Russia

The main common conclusions were that the joint decision to set up cooperative missile defense was only very recent (November 2010) and that all parties were working seriously at an official level to understand the full implications.

Dr. Neuneck supported Ambassador Rogozin’s call, emphasizing that NATO and Russian politicians should be fully enlightened on technical capabilities of BMD systems for better strategic decisions. He presented conclusions from a cooperative study by the Academy of Sciences in Hamburg and the IFSH (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik) released at the end of last year. The German expert argued that it is the right moment for NATO and Russia to decide on the BMD architecture, as he considers NATO's TMD experience minimal, and joint BMD systems and architecture experience  non-existent.

Robert Bell, in an interview with the Voice of Russia before the seminar, called for an examination of lessons learned from the previous positive NATO-Russia cooperation on TMD, when good results were demonstrated on interoperability solutions and operating procedures. Applying these lessons to a new concept of cooperation on a wide area of territorial defense is now possible thanks to the progress of technology and capability of TMD to achieve a range of 3,000 kilometers.

It was stressed that a window of opportunity for closer cooperation between Russia and NATO on non-strategic missile defense was opened at the Lisbon Summit. Furthermore, participants emphasized that an agreement needs to be reached prior to the 2012 American and Russian presidential elections  in order to seize this unique opportunity.

The most serious threat of all was from nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. To address this threat, the United States and the Soviet Union relied in large part on mutual assured destruction and the deterrence imagined to flow from it. The two sides also developed large second strike capability for retaliation as extra insurance. The surprising aspect of this balance of terror was that in 1972 both sides had agreed by treaty to forego large scale development of actual defences against missiles in flight – what is called now ballistic missile defence (BMD). The idea was that by foregoing a comprehensive system of defence against in-flight missiles, the two sides would strengthen mutual deterrence.   

The international agenda for BMD is now significantly different. We are a decade into recurring controversies between Russia and the United States over the role of missile defence and tactical nuclear forces in national deterrence strategies. These disputes have been caused in large part by the United States withdrawal in 2001 from the 1972 missile defence treaty mentioned above. In Russian eyes, this move upset the balance between offence and defence in mutual nuclear deterrence since it was made by the Americans to allow them to drive towards a comprehensive system for destroying ballistic missiles in flight. In December last year, NATO announced its intention to set up a comprehensive system for missile defence, and thereby to formalize the emerging American “missile umbrella” over Europe.

Russia indicated then its readiness to work with NATO to create a pan-European system that extends well beyond NATO. The joint political decision has been taken. All parties are now working out if and how that might be executed. If the details can’t be agreed, all say they are prepared to walk away from the original consensus.

One stumbling block is that Russia does not want to be subject to a “missile umbrella” commanded or dominated by Americans. According to a January 2011 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, that motivation may be shared by a number of NATO members too.
Another stumbling block is that Russia needs a BMD system with global reach and wants the NATO-Russia joint effort to cover its Asian territory and potential threats across all of Asia. Since the Americans have theatre missile defence systems in East Asia, that should not be too hard. NATO members should readily accept that they can defend better against missiles coming from Asia if they rely on direct Russian involvement in the defence system. A third stumbling block is Russian insecurity about American dominance in BMD technology in coming decades.

The underlying obstacle however is lack of trust. In large part, the insecurity arises from Cold War stereotypes, but there is also a Russian neuralgia caused by American and NATO use of military force for political purposes other than national defence. A strategic signal is needed, one that can sweep away the remnants of the Cold War, address current sensitivities and establish a modicum of trust at an operational level of missile defence. It may need to be as radical as stationing of joint missile defence units on each other’s territory. 

 But there does have to be a new treaty too, one that re-connects missile defence to broader but contemporary needs of all parties for deterrence. By insisting on a treaty, Russia is not re-living the past, it is very much concerned to obtain some guarantees about its security in the future. NATO could look more closely at how it might benefit from such a treaty.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

"Not long ago at all, our partners came out actively for honest democratic elections in the Palestinian territories," Putin said. "Wonderful! Well done, lads! And it turns out Hamas wins, the same people you are calling a terrorist organization and have started to fight against." (Moscow Times).

