Politics and Governance

Shades of Gray in Afghanistan

EWI Chief Operating Officer James L. Creighton provides his personal insights into dealing with warlords in Afghanistan in this piece for The Diplomat.

In August 2010, I assumed command of combined Team Uruzgan, a diverse force of coalition soldiers from ten countries, including Australia, Singapore, France, New Zealand, and the United States, created to push back Taliban influence in the province and to “promote effective governance, provide development and transition security to the Afghan National Security Forces.”

One day prior to assuming command, I faced a dilemma, exemplary of the larger difficulties Western efforts in the country face. On July 31, 2010, in Uruzgan, Afghans associated with the Taliban accused the coalition forces of “stabbing” a Koran. There was concern among the Afghan leaders in the provincial capital city of Tarin Kowt that there would be widespread unrest in the Mirabad valley, just five miles from Kamp Holland, regional headquarters of the Dutch command representing NATO in Afghanistan. The coalition forces were transitioning from Dutch control to a combined organization of ten countries under a U.S. Army colonel.

The local warlord, Matiullah Khan approached the coalition leaders and offered to broker a meeting between the local leaders who believed that a NATO soldier had stabbed the Koran, and the coalition leaders who knew that the charges were false. Dutch authorities considered Matiullah a criminal and refused to work with him. The new coalition leaders decided that although Matiullah had in all likelihood committed illegal acts, as a tribal leader, he was best placed to defuse the situation.

At Matiullah’s headquarters, a group of five Australian and U.S. leaders were led into a long narrow room in which approximately 100 Afghan leaders were assembled. Matiullah, police chief Brigadier General Juma Gul, Afghan Army commander Brigadier General Hamid, and National Director of Security commander Brigadier General Zakaria led the coalition leaders through a narrow gauntlet that opened to the front of the room. There, the coalition representatives sat down in front of a small lectern while their Afghan partners moved to their own places at the head of the assemblage. At the lectern a black turbaned mullah began ranting. With flaming red eyes and profuse spit, he exhorted the Afghans in the room to defy the coalition and local Afghan leaders; to kill coalition soldiers; and to take retribution for the blasphemous act of stabbing a Koran. After 45 minutes of the mullah’s tirade, General Hamid moved forward and suggested politely that it would be best for the coalition leaders to leave.

We spent the next four hours in Matiullah’ s office waiting for the meeting to conclude. Finally, the Afghan partners returned to inform coalition leaders that the issue had been resolved and that the assembled Afghans were on their way home. The coalition leaders were told that the police chief, General Gul, had taken the podium and looked each Afghan in the eye, telling them to swear on the Koran that they had seen the Koran being stabbed. When everyone in the room denied having witnessed this evident sacrilege, General Gul, said “If no one can swear on the Koran that they saw the Koran being stabbed then it did not happen!” Convinced of the facts through exhaustive discussion and debate in an Afghan “Shura,” the assembled leaders filed out of the hall and headed home content that the Koran had not been violated.

Shades of Gray

As the coalition commander in the room, I faced a dilemma: Should I work with the Afghan warlord who had defused the crisis or should I follow the Dutch example and spurn those Afghan leaders believed to be corrupt and criminal. Is it better to follow a black and white path and only cooperate with Afghans who met strict Western definitions of appropriate conduct? Or, is it better to accept the leaders on the ground as constituted within a spectrum of shades of gray? How should I distinguish shades of gray? At what point is a person too gray and approaching black and just too bad to be tolerated? These were the critical questions I faced as I prepared to take command on August 1, 2010, the next day.

The Dutch assessment of Matiullah was very critical. They had gathered credible evidence that Matiullah’s uncle, Jan Mohammad Kahn, a tribal leader, warlord, and deposed governor of Uruzgan, had recruited him to enforce order in the region. In this role, Matiullah was accused of killing locals and Taliban for his uncle. Matiullah was a colonel in the Afghan National Police force and commanded the “2000” man Private Police Militia, Kandak Amniante Uruzgan (KAU). The police chief, General Gul, accused Matiullah of charging the government for KAU policemen that did not exist. The KAU were accused by other local tribal leaders of attacking non-Taliban locals and of torturing captured prisoners. Matiullah was known to over-charge coalition forces for security of convoys traveling for 22 hours along the 160 miles of dirt road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt, known as Route Bear. If the coalition refused to pay the inflated charges then incidents along the route increased. Matiullah was accused of instigating these attacks in order to justify the security requirements. Coalition leaders, principal elders of opposing tribes and local Afghans shared these concerns. Although not indicted or convicted there was clearly a pattern of suspicious behavior associated with the KAU Commander’s actions in and around Uruzgan.

