trade in each country, seem to suggest that this is not the case. The slow progress of the CASA 1000 and TAPI projects exemplify the skepticism encountered by cross-border initiatives, which require further stability and international community involvement to succeed.

At the same time, Ambassador Jenča mentioned that the main challenges and obstacles to stability often lie within Central Asian states. The succession of political leaders, socio-economic problems, marginalization, shortcomings in the rule of law, religious extremism, inter-ethnic tensions and organized crime are issues which need to be addressed by the countries in the region in particular through preventive efforts, which UNRCCA promotes. Moreover, the more stable, democratic and prosperous the countries will become, the more resistant they will be to external threats.

Despite the risks and threats faced by the region, Ambassador Jenča stressed that Central Asian states had made continuous progress in the past 20 years and had managed to keep the region stable. In this respect the international community needs to build upon and sustain the developments achieved in the region. As Central Asian states continue to diversify their foreign policy and partners to face increasing challenges, the EU has the opportunity to become an even more attractive partner in the region, and may consider more targeted support to Central Asia.

The ensuing discussion referred to the challenges posed to the region by unresolved border disputes, tensions over the use of common water resources and energy needs, marginalization and human rights questions, drug trafficking, terrorism and other forms of organized crime. Such trends continue to undermine regional stability and require concerted efforts by all countries of Central Asia to develop effective responses.

The regional dimension of the threat of violent extremism was strongly remarked, in light of the possible return of over 2,000 fighters from the region who joined the IS insurgency in Iraq and Syria. In addition, Ambassador Soliev noted that IS has announced future actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, raising the level of alert of neighboring countries. A recent meeting of deputy foreign ministers from the region has discussed the issue at length in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

In addition, developments in Afghanistan are affecting security in Central Asia as a whole, as there is a potential threat of terrorist and extremist actions related to lesser control over the Afghan territory after the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In this respect, Ambassador Tandar stressed the key role of Afghanistan, which he described as “The Shield of Central Asia” in the fight against terrorism.

Speakers agreed that ISAF and the international community have not successfully addressed narco-trafficking stemming from Afghanistan during ISAF’s mandate, and that it is having an impact outside the country’s borders, feeding organized crime in the region and beyond. As the NATO presence decreases, poppy cultivation is increasing—as forecasted by UNODC, whose regional program on the topic is coming to an end. These developments may exacerbate the already fragile security situation in the region. Further commitment is therefore required from the international community. NATO is available to provide support to Central Asia in relation to narco-trafficking, as well as in the field of border control and transit through training and mapping exercises. However, its involvement should not be seen as part of a zero-sum game by other influential actors in the region, as it will not be embedded in a political agenda.

It was also mentioned that Central Asian states can play a more important role in stabilizing Afghanistan, using their comparative advantages of geographical proximity, cultural similarities, and potential for mutually beneficial regional cooperation. Countries in the region are already involved in Afghanistan’s energy, infrastructure, transport and capacity building, but further engagement is necessary. These countries, however, need to be supported by the international community in order to harvest the fruits of regional cooperation. In particular, Afghanistan needs to be better engaged in regional processes and relevant regional initiatives. At this critical time, international support for concrete projects is needed more than ever.

Speakers agreed that Central Asian states feel they need to survive between two powerhouses: Russia and China. The former’s influence in security and politics is great, and the latter’s economic clout is growing continuously.  This often puts countries in the region in front of difficult choices. For example, Ambassador Jenča referred to Kyrgyzstan’s decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as China’s pledge of 3 billion dollars for projects in the region, through its Silk Road Initiative. Central Asian states are strengthening ties with these partners, while others’ commitments to the region have been less consistent. In particular, the US’ interests in the region remain unclear, while the EU needs to show itself as a more appealing partner, beyond its ongoing engagement in the area.

Particular attention was paid to the EU’s involvement in Central Asia, thanks to the contribution of Members of European Parliament Dorfmann and Zeller from the audience. More specifically, they highlighted how the EU is lagging behind Russia and China in the establishment of its priorities in the region. After the launch of the EU Strategy for Central Asia in 2007, its role was largely neglected until the current Latvian EU Presidency, which has committed to producing a more focused updated strategy by the summer. The EU has nonetheless expanded its assistance to Central Asia, and the European Parliament has been supporting the region’s path towards democracy. Moreover, Ambassador Soliev reminded the audience about the upcoming EU-Central Asia High-level Security Dialogue, to be held on March 11, 2015, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Ambassador Jenča stressed fostering cooperation and establishing partnerships as fundamental factors for advancements in the region. In particular, he recognized the commitments in this direction made by Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, who, since his inauguration has conducted numerous international missions aimed at strengthening ties with neighboring countries. Moreover, looking at the region as a whole, Ambassador Jenča concluded that cooperation between states in the region is an absolute priority for stability, and that the implementation of national reforms is key.

