Russia

In Syria, a dictator is waging war against his own people, targeting men and women standing in line at bakeries. By now, according to UN reports, more than 60,000 people have lost their lives. There is no telling when the terror will end. Those who have witnessed the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s are reminded of the helplessness and powerlessness they felt during those years. At that time, the international community began to develop the idea that it would not be acceptable any more for a regime to turn on its own civilian population. The result: the “responsibility to protect.” And today, two years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, we still hardly have a clue how to live up to this obligation. Perhaps a look back at the wars in former Yugoslavia – during which we had to learn our lesson the hard way – can help.

In the 1990s, it took us a long time to understand that the threat or even the use of military power is sometimes necessary to reach political goals and advance peace: In Bosnia, without the intervention of NATO, the Dayton accords that ended the civil war never would have been possible. Understandably enough, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made Western societies tired of intervening. The West has come to realize that military interventions – as morally justified as they may be in individual cases – are rarely effective if they are not embedded in a sustainable political strategy. But hasn’t our skepticism gone too far? Could we not have saved many thousands lives with, for instance, a no-fly-zone and the suppression of Bashar al-Assad’s air force? Could the mere presence of NATO missile batteries a year ago have demonstrated the resolve of the West?

The experience in Yugoslavia has also underlined the importance of a joint position of the members of UN Security Council. The NATO air strikes alone could not end Milosevic’s regime. The Serbian president was not run from power until Russia turned its back on him as well. Today, the disunity of the UN Security Council allows Assad’s killings to continue unabated. For more than a year, the veto powers Russia and China have been blocking all efforts to pass a resolution.

It would, however, be too simplistic to attribute responsibility to Russia alone. To some degree, the West is also to blame. From Moscow’s perspective, the Western nations have time and again disregarded Russian interests. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer once said that it was very difficult to cooperate with somebody who thinks of himself as a victim. Moscow feels that it is not being taken seriously as a partner. Again, the memories of the Yugoslav wars play a role: In Russia’s view, the West would ask Moscow for concessions when these were indispensable. Yet after Russia had cooperated, the West would, as seen from Moscow, again ignore Russian interests. Moscow knows that while its power to shape is limited, it still has a considerable power to obstruct.

Of course, the West is aware of that power. At the Munich Security Conference in 2009, just days after President Obama’s first inauguration, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden announced a reset of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Promising results ensued: Obama and then-President Medvedev adopted the most important arms reduction treaty in the past two decades – “New START” – and agreed to cooperate on missile defense. However, the relationship cooled for a number of reasons. As the West grew more concerned over the domestic situation in Russia, Moscow insisted on full partnership in missile defense cooperation – on terms that NATO could not accept.

The case of Syria again reveals the fundamental underlying issue: If the West does not want to undermine the authority of the United Nations, it will have to find a way to convince Moscow. The fact that Russia is not fundamentally opposed to any kind of intervention became clear when it abstained on the Libya resolution 1973. Nonetheless, with respect to Syria the Russian government will only agree to sanctions or even the use of military force when it feels it won’t – again – regret changing positions.

Thus, we should hope for a clear signal towards Moscow from the second Obama administration. After all, the U.S. president now does have “more flexibility”, as he had said in the “open mic” incident with Dmitri Medvedev last year. If the U.S. decided not to re-engage Russia, it would be a missed opportunity. No one wishes to gloss over or ignore deplorable domestic developments in Russia. But the fact remains that our foreign-policy interests require that we finally address the obstacles in the NATO-Russia relationship. This includes an agreement on missile defense cooperation: The base lines for a compromise are, in principle, known, yet neither side has dared to make a real move.

Without progress in our relationship, a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community that includes Russia will not become reality. Or, to put a positive spin on it: As the NATO-Russia relationship grows stronger and deeper, conflict resolution outside the Euro-Atlantic region will become more likely – not only in Syria.

