Russia

Some of these tensions are directly related to Russia’s WTO membership application. Now that Russia has joined the WTO, the United States finds itself in violation of WTO rules that require an unconditioned trade relationship. Back in 1974, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment that tied free trade to free emigration in non-market economies as a means of pressuring the Kremlin to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate. Russian officials have pointed out for years that this is an anarchic piece of legislation since Russia is neither a non-market economy nor does it restrict emigration. Yet despite the efforts of successive U.S. presidential administrations to graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Congress has thus far refused to act. In part, this is because many members of Congress continued to view Russia through a Cold War prism.

Now that Russia has joined the WTO, such attitudes are changing—up to a point. Both the House and the Senate are considering bills that would graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik and grant permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). There is a possibility—although far from assured—that Congress could act when it returns from the August recess. The price, however, will be tying PNTR to passage of the Magnitsky bill, which focuses on human rights abuses by government officials in Russia. These human rights objections are not as easily dismissed as those rooted in outdated Cold War thinking.

The Obama administration has sought to delink Magnitsky and human rights issues from PNTR, but Russia’s recent increasingly heavy-handed treatment of political dissenters has undercut those efforts. Congressional and other critics of its human rights record point to the recent trial and two-year jail sentence for the punk band Pussy Riot, opposition leader Garry Kasparov’s arrest, the relentless pursuit of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the efforts to undermine non-governmental organizations that receive foreign funding by subjecting them to frequent audits and labeling them as “foreign agents,” and increased penalties for protestors.

Those same critics argue that the Obama administration has turned its head as the Russian government moves backwards on human rights with such actions. Such criticism is not entirely fair. The administration has imposed visa bans on officials linked to the Magnitsky case (the Magnitsky bill seeks to do something similar, but on a broader scale) and has used official channels to quietly press the Kremlin on human rights. The problem, however, is that the Obama administration has not been able to engage the Putin administration on these issues. The Russian government rejects all such criticisms of its human rights practices, calling them an intolerable meddling in its domestic affairs.

So the bilateral relationship is dealing with—or, perhaps more accurately, not dealing with—several significant stressors. And the U.S. presidential contest is certain to shine an uncomfortable spotlight on the strained relationship as the Romney team seeks to undermine any foreign policy successes that the Obama administration claims, such as New START and Russia’s WTO accession. Mitt Romney already launched one broadside against Russia, calling it the “greatest geopolitical foe.” While the Republican candidate has quietly dropped such inflated rhetoric, he is unlikely to soften his overall tone. And given Putin’s tough measures against dissenters and his policy on Syria that is widely seen as obstructionist, even Obama is likely to feel compelled to distance himself from Russia’s actions at home and abroad. For now, the once-touted notion of a “strategic partnership” between Russia and the United States is, at the very least, on hold. It would take some major course corrections to give it a new push.

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in EWI's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. program.

Panelists included Ali Akbar Javanfekr, managing director of the Islami Republic News Agency, Peter Horrocks, director of the BBC World Service, and Jānis Kārkliņš, Assistant Director General for Communication and Information of UNESCO. 

The working group is drawn from U.S.- and Russia-based experts who are producing a joint threat assessment (JTA) on the wide range of challenges posed to both states by narcotrafficking from Afghanistan. The JTA will be followed by a Joint Policy Assessment suggesting cooperative measures that the United States and Russia can undertake to tackle the dangers posed by Afghan narcotrafficking.  This working group is addressing a key security concern to both the United States and Russia and thus aims to aid in the “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations by delivering positive momentum, confidence-building, and policy impact. As the U.S.-Russia relationship faces increased strains and tensions from difficult and increasingly divisive issues like ballistic missile defense and Syria, the need to promote dialogue where there are common interests intensifies.

The working group members met in June at EWI’s Brussels office for three days of discussions. Initial sessions were held with senior officials from the European Union, NATO, and the Russian Mission to NATO on actions, interests, and challenges in Afghanistan. The experts then devoted two days to assessing the key threats that both Russia and the United States face and possible scenarios for these threats after 2014. The discussions touched on economic development, insurgency and criminal groups in trafficking, state capacity, the Afghan national forces, corruption, border management, the role of eradication in counternarcotics strategy, and the function of international organizations in the region.

