Politics and Governance

While opposing claims of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been a mild irritant in Japan-China relations for over 40 years, the dispute has escalated rapidly since 2010. What key factors have contributed to this escalation?

2010 was a turning point of sorts for China’s maritime diplomacy, as China became visibly more assertive in staking its maritime territorial claims against its neighbors. This included a diplomatic standoff with Japan over the incursion of a Chinese fishing trawler in waters off the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Japan has become increasingly concerned about China’s military modernization and what that means for the latter’s defense of its maritime claims in the East China Sea. 

For its part, though, Japan hasn’t helped matters much: It has refused to acknowledge that the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is disputed and nationalized the islands in 2012, much to China’s chagrin. 

Finally, China blames the U.S. rebalancing in Asia for emboldening Japan and other claimants in their maritime disputes against China, while the U.S. has reiterated its commitment to coming to Japan’s defense under the terms of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty. All those tensions—and lots of historical baggage—are coming into play in light of China’s announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone, which covers the disputed islands.

Intense nationalist sentiment has played an important role in this conflict in both China and Japan. Yet China’s leadership faces a particularly delicate balancing act if it wants to harness the power of popular nationalism to bolster its claim on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Can you address the role of nationalism in both China and Japan, and explain why nationalism within China could potentially be a double-edged sword?

Because both countries face domestic challenges, especially on the economic front, nationalist sentiment is a useful tool for leaders to rally their domestic constituents and consolidate their own political standing within the country. In Japan, we saw the role nationalism played in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, as Tokyo’s Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced plans to purchase those islands eventually led to the national government buying them instead. And nationalism is at the core of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s slogan of a Chinese Dream, whose key premise is to “realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (shixian zhonghua minzu weida fuxing). Nationalism within China—and Japan—could potentially be a double-edged sword if strong sentiments within the population forces the hand of the leadership into doing things that could escalate rather than defuse tensions. This risk is particularly real in a relationship as emotional as that between China and Japan.

When China first announced the new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), many in the shocked global community declared it a poorly executed fumble possibly resulting from lack of communication or factional struggles. Yet less than two weeks after the announcement, there is now a growing consensus that the ADIZ is in fact a carefully calculated move in China’s larger strategy for the region. What is that larger strategy, and what role does the Chinese leadership envision for the new ADIZ? 

While we can only guess what exactly was in the central leadership’s minds as they signed off on a new ADIZ that overlaps with the ADIZs of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, I can see a few strategic objectives achieved with this move.

First, China is seeking to enforce a new status quo in the East China Sea that the rest of the region—especially Japan—will have to deal with. By including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in its ADIZ, and requiring aircraft to report flight information when they enter the airspace over that area, China is responding, in its own terms, to Japan’s refusal to acknowledge the dispute. 

Second, China is putting its money where its mouth is and staking its claim as a maritime power. Other ADIZs are expected in the South China and Yellow Seas, where other maritime disputes exist. And it is hardly a coincidence that the ADIZ announcement and the maiden voyage of the Liaoning aircraft carrier down the South China Sea occurred within days of each other. 

Third, the ADIZ could test U.S. security commitments in the region. Politically, it could test the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense in the event of armed conflict with China. As it is, the U.S. had to assuage Japanese concerns over its advice to American airlines to comply with the Chinese ADIZ’s flight reporting requirements; the Japanese government had instructed Japanese carriers not to do so. From a military perspective, the ADIZ could also be part of China’s anti-access strategy aimed at deterring the ability of U.S. forces to come to Taiwan’s defense in a timely manner.

Immediately after the announcement of the ADIZ, the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and Secretary of State condemned the Chinese ADIZ. American bombers were flown into the disputed airspace. What is the U.S. role in this dispute? 

The announcement of the ADIZ has presented an opportunity for the United States to reiterate its commitment to its security allies in the region and to its rebalancing strategy. This commitment had been questioned by Asian leaders when President Obama missed a few key summits in October due to the U.S. government shutdown. Although the U.S., Japan, Korea and China all flew military airplanes into the disputed airspace, I don’t think that any of them wants to intentionally start a military confrontation. The U.S. role would be to try and prevent the escalation of tensions on all sides that could lead to miscalculations and armed conflict.

During Vice President Biden’s recent trip to China, he did not demand the removal of the ADIZ. Was this tacit acceptance on the part of the Obama Administration of the ADIZ as a fait accompli?