Russia and the West share key interests in Syria. Nobody really sees a future for Assad, nobody wants to have Syria become a failing state, nobody wants an Islamist regime in Damascus. Considering the strong historical ties between Moscow and Damascus, a solution for the Syrian conflict will have to go through Moscow. The Russian secret service is superior to those of the West when it comes to information on the Assad regime. Again, a similarity to Yugoslavia.

In 2012, we jointly failed in solving the Syrian conflict – the West and Russia. Now we can and must better prepare for the time after Assad – but only if Russia is part of the solution, not part of the problem. This makes new U.S. impetus on a missile defense compromise necessary. In addition, Russia must be integrated more closely into the efforts for Syria. Similarly to the contact group on Yugoslavia, we need a contact group for Syria. The group would have to focus on strengthening the moderate opposition forces, developing a joint peace plan, and aiding refugees.

Only with the help of all Security Council members, the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will be able to succeed. Those who do not want to be forced to intervene militarily after all (as in Mali) need to strengthen the UN Security Council. The path goes through Moscow.

“China, the Abnormal Power,” by Yukon Huang. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 5.

"A Russian 'Frenemy'," by Leon Aron. Los Angeles Times. March 5.

"Obama's Nuclear Future: The Battle to Reduce the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Begins," Foreign Affairs, March 6.

“China navy seeks to 'wear out' Japanese ships in disputed waters,” Reuters. March 6.

"Holder says Obama plans to explain drone policy," The Washington Post. March 6.

“North Korea Warns of Pre-emptive Nuclear Attack,” The New York Times. March 7.

"U.N. Security Council approves new sanctions against North Korea," The Washington Post. March 7.

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Among more than 400 participants of this year’s Munich Security Conference there are 11 heads of states or governments, 43 foreign ministers and 20 defense ministers. Has this high concentration of global decision-makers brought any good?

At a conference such as this one in Munich, which is the biggest security conference in the world, the most important thing is to capture the general sense of how good or bad the current situation is. Last year it was genuinely depressing, people were not enthusiastic – today it’s much better, although they are not naively positive either. The world is doing much better than one year ago.

But now we have wars – in Syria, Mali…

There will always be wars, and although what’s going on in Mali is terrible, a collapse of the Eurozone would have been something totally different. People are now much more optimistic and eager to cooperate. It’s true that the UN Security Council can’t take action on Syria, but the real concerns are elsewhere. I led a debate on cybersecurity in which we all agreed that the threats are higher than one year ago. In some areas the situation is worse, but if we take everything into account, the overall environment is much better, especially in Europe.

If we stay on Syria and Iran for a moment – how should we observe the Russian foreign minister’s meeting with Syrian opposition leaders?

Lavrov’s meeting with the opposition is a dramatic move, yet what is even more dramatic is that the opposition leader also met with the Iranian foreign minister. It’s exactly why these conferences are important – a lot is going on in the background, leaders meet day and night.

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said in Munich that international politics can get personal. Do you see any shifts in the U.S. foreign policy as President Obama begins his second term?

Vice President Biden was careful not to announce anything big before President Obama outlines his big foreign policy plans for next four years in his State of the Union address. There are some hints, though – climate change will certainly be one big theme of Obama’s second term.

Another important topic at the Munich conference was the new technologies of shale oil and gas extraction. As America ends its reliance on imported fossil fuels, and even becomes a major exporter, how will all this change international relations?

Many countries will be affected – Russia will bear strong consequences. Russia has so far influenced the prices with its long-term contracts, but its global economic position is about to change dramatically. Nobody knows how this is going to look like in the end, but the situation is going to be much, much different.

How about China?

Chinese leadership is under intense domestic pressure; there’s widespread corruption, a huge emerging middle class that demands clear air and clean water, millions of people still living in poverty. They are facing very difficult challenges – Chinese leaders have their hands full.