There was a widespread expectation that in the immediate aftermath of NATO’s withdrawal and a reduced U.S. troop presence, there will be an increase in the amount of poppy produced and the role of opium—already significant—in Afghanistan’s economy. Both the willingness and ability of the Afghan national forces to take on a significant counternarcotics role was also discussed.

Although the supply side of counternarcotics strategy dominated the conversations, the experts discussed how Russia and the United States could do more work on the demand side of counternarcotics strategy, which is fertile ground for continued collaboration. How to reinforce and expand already successful cooperation, such as the already robust Drug Enforcement Agency(DEA)-Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) ties, was also discussed.

The JTA, which should be finalized by September, will include assessments of the following areas:

• the threats that Afghan narcotrafficking poses specifically to Russia and the U.S. and the shared concerns between these two countries
• the opium economy in Afghanistan
• the transnational trade in Afghan opiates and money laundering
• effects of narcotrafficking on state-building in Afghanistan

Working group members are scheduled to convene in New York in the fall to finalize the joint policy assessment.

Members of the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking:

Russian Experts

Ilnur Batyrshin, Head of the Scientific Research Center of FSKN 

Viktor Korgun, Head of the Afghanistan department, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Yuri Kroupnov, Director, Institute for Demography, Migration, and Regional Development; Advisor to the Director of Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN)

Aman Saliev, Senior Expert, Institute of Strategic Analysis and Planning, Kyrgyz-Russian University of the Kyrgyz Republic

Konstantin Sorokin, Project Manager, Department of Training and Methodology and Research Projects, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM)

Ekaterina Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit of IMEMO

Georgi Zazulin, Professor at the Chair of Conflictology, St. Petersburg University, specializing on narcoconflictology and anti-narcotics policies in Russia and Europe; Russian representative of the International Organization European Cities Against Drugs 

U.S. Experts

Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

George Gavrilis, Executive Director, The Hollings Center for International Dialogue

David T. Johnson, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Senior Advisor, Avascent International; former Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement

John “Jack” Lawn, former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency

David Mansfield, Visiting Fellow, The Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University

Kimberly Marten, Professor, Department of Political Science, Barnard College

Gretchen Peters, author, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs and Crime Have Reshaped the Afghan War; Consultant, Researcher and Advisor of Transnational Crime Issues

Cory Welt, Associate Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs; Adjunct Fellow, Center for American Progress

The meeting could not have been more timely, following on the heels of the recently concluded NATO summit in Chicago, which took place without a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. At the heart of the issue is a deep divide between the United States and Russia over what a cooperative BMD program should look like. The Russian government has concerns that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could eventually be directed against Russian ballistic missiles and is insisting on a legal guarantee that NATO's BMD system will not be used against Russia. The United States has repeatedly stated that it understands Russian concerns but that the EPAA will not be directed against Russia .The United States is willing to offer political guarantees matched by cooperative confidence-building actions but that it is unable to provide Russia with legally binding statements. Signaling its frustration with the United States over BMD, Russia did not participate at a high level in the NATO summit. And, as expected, NATO announced at the summit that the EPAA had reached interim operational capacity.

Rose focused his comments on the details and goals of NATO's EPAA plan and the future of U.S.-Russian cooperation on BMD. After his presentation, participants inquired about the divergence between Russian and U.S. assessments of the threat emanating from Iran. Another attendee asked about the political environments in both countries and whether political factors are driving their respective positions. Others focused their questions on the future of the EPAA considering the ever-changing international security concerns.

Separately, Rose offered these on-the-record responses to questions posed by EWI’s Thomas Lynch: 

To what extent does the notion of mutually assured destruction factor into current tensions on ballistic missile defense? Additionally, how can NATO and Russia overcome their differences vis-a-vis addressing today's nuclear challenges (e.g. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan)?

Cooperation on missile defense would be a game changer and the next step in expanding U.S.-Russia cooperation.  It would give us the chance to build a true strategic partnership and help us move away from Mutually Assured Destruction toward Mutually Assured Stability.

President Obama has said on many occasions that the United States is committed to finding a mutually acceptable approach to missile defense cooperation with Russia.   Such cooperation can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia.

