Politics and Governance

In the wake of revelations that the American government tapped the cellphone of Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, trans-Atlantic relations have reached a low point not seen since the Iraq war.

In fact, the current crisis may be worse: Back then it was a question of policy disagreement; this time, it is a matter of broken trust and personal humiliation, the worst thing that can happen to a political leader.

For Germans, it is particularly painful. We remember well the days of the Cold War, when East Germans like Ms. Merkel were spied on by the Stasi. Again, in some ways this is worse: The Stasi wasn’t our friend; America is.

In International Diplomacy 101, one learns that the most important ingredient of international cooperation is trust, easy to lose but hard to gain. How can Ms. Merkel, or anyone else in the European political leadership, ever trust the White House again?

The problem is not that countries spy on one another per se. Everybody does it (well, many countries do it) with varying degrees of effectiveness and success. But few governments do it to the extent that the Americans appear to have—the tap on Ms. Merkel’s phone began in 2002, long before she became chancellor, and apparently continued even after she was awarded the Medal of Freedom in the Rose Garden a few years ago.

Nor can we deny that fighting terrorism requires huge expenditures and unusual measures. But asserting that only adds insult to injury: Ms. Merkel, the French president, François Hollande, and other allied leaders are surely not among the terrorism suspects.

Rather, the heart of the scandal is bad management and hubris. Normally, when a spy proposes to expose a corrupt foreign leader, or to install a listening device in a foreign capital, his political-risk manager will assess whether the potential damage from exposure outweighs the intelligence benefits.

Apparently, this kind of risk assessment either did not exist or was ignored when the decision to eavesdrop on Chancellor Merkel and others was taken. Given the size and power of the American intelligence apparatus, and the eagerness with which it has been deployed, this lack is truly frightening.

In a personal relationship, the destruction of trust would be likely to lead one or both parties to sever the bond completely. But among countries, particularly ones as mutually dependent as Europe’s and America, such severance is out of the question. The important question now is how to proceed with rebuilding that trust, while taking care not to damage the trans-Atlantic relationship irrevocably.

For one thing, President Obama must find a way to show contrition. Many in Europe understand that it would be tricky for him to issue an apology since this could weaken him and his intelligence agencies. Yet doing so could go a long way in placating irate Europeans.

Besides, if the rift over Iraq has taught us anything, it is that dealing with the continuing dynamics of a developing crisis is just as important as the disagreement itself. Let us not repeat the mistakes of 2003, when both sides did not do nearly enough to prevent the crisis from spiraling almost out of control.

Second, while Europeans may understandably desire some sort of payback, they should not deepen the trans-Atlantic rift by linking the scandal to the continuing negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, as some angry commentators have called for. The partnership is as much in Europe’s interest as it is in America’s, and later on it will be an important means for rebuilding ties once the scandal has passed.

Third, the United States should take the initiative in developing confidence-building measures. One important step could be a trans-Atlantic “no spy” agreement on standards for surveillance and intelligence operations among allies. This would build on a report, adopted by the European Parliament in 2001, which recommended “a code of conduct based on the highest level of protection against intelligence which exists in any Member State” and that a “similar code of conduct should be negotiated with the USA.” Then 9/11 happened.

Finally, European political leaders are not the only ones who believe that the American intelligence community has gone too far; important voices in the United States Congress agree. Discussions between congressional intelligence committees and their European counterparts could help manage and resolve this crisis. In a related fashion, America’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board may also be a potential partner for Europe for taking these issues forward in a bipartisan way.

One step that should be avoided is a proposal, currently making the rounds, to limit the number of accredited American diplomats in any one country to the reciprocal number of that country’s diplomats in America—an age-old diplomatic principle that Europeans, mindful of America’s size and interests, have traditionally not had a desire to invoke.

Retaliatory steps like this might offer momentary satisfaction, and would certainly seem to limit the reach of American intelligence. But because they would be premised on a relationship of mistrust, they would not help repair trans-Atlantic relations.

As tempting as it is to play tit for tat, the Europeans should resist it. If both sides make damage limitation their priority, then over time a sense of trust can re-emerge across the Atlantic.

To read the article in The New York Times, click here. 

According to Sehgal, the main issue complicating such talks is India’s accusatory rhetoric against Pakistan. “Indian leaders and the media are prone to whipping up a frenzy of anti-Pakistan feelings at short notice,” Sehgal says. “Successfully combining soft power with hard power, India has cleverly converted the freedom fight in Kashmir into ‘terrorism’ and the ceasefire violations at the Line of Control (LoC) committed by them are labeled as engineered by Pakistan.”

Charging that Pakistan is following a policy of appeasement, he warns that this will not help resolve the country’s longstanding disputes with India. “There is no substitute to peace with India but not at the cost of our self-respect and independence as a nation,” he writes. “History has shown that taken as a sign of weakness, appeasement has no future.”

Click here to read the full article.

Click here to read an opposing view from EWI Board Member Kanwal Sibal.

Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the event, which was attended by experts and diplomats, featured a conversation with William Tobey of the Belfer Center and Pavel Zolotarev of the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies. They introduced the report and outlined specific policy recommendations for the U.S. and Russia aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Building upon a previous study released in 2011, this new report identifies the legal and political frameworks for cooperation, current gaps and weaknesses, and proposals to improve U.S. and Russian efforts to prevent and respond to nuclear terrorism.

“The threat of nuclear terrorism is both urgent and real,” Tobey declared, citing a number of cases over the past decade where fissile material was seized outside of regulatory control. These incidents warrant deep concern not only because they highlight the inadequacy of current security measures, but also because the interdicted materials represented only a sample of much larger quantities for sale. 

As it stands today, Tobey noted, “The U.S. and Russian governments are not well organized to cooperate in suppressing illegal trafficking of nuclear materials to combat nuclear terrorism.”