At the conference you led a discussion on fighting crime or even war in cyberspace, just as the leading U.S. newspapers accused China for launching cyber attacks as retaliation for their reports on the Chinese prime minister’s family fortune.

Yes, the Washington Post, New York Times and Wall Street Journal all complained about the attacks. There’s a lot going on on the Internet, but cyber crime is still the greatest challenge. It all starts with individuals – how smart we are with our passwords; how often do we change them, how complex they are;do we use one password multiple times. If we go further to companies, organizations and governments, there’s no cyber warfare, but a lot of industrial espionage going on, not just by Russians and Chinese. Democratic countries are in the game, too: Israelis, French, we Americans. But it all gets back to individuals – your computer gets infected with a virus and, while you go to the kitchen for a cup of coffee, for example, the organized criminals take control over your computer; this trend is really dangerous.

Your organization, the EastWest Institute, aims to build trust and solve problems in international relations. Are you succeeding?

Building trust is about dealing with other human beings. If you need somebody, you automatically want to trust that person. If it is somebody from a different culture, religion or ethnic group, acquiring trust takes a little bit longer. If there is bad experience involved, then building trust takes even more effort. Trust-building is a long process that doesn’t depend just on a presumption that you are a good person and therefore I want to trust you. Building trust is a two way street, where we have to work together. In cybersecurity we work in this way with the Chinese on spam. Two thirds of all emails are spam, large number carry viruses, so we are delivering global standards to fight spam.

What are your other projects?

A lot of them deal with water and food security, on the issue of water in Africa, we worked together with the French G20 presidency. Climate change has dramatic impact on water resources, threatening wars and mass migration of people. We deal with this in Central Asia as well, in the Amu Darya basin, which involves 5 countries, including Afghanistan. Once there were rumors of war, now they work together on better management of river flow, etc. The same process is going on between Egypt and Ethiopia. In very practical terms, we did in the Amu Darya basin what we used to do in the Balkans: we brought together people that can help and we focused on practical issues of deforestation and erosion of river basins. These are small things, but it is how you build trust and change people’s mindsets. It’s a hard work that you can’t do at a conference, but somebody has to do it.

Clear air and clean water have impact on clean environment. What about fracking, which wall also talked about? Many Europeans reject the idea, because of strong chemicals involved.

There are arguments for and against. In my country, the U.S., the level of pollution went down to 1982 figures, almost exclusively because we replaced coal with gas. Gas has side effects as well, but nothing compared to coal. Imagine, therefore, if China could replace a third of their coal based power plants with gas. The biggest problem is water, because fracking requires a lot of water mixed with chemicals. In five years, new technologies will emerge that will require smaller amounts of water and no chemicals at all, which will make shale oil and gas extraction environmentally friendly. Shale fossil fuel resources are not found just in America, but China, Ukraine, Poland, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. This is a game-changer.

Years ago, you used to work in Western Balkans. What would you say about the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia?

The EastWest Institute goes where the situation is toughest, where there is an imminent threat of war: there’s nothing like that between Slovenia and Croatia. A lot depends on the political will, but also on the people, that must say: “That’s enough!” Just when I look at the European economy, and then look at the issue of Cyprus, I think: how ridiculous is that! Let’s resolve this and focus of economic growth.

For Slovenians, however, the access to international waters is a very important issue.

That is something else, that is part of history and should be addressed. I believe that the people should be more vocal in demanding that these open issues should be resolved. However, it is true that nationalism is growing nowadays. Everywhere – in Japan, Korea, China, as well as in Europe. It’s one of the effects of globalization, people are more nationalistic, which makes the problems, like the border one that you mentioned, harder to resolve.

Are you afraid of new currency wars?

No, people might be more nationalistic but they are not mindless to shoot themselves in the foot. I don’t think it will come to that. Many people around the world are aware of everything that Europeans had to undertake. Faced with the crisi, they understood the difficult decisions that had to be made; even in Greece the level of unrest was not that high.