The best assurances for Russia that the U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be achieved through close cooperation with the United States and NATO. 

Through this cooperation Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed and capable of defending against missiles originating from the Middle East and is not designed for or capable of undermining the Russian strategic deterrent.  Cooperation can be difficult, but it will bring benefits to both sides.  We know because cooperation in other areas is producing positive results.  We are successfully implementing the New START Treaty, moving materials to and from Afghanistan and stopping drug traffickers and terrorists.  Our track record with the Russian Government on New START and other issues demonstrates that we can come to agreement on complex issues. We look forward to continuing our dialogue with the Russian government on this issue.

What are the best means of addressing the trust deficit between Russia and NATO on BMD issues?

Let me start on the progress we have made with Russia under this Administration.  I'd point to Russian support of U.N. Security Council resolutions that included the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea and Iran, our work together on the New START Treaty, and our work to open up the Northern Distribution Network to get critical supplies to troops in Afghanistan, to name a few.

We are working together to implement a landmark agreement that calls for each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, in total enough material for about 17,000 nuclear weapons.  The United States and Russia have also partnered successfully to remove unneeded highly enriched uranium from several central and eastern European countries, former Soviet republics, Vietnam and Libya, reducing the risk that terrorists could get their hands on dangerous nuclear materials.

There are obviously areas where we've disagreed, but Russia is a committed member of the international nonproliferation community and we will continue to work with Russia and other partners on nonproliferation challenges.

If enacted, the bill would impose financial and visa restrictions on Russian officials who have been linked to the criminal prosecution of hermitage capital lawyer Sergey Magnitsky.

Miller held that, "much as the Jackson-Vanik amendment did in 1975, I think this would be yet another source of tension in the bilateral relationship."

Click here to listen to the full interview at Voice of Russia.

The Jackson-Vanick amendment, which restricts trade with Russia as a response to immigration policy, was enacted by the United States in 1974. In light of Russia's impending admission to the World Trade Organization, many consider Jackson-Vanick to be an outdated impediment to U.S. economic growth. Others claim that its trade restrictions are necessary as a means of punishing Russia for human rights violations.

Miller holds that, while the effectiveness of Jackson-Vanick has long been disputed, "the administration is going to have to give something to the human rights folks." 

Click here to read the article in CQ Weekly.

Those reluctant to graduate Russia have valid concerns—after all, the Russian government’s human rights record is under constant attack. But maintaining Jackson-Vanik restrictions on Russia is simply the wrong response to these concerns.  At best, Jackson-Vanik is completely ineffectual in promoting human rights and rule of law in Russia. At worst, it is counter-productive.

The Obama administration’s top trade priority this year is getting Russia graduated from Jackson-Vanik, and timing is crucial. When Russia formally joins the World Trade Organization (WTO) later this year, the United States will be in violation of WTO rules because Jackson-Vanik attaches conditions to the U.S.-Russia trade relationship. This means that American businesses will be at a disadvantage in Russia because the carefully negotiated reduced tariffs will not be extended to U.S. goods and services.

The administration faces an uphill battle in Congress—both Democrats and Republicans have objections to granting Russia permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). Those objections are both economic (intellectual property concerns, market access) and political (commitment to rule of law, respect for human rights). Human rights proponents fear that graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik would deprive the U.S. of leverage over the Russian government. But Russia has been determined to be in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik every year since 1994, so it currently provides no sanctions on Russia. It could only do so should the Russian government abandon the free-market and start restricting emigration.

Practical considerations aside, the Jackson-Vanik amendment has been mythologized as a piece of legislation that has advanced the cause of human rights and allowed hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens to leave. But its record is decidedly mixed. Rather than being responsible for freeing countless Jewish and other emigrants from the Soviet Union, the amendment may actually have resulted in thousands of would-be emigrants being denied exit visas.

Emigration numbers varied considerably during the Cold War as Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate became pawns to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. Immediately after the amendment came into force, emigration from the Soviet Union dropped by 35 percent. Numbers slowly climbed, reaching a pre-collapse peak in 1979 of 51,320. But the next year, emigration declined by 58 percent as the Soviet government sharply decreased the number of exit visas issued.  At the very least, this is a decidedly mixed record.

