Politics and Governance

“Whether by design or accident, the nuclear deal struck in Geneva this past weekend is about far more than centrifuges, enrichment and breakout times.

Ultimately, the success of the nuclear negotiations will help determine who and what will define Iran for the next few decades.

Will Iran be defined by the confrontational and bombastic approach of its former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the conservatives around him? Or will it be defined by the more open and moderate approach of its current President Hassan Rouhani and his energetic and respected Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif.”

-“Nuclear Deal will Define Future Iran,” Reuters, November 25, 2013.   

“The Obama administration moved quickly to sell the agreement to nervous U.S. allies, particularly Israel, and to persuade lawmakers not to push ahead with new economic sanctions that could prompt Iran to abandon the six-month freeze on its nuclear program set under the accord. In interviews, Secretary of State John F. Kerry defended the deal, saying that the United States and its allies believe that the agreement ensures Iran will either abide by the terms or face the reinstatement of measures that have crippled the country’s economy.”

-“After Iran nuclear deal, tough challenges ahead,” Washington Post, November 24, 2013.

“The White House has to persuade skeptical lawmakers to hold off on imposing new sanctions on Iran during the next six months. That may be a hard sell given the number of lawmakers from both parties who want to increase the sanctions on Iran rather than softening or relieving any of the existing measures. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, a close White House ally, has said he's prepared to take up a tough new sanctions bill when the Senate comes back into session next month. The bill would almost certainly pass if it was put to a full vote. Secretary of State John Kerry said Obama was prepared to veto new sanctions legislation, but that's a battle the White House would dearly love to avoid.”

-“Deal Reached to Halt Iran's Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy, November 24, 2013.

“The U.S. readiness to talk with Tehran, after decades of mistrust, has angered some people in Israel, who said it was a form of appeasement. But supporters of the deal say it will encourage Iran to be more open about its true nuclear aims, which it says are peaceful.

Israel's parliamentary opposition leader Isaac Herzog said Netanyahu should minimize confrontation with the Obama administration "and restore the intimate dialogue with the leaders of the big powers."”

 -“Netanyahu sending security aide to U.S. for talks on Iran,” Reuters, November 25, 2013.

“The Iranian foreign minister pointed to Israel’s animosity with Iran and fury of the Israeli leader over the victory of Iran’s diplomacy in Geneva talks, and said, “In these negotiations we want to build the trust of the world in the fact that we are not after nuclear weapons; so why have the enemies been terrified in such a way and why are they crying out?”

-“AEOI Chief: Structure of Iran’s N. Program Unaffected by Geneva Deal,” Fars News Agency, November 25, 2013.

“Gary Sick, a former National Security Council Iran expert who now teaches at Columbia University, said the bilateral U.S.-Iran communication was about ‘laying the groundwork’ for the interim deal concluded in Geneva. ‘The real negotiations, of course, took place with the P5+1’ he said, but the secret U.S.-Iran talks were a way ‘to break the ice a little bit.’ There has been more direct communication between Washington and Tehran in the last few months, he suggested, than in the 34 years since the Iranian revolution.”’

-“Nuclear deal raises prospects (and fears) of broader US-Iran thaw,” Al Jazeera America, November 24, 2013.

“…The interim nuclear agreement signed in Geneva on Sunday by Iran and the six big powers has many of the flaws of Munich and Paris. But it has none of their redeeming or exculpating aspects.

After Geneva there will come a new, chaotic Mideast reality in which the United States will lose leverage over enemies and friends alike.”

-“Stephens: Worse Than Munich,” The Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2013. 

Just as the United States has had to adapt to a world where its power is unmatched but no longer will determinant, Israel have to do the same. With enlightened leadership this adaptation could strengthen the Jewish state, securing the nation through integration in its region rather than domination of it. For now Israel is some way from this mind-set. Its overriding prism is military. It was important that President Obama set down a marker, as he has through this deal, one that may spur new strategic reflection in Israel.

-“Israel's Iran Dilemma, “The New York Times, November 25, 2013. 