At one level of politics, Putin’s analysis of Iran and Palestine is rational. On another level, there is a deep neuralgia in Russia about the Muslim world. Putin said that Russia was concerned about the consequences of the recent uprisings in Arab countries for Russian security. He also warned (correctly) that the events could have negative consequences for Europe. The underlying anxiety here is not unique to Mr Putin. He is showing a discomfort here many Western leaders share and that will only grow. 

The anxiety comes about because of shifting power relationships in many fields of national endeavor. On a much lower level, this was symbolized in a tantalizing way in the shock defeat of Russia by Iran (1-0) in a football friendly in Dubai on 9 February. Perhaps the patriotic, sports-loving Mr Putin was smarting from the defeat. The Dubai game, a warm-up for the Euro 2012 qualifiers, was only held in Dubai so that the Russian football federation could get the money from the TV rights involved in playing a team from the region.

More seriously though, the Putin visit to Brussels and the concerns he expressed reflect fundamental shifts in world power at a time when, with the uprisings, revolts and wars in the Muslim world, there is an historic shift under way in world politics. Russia’s relations with the European Union (EU) now look very different from three years ago. Russia has overtaken China as an economic partner of the EU and Putin is determined to make Russia and the EU partners in international security affairs as well.

At exactly the time when the world press was trumpeting the statistic that the Chinese economy had overtaken the Japanese economy, and would eventually surpass the American economy, a different data set from the IMF revealed another shift. The US economy was correctly reassigned to number two spot behind the European Union in GDP on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. And Indian GDP is within a whisker of Japan’s. The bargaining power relationships within the G20 and IMF are shifting and on the global stage have shifted in Europe’s favor.

So, the EU is not a country, some might say. Yes, but it is an “economy”, a single economy, in a world where, as a good Marxists might tell you, economics is in command. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF (Section XIII) dictate that “The principal office of the Fund shall be located in the territory of the member having the largest quota”. Well the European Union now has almost double the quota of the United States, around 30 per cent of the total for the EU compared with just over 17 per cent for the United States, and China’s un-naturally low 3.72 per cent. So the IMF headquarters really should move to Europe.

Journalistic flourishes aside, what does this growing list of re-alignments of politics and power mean? At the very least, in economic and social terms, it means that the initiative for change, the impulse for reform and the power for transformation are slipping even faster from American hands. Russia knows it and is looking for European partnership, especially to secure the southern flanks not just of Russia but of Europe as a whole.

Click here to read this piece in New Europe

EWI releases report by Russian and American experts on the “rules of the road” for cyber conflict, examining how the principles of the Geneva and Hague Conventions can be applied to cyberspace. The report caused a lot of interest in the media and among bloggers; here is a selection of stories published so far.

• BBC Newsnight Exclusive
• BBC report, featuring EWI Director Melissa Hathaway
• BBC coverage of cyber hackers
• BBC Digital Planet podcasts on Russia-U.S. report on Cyber Conflict 
• BBC coverage on cyber war
• Wall Street Journal
• MSNBC
• Daily Telegraph
• The Register
• V3
• CIO
• ZDnet UK
• PC World
• ComputerWorld UK
• Computer Weekly
• Forbes
• Federal News Radio
• Rossijskaya Gazeta (in Russian)
• Nezavissimaya Gazeta (in Russian)
• Digital Journal
• IT Pro
• InfoSecurity
• Information Age
• Tech Eye
• Red Orbit
• Spinport News
• ZDnet Australia
• UK Fast
• RM Professional
• CrunchGeer
• Security News Daily
• PublicTechnology.net
• Secure Computing
• IISS
• Tech News Review
• Fierce Government
• Israel National News
• PressTV
• The National
• Internet Security

An article on nextgov.com, a blog on governmental technology and business, discusses an EastWest Institute study on the challenges of an international treaty to establish regulations for computer security.

Summary report of the EWI seminar held in Brussels on December 6, 2010

The growing potential for ethnic and religious conflict in Eurasia in large part lies in the deficit of proper inter-ethnic integration policies at national and international levels in government-led active economic modernization efforts.