The expectation that Jackson-Vanik would provide some leverage on Soviet human rights practices was not unreasonable. The Soviet Union was eager to build a stronger trade relationship with the United States and mounted a lobbying effort to try to ensure that the amendment was not passed by Congress.  General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev met with several Senators in the Kremlin and with more Senators in the Blair House on a June 1973 trip to Washington.  The expectation was that the Soviet Union’s economic needs would outweigh its desire to keep dissidents from emigrating. This expectation, however, was not borne out.

Despite Jackson-Vanik’s questionable achievements, it is currently all that the U. S. has in terms of legislation to try to pressure the Russian government to improve its record. But rather than rely on an outdated and ineffective tool, human rights advocates, including those in Congress, should work with the administration to expand the arsenal of effective policy options to address Russia’s backsliding on democratization and human rights. The U.S. government, no matter which party is in control, is going to be concerned about human rights. The Russian government does not like this, but it is clearly an important dimension of U.S. foreign policy.

Both the House and Senate have introduced “replacement” human rights legislation to address ongoing concerns in Russia. The proposed legislation is a response to the death of 37-year-old Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who was killed in pretrial detention in 2009. A surprising coalition of Republicans and Democrats would like to link Russia’s graduation from Jackson-Vanik to passage of a Magnitsky bill, which would impose a visa ban on 60 Russian officials linked to Magnitsky’s death.

But the Obama administration has declined to support a Jackson-Vanik for Magnitsky quid pro quo. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul recently branded this a “weird linkage” and dismissed the notion that “somehow holding Jackson-Vanik is going to make Russia more democratic or help us with Syria."

Some of the most prominent members of the Russian opposition movement have taken a clear stand on Jackson-Vanik, strongly questioning its linkage with current human rights concerns. “At the end of the day, those who defend the argument that Jackson-Vanik’s provisions should still apply to Russia in order to punish Putin’s anti-democratic regime only darken Russia’s political future, hamper its economic development, and frustrate its democratic aspirations,” their recent joint statement declared. “We, leading figures of the Russian political opposition, strongly stand behind efforts to remove Russian from the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Jackson-Vanik is not helpful in any way -- neither for promotion of human rights and democracy in Russia, nor for the economic interests of its people.”

Nonetheless, the opposition leaders advocate selective sanctioning of Russian officials complicit in human rights abuses and mention the Magnitsky legislation by name. The State Department, however, has already instituted a visa ban on some officials believed to be linked to Magnitsky’s death, and it argues that the new legislation would mandate investigations of assets of Russian officials that would be difficult to carry out. There are also concerns that provisions of the Magnitsky bills are illegal (such as not providing an appeal mechanism for those sanctioned) or of dubious precedent (punishing people who have not been found guilty of a crime). The administration is also concerned that the Russian government would retaliate against the Magnitsky legislation by withholding cooperation on Iran, the Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan and other strategically important areas.

A Jackson-Vanik for Magnitsky quid pro quo could end up trading one piece of ineffective legislation for another. Still, the administration is going to have to give something to get Congress to agree to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik—it is, after all, an election year and Russia is a popular target, especially after its recent actions vis-à-vis Syria. In anticipation of having to put more substance to its human rights efforts,  in October the administration submitted a congressional notification for the creation of a civil society fund to provide long-term support for Russian NGOs—but no further action has been taken.

Critics of Russia view Russia’s unconditional graduation from Jackson-Vanik as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States and a victory for Russia. But even most major U.S. Jewish groups, who strongly supported the amendment’s creation, have also come out in favor of repealing Jackson-Vanik. And now it is the United States, not Russia, who will bear the cost of keeping Jackson-Vanik on the books—to the tune of some $9 to $10 billion annually in unrealized benefits from Russia’s WTO accession. Rather than linking human rights to trade, human rights should be promoted as important in its own right, and the U.S. should develop a whole arsenal of tools that are more substantive than symbolic.

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in EWI's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. and WMD programs.