“This is a sham from beginning to end. It’s the worst deal since Munich…It’s really hard to watch the president and the secretary of state and not think how they cannot be embarrassed by this deal.”

-“Charles Krauthammer: Worst since Munich,” Politico, November 26, 2013.

The debate about whether Islamist or secular parties could better guarantee a smooth transition to stable and democratic governance was central to the entire meeting. Some participants argued that discussing ideologies and their compatibility with democracy is a futile exercise since “people are interested in programs and results, not in ideologies,” while others countered that “one cannot discuss transition to democratic, rights-respecting governance without discussing the relation between religion and the state.”

The political dynamic in countries in transition is also marked by the contrast between institutional politics versus “street politics,” and by large generation gaps. Using mainly social media outlets, youth activists wield a new kind of power. Incoming leaderships are often fragmented and inexperienced, or project a sense of inclusion of people with differing views.

Many participants expressed concerns about the security and economic situations of several countries in the region. The deteriorating security environment, terrorism (in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt) and sectarian violence continue to pose a threat to both political and economic stability.

The regional economies are facing rising public debt, inflation and unemployment, particularly among educated youth-—all of which pose difficult challenges for these countries already burdened by a volatile and fragile political environments. “Newly elected governments did not come with a new economic model,” a participant explained. Wary of taking risks while they are managing the political transition, new leaders have delayed key economic reforms, such as reducing state subsidies. The question was raised whether new economic governance can really be postponed much longer: after all, the populations of these countries expect not only more political participation but also more concrete results towards economic stability.

Participants noted a trust deficit between the EU and North African countries undergoing transition. This is attributed to Western support for former regimes, the EU’s domestic concerns at its southern neighborhood, and, more recently, the backlash triggered by the flow of refugees from North Africa. Most participants contended that the EU should take a proactive strategic approach to the region. This would mean offering cooperation in areas of capacity building, promoting the rule of law, and reforming the police, judiciary and the economy. The latter would include reforming the fiscal system, subsidies and the energy sector in particular. These are key areas for security, political stability and economic recovery for countries in transition.

The transition process that began in Tunisia since 2011 will continue for years to come. Despite many setbacks, participants pointed to noteworthy achievements in a relatively short period of time: new constitutions drafted; empowerment of women in public life; and a qualitative and quantitative development of civil society organizations. In addition, unions and syndicates for trade, laborers, lawyers and journalists have emerged. There is also a growing free press, which allows for the possibility of public criticism of political elites and the continued efforts to support national dialogues in Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.

Civil Society Organizations

Since 2011, the number of civil society organizations has grown dramatically, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In some countries, these organizations have nearly doubled in number. Tunisia has witnessed the creation of 5,000 new civil society organizations in less than two years. In Libya, 3,000 new organizations emerged since the fall of Qaddafi.

Civil society organizations are also taking on a broader range of issues. They are debating new topics that used to be considered taboo under the old regimes, such as corruption, gender equality, women’s rights, and the rights and freedoms of ethnic and religious minorities.

Civil society organizations had a crucial role in leading the protests on the streets of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and they are now equally important in implementing the longed-for reforms, having become “a real partner and a real force of objection,” as one participant put it. The current roles of civil society organizations in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate a noteworthy difference. In Tunisia, syndicates, labor unions, the League of Human Rights, the law and bar association, and the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) played a key role in brokering a dialogue between the opposition and the government. In Egypt, conversely, civil society and human rights organizations have been marginalized in the public debate following the demise of President Mubarak. Moreover, many political parties, including often conservative ones, have used human rights jargon in an attempt to project a liberal, democratic image. More importantly, debates on human rights, civil liberties and freedoms often spark conflicts with the more conservative ruling parties, renewing the age-old debate on the compatibility Islam with democracy.

In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, a significant number of civil society organizations are led by young motivated leaders with little management experience. They lack the capacities to fully represent and advocate their organizations’ concerns at the political level. This has an impact on politics, since many parties look to these young leaders, hoping they will become the face of the popular revolutionary movements.