This is the basic analytical conclusion of the seminar on Ethnic and Religious Risks of Modernization organized by EWI in cooperation with Leo Gumilev Center (Moscow), a new think tank focused on issues of multiculturalism.  The seminar was held in Brussels on December 6, 2010, as a sideline event of the EWI’s Global Conference on Preventive Action (European Parliament, Brussels, December 6-7, 2010).

The policy context of the seminar, bringing together 30 independent and government experts from Russia, the EU and the  U.S.,  was largely determined by the Russian President Medvedev’s initiative on national technological and economic modernization. International “partnerships for modernization” are becoming a major element of Russia’s ongoing rapprochement with the EU, the U.S. and other developed Western democracies, and are seen by the Russian leadership as an important source of advanced technologies and innovative management know-how. 

In his introductory remarks Vladimir Ivanov, Director of EWI Russia Branch, pointed out that these governmental efforts largely focus on the development of several critical technologically advanced sectors (e.g. energy efficiency, space technologies, bio and medical science, advanced IT, etc). In the meantime, it is obvious that sooner or later promoting technical innovations will lead to deep social, cultural and political changes. As the Russian federal government is planning massive public investments in such industry clusters, competition among regions for these centrally disbursed funds will increase. In such a multiethnic country as Russia, social and economic transformations on the regional level will inevitably provoke the rise of regional cultural identities. Conflict potential based on ethnic and religious values bears the risk of breaking out into outspoken nationalistic movements, religious radicalism and violent extremism. Increased migration flowing from the conflict regions like the Caucasus will feed instability in megacities and centers of accelerated development. Eventual counter-modernization reactions in Eurasia may well become inspired by anti-Western slogans, as modernization is largely perceived as “westernization” of traditional societies. These trends will challenge domestic and international security of Russia and its neighbors, both in west and east. 

The importance of the seminar was highlighted by an unprecedented wave of inter-ethnic clashes in Russia, which rolled through major Russian cities from Kaliningrad to Vladivosto. The clashes started on December 11, 2010, with a 5,000-person demonstration of nationalistic football fans near the Kremlin walls, who protested against growing ethnic criminality and the inability of authorities to stop it.  For the first time since the end of the 1990s, these events forced the Russian leadership to acknowledge inter-ethnic tensions as a serious domestic issue requiring systemic policy action.

The purpose of the seminar, as defined by the organizers, was to explore new policy ideas for addressing these risks in the globalization of Eurasia, including such issues as soft security responses to religious radicalization and violent extremism, and cultural and economic conflicts caused by the influx of migrating populations into centers of dynamic development. The participants sought to develop a multiculturalism policies agenda for modernization initiatives, both in their domestic dimension and in the framework of international development aid and cooperation programs (e.g. the Eastern Partnership, the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, post-war recovery programs for Afghanistan, etc). 

Discussion centered around: comparative analysis of ethno-political and religious effects of  modernization experiences in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus, the Baltic States, Turkey and  China; the role of migration flows in fuelling national and religious radicalization in the EU and Eurasia; and practical policy implications.

Key presentations were delivered by the following experts: Evgeni Bakhrevsky, Coordinator, Peoples' Rights Movement (Russia); Jean-Pierre Devos, Superintendent of the Belgium Federal Police (Belgium) and Project Manager for Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPPRA project); Irina Ivakhnyuk, Deputy Head, Department of Population, Economic Faculty of the Moscow State University (Russia); Kirill Koktysh, Senior Fellow, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (Russia); Pavel Levushkan, Chief Editor, Christian Portal “Baznica” (Latvia); Christopher Marsh, Director, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University (United States); Andrey Marudenko, President, Aurora Expertum Club (Russia); Kirill Serebrenitsky, Director, Eastern Bureau for Ethnic and Political Studies (Russia); Denis Sokolov, Head of the Center for Regional Social and Political Studies RAMCOM (Russia); Pavel Zarifullin, Director, L.Gumilev Centre (Russia).

