Ikram Sehgal

Even though most cannot really explain why, who the US president will be seems to really matter to the rest of the world. The US presidential debates therefore excite much interest, more outside the US see them within the US. A young, buoyant John Kennedy got the better of a seemingly tired Richard Nixon in the live debate in 1960. Since then instant perception influencing the elections has come to make a huge difference.

Ronald Reagan was decidedly trailing the meticulous Jimmy Carter in 1980, but his self-deprecating, laidback “there you go again” spiel took the incumbent president off his feet. Al Gore squandered a considerable lead against George W Bush by his ponderous debating style. Though Obama did not land any knockout blows against John McCain in 2008, his enhanced debating skills easily outscored the much older senator. In the mass aspirations for change public perception ignored Obama’s relative inexperience in government.

A record US audience of nearly 70 million viewers, second only to the Super Bowl, watched the first debate on Wednesday, October 3. By the end of the evening President Obama had blown his comfortable lead in public opinion, the Republican contender clearly scoring over his seemingly listless opponent. It was a dramatic 67 percent victory, according to a quick CNN poll after the debate. To quote The New York Times, “voters want someone who can stand in the public square and not only sell themselves but the power of their ideas.”

Within days voter sentiment in the polls had swayed 4-6 percent in Romney’s favour, turning the race into a statistical dead heat. One may forgive the rest of the world for being mystified as to how in one single evening the tide had turned enough for the momentum to go with the feisty Republican aspirant for the presidency. Obama’s problems notwithstanding, the tracking of countrywide polls show Democrats retaining their narrow lead in the US Senate in close races, even doing better in the US House of Representatives presently controlled by the Republicans.

The Democrats have done far better in the voter’s registration drive, maintaining an average majority of 6-8 percent in the swing states among registered voters. The commensurate registration of independent voters constitutes an average of 25 percent in each state. A majority leans towards Romney after the first debate. Not enough in the six battleground states, but combine these with the so-called “Reagan Democrats” who tend to vote for Republican contenders and you come up with a whole new ball game, a huge difference in the Southern states and a wide swath across the Midwest. The counter-balancing is achieved with New York and California having many electoral votes, definitely going for Obama.

For someone from the Third World it was a privilege to gauge at first hand the reaction of a cross-section of US citizens of some standing during my current visit to the US. Their perception of a generally ineffective president was reinforced by Obama’s rather strange and inexplicable performance during the first debate. Even then, informed outside observers can never really comprehend how the US voters can forgive the Republicans for squandering the fiscal surplus generated by Clinton and not give credit to Obama who inherited this horrendous economic situation for containing further economic damage.

His major mistake was in opting to give “Medicare” rather than the economy the pride of place in presidential attentions. Disappointment over his performance, and even dislike, one can understand, but the virulent hatred that seems to overwhelm dislike was a shock. Even more surprising: given that the financial stimulus by the federal government generally profited the elite one percent, why will a major portion of the less than privileged (including Romney’s “47 percent” gaffe) still vote against him?

To quote from a recent article: “The O-Man, Barack Hussein Obama, is an eloquently tactical empty suit. No resume, no accomplishments, no experience, no original ideas, no understanding of how the economy works, no understanding of how the world works, no balls, nothing but abstract, empty rhetoric devoid of real substance.”

It goes on to say: “He has no real identity. He is half-white, which he rejects. The rest of him is mostly Arab, like his first two names, which he hides. Obama is not the descendent of slaves, he is the descendent of slave-owners, thus he makes the perfect liberal Messiah. Thank heavens the voting majority of Americans remain ‘Christian’ and are in no desperate need of a phony saviour. His candidacy is ridiculous and should not be taken seriously by any ‘thinking American.’”

This was not written by an extreme white racist supremacist but by a respected former Reagan advisor who devised the “Star Wars” strategy that brought the Soviet Union down to its economic knees. This “thinking American,” Dr Jack Wheeler, represents the diehard whites never coming to terms with a black in the White House. Governor Romney may not be their favourite, but any alternative to Obama is acceptable to this lot.

In 2008 nearly 65 percent whites voted against him. While the black vote remains rock-solid, Obama will lose more of the white vote. His appeal to the Hispanics who voted for him in 2008 in strength is somewhat suspect. He may well lose the popular vote but to be ousted as president he has to lose in the rather complex Electoral College system. Here Romney has a real problem.

In crucial swing states with big electoral counts like Ohio and Florida, Obama seems to be holding onto his portion of the white vote, the Electoral College mathematics giving him enough to retain the presidency. The joker in the pack could be former Republican New Mexico governor Gary Johnson as the Libertarian Party Candidate, taking away crucial votes for Romney similar to Ralph Nader’s erosion of Al Gore’s vote bank in 2000. The Republicans allege that the Obama campaign machine put Johnson up to it.