Many of the civil society organizations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya often find themselves in the midst of regional powers’ polarization. In Tunisia for example, the reform of the legal and political framework regarding the establishment and funding of civil society organizations is quite liberal and allows for foreign funding to be directly channeled to civil society. While this is helpful for the growth and development of needed civil society, it also allows the politicization of money for various political agendas.

Economic Challenges

While “there is no political transition without economic reform, and vice versa,” there can be no economic reform without security reforms either. Since 2011, for example, five consecutive Tunisian governments with no clear political agenda have negatively impacted the economy, discouraged the business community and scared away foreign investors. Furthermore, a decline in tourism has worsened an economy hammered by rising unemployment, inflation and a banking system on the brink of collapse. Tunisia could be heading for a major economic crisis.

A report published by E3G and the EastWest Institute, presented during the consultation, points out that a decline in living standards is one of the most important factors leading to instability. There is a high risk of instability driven by persistent youth unemployment, regional and social inequalities, dependence on low-value and underperforming sectors, harmful exposure to global food and energy price shocks and strong competition from emerging economies. Moreover, given worsening fiscal balances caused by lower exports, high energy prices and food subsidy payments, net oil and food importers have ever-fewer resources to buffer these risks. MENA economies face significant constraints on growth due to shortages of energy and water, which is further exacerbated by climate risks.

Energy markets and energy subsidies require new attention. Growing populations will increase demand for energy, particularly for oil and gas that are still the main resources consumed. Energy subsidies based on actual consumption reward and promote consumption indiscriminately; they need to be reduced to cut public spending, while still protecting the poorer population. The energy mix also needs to be diversified and must include renewables energy.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The EU should engage in strategic partnerships with the countries in transition in Europe’s southern neighborhood at diplomatic, economic and social levels. Medium and long-term support for key areas of capacity and institution building, rule of law, education and economic governance should be provided.

Building on the its experience as a model for regional integration, the EU should provide advice and assistance to North Africa on how to move forward with its political transition to encourage reconstruction and regional integration.

In economic terms, the Free Trade Agreements between the EU and North African countries should be reassessed to give countries in transition better access to EU markets—both for products and for people. If North African economies will prosper, the EU will benefit as well.

2. The role of civil society organizations has been crucial during and after the elections in countries in transition. Their young leaders and representatives need to develop their leadership capabilities, expertise in conflict and project management and public standing. Partnerships with academia could provide support.

3. Civil society organizations rely heavily on foreign funding, which can be beneficial but also provides ample opportunity for misuse and for regional polarization. Transparency in the financial and legal frameworks is essential for better monitoring of foreign funding to civil society.

4. A call was made for an Arab-Arab learning process on transition to democratic governance in North Africa, as there is almost no exchange among civil society organizations, parties and relevant voices within the region. Participants believed that it is possible to set up such inter-regional dialogue that includes political leaders, parliamentarians and civil society organizations.

5. Knowledge of and experience in trust-building and mediation processes are weak in the MENA region. Training Arabic-speaking facilitators for national dialogue processes would be useful.

6. Governments in countries in transition should overcome old divides and seek to form public-private partnerships with the business sector to benefit the economy and the population, e.g. by cooperating in the field of education, vocational training and promotion of young entrepreneurs.

7. There is a crucial need for fiscal reform, banking reform and reform of government subsidies, notably in the energy sector. Energy subsidies in Egypt and Tunisia have failed to alleviate expenses for the poorer communities. They drive consumption and increase public debt. From an economic and a social perspective, subsidies need to be reduced and to be directed to those who need them most. Governments of countries in transition have feared initiating such reforms, which require public discourse and broad public and political support to avoid clashes and crises.

8. The MENA region depends mainly on oil and gas with no renewables; there is a critical need to address the energy mix in the MENA region through the diversification of energy resources and more efficient consumption. As the water-food-energy nexus will affect the MENA region—with water shortages, higher food prices (due to climate change), growing energy consumption and prices—policy makers should not only seek to promote higher growth rates but also economic resilience, providing protection against shocks. This could be a topic for regional cooperation.

9. Natural resources management in the Eastern Mediterranean involving Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Cyprus and Turkey could provide a good opportunity to encourage regional cooperation, sustainable exploitation and the establishment of an inter-regional market.