Experts identified the following major factors leading to ethnic and religious radicalization in the framework of modernization initiatives:

• Accelerated urbanization and disaggregation of traditional societies, especially transformation of labor and consumption into market values;
• Perception of modernization initiatives by local communities as externally imposed  in the absence of targeted efforts by authorities to harmonize social innovation with indigenous mythology and traditions; often governmentally imposed secularism associated with modernization (as in the USSR, Kemalist Turkey, Communist China, Iran under the White Revolution);
• Massive financial injections of government funds into institutionally unstable regions with strong population growth rate, leading to the development of regional “economies of violence” which, through the mechanisms of corruption and migration, expand into the national centers of decision-making (e.g. Caucasus vs. Moscow);
• Lack of proper integration policies (observed in Russia, particular EU countries and at the  EU level in general) for migrating populations;
• Strong presence of alternative ideologies (e.g. fundamentalist Islam) in the modernizing countries and regions.

Exposure of particular regions to these factors is even stronger if they are situated in the “critical frontal zones” where different civilizations geographically meet each other, as in: the long-lasting divide between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon identities in the UK; the divide between Romans and Germans in Belgium; the great African chain of conflict zones, from Western Sahara and Southern Senegal through Sierra-Leone, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Northern Chad, Southern Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, marking the neighborhood of the Arab Muslim world and Christian and polytheistic Tropical Africa;  and the Asian civilizational frontal -- Palestine and adjacent Arab territories, Iraq, Kurdistan, Northern Caucasus, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Chinese Turkestan and Xingjiang.
Another contemporary conflict multiplier, according to experts, is the recent global economic crisis: it increased the fight for resources between ethnic groups and fostered transformation of tensions caused by social inequality into inter-cultural identity conflicts, which was particularly demonstrated by cases of growing nationalistic tensions in the North Caucasus, Southern Russia and major Russian cities. 
Turning to practical ideas on how to address ethnic and religious risks of modernizations in Eurasia, experts suggested a broad series of recommendations for policymakers on national and international levels:

1. Include ethnic, religious and migration risk analysis in the modernization programs and relevant international partnership agreements, and develop appropriate preventive concepts and action plans focused on protecting regional cultural identities, and devise flexible integration policies for migrants. Eurasianism, a historic school of thought in Russia dating back to the end of the 19th century that explores ways of managing regional cultural diversity as a basis for sustainable development, can serve as one of the key methodological sources for such policies.
2. Develop networks of independent monitoring centers in critical conflict zones in Russia and CIS countries with the following major roles:
   • Permanently conduct field analysis of cultural identity trends, including through ethnographic expeditions;
   • Create and permanently update a map of ethnic and religious risk zones;
   • Advise policymakers on conflict prevention and mitigation strategies and  methods taking into account local cultural specifics;
   • Mediate local conflicts on behalf of the civil society.
3. Undertake analysis of legal practices in conflict regions and devise measures to harmonize state legislation and customary law and dispute resolution practices (e.g. Shariah law, adats, traditional ethics and norms of the Caucasus). Russian Northern Caucasus could serve as a pilot zone for such efforts.
4. Explore ways to strengthen  international legislation on protection of peoples’ rights on the basis of existing UN documents (UN Charter, the UNGA Declaration of 2007 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UNESCO Universal Declaration of 2001 on Cultural Diversity, etc.) to reflect new requirements for preventing ethnic conflicts in the 21st century.
5.  Establish the institute of Ombudsman for Peoples’ Rights, on national and regional levels, in Russia and other CIS countries, with the role to oversee and preserve protection of ethnic cultural identities.
6. Promote best practice sharing (e.g. the EU-supported CoPPRA project) in Eurasia, involving UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, CSTO, SCO and respective national authorities and NGOs, in training enforcement agencies in order to enhance their capacity to identify members of radical movements and to cooperate with local communities in preventing violent extremism at early stages of engagement of frustrated individuals by organized radical groups. 
7. Develop political and spiritual leadership training programs in cooperation with moderate Muslim institutions, targeting potential young radical leaders, with the purpose of providing them with attractive alternative career opportunities within the normal, non-violent political field.