The Australian and U.S. Special Forces in the region had a much different assessment. Matiullah was seen as warrior who hated the Taliban and would readily provide well-trained and effective augmentation to combat operations. His KAU provided excellent security along Route Bear with minimal loss of equipment and supplies enroute. He escorted medical and humanitarian goods at no charge. I personally witnessed his ability to quietly broker agreements between competing tribes who were fighting over a wide variety of issues. He presided over a “Thursday Shura” during which local people, usually women, would come to ask for assistance with opening businesses, supporting schools, building athletic facilities, and other basic needs. Matiullah was able to provide this assistance, resolve problems, and support the local community. His ability to gather tribal leaders from all local tribes in order to help resolve disputes was a critical element in sustaining relative peace in Uruzgan. There are conflicting opinions regarding the ultimate purpose behind Matiullah’s civic actions; however, he clearly assisted the coalition in maintaining security and keeping the Taliban out of Uruzgan.

Facing a dilemma of how to view Matiullah and not compromise Dutch cooperation, seeing him as a corrupt warlord versus seeing him as an effective and reliable commander and supporter of coalition operations, I had a decision to make. From my perspective, I saw him neither as all white, à la coalition Special Forces, nor all black, à la the Dutch. I viewed Matiullah as a deep shade of gray. I accepted that he was in fact a commissioned colonel in the Afghan National Police who, despite a trail of ostensibly incriminating actions, was an effective commander who supported coalition security operations. I recognized that although his suspect past and current dealings were not acceptable according to official Western practices, they fell under the tacit moral aegis of the Afghan National Police, provincial governor and Afghan president. From my perspective it was better to work with the accepted and appointed Afghan leader despite conspicuous flaws than to marginalize him due to accusations of improper behavior. I concluded that building a cautious and wary relationship was better for the security of the region than to confront Matiulah and work at cross purposes, potentially creating another enemy.

Matiullah Khan was a quiet, enigmatic tribal leader who rose to the rank of brigadier general in the Afghan National Police. He cared deeply for his people, despised the Taliban, and was instrumental in maintaining security in the region. He worked closely with the coalition to eliminate Taliban influence in Uruzgan. By working with Matiullah and the other leaders in Uruzgan, all different shades of gray, we were able to dramatically increase the volume of goods in all provincial bazars, build a 42-kilometer asphalt road from Tarin Kowt to Chora, more than double the number of children in school, and all but eliminate Taliban Influence in the province.

During my last flight from Gizab, a small mountainous village 120 miles north of Tarin Kowt, I noticed that what ten months earlier had been pitch black was now covered with a multitude of lights. And the lights of progress shone too, security and economic growth made possible by working with local leaders who helped create a more stable environment, despite characters of murky gray and rigid perceptions of black and white.

Matiullah Khan was killed in a targeted suicide bombing in Kabul in March 2015.

Expansion of education in Uruzgan.

Provincial Chief Justice Maulawi Mohammad Jan delivers a shura on maintaining law and order and eliminating corruption in Uruzgan.

Afghan National Police (ANP) getting ready to go on patrol.

Cooperation with local elders from Uruzgan.

ANP on Patrol.

A local elder expresses thanks to Afghan and coalition forces for clearing route from Tarin Kowt to Kaz-Uruzgan. This was the first time in 5 years that he was able to travel on this road.

Expansion of bazaar in Tarin Kowt.

Matiullah Khan on patrol.

Uruzgan Security Battalion (KAU) policeman guarding convoys along the route to Bear.

Completion of the Tarin Kowt to Chora Road, a Dutch-German project, which reduced travel time between the two major commerce centers in Uruzgan from six hours to two hours.