In her editorial, Taylor explains: “During the conference, we talked about a number of pressing issues; we identified the issue of violence against women worldwide as one of our greatest concerns. Collectively, we agreed on the importance of continuing effort to pass The International Violence Against Women Act, a proposed piece of legislation that would for the first time place gender-based violence at the center of the U.S. foreign policy and international aid agenda. Thankfully, the Coalition to End Violence Against Women and Girls Globally is pushing Congress to reintroduce and pass this vital legislation in 2013.” 

Taylor goes on to describe the global importance of the legislation, should it pass. “From Afghanistan and Mexico to India and the United States, violence against women destabilizes families and communities, blocks economic progress, and undermines women’s efforts to create better lives for themselves and their families…If passed, the International Violence Against Women Act (I-VAWA) would establish gender-based violence prevention programs and create a response lens through which the U.S. government’s foreign aid could be redistributed to better respond to and ultimately reduce levels of violence against women internationally.”

To read State Senator Taylor’s editorial, click here.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's back-to-back visits to Russia and China from October 20 to 24 reflect the evolution of India's external relations in a world with shifting power balances.

The challenges lie in consolidating relations with tried and trusted friends with declining power, while forging understandings with adversaries with rising influence who seek to advance their interests through tactical overtures of friendship.

Russia

Russia remains a vital strategic partner of India. The long-term geopolitical interests of both are compatible. Russia is not interfering in sub-continental affairs, where it recognises India's primacy.

On principles that should govern international relations such as respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, combating international terrorism without double standards, and opposition to regime change policies, India and Russia have shared views.

Russia is India's principal defence partner, offering over the years platforms and technologies that have fortified our defence capabilites, whether it is the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya, the leased nuclear propelled submarine Chakra, technical assistance for Arihant, licensed manufacture of front-line combat equipment such as the Sukhoi 30 MKI aircraft and T90 tanks, the joint development of the potent supersonic missile Brahmos, or co-developing the fifth generation fighter aircraft and a multi-role transport aircraft.

Russia's politically significant role in India's civilan nuclear sector is epitomised by the construction of two 1000 MW nuclear power plants at Kudankulam, honouring a commitment made prior to its Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership.

The techno-commercial negotiations for building two additional reactors at Kudankulam have been completed, but the contract's finalisation awaits resolution of issues raised by India's nuclear liability legislation.

With China our territorial disputes endure. China has strengthened its military infrastructure on our frontiers, forcing India to belatedly raise additional forces and allocate enhanced infrastructure expenditure on its side. China seeks substantial territorial concessions by India, not simply an agreement on border adjustment, which makes settlement a distant prospect.

Vladimir Putin (right) will need reassuring that India's increasing ties with the US will not come at Russia's expense

Vladimir Putin (right) will need reassuring that India's increasing ties with the US will not come at Russia's expense

The confidence-building border measures that China backs are intended to prevent military incidents that would distract it from dealing with far bigger challenges in the east presented by US and Japan constraining China's regional dominance and its naval power expansion.

China

China interferes actively in our region, feeding fears of Indian hegemony amongst our smaller neighbours and preventing India from raising its global profile by consolidating its regional base. Pakistan, which has been fully complicit in this, receives Chinese political and military backing for pursuing its confrontational policies towards India.

China is Pakistan's principal defence partner. By transferring nuclear weapon and missile technology to Pakistan, China has profoundly damaged India's security.

In the civilian nuclear field, as a counter to India-Russia nuclear ties, before joining the NSG, China "grandfathered" its supposed commitment to supply two nuclear reactors to Pakistan. It then decided to supply two additional reactors on the same pretext, this time as a riposte to the India-US nuclear deal.

PM Manmohan Singh will hope for a positive agreement on border security when he visits China this month

PM Manmohan Singh will hope for a positive agreement on border security when he visits China this month

China is aiding in the construction of plutonium reactors in Pakistan to enable it to build smaller warheads for tactical nuclear weapons.