On December 7, 2010 recommendations of the seminar were reported at the concluding session of the Global Conference on Preventive Action at the European Parliament. EWI has established a special project series under the rubric “Modernizations and Security” and will continue cooperation with its partners to further consider the conclusions of the seminar  in view of developing them into specific action-oriented projects.

“President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visit to India has given fresh luster to a relationship that had begun to lose its sheen,” Sibal writes.  Sibal argues that the media and the international community have focused too much on the India-U.S. relationship, thus losing sight of the India-Russia relationship.

The economic aspect of the India- Russia relationship has made some progress but still has a far way to go, according to Sibal. As he sees it, the countries’ different economic structures have made it difficult to establish an effective economic partnership and a trusted basis for trade.  However, Sibal believes that the countries are making strides in joint ventures, pointing to a new steel plant in Karnataka and recent agreements in the telecommunications sector.

For Sibal, the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Agreement in the hydrocarbon sector represents an important breakthrough for the relationship because “it formally concretises Russia’s greater willingness to develop the energy relationship.”

From a political standpoint, Sibal points out, Russia has been one of the biggest supporters of India’s permanent membership in the UNSC, as well as India’s nuclear capabilities. Russia “is the only country actually building power reactors in India,” writes Sibal.  “In the defence area, India still receives top-of-the-line equipment from Russia, as well as access to sensitive technologies.”

Sibal concludes that President Medvedev’s visit to Russia restored faith in the two countries’ relationship and bodes well for the future, with a caveat: “For it to graduate to a ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’ that the Joint Statement speaks of will need greater movement in the positive directions that President Medvedev’s visit chartered.”

Click here to read Sibal's piece online

Wang spoke at the EastWest Institute (EWI) on December 8, 2010, to an audience that included EWI Co-Chairman Ross Perot, Jr. (who chaired the event); Edward Cox, Chairman of the New York Republican State Committee; Maurice Greenberg, Chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc.; Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to China; and Frank G. Wisner, Jr., International Affairs Advisor at Patton Boggs LLP.

Wang shared his first-hand impressions of the United States and China’s approach to addressing various global challenges. In his speech, Wang endorsed a piece of advice given to him by Henry Kissinger, a former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor who helped normalize relations between the U.S. and China in the 1970s. Kissinger had suggested that the two countries find solutions to differences in private rather than present the contents of all conversations publicly to the media.

Wang emphasized the value of this kind of discreet communication in approaching the North Korean leadership, particularly during the current crisis on the peninsula. Regarding U.S. calls for China to take more forceful action against North Korea, he noted that his country does not publicize all that it does. Therefore, simply because China has not announced that it is conducting quiet diplomacy does not mean that it is not doing so.

Wang also suggested more candid exchanges between the United States and China, similar to the 2nd U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue recently convened in Washington, D.C. Lauding the dialogue as an important new platform for promoting relations between the two countries, he proposed the possibility of organizing additional dialogues between various groups, such as businessmen or youth. Citing interest by Ohio political leaders in attracting Chinese businesses to their state, Wang stressed, for example, the constructive role that a dialogue between Chinese and U.S. businessmen could play.

This speech came at the end of a nine-day, four-city visit of the United States by a 22-member Communist Party of China (CPC) delegation led by Wang.

Following the dialogue sessions in Washington, D.C. with Democratic and Republican leaders, the CPC delegation visited Chicago, Illinois, and Columbus, Ohio, before concluding their trip in New York City. In Chicago and Columbus, the delegation had meetings with a number of prominent local Republicans and Democrats (including Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Ohio Governor Ted Strickland, and Ohio Governor-Elect John Kasich), members of the Midwest U.S.-China Association, leading Ohio businessmen, and The Ohio State University President Gordon Gee. In New York, the delegation also met with Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Going into the midterms, the Obama administration was confident that it could count on at least a dozen Republican votes in favor of New START.  The key to their ratification strategy was Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, but he issued a surprise announcement on  November 16th that he did not think the treaty should be voted on this year.  Two days later, ten of the incoming Senate Republicans released a letter saying that they wanted a chance to vote on the treaty.  This was a double whammy that could crush the Obama administration’s efforts for a quick, successful vote.