For most Russians, the eight years of Putin’s Presidency (2000-2008) were the best years in Russian history. Living standards more than doubled and the economy—propelled by a massive devaluation in 1998 and rising oil prices after that—recovered to the level of 1990, before the decade-long depression triggered by Gorbachev and Yeltsin’ failed economic reforms. Moreover, Putin squirreled away enough of Russia’s oil revenues so that the country was able to survive the effects of the 2008-09 world economic crash. By contrast, neither the Gorbachev nor Yeltsin governments ever recovered from the collapse of world oil prices to $10-11 per barrel in 1986 and 1998, respectively.

In addition, the government’s control over the five national television stations means that political news is strictly controlled to prevent any “feeding frenzy” that might damage Putin’s standing, as nearly happened to him after the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk in August 2000. And just to take no chances, in recent days the government has moved to change the Board of Directors of the last major independent radio station, the Moscow Echo, which has been relentlessly critical of Putin.

Finally, none of the candidates nominally opposing Putin have the remotest chance of defeating him, or even coming close. The most popular, the communist Gennady Zyuganov, has been running for president fruitlessly for 20 years; the independent Levada polling institute in Moscow has projected that Zyuganov can achieve at most 15% of the vote. And out of an “abundance of caution,” as it were, Putin’s Central Electoral Commission at the last minute disallowed liberal economist Gregory Yavlinsky’s candidacy on patently trumped up claims of illegible signatures on petitions. What Putin feared was not Yavlinsky the candidate—who was unlikely to breach the 10% threshold—but that as a candidate Yavlinsky would have the legal right, which he was well prepared to exploit, to deploy election monitors throughout the country and thereby question the legitimacy of Putin’s announced victory.

The key issue is not whether Putin will win but how he reacts after winning to the growing signs of disagreement with his system of rule. Does he see the recent demonstrations as threatening a new “vacuum of power,” a specter that has haunted Putin since the collapse of the Berlin Wall? Or does he see them instead as foreshadowing the dangers if he does not fundamentally reform an authoritarian political machine that, whatever its genuine accomplishments, seems incapable of shaping Russia into a truly modern society?

Each choice carries its own risks. Without real political reform, Russia will be condemned to the status of a petroleum state and consigned to the margins of the world economy. But if Putin decides to broaden the base of his government, he would have to depend on those he does not really trust and at the same time wage a titanic war against his own loyalists, who control over 40% of Russia’s economic assets. History will judge Putin on how he makes and executes that choice.

The author is Director of Research, Center for International Studies and Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author most recently of, Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft (Potomac Books, 2011). Between 1984-89 he worked as an analyst of Soviet affairs at the then Institute for East-West Security Studies.

Click here to watch Allen Lynch discuss his latest book on Youtube.

After the lows of the U.S.-Russia relationship during the George W. Bush administration, no one thought that Barack Obama’s “reset” policy towards Russia would be easy. But does it have to be this hard?

The reset has been under fire in both Russia and the United States. On the Hill, many Republicans are eager to target a policy that has been such a central tenet of Obama’s foreign policy and to express their lingering mistrust and even outright hostility toward Russia. Russian critics have also pounded the reset, which is closely identified with President Dmitri Medvedev. Especially among Vladimir Putin’s circle, mistrust of the United States runs deep—and Putin himself has been a vocal opponent of his protégé’s policy. The main criticism is that Russia has given up too much and received too little in return, which ironically mirrors a common refrain in Washington: that Russia has given too little and the U.S. too much. In other words, many on both sides continue to view each other in zero-sum Cold War terms. 

While acknowledging that the reset was never meant to be a panacea, the Obama administration rightly points to its accomplishments—notably, the New START treaty, the Northern Distribution Network for resupplying efforts in Afghanistan, and Russian entry into the World Trade Organization.  These have (or should in the case of WTO accession if Congress normalizes the trade relationship with Russia) resulted in concrete gains for both countries. But Iran, missile defense, human rights concerns, Putin’s decision to return to the presidency, the December parliamentary elections in Russia and ensuing widespread protests, and now Syria are important conflict points in the relationship—ones that challenge the optimism of even the most ardent reset supporters.

All of which has led to a ratcheting up of fiery rhetoric. High-ranking U.S. officials publicly used words like “disgusting” and “a travesty” to describe Russia’s Syria veto. During the height of the Middle East uprisings last year,  Senator John McCain used Twitter to convey taunts like “Dear Vlad, The #ArabSpring is coming to a neighborhood near you,” and Putin responded in kind, calling McCain “nuts” and referencing McCain’s lengthy term as a prisoner of war. 