To read this article at The Diplomat, click here

Click here to listen to a podcast on the article with The Diplomat's Ankit Panda

Kyrgyz Republic: Democratic Reforms and Foreign Policy Priorities

On March 30, Ambassador Martin Fleischer, vice president and director of the Regional Security Program, moderated the discussion “Kyrgyz Republic: Democratic Reforms and Foreign Policy Priorities” with H.E. Mr. Almazbek Atambayev, president of the Kyrgyz Republic, jointly with Christian Forstner, director of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Brussels.

The event gathered high-level participants from EU and NATO institutions, the diplomatic community, and NGOs in the premises of Bavaria’s representation to the EU. During his speech, President Atambayev reviewed the progresses made in the fight against corruption and the containment of Islamic radicalization. Moreover, he stressed his commitment to strengthening people’s faith in Kyrgyzstan’s democratic process and to carrying out free and fair parliamentary elections in Autumn 2015.

Asked by Amb. Fleischer about Kyrgyzstan’s geopolitical position, President Atambayev highlighted the importance of establishing amicable ties with all neighboring countries. Kyrgyzstan considers itself a bridge between Europe and Asia, and in this respect sees the EU as an important partner that could be even more engaged in the region. At the same time, the country is developing its economic ties with neighbors. The foreseen accession to the Eurasian Economic Union by May 2015 should not be seen as a contradiction to the partnerships with the EU and NATO. President Atambayev was also optimistic about deepening cooperation with China and in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Following the discussion, the President opened a photo exhibition depicting the dramatic revolutionary events of the year 2010, as well as the rich culture and tradition of the country.

NATO’s European Security Challenges: Russia and ISIS

Overview

A Conversation with Lieutenant General John Nicholson, Commander, Allied Land Command, NATO, Izmir, Turkey
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Friday, April 24, 2015 | 11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. EDT
EastWest Institute | 11 East 26th St., 20th Fl., New York, NY 10010

A light lunch will be served.
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In 2014, major European security crises emerged on two fronts–Russia/Ukraine and the appearance and expansion of ISIS in the Middle East:

  • The rift between the West and Russia is a post-Cold War turning point for NATO. Russian military exercises and troop build-up on the Ukraine border have unsettled Eastern European members of the Alliance.
  • ISIS is fighting on NATO’s border. As Turkey is a member of NATO, ISIS represents a credible threat to a the alliance member.

Lt. Gen. Nicholson leads all NATO land forces in Europe, with operational responsibility for land-based threats. He will provide his perspective on how these two ongoing crises are impacting NATO and the Land Command and possible responses.
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Click here to read Lt. Gen. Nicholson's full bio. 

Afghanistan Reconnected - Advocacy and Outreach Mission to Pakistan

Together for Reforms and Cross-Border Cooperation

How can economic development increase not only prosperity, but also security and stability in post-2014 Afghanistan and the region? Can Afghanistan reclaim its unique position as a transit route between resources in Central Asia, Southwest Asia and the booming Far East? And what are Pakistan’s challenges and opportunities in this scenario?

These were the dominant themes of the EastWest Institute’s advocacy and outreach mission to Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad from March 18-20, 2015, conducted as part of the Afghanistan Reconnected initiative (also referred to as the Abu Dhabi Process). The mission was carried out by a delegation of parliamentarians, former ministers and private sector experts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States and Turkey. 

Tunisia's Hour of Need

EWI’s Distinguished Fellow Mustapha Tlili argues in his New York Times op-ed, “Tunisia’s Hour of Need” for the United States to take bold action to help the country stand up to extremist assaults. The Islamic State claimed responsibility in the latest attack in Tunisia that left 21 dead. 

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To read the article at the New York Times, click here

In the terrorist attack last week that took the lives of 21 people, most foreign tourists, at the National Bardo Museum, Tunisia itself was under attack. And it will remain so because it is a secular democracy in an Arab world that is not democratic and, with the exception of Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangements, has never known democracy.

Responsibility for the outrage was claimed by the Islamic State, although officials have identified a cell of militants with various allegiances, including the local Salafist extremist group Ansar al Shariah. The Arab world is reeling from an unprecedented wave of Islamic extremism, in part financed by sympathizers in oil-rich Persian Gulf states and unfortunately exacerbated by America’s “war on terror.” The West must now decide whether the young Tunisian democracy is worth saving.

From Iraq to Libya, and Syria to Yemen, the status of democracy in the region is a catastrophe. Even Egypt has reverted to its authoritarian ways. Today, those in the region who have survived the mayhem yearn for a more stable Middle East, for a chance to find their way and fulfill the destinies of their peoples.