_

Return to EWI Now. 

What went wrong? Predictably, the two sides blame each other. But, without a doubt, the trigger for the now seemingly endless exchange of mutual recriminations and tit-for-tat punitive measures were two key events: the U.S. Congress’s passage of the Magnitsky Act, despite efforts by the administration to prevent such an outcome, and Putin’s continued crackdown on dissent at home.

All of which is already making people forget that the reset was far from a complete failure. The policy was effective in improving the tone of discourse and widening the areas on which U.S. and Russian policymakers met and talked regularly, especially through the mechanism of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). Both the United States and Russia could point to some significant accomplishments. Obama got New START, cooperation on Afghanistan, and initial if fleeting cooperation on Iran. Russia got its long sought-after WTO accession, graduation from Jackson-Vanik, the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, and the foreign policy attention that it thought it deserved.

The price the U.S. Congress imposed for graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik and granting permanent normal trade relations was the Magnitsky Act. The Russian Duma responded with the Dima Yakovlev Act, which barred the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens. The linkage by the U.S. Congress of the economic relationship to human rights was, for some, “weird,” as U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul described it. It was not, however, unprecedented as the Jackson-Vanik amendment made the same linkage.

But linking the fate of Russian children stuck in orphanages to the overall bilateral relationship was a new twist, which critics claimed was unusually cruel. The Yakovlev Act is named after a Russian child adopted by American parents and forgotten in a car for hours—an absolute tragedy. But the parents in this case, and the parents in the other cases where adopted Russian children have been abused and mistreated, were not government officials. Many Russian protesters charge that the Yakovlev Act is a desperate and cynical ploy, as were Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s tweets about child abuse in the United States.

Even before the Magnitsky Act was passed, the Kremlin had extended its domestic crackdown to any groups with foreign ties. NGOs that accept foreign funding are now required to register as foreign agents, a loaded term in Russia; USAID was expelled from Russia; and the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute are moving their staffs out as well. In utter frustration at the fragile state of civil rights and liberties in Russia, the United States recently pulled out of the Civil Society Working Group of the BPC.

The policy repercussions of the weakening bilateral relationship have extended beyond the human rights sphere: Russia recently declined to renew Nunn-Lugar and halted some counternarcotics cooperation governed by a 2002 agreement (although other avenues of counternarcotics cooperation, especially in regard to Afghanistan, are ongoing).

There still are areas where both sides can continue cooperative efforts. Arms control, nonproliferation, narcotrafficking, and expanding bilateral economic ties are all areas where there was good cooperation in the first term and overlapping interests going forward. But in Washington, the view that Russia is simply not serious about being constructive in the international arena seems to be gaining more traction and policymakers are finding it impossible to overlook Russia’s domestic politics.

If Russia continues respond to U.S. “meddling” in Russian domestic affairs by targeting NGOs, opposition leaders and orphans, it is hard to see how the relationship can return to the effective working relationship of Obama’s first term. At that time, Washington and Moscow agreed to effectively disagree on some issues while pursuing cooperative policies on others where their interests coincided. But Putin may not want to return to the same level of cooperation. The United States’ policy responses have become a convenient rallying cry for trying to build support for continued tough measures against domestic opposition forces, invoking the classic claim that Russia must defend itself against its external enemies.

Four years ago, the reset was supposed to ensure that Russia returned to what it saw as its rightful place as a key concern of U.S. foreign policy. Today, the domestic circumstances in Russia have changed significantly and so has the mood in Washington. Neither Russia nor the United States looks either willing or able to invest in a vigorous bilateral relationship at the official level.

Early in his first term, Mr. Obama outlined his vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. As part of the “concrete steps” necessary to achieve this goal, he pledged that America would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, push for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), pursue negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), ratchet up international pressure on North Korea and Iran, and take steps to strengthen nuclear materials security and prevent nuclear terrorism.