Even before Russia’s recent veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria, ties had become increasingly fraught between Russia and the United States. A few recent examples: 

• Missile defense has been the thorniest issue in the relationship. Russia insists that NATO’s U.S.-led European missile defense system could eventually be targeted against Russian missiles. Washington has repeatedly offered assurances that the system is not directed against Russia and suggests data exchanges but refuses to provide the written guarantee that Russia is asking for—even though Medvedev knows full well that such a guarantee would never survive congressional scrutiny. In another bit of ironic symmetry, at least one U.S. lawmaker asked Obama to provide written assurances that the United States would not share data with Russia. In response, Medvedev threatened again to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and even to withdraw from New START. The difficult missile defense talks had collapsed, he said.  
• Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the conduct of the December 2011 Duma elections, which were widely seen as tainted by irregularities at best and rigged at worst. When Russians took to the streets in protest, Putin accused Clinton of sending a signal to protestors and decried the “foreign money” that he claimed was being used to stir up trouble.
• Washington’s new ambassador in Russia, Michael McFaul, was greeted by charges in the pro-government media that he had been sent to foment an Orange Revolution (and/or Arab Spring) in Russia. Shortly after he arrived, his meeting with opposition figures triggered even more criticism. 

The challenges continue to stack up. On Feb. 7 the Russian police announced that they were prepared to prosecute lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died at the age of 37 in pre-trial detention on trumped-up tax charges. Never before has Russia undertaken a posthumous prosecution. American critics point to the Magnitsky case as clear evidence of the Russian government’s disregard for human rights and the rule of law. Russian critics point to the U.S. focus on Magnitsky, and especially the legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate and House about the case, as another unacceptable example of American efforts to interfere in Russian domestic politics.

The biggest new challenge for the reset is managing the fallout of Russia’s veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria. Russia is standing nearly alone in its support for Bashar al Assad. China also vetoed the resolution but has faced far less criticism. The probable reason: There are no striking photos of Chinese officials meeting with Assad as civilians continue to be killed in Homs, whereas Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took a very public, well-documented, in-your-face trip to Damascus. Russia seems convinced it needs Assad in power to advance what it sees as its strategic and economic interests in the region  

If Assad manages to cling to power, the U.S.-Russia relationship will continue to suffer. Both Putin and Obama may be forced to decide if the practical gains of the reset outweigh this very big, very public falling out over Syria. If Assad is overthrown soon—especially before the U.S. presidential election—the damage to the reset is more likely to be manageable. But in that case Russia will be even more bitter about losing Assad and thus Syria given its lingering resentment about the toppling and execution of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. 

All of these tensions are playing out against the backdrop of an election year in both Russia and the United States. That Vladimir Putin will win the presidency of Russia again is not in doubt. What is in doubt—and surprisingly so—is whether Putin will retain enough credibility to effectively govern. For now, he is resorting to the familiar tactic of blaming Washington for his troubles. By so doing, he hopes to discredit many of the protesters and appeal to nationalist sentiments. That means he’s unlikely to ease up on his anti-American rhetoric anytime soon. 

Can the reset survive the next Putin presidency? What is clear is that Presidents Obama and Putin will not enjoy the same kind of relationship the Medvedev and Obama did. And if Obama loses the November presidential election, his victorious Republican successor—whoever that turns out to be—will be coming off a campaign filled with tough talk about Russia. 

But the reset was never set up to resolve all differences, only to work on improving the U.S.-Russia relationship in the areas where their interests overlap. While Putin and Obama will never end up as best buddies, both are practical politicians. And practical considerations are likely to push them in the direction of salvaging the reset. Any new Republican president would be likely to begin the process of abandoning some of his harshest campaign rhetoric once he is faced with the practical task of governing. That is, unless some surprising development, most likely a dramatic new twist in Russia’s domestic political drama, throws all rational calculations out the window. So it seems safe to say it’s too early to write off the reset…sort of. 

Jacqueline McLaren Miller is a Senior Associate in the EastWest Institute's Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, where she runs the U.S. and WMD programs.