In this sense, in the margins of the conference, the UNSRSG and EWI formed a partnership for the final and critical phase of the Afghanistan Reconnected Process, aiming at advocating for reforms with governments in the region. By sharing the policy recommendations developed by business leaders from Central Asia and neighboring countries with concerned national administrations, the initiative will promote and support change towards enhanced economic cooperation and stability for the region.

The EastWest Institute has just released Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios, the second report out by its working group of Russian and U.S. experts. As Afghanistan now faces an uncertain political and security environment following the drawdown of ISAF troops at the end of 2014, the potential for a worsening narcotrafficking threat is great.

The report states that the potential for deterioration “underscores the imperative need for Russian and U.S. policymakers to find the political will to resume and perhaps even increase cooperation despite ongoing differences on other issues. Together with regional partners and international organizations, renewed Russian-U.S. cooperation presents the best hope for a brighter future.”

Senator Dianne Feinstein issued the same call for cooperation in a December 2014 report by the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, in which she wrote: “The simple fact is that Afghan narcotics pose serious security and health threats to both the United States and Russia. We should find opportunities to jointly address this shared problem.”

The working group’s first report, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, came out in 2013. Post-2014 Scenarios will be followed by three more reports in 2015 and 2016 offering specific policy suggestions on border security, alternative livelihood in Afghanistan and narco-financing, with a final report presenting a compendium of all recommendations.

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Appearing with Firestein on the panel were Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Wilson Center, and Charles Laughlin, chair of Asian Studies at the University of Virginia. In the first part of the discussion, the panelists offered reflections on their careers and experiences working with and on China, and the second part focused on the latitude for free expression and openness to different ideas in China and Chinese culture. Firestein’s comments on the program are summarized below.

All links below are for Mandarin-language videos only.
 

Part 1: Personal history and interest in China

Firestein visited China for the first time in 1984 as a tourist. He later studied international relations and Mandarin before being posted to China as a U.S. diplomat. In his personal experience, today’s China is vastly different from the China of 30 years ago. He noted two of the most evident changes: first, the greatly increased pace of life and its attendant toll on the quality of interpersonal bonds; and second—and more fundamentally—the increasing space for choice in the individual lives of Chinese. Firestein also noted that the Chinese Ministry of Education’s recent decision to curb the flow of Western ideas and values into Chinese academic institutions was unfortunate. In his view, innovation and new ideas are at the heart of China’s continued economic development, and this decision represents a step backwards on that path.
 

Video: http://www.voachinese.com/media/video/voaweishi-20150130-pro-and-con-1/2620544.html

Part 2: Expression and openness in China

Firestein noted that the main difference between American and Chinese culture is the emphasis placed on people’s right to free choice. According to Firestein, free choice in the United States is considered a sacred right and an integral aspect of being a human being; this derives from the country’s Judeo-Christian roots. China is also developing in this regard; for example, relative to the 1980s, Chinese people now have greater freedom to make choices in their own lives on matters such as their education, employment and foreign travel. However, Firestein noted that some recent trends in China toward greater restrictions on expression in artistic and intellectual fields are concerning, and expressed hope that China will continue to work to build an open and innovative society.
 

Video: http://www.voachinese.com/media/video/voaweishi-20150130-pro-and-con-2/2620582.html

Malik is the former director of the Human Development Report Office at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). His professional experience in development economics and implementing related programs brought a unique perspective to his presentation, which was followed by a lively question-and-answer session.

Utilizing development data and anecdotes from his time at the UNDP, Malik described how economic inequality, social stratification and uneven access to services drive otherwise peaceful people to ideological extremism and violence.

According to Malik, three important and interrelated forces that push people towards violent extremism are “exclusion, climate change and job insecurity.”

The international community needs to be more “inclusive of other perspectives and increase understanding, in order to implement more effective development policies,” said Malik. Not doing so, he said, has led to inefficient allocation of aid and pushed many in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, toward violent extremism.

When discussing the impact of climate change on religious extremism, Malik pointed to the Syrian conflict and a drought that began in 2002 that precipitated massive job shortage, ultimately serving as a trigger for the current conflict. Malik also tied climate change issues to conflicts in Mali, Niger and even the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Malik pointed out that 98 percent of the damage wrought by violent extremism occurs in developing countries. He also highlighted a study which found that 70 percent of young Taliban fighters had joined the group because it offered a rare steady job. Malik was careful to point out that job insecurity does not always lead to a rise in violent extremism, but is often a common feature of regions experiencing it.