By April 2011, the Obama administration had negotiated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia and secured Senate approval, issued a Nuclear Posture Review that revaluated U.S. defense posture and limited the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, and convened a Nuclear Security Summit with 47 world leaders that elicited national commitments to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Although significant, these achievements fall far short of the broad agenda Mr. Obama dramatically proclaimed four years ago. Deeper cuts beyond New START failed to materialize as relations with Russia soured, Senate ratification of the CTBT was never pursued, FMCT negotiations remain stymied by deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, and engagement with and pressure on Iran and North Korea yielded few tangible results. Despite considerable initial progress, nuclear disarmament stagnated as a policy priority for the Obama administration.

These new reduction targets will undoubtedly encounter Republican opposition, but members of the U.S. defense, national security, and foreign policy communities have all pledged their support for further reductions in deployed weapons. White House officials point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have acknowledged that deeper cuts will not jeopardize U.S. national security. Similarly, the State Department believes that Russia is already below the limits outlined by New START and encourages the U.S. to “follow Russia downward below New START ceilings.”

Secure in his second term, Mr. Obama has every reason to continue reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, with or without matching commitments from Russia. Further cuts would save billions of dollars, improve international stability, contribute to the fulfillment of America’s commitment under Article VI of the NPT, and support the global disarmament norm. A reduction to 1,000 deployed nuclear weapons, if matched by similar cuts in nondeployed and tactical weapons, should also induce other nuclear weapons states to join in the disarmament process. Nuclear disarmament can be a tortuously slow process. But bold action by Mr. Obama could provide the necessary force to overcome this inertia.

Kevin Ching is the EastWest Institute's Davis WMD Fellow in the U.S. Global Engagement Program.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev shocked many in Davos on Wednesday when he told Bloomberg that "Gazprom may lose its monopoly on gas exports from Russia."

This statement underscores the rise of the independent gas producers and marks a paradigm shift for the Russian gas market. Last year, Gazprom's production decreased 5.4 percent, while the independents increased their output. For example, Novatek's production grew 7.1 percent in 2012.

Inside Russia, the key impact has been that Gazprom, the dominant supplier, lost important clients such as E.On Russia. There was a similar story at a previous development, when Qatari gas first started to compete in Europe. Traditional suppliers lost market share because of newcomers' competitive pricing.

Currently, gas trade in Russia is regulated by the Federal Tariffs Service, or FTS. While Gazprom has to respect FTS' prices within a 3 percent margin, independents can sell below the minimum tariffs, allowing them to gain market share. In an oversupplied gas market, the reintroduction of spot trading, expected this fall, could boost even more the expansion of the gas independents at the expense of Gazprom.

Independents have key advantages over Gazprom. They can secure new supply contracts, control lifting costs and buy gas production and distribution assets. Their ability to lobby for tax breaks has also contributed to their success. For example, the favorable tax regime was a key factor in Total's decision to partner with Novatek.

Independents' ambitions are not limited only to Russia. In November, Novatek requested an exemption from the gas export monopoly. If Novatek is successful, Rosneft, an emerging gas producer, might follow suit.

While the monopoly will formally remain intact, the energy independents may be allowed to bid for specific export quotas. If implemented, this measure will probably lead to a smaller Gazprom, which will have to increase its operational efficiency and will need to review some of its ambitious projects. But it will also improve the image and market position of Russian gas in Europe's liberalized energy market.

Click here to read this piece at The Moscow Times.

Commenting on the value of shale gas and similar energy alternatives, Bochkarev held that they "can be quite an important source of natural gas and energy for the country."

Click here to read the article in full at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Bochkarev has recently published an EWI report on energy security solutions, available here.

 Click here to comment and rate this video on EWI's Youtube channel.

Earlier this week the European Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation against the Russian gas company for allegedly hindering competition in Central and Eastern European gas markets. 

Click here to read the article in EurActiv.