It is impossible for the United States to demand the removal of the ADIZ, simply because other countries—especially Japan and Korea—have already established ADIZs in the region, and the United States itself has several ADIZs. At the same time, the U.S. faces a delicate political balancing act: On the one hand, it needs to show that it is standing firmly by its allies; on the other hand, it has to present itself as a trusted broker of peace and demonstrate that it is not out to contain China.

Beijing has stood firm against calls to rescind the ADIZ, so it seems likely that the new ADIZ, while dangerous, is here to stay. What steps do China, Japan and other regional players need to take in order to prevent escalation and establish deeper trust and cooperation in the East China Sea?

First, a mechanism for crisis communication and management needs to be implemented, at least between China and Japan (perhaps facilitated by the United States), if not involving other regional players as well. China and Japan have had on and off talks about a defense hotline. That would come in pretty handy at a time like this. Second, regional players need to engage in serious dialogue to develop rules of the road for their militaries to deal with one another in the region. The United States could play a very useful role in facilitating these discussions among all parties concerned.

The new ADIZ not only encompasses the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but also overlaps with the existing zones maintained by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Chinese ADIZ requires both military and civilian aircraft passing through the zone to notify Chinese authorities on penalty of emergency military measures. The announcement sparked immediate condemnation from the governments of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States against what they characterized as unilateral Chinese action. American policymakers have refused to recognize the ADIZ, immediately dispatching B-52 bombers into the ADIZ.

Read a roundup of select opinions on this issue, from multiple sources: 

“[The ADIZ] is a necessary measure for China to protect its state sovereignty and territorial and airspace security…China’s ADIZ was established to set aside enough time for early warning to defend the country’s airspace, with defense acting as the key point. The zone does not aim at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region.”—Geng Yansheng, spokesman for Chinese Ministry of National Defense

“Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone,” Xinhua, December 3, 2013. 

“The United States is deeply concerned about China’s announcement that they've established an ‘East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.’ This unilateral action constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident.”—John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State

“Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” U.S. Department of State, November 23, 2013.

“The United States is deeply concerned by the People’s Republic of China announcement today that it is establishing an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.”—Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of Defense

"Hagel Issues Statement on East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 23, 2013.  

“As a general proposition, this is of course one more sign of worsening relations between China and Japan, focused in this case on the tiny islands both countries claim to control. As for the immediate reasons for this move, no one outside the central leadership can say with any certainty, and perhaps not even anyone there.”—James Fallows, National Correspondent, The Atlantic

"How to Think About the Chinese Air-Defense News,” The Atlantic, November 26, 2013. 

“There is a lot of over-reaction and over-explanation of this as a Chinese provocation. Remember, China has as large a stake in the peace, stability and prosperity in the region as anyone else. Its economy depends on this. Despite the tension, China and Japan’s trade goes on unimpeded. So China would not want military conflict.”—Chen Weihua, Columnist and Chief Washington Correspondent for China Daily and Deputy Editor of China Daily USA

“Why’s the U.S. Flying Bombers Over the East China Sea?,” ChinaFile, November 27, 2013. 

“The ADIZ announcement shows that China wants to enshrine in law and regulation the practice of “overlapping administration” which it has managed to establish since Japan’s purchase announcement in September 2012. It wants to “normalize” this de facto situation by bringing its legal and institutional framework up to what it believes is a more equal position with Japan…The problem here is that while China knows that it needs to manage the islands together with Japan, it will not talk directly to Japan about protocols/rules of the road/confidence building measures (CBMs) around islands until Japan admits they are disputed…Some actors within the PLA and Maritime surveillance even say that a “minor crisis” could actually help their position, as long as it doesn’t escalate. They believe they can control escalation.”—Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Director of Asia-Pacific Program of the U.S. Institute for Peace

“Why’s the U.S. Flying Bombers Over the East China Sea?,” ChinaFile, November 27, 2013. 

“Despite the mainly negative and critical responses from its neighbors and particularly from Japan, China does not want to hide its confidence and even assertiveness on this matter…One of the main implications of China’s move is that it has been taking every chance to change its role from that of a humble and obedient follower of U.S.-dominated regional and international orders, to that of a new player in the current multiple rule-making processes.”—Jin Kai, Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies, Yonsei University

“With ADIZ, China Emerges As Regional Rulemaker,” The Diplomat, December 6, 2013.  

Hostile rhetoric and military contingency planning by China and Japan in respect of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are at their most serious since the dispute first surfaced in 1970. It may be said that diplomacy has worked well so far in avoiding serious conflict, but in fact the two countries were never interested in any action that had a high risk of provoking a military confrontation. Times have changed.