Much depended upon the vice-presidential debate between incumbent Biden and challenger Ryan. Ryan held his ground against Biden’s experience, his youth giving him an image advantage over the much older Biden on TV. A virtual draw gave heart to the Democrats but did not entirely stem the Romney momentum. The second TV debate on Tuesday, therefore, assumed enormous importance, Obama needed to erase the memory of his last performance. Otherwise he could forget being re-elected.

The dilemma: how feisty could he get without turning off the voters by seeming to be rude and losing the presidential high ground? Romney just had to imitate Ryan in not losing his cool and contain Obama’s frontal attack without crossing the failsafe line of good behaviour and manners one expects from a would-be US president. The incumbent had to somehow stem the challenger’s surge or anything could happen in the presidential stakes. Obama was a different man last Tuesday, a quick CNN poll giving him 49 percent to Romney’s 46 percent. The race may go down to the wire but the question is: does it really matter to us in the Third World who is chosen as the leader of the greatest nation on the face of this earth?

Click here to read this column at The News International.

The 8th Worldwide Security Conference in Brussels held last October by the EastWest Institute (EWI), one of the world’s leading think tanks, focussed on (1) sharpening appreciation of the existing security dynamics in Southwest Asia, with particular emphasis on Afghanistan, (2) analysing new means of promoting collective security in the region, and (3) and develop consensus for the enhancement of security.

There was consensus among the participants of the event, held in collaboration with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and The Financial Times, was that in the climate of uncertainty and high risk, the Western world must prepare itself to manage more complex emergencies. Notwithstanding a broad agreement about a durable security policy, there was realisation that the Western nations are not geared to address some of the challenges that exist and/or are anticipated in the future. The situation almost one year later is described in a relevant paper as “a sense of disarray and retreat, rather than a commitment to continual reassessment and policy innovation.”

The negative factors influencing the present situation in Afghanistan include (1) weak commitment among the states in the region to cooperate, so as to prevent, reduce and/or contain imminent violent conflict, (2) economic growth not consistent with the required standard of living, (3) governance remaining weak with power shifting to local actors – i.e., warlords in the sub-regions, (4) with outside commitment weakening, political leaders in the region face domestic pressures and are reluctant to stake their political future on cooperation.

The risk factors are (1) conflicting requirements of modernisation and tradition (especially religious fundamentalism) (2) a likelihood of regional and internal conflicts with a potential for nuclear confrontation, and (3) increasing dependence of Europe, Japan and China for energy on this region.

Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason claim that the insurgency continues due to three inter-related factors: lack of a state apparatus and the inability of the government to exert a national level of control; failure of both the Coalition troops and the emerging Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to secure the rural areas to facilitate development and reconstruction; and the lack of any real progress made to help the majority of the Afghan people, particularly those in the south and southeast.

Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey may have erred on the side of excess in his article for Russia’s daily Pravda in August 2010. “When it all started nine years ago in Afghanistan, Nato was supposed to breeze into Afghanistan, sweep the Taliban from power and install a nice, stable government. In 2005, the Human Development Index for Afghanistan was 173 out of 178 countries. At the end of 2010 it was 181 out of 182.

In simple terms, it means that Afghanistan slipped down the UN human development index, which ranks it 181 out of 182 countries, with only Niger lower. There has been a 40-fold increase in opium production and drug income represents over 60 percent of the economy. Afghanistan has the worst record in infant deaths and has a life expectancy of 44 years. Most of the roads remain un-built and many Afghans remain without access to basic utilities, unemployment is rife, and the country ranks lower and lower in terms of human and economic development indices.”

A report by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (the 2010 Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict) also had shocking statistics: the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2010 rose by 31 percent over the same period last year due to an increase in the number of hostile actions by armed elements. Human casualties in this period totalled 1,271 dead and 1,997 injured, of which 76 percent of the 3,268 were attributed to the activities of anti-government elements (a rise of 53 percent) and 12 percent were caused by the actions of pro-government elements (a decrease of 30 percent). The number of children killed or injured increased by 55 percent.

The report said aerial bombardment by the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) was the main cause of the casualties inflicted by pro-government elements, namely 69 of the 223 civilian deaths and 45 injuries, although the number of victims of these attacks had decreased by 64 percent over the course of the year.

Almost everything that could go wrong has gone wrong. Every time the Taliban were believed to have been routed, they have managed to regroup and resume hostilities. Instances of militants or their supporters wearing uniforms and attacking coalition soldiers have increased. Paramilitary forces and policemen have defected in droves.