Bold action, by the United States in particular, could make a significant difference. If the West perceives Tunisia as a new light in the otherwise dark Arab political sphere, it might help the country stand up to extremist assaults. But if it chooses merely to pay lip service to Tunisia’s achievements, the risk is that the newly elected government may fail. The consequences of this choice are grave.

The Obama administration and the United States Congress have an opportunity to amend future historians’ judgments of America’s misguided interventions in the Middle East by coming to the aid of the one success story of the period. And Tunisia’s political achievements are all the more important because they are not the product of American armed intervention.

The country’s secular democracy owes much to cultural factors: the peaceful character of its people, their middle-class culture, respect for women’s equality, regard for education, moderate practice of Islam and social tolerance. Unfortunately for the hopes of many at the outset of the Arab Spring, these preconditions for democracy simply did not exist in the rest of the Arab world.

In January 2014, just three years after Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself — an act that incited the Tunisian revolution, ending 23 years of dictatorship — the transitional assembly adopted the new Constitution. Islamists held a majority of seats until the elections last fall. But the secular opposition successfully resisted the push of the Islamist party, Ennahda, toward theocracy and Shariah law. Tunisia’s recent presidential elections were universally applauded for their transparency, fairness and civility. In January of this year, President Beji Caid Essebsi pledged to respect and defend the new secular Constitution.

The Islamist terrorists who struck weeks later at the Bardo Museum could not accept or even fathom such a bright future. Tunisia’s success as a democracy is incompatible with their perverse, absolutist, almost nihilistic interpretation of Islam. They will not cease until Tunisia declares its allegiance to an archaic form of Islam incompatible with Enlightenment principles — what my Sorbonne professor, the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, called the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” the interpretive power of critical reason applied to our beliefs and our texts.

How can the United States come to Tunisia’s assistance in its hour of need? President Obama’s recent phone call to Mr. Essebsi was appreciated, but words of sympathy are surely far less than the moment requires. To convey a stronger message, America’s president should schedule an early visit to the country, address its newly elected Parliament and let Tunisians know that they are, from now on, among the strategic allies of the United States on the basis of shared democratic values and interests.

Congress should, for its part, promptly issue an invitation to Mr. Essebsi to address a joint session of the legislature upon his first official visit to the United States. Congress should also offer a far more significant package of economic, military and financial assistance than the present $61 million appropriation for Tunisia, particularly since the country’s tourism industry, which accounts for about 15 percent of the country’s economy, will certainly be affected by the museum attack.

Tunisia only recently emerged from four years of financial mismanagement by the Ennahda-led transitional government. A donor conference, including other major Western countries, would provide the setting for an effective response to Tunisia’s economic needs. Tunisia needs more than symbolic gestures to combat Salafist terrorists determined to cripple the Tunisian economy by frightening off Western tourists and investors.

Tunisia’s security sector is also vulnerable and in need of support, including more modern military equipment and intelligence-gathering tools. The government has to contend not only with a 300-mile border with a chaotic, post-Qaddafi Libya (a huge arms bazaar for Islamist terrorists of all stripes), but also with as many as 500 returning Islamic State fighters who must be prevented from launching further attacks like the one at the Bardo Museum. Effective exchange of information between the American intelligence community and the Tunisian security apparatus should be mandated by Congress.

Cooperation on security should extend to NATO countries, too. It is clear that Islamic State-inspired jihadists are aiming at Europe no less than at Tunisia, with the Mediterranean region serving as shelter for a new breed of terrorists who can easily disappear among the local populations. It is estimated that about 2,500 susceptible, misinformed Tunisians are fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State. They, too, might one day return and spread havoc.

Why wait for another Bardo tragedy to deal with this threat? There is as much at stake for the West in the attack at Tunis last week as there was at Paris in January: It is the same fight.

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To read the article at the New York Times, click here

Piin-Fen Kok Interviewed by Asia News Weekly on the Implications of Abe's Address to U.S. Congress

On April 29, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will address a joint session of the U.S. Congress in the run-up to the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Piin-Fen Kok, director of the China, East Asia and United States Program at the EastWest Institute, discussed the potential implications of the speech on the March 27th edition of the Asia News Weekly podcast. 