A yes vote from Kyl, it was assumed, would bring along enough Republicans to assure the treaty’s ratification. His new call to delay ratification could well cause other Republicans who may have voted yes to backtrack. Bob Corker, one of the Republicans who initially voted the treaty out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had already said he may not support ratification. If a vote is put off until the new Congress convenes in January, the odds look even worse. For New START, it may well be a case of now or never—and never has some serious negative implications for all aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship.

The administration is refusing to go down without a fight. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and President Obama himself, all veterans of the Senate, are continuing to lobby hard for ratification. In the Senate, they are working closely with John Kerry and Dick Lugar, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, respectively. And Lugar rebuked his colleagues in the Senate this week, arguing, in essence, that national security is falling victim to political considerations. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the administration may need to work both sides of the aisle because as at least one Democratic Senator, Ben Nelson of Nebraska,  has also called for delaying a ratification vote until the 112th Congress.

Among the key issues wrapped up in the debate over the treaty are U.S. ballistic missile defense plans, the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and the broader U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.  Some opponents of the treaty have long argued that it constrains U.S. options to deploy a ballistic missile shield. As evidence, they point to its preamble that notes the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms.  The Russian government appeared to give them more ammunition when it issued a unilateral statement that that any U.S. missile defense build-up that would “give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation” would justify Russia’s withdrawal from the treaty. To the skeptics, this proved their point.

But neither of these documents is legally binding and thus they do not constrain U.S. options on missile defense.  The critics also largely ignore the fact that the United States also unilaterally reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if it feels its national interest is threatened. It’s worth recalling that it was the United States, not Russia, that  exercised such an option when it unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. U.S. missile defense plans have long been a highly contentious issue in the U.S.-Russian relationship and BMD was one of the main reasons that the negotiations on the New START treaty took so long. And although the Obama administration refused to go along with any concessions that would tie their hands in terms of BMD, the Russian government portrayed the treaty as doing exactly that in order to show progress on one of their key areas of concern. Russian statements that the treaty should constrain U.S. missile defense plans have thus complicated the picture for the administration.

Additional objections to the treaty arise from the suspicions of its opponents that the administration is not truly committed to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, which becomes all the more important as the number of weapons decreases. Yet the administration had already committed $80 billion over 10 years to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons complex—and added another $4.1 billion recently to satisfy Kyl.  Linton Brooks, who was in charge of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2003 until 2007, proclaimed: “I would’ve killed for this kind of budget.”

A broader objection to the treaty is based on distrust of the entire reset effort with Russia. Many American critics believe their country has given away too much in its efforts to build a stronger relationship with Russia across a range of issues and received nothing in return. The Obama administration’s decision to abandon the Bush administration’s plans for a BMD system based in Poland and the Czech Republic  was seen as particularly symbolic in this regard.

But there have been concessions—and some quite significant—from the Russian side. The reset has been underpinned by mutual concessions. Under Medvedev, Russia cancelled its contract to sell S-300 SAMs to Iran, supported new sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program, and opened a supply route through Russian territory for the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. These decisions have opened Medvedev up to domestic criticism similar to what Obama has faced—giving away too much for too little in return. If the United States does not ratify New START, Medvedev is likely to be unwilling or unable to deliver on some of the most difficult policy issues—Iran, Afghanistan, arms control.

In any honest appraisal,  the ratification of New START would not only give the United States greater insight into the Russian nuclear arsenal and vice versa, but also  greater stability and transparency. There would be  boots-on-the-ground verification,  which the United States has been forced to live without for nearly a year now. Ratification also would help promote progress on a broad range of issues of strategic interest to the United States—on, as Hillary Clinton recently enumerated, Iran, Afghanistan, nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics. If the treaty is not ratified, cooperation with Russia could well grind to a halt. And both Obama and Medvedev would be seen as failing to deliver on the promise of the reset.  It would be a blow to more than the two leaders’ prestige; it would also undercut U.S.-Russian relations and the prospects for further nuclear reductions anywhere. The stakes are incredibly high.