With billions of US taxpayers’ money going into the war effort there is a rising tide of anger at home about the cost and the continuing needless sacrifice of American lives, very much like in the later stages of the Vietnam War. There is widespread public opposition to the war among the Nato nations that make up the coalition, further aggravated and complicated because of their financial woes.

By the end of 2014, when much of direct Western security involvement in Afghanistan will cease, they will be leaving behind malfunctioning governance, mounting insurgency, deteriorating security and ever-spreading corruption. With lack of political and counterinsurgency progress in Afghanistan, even though the rhetoric suggests otherwise, the Barack Obama administration is pushing more actively for the end of the US military presence in its current form. The US-Afghan treaty signed in May 2012 says US troops – mainly consisting of US Special Forces, training teams and their operational and logistical support – will stay in Afghanistan in several military bases after 2014.

Both the US and Nato are determined to shed a significant share of responsibility for security that they had assumed in the aftermath of the 2001 intervention into Afghanistan. It is both incongruous and strange but the effort to train and equip the Afghan security forces is following the same pattern as in South Vietnam, except that in South Vietnam the forces were far better trained, more combat-oriented and more capable than the present Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). When push came to shove, the South Vietnamese military machine disintegrated like a house of cards. The lessons learnt from Vietnam makes it all the more important that military withdrawal amidst the unabated violence has to be graduated and accompanied by definitive moves towards some form of political settlement. The political process in turn requires direct involvement of the same insurgents.

The world must recognise that Pakistan is central to a solution in Afghanistan, conversely Pakistan must come to terms with the fact that without a solution in Afghanistan there can be no peace in Pakistan. As a superpower the US has core strategic interests in the region, a fact Pakistan must reconcile with. The US in turn has to qualm Pakistan’s fears for the future. Only pragmatic engagement with the home truths prevailing will provide for a credible and lasting solution to the Afghan conundrum.

Photo: "Marines, Afghan National Police Stay Vig" (CC BY 2.0) by DVIDSHUB

“Interrogations, isolations, mental games, etc, those are all part of one's existence as a POW and we went through the whole gamut,” writes Sehgal in a column published last November on his escape.

A launch event was held on July 12, at the Pearl Continental Hotel in Lahore, Pakistan, and featured keynote remarks by Imran Khan, chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, as well as comments from AR Siddiqi, a fellow columnist at The News International, and Muhammad Taj, who had been Sehgal’s commander at the time.

“What you went through, 99 days… I just cannot comprehend how anyone can spend that much time in captivity,” said Khan, who had himself spent eight days in jail following a 2007 protest.

Imran Khan's remarks on Ikram Seghal's "Escape from Oblivion"

Click here for full coverage of the launch event at The Express Tribune.

Trying to muddle way out of another unpopular war and loath to concede defeat, US and NATO have been racing against time to build an Afghan army able to fend for itself after 130,000 US and ISAF troops pull out in 2014. The final transition phase, involving the handing over of responsibility for provinces and districts to Afghan authorities, will start from “mid-2013,” Nato secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said. A number of areas and towns have already been handed over since the transition started a year ago. Incidents of Afghan soldiers turning on Nato troops cause apprehension of increased Taliban infiltration of the Afghan police and army.

Nato initially planned to expand Afghan Security Forces to over 350,000. Defining the 2014 exit strategy the Chicago summit set the size and scope after 2014 to be much smaller, roughly 230,000 troops. Without scaling down the future security needs, it simply reflected prevailing economic realities in an era of austerity budgets and defence cutbacks. The US and Nato require $4.1 billion a year to maintain the Afghan military, far less than the cost of maintaining foreign forces in Afghanistan and also, and more importantly, easier for the economically suffering and war-weary US and European publics to sustain.

In keeping with his campaign pledge, incoming French president Francois Hollande said France will withdraw its own forces by the end of 2012. Along with Britain, Germany and Italy, France is among the top five troop-contributing nations with about 3,600 soldiers, dwarfed by the 90,000-strong US force. The 9,500 British forces in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion in 2001 will be reduced by 500 soldiers this year. Two hundred members of Britain’s Special Forces will stay on after 2014 to help combat terrorism in Afghanistan.

As Afghanistan’s largest patron, the US is supposed to share about 25 percent of the cost after 2014 in support of the present Afghan regime for at least a decade (or more), but could well conceivably bear more than half the cost. The recent Obama-Karzai strategic partnership covers everything from security to economic development, to building a functional Afghan government. US special operations forces will have to stay to “mentor the Afghan National Security Force,” says Marine Corps Maj Gen John Toolan, who commanded Nato forces in Afghanistan’s volatile southwest. US gunships and air-to-ground assault planes will continue supporting ground forces. The fledgling Afghan air force which in 2015 will still be unable to do so. The US will also continue maintaining a fleet of intelligence-gathering and surveillance aircraft, Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis claims that “it spells out an important US red line to the Taliban, who have long called for expelling all foreign forces from the country.”