Some leaders in each country believe that provocations by the other side demand a robust response and that the appearance of a back down in favor of a return to calm would be seen as an historic concession of weakness. The conflict potential of this situation is serious. Diplomacy is failing because it has failed to provide an answer to three related problems of a structural kind that are aggravating the perceptions gap between the parties.

The first of these unaddressed problems is the interaction between the rise of China and the normalization of Japan’s foreign and security policy. Both have unmistakable military dimensions that are conflict-enhancing. The impulse on the part of China to modernize its armed forces and to expand its navy is both natural and understandable. Equally, the impulse in Japan to normalize its security policy and calibrate its naval development against regional powers like China is also reasonable. The two trends are however taking place as mistrust between the two countries reaches an historic four-decade high. There is an active territorial dispute: never a happy situation when countries are so mistrustful and stepping up military modernization. In China, there has been a visible increase inside military circles and among the population of hostile rhetoric towards Japan. In Japan, for almost two decades, some opinion leaders have been gradually talking the country into the position of likely first victim of an attack by the modernizing Chinese armed forces.        

The second unaddressed problem is the impact of the Taiwan issue on perceptions and policies of both sides. This is being felt at two levels, both very tough to manage. On the one hand, the mainland government believes that since Taiwan is so robust on the territorial dispute with Japan, then it cannot afford to take a more quiescent line lest the Taiwanese authorities be seen within China as a better defender of national dignity than the government in Beijing. On the other hand, the drift of Taiwan to closer economic integration with the mainland and the very visible move away from military options by China has unsettled power balances in the region. Some in Japan now see a “unified China” as an economic and military power they don’t even want to begin to contemplate.   

The third is the unsettling impact of developments in regional security order, not least on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea, and in the United States determination to reassert its military power in East Asia as a hedge against the rise of China. For most of the last 25 years, this region was a much less confrontational one than it is today. Leading the charge to confrontation is North Korea, now armed with nuclear weapons and long range missiles, undertaking occasional military provocations, and undergoing a shaky leadership transition. New tensions in the South China Sea are seen as proof for some that China is pushing for regional military hegemony, or at the very least is too prone to use military force against weaker neighbors.

Above all else, the decision of the Obama administration to make East Asia the central focus for application of its overwhelming military power has aggravated Chinese concerns and emboldened advocates in Japan for more robust military posture.    

The seriousness of the lack of attention to these problems is heightened by the length of time some of these factors have been in play. There has been a steady erosion of confidence about the peaceful intentions of regional actors for almost two decades. This weakening of the urge to accommodation and conflict avoidance is all the more remarkable because it flies in the face of deepening economic and social integration in East Asia.

What to do? It seems that there are historic forces in play here that are inevitable and irreversible. The only answer is for military actors of the region to manage the trends better collectively. There has to be a laser-sharp focus on three lines of action: the atmospherics of conflict, possible catalysts for a combat action, and the institutions of regional order.

Governments and civil society actors need to call out the negative trends in hate speech and hold governments accountable for it. In the case of China, outspoken military officers provoking conflict need to be seriously disciplined and brought into line. In Japan, those who deny Japan’s war history and those exaggerating Chinese military aggressiveness – although more subtle a force and less subject to government control – need to be countered comprehensively. If either government is fostering this hostile rhetoric for its own purposes, then it needs to take better stock of how much the danger of conflict is inflamed by it.

On the catalysts for combat, all parties need to work to reverse the militarization of the territorial dispute.  The declaration by China of an air defense identification zone has been escalatory but given what Japan and the United States have been doing and saying, one might see good reasons why they did it. But avoidance of a military clash in this case is more important than who is right or wrong in particular actions.

The institutions of regional security order need to be modernized. The ASEAN Regional Forum has been useful but for Northeast Asian problems it has outlived its time. The current informal institutions of East Asia, such as APEC, grew up beginning in the 1990s when Asia was not ready for a hard-edged and definitive settlement of the kind represented by the Helsinki Accords in Europe in 1975. Nor would we want to inflict on East Asia a model like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Shangri-La Dialogue at Ministerial or Chief of Staff level has been important in this region. But it needs to graduate. East Asia, or more narrowly Northeast Asia, needs a standing, military-based dialogue channel that meets often, is broad-based and is far more alert than existing forums to the risk of a military clash between Japan and China and the dangers that it might bring. We need to work a lot harder to keep the peace between Japan and China.

Greg Austin is a Professorial Fellow in the EastWest Institute and Director of its Policy Innovation Unit. 

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Click here to read the article in China Focus.