One of the obstacles that continue to frustrate U.S. and Russian efforts to prevent and manage the threat of nuclear terrorism are the divergent responses the two countries apply to nuclear crises. Though both parties acknowledge that the acquisition of fissile materials by terrorists pose a grave threat, the U.S. and Russia differ in policy responses, eschew information sharing, and have very different public notification strategies. 

Zolotarev added that the amount of attention paid to the cooperation procedures between the U.S. and Russia are inadequate or nonexistent. “We cannot remain complacent when considering preventing nuclear terrorism,” he warned. 

In order to more effectively combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, the report’s authors recommend three sets of actions for U.S. and Russian authorities. The U.S. and Russia should pursue joint actions in working groups composed of high-ranking officials; introduce parallel measures including improvements in nuclear security practices and regulatory enforcement; and take the lead in pursuing cooperative activities in concert with other countries.

As possessors of the world’s largest nuclear inventories, the U.S. and Russia share a special responsibility for leading international efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, the speakers pointed out. Although the U.S. and Russia often find themselves at odds on a host of other issues, nuclear security is a critical area in which U.S. and Russian national interests coincide, particularly when it comes to the threat of terrorism. The recommendations put forth in this report and expounded upon by Tobey and Zolotarev are meant to serve as a catalyst for more vigorous actions by both countries, acting in concert, which should benefit everyone. 

Click here for the full Joint Threat Assessment. 

Cai noted that the Internet is "a major driving force" in China's economic transformation, but that the country faces enormous cyber threats. "More than 80 percent of Chinese Internet users have fallen victim to cyber attacks," and more than 20,000 China-based websites were "modified by hackers," he said, causing severe damage to the economy.

Cai's proposals included using the framework of the United Nations to help define the rules of the road in cyberspace in a way that protects the interests of all parties; exploring "effective means to tackle urgent problems...such as cyber attacks, viruses and cyber terrorism;" and creating "communication channels to facilitate international cooperation."

"The United States and China are Internet giants," Cai said. "We share many common interests and there is enormous scope for cooperation." He pointed to the closing down of the biggest Chinese-language pornographic website, the Sunshine Entertainment Alliance, as the result of successful cooperation of the police forces of both countries.

But Cai rejected the notion that the national norms no longer apply in cyberspace. "The Internet is global, but at the same time it belongs to different countries," he said, calling for everyone "to show respect for national sovereignty in cyberspace."

In subsequent panels, top cyber experts pointed to encouraging signs of progress in international cyber cooperation, although pointing out that it is still far from adequate.

EWI Distinguished Fellow Latha Reddy, the former Deputy National Security Advisor of India, vowed: "India will enhance global cooperation" on cybersecurity. Christopher Painter, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Cyber Issues, hailed recent efforts to bring the policy and technical communities together in solving problems, and recent U.S.-Russia cooperative efforts. "No one wants a cyberspace that is a source of constant conflict," he said.

But conflict and tensions remain. Dirk Brengelmann, the Commissioner for International Cyber Policy of the German Foreign Ministry, pointed out that for Germans human rights are closely connected to "privacy'--alluding to the recent spying revelations.

Scott Charney, Corporate Vice President of Microsoft added: "There is so much rhetoric about about government-to-government cooperation, and at the same time they may be attacking each other."

In partnership with the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University and the IEEE Communications Society, EWI also sponsored "breakthrough" groups that built on the work of previous summits. Topics included: Optimizing Policy for Secure Cloud Enablement; International Critical Infrastructure Protection; Emergency Preparedness for the Financial Services Sector for International Crises in Cyberspace; and Acts of Aggression in Cyberspace. The first day of the conference also featured a special presentation on Measuring the Cybersecurity Problem, a just-released report by EWI.

Following the successes of the previous annual summits in New Delhi, London and Dallas, this conference brings together an international group of cyber experts, leaders and practitioners from both the private and public sectors. During this two-day event, participants have the opportunity to address critical security areas where international policy has failed to make progress and propose new solutions.

Other key speakers include Michael Chertoff, Chairman and Co-Founder of the Chertoff Group and former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security; Steven Chu, Nobel Prize winner and former U.S Secretary of Energy; Joseph S. Nye Jr., Harvard University's Distinguished Service Professor; and former dean of the Kennedy School. Ellen Richey, Chief Enterprise Risk Officer, Visa; William J. Perry, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and John L. Hennessy, President, Stanford University.

In his opening remarks, EastWest Institute President John Mroz declared: "Our 4th summit is a place where honest frank discussion must take place to improve our global cybersecurity."

The recommendations of the Silicon Valley summit will be pursued over the course of the next year, forming the basis for discussions at the 5th Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit that will be held in Europe in 2014.

We are tweeting about the summit under #cybersummit2013. The full agenda and other information is available at www.cybersummit.info.

Click here to view the full transcript of Minister Cai's keynote address.

Click here for the Chinese transcript of Minister Cai's keynote address.

McConnell says that though Alexander was a "grounding-breaking visionary," shaping the future of cyberspace as a military and intelligence domain, "the policy and political implications of his vision have proven to be his major blind spot."

"Keith was the right choice for the the combined job," McConnell continues. "Now, the posts should be split. History teaches that the consolidation of authority across defense and intelligence lines can be dangerous, and this is particularly true in cyberspace."

Click here to read the full article in GovInfo Security. 

The three members of The Elders also called for a more “comprehensive resolution” to Myanmar’s “ethnic conflicts” that would include increased political dialogue.

“It’s the beginning of a peace process … It doesn’t come overnight. [But] it is very difficult to address [the concerns of ethnic groups] if they can’t actually stop the fighting,” says Ahtisaari.

Click here to read the article in the Myanmar Times.