When asked whether there were policies that do work to increase access to services and decrease inequality and stratification, Malik displayed some optimism.

“If we stop the flow of illicit money, educate the people and invest in job creation programs, we can see tremendous positive change.”

One outcome of President Barack Obama’s visit to India that has received the greatest attention is the breakthrough on the nuclear deal front. For the US, India’s unwillingness to resolve the outstanding issues reflected a lack of commitment to the strategic relationship. This had affected the overall political relationship. 

The supplier liability issue seems to have resolved by India’s decision to set up an insurance pool to discharge liability, as well as a written clarification on the applicability of Section 46 only to operators and not suppliers. On the vexed national tracking issue the nature of the understanding with regard to reconciling the provisions of the 123 agreement, our “international obligations” and the Canadian template under which only International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tracking is required, is not yet fully clear, but a “done deal” has been announced. Yet, the larger question of the commercial viability of US supplied reactors remains, a point alluded to in Prime Minister Narendra Modi-Obama joint press conference. Modi has done well to transfer the subject from government level to commercial level so that the negative politics surrounding the subject is eliminated.

Defence has been the other touchstone for the US to measure India’s willingness to deepen the strategic partnership. During the president’s visit, significant progress was expected to be announced under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative. This has not happened, but some progress has been made, with four “pathfinder” projects being announced involving relatively less complex technologies. As expected, the India-US Defence Framework Agreement of 2005 has been extended for another 10 years.

A document of considerable geopolitical significance signed during the visit is the US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. During his September visit to Washington, Modi had spoken about India-US convergences in the Asia-Pacific region and had declared that the US was intrinsic to India’s Act East and Link West policies. In the joint statement issued after the bilateral discussions on Sunday, the two sides have noted that India’s Act East Policy and the US rebalance to Asia provide opportunities to work closely to strengthen regional ties. 

A separate document on the subject shows how far India has travelled in affirming, along with the US, the “importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”. The document also calls on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means in accordance with international law, including the Law of the Sea Convention. 

It speaks, in addition, of India and the US investing in making trilateral countries with third countries in the region, with Japan and Australia clearly in mind. This is a direct message addressed to China, reflecting less inhibition on India’s part both to pronounce on the subject and do it with the US, irrespective of Chinese sensibilities. Some Chinese commentary has criticised this effort by the US to make India part of its containment strategy, without taking cognisance of how India views China’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean, its strategic investments in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan and other countries.

The Obama visit has also demonstrated the good personal rapport established between him and Modi, with embraces and first name familiarity, walk in the park and talk over tea, all of which adds to the prime minister’s personal stature as a man comfortable and confident in his dealings   with the leader of the most powerful country in the world on the basis of equality. This personal rapport could be leveraged to make the White House exercise continuing oversight over the Administration’s policies towards India, which experience shows is very helpful for the bilateral relationship.

Counter-terrorism
Counter-terrorism is always highlighted as an expanding area of India-US cooperation because of shared threats. The joint statement speaks dramatically of making the US-India partnership in this area a “defining” relationship for the 21st century. Because the biggest terrorist threat to India comes from Pakistan, does this mean that the US will share actionable intelligence with us on terrorist threats to us emanating from Pakistani soil? One can remain doubtful about this. The continued omission of the Afghan Taliban from the list of entities India and the US will work against is disquieting, as it indicates US determination to engage the Taliban, even when it knows that it is Pakistan’s only instrument to exert influence on developments in Afghanistan at India’s cost.

On trade, investment and intellectual property rights (IPRs) issues, the two sides will continue their engagement with the impulse given to the overall relationship by these Obama-Modi exchanges. On the Bilateral Investment Treaty, the two sides will “assess the prospects for moving forward”. On the totalisation agreement the two will “hold a discussion on the elements requires in both countries to pursue” it, a language that offers little hope. On IPRs, there will be enhanced engagement in 2015 under the High Level Working Group. The Higher Education agenda seems essentially stalled as the joint statement shows. 

On climate change, we have reiterated the decision to work together this year to achieve a successful agreement at the UN conference in Paris, even when our respective positions are opposed on the core issue of India making specific emission reduction commitment. While stating that neither the US nor the US-China agreement put any pressure on India, he acknowledged pressure on all countries to take steps for the sake of posterity. He has finessed the issue for the present with this artful language. All in all, president Obama’s visit has given a welcome boost to India-US ties.

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To read the article at Deccan Herald, click here.