Despite political closeness, India's economic relationship with Russia remains modest, with two-way bilateral trade at only $11 billion plus last year. The target of $20 billion by 2015 seems unachievable. Several business promotion efforts have failed to boost economic exchanges.

India is proposing Russian investments in the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor, while the expanded energy partnership with Russia that India has long sought remains unrealised. In contrast, despite serious political differences, India-China trade relations have flourished, expanding to nearly $70 billion in 2012, making China India's largest trading partner in goods despite the damage done to our manufacturing sector in the process and security concerns emanating from China's huge penetration of our power and telecom sectors.

However, the $100 billion target set for 2015 is unlikely to be achieved because the trade deficit - likely to reach $40 billion this year - is becoming unsustainable.

Strategy

Improved India-US ties impact our relations with both Russia and China. Russia's primary concern would be the erosion of its dominant position as our defence partner as we increase our acquisitions of US defence equipment, as this affects political equations.

India will need to continually reassure Russia concretely that its expanded strategic ties with the US would not be at Russia's expense. China closely monitors US arms sales to India, viewing them as integral to the American strategy to create a security ring around China. With China under an arms embargo by the West, Russia has been China's principal arms supplier, with the potential sale of Russia's Su 35 combat aircraft to China under discussion.

Russia's concerns about Chinese reverse engineering are pitted against its need to export to sustain its domestic defence industry, besides solidifying strategic understandings with China as a consequence of western geopolitical and economic pressures on it.

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Russia has also supplied RD-93 engines to power the JF-17 fighter aircraft, a China-Pakistan joint venture.

Our triple challenge is to avoid entanglement in Russia-US tensions, manage to our advantage US-China strategic competition and attenuate the negatives for us of increased Russia-China collaboration.

The PM's Moscow visit for the 14th summit meeting will be successful if it delivers the Kudankulam 3 and 4 contract. The deliverable from the China visit will be the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, valuable for avoiding incidents, not solving their cause.

Our challenge, then, is to build a larger edifice of relations with Russia on existing strong political and security foundations, whereas with China it is ensuring the safety of the impressive edifice that is rising on foundations that are not only weak but can shift.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary

Click here to read the full article in the Daily Mail.

We have a tendency to overstate the positives of our relations with China and downplay the negatives. This creates the impression that our ties are better than they actually are, and that the problems are either not as bad as they are made out to be or are more manageable than is thought. Since our most difficult relationship is with China, we have to be very careful in how we project it. It should be as close to reality as diplomacy permits so that the public at home is not misled or encouraged to be complacent, and observers abroad are not confused about where we stand.

China is set to acquire the status of tomorrow’s Number Two power. How India, the only large Asian country that can potentially challenge China’s dominance, develops its relations with it has a bearing on international equations in the years ahead. China’s phenomenal rise is causing concern in its neighborhood and beyond. Those watchful or threatened would want to apprehend as clearly as possible what the Indian perspective is for seriously exploring the possibility of forging greater understandings in common interest. If we behave as if the threat from China is either exaggerated or that we can cope with China’s rise and the expanding economic and military gap between the two countries largely on our own, then we will be unable to work out optimal partnerships needed to handle the challenges ahead.

It is debatable whether Manmohan Singh needed to go to China so soon after the Chinese premier’s May visit to India. Barring compelling reasons, such high-level visits are normally spaced out sufficiently to extract maximum results. Intensified top-level parleying between countries with known bilateral problems ordinarily indicates rapprochement dynamics at work. With mounting China-Japan tensions, rising Southeast Asian concerns about China’s conduct and growing US-China geopolitical rivalry, India releases pressure on China by visibly boosting its own engagement with it and allowing it to tactically present a more constructive and conciliatory face, just as we have been doing this by increasingly engaging Pakistan and softening our stand on its terrorist affiliations just when it had begun to be cornered on this issue by the West.