Watch Kok's interview at 1:06

To listen to the podcast, click here

 

Key excerpts from her comments are below:

On the ramifications of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being invited to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress: 

“As far as I understand, no sitting Japanese prime minister has ever addressed a joint session of both houses in Congress, so this is a big deal… It’s a very interesting time right now for U.S.-Japan relations. On the economic front, both are concluding negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the congressional role is very important in the U.S. because the president would need the Congress to grant fast-track trade promotion authority to facilitate the TPP.  On the security front, the two countries are revising their defense guidelines in recognition of the more proactive global role that Japan wants to take on. But this year is the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, so a great amount of attention both in the U.S. and globally, and especially in the Asia region, will be paid to Abe’s remarks about Japan’s role in the war.”

 

On the implications for the U.S. in Asia if Prime Minister Abe were invited to address the joint session and not take a more repentant view of history:

“I think that it would not be well received at all in Asia, especially by its two closest neighbors, China and Korea. And from the point of view of China, that would fuel even further the narrative by the Chinese that the U.S. is just enabling Japan for its own selfish strategic goals and ignoring history and the role that Japan has played in the war. And for Korea it’s just going to be a very tricky situation for the U.S. in trying to manage relations with its two main allies in the region… It’s been a rough time these days for America’s relations with its allies in other parts of the world, whether it’s tensions with Israel over Iran, or the UK, France and other European allies joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank led by China. So I think the U.S. could scarcely afford any blow-up in relations between Japan and Korea.”

 

On whether Abe may adopt less apologetic language in his address for the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II:

“I think Abe had said himself back in January that he does plan to express remorse for Japan’s role in the war and to uphold the statements given by previous Japanese leaders. So I think in general he would probably abide by the spirit of what has been said before. Like they say, the devil is in the details—it’s all a matter of how nuanced an interpretation he himself wants to give, and things like referring to aggression, whether he would mention that kind of verbiage.”

 

On Japan’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution to allow for collective self-defense and its ramifications for U.S. interests in Asia:

“I think we need to make a distinction between reinterpreting Article 9, which is what is happening now, with the ruling coalition preparing a timetable and draft legislation to the Diet to be passed to lift the ban on collective self-defense... That is distinctly different from actually changing the constitution, which some have said is the ultimate goal of Prime Minister Abe. But changing the constitution will require a public referendum, and given the split in public opinion about this issue, that’s going to be exceedingly difficult and almost impossible to achieve... About the prospects of the legislation in the Diet that is most likely to be presented in the coming months or by next year, if it should for some reason or another fail, that would conceivably eliminate what Japan under Prime Minister Abe would desire to do in terms of a more proactive role in partnering with the U.S. and other countries in the region to defend their maritime interests, whether it’s in the East China Sea or in the South China Sea.

"But even so, even if the legislation is passed, the whole notion of collective self-defense, or CSD, faces severe, specific constraints under which such collective self-defense can be exercised. So in itself, the parameters are pretty narrow for Japan to have greater flexibility in the role of its SDF. So I think, again, a lot will depend on internal politics and a lot will depend on the coalition partner, the Komeito, which has its own reservations and adopts a more pacifist stance. Talking to Japanese experts and Japan watchers, the general sense is that to the extent that legislation is passed, it will most likely be pretty watered down, constrained and limited.”

Firestein Interviewed by NTDtv on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

David Firestein, EastWest Institute’s Perot fellow and vice president for the Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 diplomacy, was interviewed on the March 25, 2015 edition of Focus Talk, a news program broadcast by the Chinese-language television network New Tang Dynasty Television.

Speaking in Mandarin, Firestein commented on U.S. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) becoming the first major-party candidate to announce a bid for the U.S. presidency in 2016, as well as on the unfolding 2016 U.S. presidential election overall. 

 

Parades to Fear, Not Celebrate

In The New York Times, EWI Senior Fellow Franz-Stefan Gady writes about military parades and their growing practice and significance outside of the western world. 

To read the piece at The New York Times, click here.

LEBRING-SANKT MARGARETHEN, Austria — In my life I have participated in several military parades, but one stands out. As an officer candidate in the Austrian Army, I marched in step to the tune of the “Radetzky March” past a crowd—my Uncle Winfried and Aunt Waltraud among them—down an alley leading to Eggenberg Palace, in Graz.

It was late fall, chilly and dark. Half the members of my company carried torches, which cast eerie shadows on the Baroque exterior of the castle.

As we marched by, crowds spontaneously clapped, some shouting, “Bravo, super Burschen!” (Well done, fine boys!) The shrill bark of red-faced sergeants and long days of monotonous drill were for a brief moment forgotten. Not forgotten were the echoes of past parades and the fate of those who had marched and cheered.

Grand national military parades are waning in most of the West, but in Asia, they are becoming a popular form of statesmanship. This year, lavish pageants of military hardware and marchers in formation will advance down boulevards in India, Pakistan, North Korea and China, as well as in Russia, straddling Europe and Asia.

Continue reading the main story

Yet however alluring and visually striking, these parades embody militarism, the deadly business at the heart of almost all sovereign states. The term “parade” comes from the Latin word “parare,” to prepare. Throughout history, parades have helped prepare citizens for war.

This volume of military parades suggests a dangerously combustible combination of militarism and national insecurity. They often create instability by starting a self-perpetuating cycle of lethal competition.

The 2015 Asian parade of parades began in January in India, which held a Republic Day gala in New Delhi. It featured cultural and religious tableaus woven into an awesome array of military displays. The “chief guest,” Barack Obama—the first American president to attend the event, with the first lady, Michelle Obama—applauded the troops with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a host of dignitaries.

But these martial displays can prompt other nations—especially on borders—to continue a parade arms race in order to dispel notions of vulnerability and strengthen deterrence.

Following India’s parade, after a seven-year hiatus, Pakistan plans to hold its own Republic Day military parade. Noting President Obama’s visit to India and perhaps a Western tilt toward that country after NATO’s exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, was hoping to secure President Xi Jinping of China as his “chief guest” of this year’s ceremony, as both leaders posture for a strategic alliance.

National military parades invite their own bigger and better sequels. Yet leaders of these countries might recall Europe’s experience in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when countries underwent military innovation and stockpiled arms before the world wars.

Europe’s influence on parades can be found in Asia today in marching techniques, which often feature variations of the Prussian goose step (Stechschritt), especially popular in China, Russia and North Korea. Of the goose step, George Orwell noted that it is “one of the most horrible sights in the world.” He added, “It is simply an affirmation of naked power; contained in it, quite consciously and intentionally, is the vision of a boot crashing down on a face.”

Russia needs no reminder of the awful toll of the goose step. A parade will fill Red Square in May to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, the country’s most destructive war. President Vladimir V. Putin has expanded Victory Day celebrations, feeding his citizens’ reactionary sentiment for Soviet-era military prestige.

Military parades can also publicize military spending. In countries like China, where only a figure for the total defense budget is released, they help show what taxpayer money is buying.

After staging only three military spectacles since 1960, the Communist Party of China aims to “make Japan tremble,” according to The People’s Daily, a state-run newspaper, with a prodigious military parade later this year.

President Xi will reportedly, in an unusual gesture in China’s modern history, invite foreign heads of state to witness this tour de force in Beijing. Leaders of Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines may tremble as well.

In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought to ease postwar constitutional restrictions on the country’s military. Under the aegis of “Abenomics,” the Diet has approved an increase in military spending for three consecutive years.

No one who has ever participated in a military parade can deny the rousing yet mind-numbing sensation that marching in perfect synchronization to the tune of martial music invokes, as well as the peculiar intoxicating bond that is forged between the soldier and the audience.

Marching, you are not allowed to move your head—save the dramatic “eyes right” for the presiding leader—and should restrict your vision to the neck seam of the soldier in front.

This peripheral blindness, however, affects the soldiers, yet also the onlookers, creating what Harold Rosenberg called “a herd of independent minds.”

There is another, more solemn version of the military parade. In June 2012, I stood in a long line of a few hundred American soldiers and contractors flanking left and right the main road of Forward Operating Base Salerno in Khost Province, Afghanistan. A coffin draped with an American flag was slowly carried through the base.

There was no music and no marching in step. A chaplain and a few soldiers of the unit escorted the coffin to a C-130 transport plane waiting on the runway. A loudspeaker shouted out the commands, and even though I was wearing civilian clothes, I instantly assumed a military posture at the order of “Attention!” With no further thought, I also knelt down at the command, “Prepare for prayer!”