The calendar and content of our engagement with China should, of course, be determined foremost by our national interest and not the agenda of others, consistent with our strategic autonomy. But our initiatives should strengthen our position vis-à-vis China, rather than the reverse. We have to carefully watch China’s conduct towards Japan and its assertiveness in the South China Sea, and draw lessons from it for our own differences with China. China has multiple objectives in hiking up its engagement of India. With the forthcoming visit of the Japanese royal couple and Prime Minister Abe to India in mind, it would want to pre-empt, to the extent possible, a deepening of the India-Japan strategic embrace at China’s cost. By indicating a willingness to stabilize the military situation with India in spite of enduring territorial differences, it is trying to insinuate that Japan, not China, is primarily responsible for territorial tensions over the Senkakus by choosing to activate the dispute rather than seeking stabilizing arrangements. Beyond this, China’s moves towards India are tactically aimed at unbalancing the United States of America’s “re-balancing” towards Asia in which India is being cast in a central role.

That the Chinese clubbed our prime minister’s visit with those of the prime ministers of Russia and Outer Mongolia shows the mounting hubris of China as a “great power”, which can now command the visits of world leaders to its capital in clusters. While our prime minister was received at all the required levels and some extra personal attention was undoubtedly paid to him, the subtle way in which India has also been made to accept a reduced status should not be overlooked. Professional diplomats are prone to highlight gestures made “beyond strict protocol requirements” as signals of the high regard in which a country and its leader are held by the host. Barring immediate satisfaction that such gestures bring, they are often superficial, focused on atmospherics, without necessarily denoting any change in core calculations. In this connection, it is pertinent that while Presidents Obama and Putin are our prime minister’s direct interlocutors, with China it is the Chinese premier. Apparently, the Chinese premier is the interlocutor of the German chancellor and the British premier too, which makes this anomaly less galling diplomatically.

The border defense cooperation agreement was the most significant outcome of the prime minister’s visit. As this is by no means a breakthrough agreement, the question remains whether we were right in being maneuvered into going to Beijing at this stage to boost the accord’s intrinsic importance, especially in the context of China’s provocative conduct on our own border and elsewhere. If the 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012 agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility on the border through confidence-building measures and other mechanisms have not worked as intended, a new agreement, which, in many ways, is a watered-down version of the key earlier ones, may not yield better results. The expanding power gap with China has forced us into a position where a solution to the border issue has become less pressing than ensuring that China does not use its increased muscle to make incremental territorial incursions into our side. This accords with the Chinese strategy of not resolving the core issue and maintaining status quo as China can disturb it periodically at will and keep us under pressure.

Unsurprisingly, the joint statement issued during the prime minister’s visit repeats, therefore, the empty formulation that the “Special Representatives, who have been charged with exploring a framework of settlement of the India-China boundary question, were encouraged by the two leaders to continue their efforts in that direction”. If, after 10 years and 16 rounds of discussions, all that the two leaders could do is to “encourage” the special representatives, it indicates the wide gap that still remains to be bridged.

The memorandum of understanding signed during the visit on strengthening cooperation on trans-border rivers is a step in the right direction as it draws China into expert-level discussions on our concerns about Chinese dam-building plans on rivers flowing from Tibet to India. Whether China will move beyond data sharing and emergency management, and will concede any right to India to interfere with its plans is seriously open to question, given the implications of this, inter alia, for China’s relations with other lower riparian countries in Asia.

The joint statement notes that the exchange of visits by the prime ministers of the two countries “within the same calendar year was the first since 1954 and has great significance”. This is mystifying because the first such double exchange failed to resolve mounting differences over the border issue that culminated in a military conflict in 1962, and this second double exchange has not opened up any perspective of a resolution of these differences. Our eagerness to improve our relationship with China and project it positively in spite of Chinese provocations, which we tolerate and find ways to reconcile with, hugely handicaps our dealings with the challenges posed by that country.

Click here to read the article in The Telegraph. 

Constantinescu stressed the importance of moral education, humanistic tolerance, multiculturalism and independent thought to the creation and maintenance of effective democracies. 

“Democracy, based on the principles of statehood, allows us to develop the concept of the citizen of the future, and spiritual and moral education of young people is a way of keeping human values,” Constantinescu said.

For more on Constantinescu’s comments at the 3rd Baku International Humanitarian Forum, click here.