When I later wrote about my experience in a story for an Austrian newspaper, many complained that I—as a correspondent—should not have participated in this “hero ceremony.” I felt I almost had no choice.

For a soldier, parades mark the beginning and sometimes the end of military life. For nations, throughout history—and this is what Asia’s leaders should keep in mind—what begins as a parade often ends in carnage and death.

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To read the piece at The New York Times, click here.

Another Pipe Dream?

EWI Senior Fellow Danila Bochkarev writes about the proposed trans-Afghanistan natural gas pipeline, and why, despite significant political hurdles, it could be monumental for the region. 

To read the piece at Natural Gas Europe's website, click here.

Backed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI) aims to export up to 33 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas through a proposed pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The promise of TAPI was based on the growing energy deficit in South Asia, high hydrocarbon prices and an abundance of natural gas reserves in the neighbouringcountry of Turkmenistan.

There is a need for both India and Pakistan to find long-term sustainable solutions for their ever-growing energy demands. A shortage of supply, especially for power generation, is slowing these two countries’ economic growth considerably.

In South Asia, natural gas is rapidly gaining importance as the key fuel for power generation. Gas-based power generation plants are more economical to build than alternatives such as nuclear, hydropower and coal-fired plants. Gas-fired combined-cycle turbines are flexible and able to respond quickly to peak electricity demand. Gas-based generation is also significantly cheaper than fuel oil or diesel, often used to produce electricity in India and Pakistan.

The most efficient way to address the energy deficit in South Asia is, therefore, based on the construction of gas-fired power plants. Gas is abundant in neighbouring countries such as Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan, but the energy reality on the ground is often shaped by obstacles, which overweigh the advantages that geographical conditions offer. Iran is still under sanctions, Afghanistan remains unstable and only Qatar offers new hopes with cheaper oil-linked LNG supplies, which could counter-balance the pricing advantages offered by TAPI.

Oil prices offer little incentive for South Asian energy producers to switch from oil- or diesel-based power generation to natural gas 

Gas as the fuel of choice seems to be under (a temporary) threat as well. Lower oil prices offer little incentive for South Asian energy producers to switch from fuel oil- or diesel-based power generation to natural gas. For instance, gas has traditionally dominated Pakistan’s thermal generation. However, stagnation of domestic production and increased competition for gas from the country’s transport sector and fertiliser producers have led to a considerable decline in the usage of gas for energy production in Pakistan. However, the sharp rise in power generation costs has increased the appetite of companies to switch back to gas. But with the fall in oil prices, there is a risk that this trend might reverse and decrease Pakistani energy companies’ commercial interest in imported LNG or pipeline gas.

$2.4 billion

An increase in the estimated cost of TAPI

A combination of factors such as the oil price fall and uncertainty about transit via Afghanistan is likely to delay the launch of the TAPI further. The estimated cost of the gas pipeline has increased from $7.6 billion to $10 billion, and the estimated price based on oil-linked formula dropped from $10-$11 per MMBtu ($360-$380 per 1,000cm) to $7 per MMBtu ($250 per 1,000cm). While the price range of $6 per MMBtu ($220-$230 per 1,000cm) on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border is acceptable for Turkmengaz, it’s still unclear who will lead and finance the TAPI project.

According to the agreed timelines, the selection of the consortium leader should be finalised before the end of October. Needless to say, the leader has to have sufficient financial and technological clout to lead the project. An increase in the cost of the pipeline and decreased gas prices have reduced the interest of major players in TAPI.

Furthermore, Turkmenistan’s legislation does not allow the granting of large scale onshore concessions/PSAs to foreign companies, which, in turn, reduces their interest in TAPI. Granting access to onshore deposits to the consortium leader might help to choose an appropriate candidate. Alternately, Turkmenistan can lead the project directly or via Turkmengaz with the help of an international consortium. A trans-Afghan energy bridge could bring peace and stability to the conflict ridden-country. In fact, all neighbouring countries, including Turkmenistan, have a vital interest in a stable Afghanistan.

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This article was originally published in Oil Journal, LUKOIL Overseas’ official English-language newspaper. To read it at Natural Gas Europe's website, click here.

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