All said and done, will the Afghan Army fight? With a track record over centuries of deserting on masse to whosoever controls Kabul and the treasury, it did not fight for the Soviets against the Mujhahideen, nor for the US and Nato against the Taliban.

President Zardari faced studied but polite cold-shouldering in Chicago. On the one hand are the economic and geo-political considerations of far-reaching consequences for the destiny of the nation, on the other an enraged populace burning with anger against the drone strikes and the US failure to render an apology over Salala. A predator nation that has lived off the Indus Valley for centuries, Afghanistan will continue to live off Pakistan for centuries more.

Commenting on Abid Latif Sindhu’s article “Necessary Roughness – endgame in Afghanistan,” Brig Usman Khalid concludes: (1) The endgame will effect the world balance of power because Pakistan has a crucial role to play. It borders China, is a gateway to Central Asia and is situated on the Western part of the Arabian Sea. This part controls a chokepoint – the Strait of Hormuz, which joins the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf-and not too far to the south is the Gulf of Aden, which leads to the Red Sea via the still narrower Bab el-Mandeb Strait; (2) Pakistan has shown “necessary roughness,” which is a prerequisite for playing its role in the new narrative that would unfold after the exit of NATO from Afghanistan in 2014. Brig Usman Khalid further notes: “It is in Pakistan’s interest to facilitate the withdrawal of Nato forces by the end of 2014 and logistical support until then. The reopening of the supply line to Afghanistan is no longer an issue. Pakistan does not and cannot support the overall design of the US which is now being made in consultation with India. Pakistan-US relations will move along a rough and bumpy road. If Pakistan maintains its strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its warm relations with China, the cost of travelling this bumpy road would be bearable and diplomatic isolation avoided.” The Nato supply line through Pakistan needs resolution but will have emotional ramifications among a populace no longer patient with putting issues on the backburner.

The presence of American “experts” after 2014 with US bases operational at Bagram, Kandahar and Kabul has made the endgame more complex. According to Sindhu, “Pakistan has just shown necessary roughness while dealing with the USA in retaliation for its bashing; it was never an act of defiance. It is precisely what is required in any relationship, may it be one between husband and wife or Hillary’s favourite mother-in-law analogy. So it should be taken in the right context. Pakistan is not a rentier state; the state policy could be lopsided but it does exist. It is both a victim and the player of the new great game with a status of the regional middle kingdom. Afghanistan endgame is being played by increasing the numbers of players in its final hour; this has made the phenomenon global in nature and multidimensional in its texture.”

Sindhu asks whether Pakistan can be ignored with its unique connectivity matrix when Pakistan is fighting an extended insurgency in all of the tribal areas? In essence, he says, “globalism has come face to face with tribalism, one using technology as the main driver and later using the simplicity as the sine qua non for its existence and survival. International conferences, moots and summits without reality checks would be a futile exercise perpetuating the Afghan ordeal. Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USA have to reach an operational consensus respecting each other’s sensitivities.” Sindhu left out an inconvenient truth which the West well knows, the best bet against future conflict is not going to be the well-funded ceremonials of the Afghan army but the motivated, battle-hardened disciplined soldiers of the Pakistan Army.

The Chicago Summit recognised the home truth about Pakistan’s being not only critical but central to an Afghan solution. To quote Rasmussen, “there can be no large drawdown of troops from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help.” President Obama said: “It is in our interest to see a successful, stable Pakistan and it is in Pakistan’s interest to have stable relationship with us.” Meeting Zardari briefly, he expressed the desire to stay engaged despite differences. “The US did not want Pakistan to be consumed by its own extremism.”

Beyond Chicago, Pakistan can only hope it will not be consumed by extreme views from the West which fail to recognise the relevance of the Taliban ground reality.

Writing for Pakistan's The News International, EWI board member Ikram Sehgal, a security analyst, examines the implications of the French election on prospects for economic recovery and stability in Southwest Asia.

Click here to read this column in Pakistan's The News International.

Writing for India Today, EWI board member Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary of India, assesses the likely impact of Hollande's administration on the Franco-Indian relationship.

Click here to read this column in India Today.

Click here to read this column in The News International.

One of the great tragedies to befall this country was the assassination of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer by Mumtaz Qadri in Islamabad on Jan 4, 2011, bringing into sharp focus one of the important aspects of security that does not get the attention it should: fidelity.

A policeman in the security detail provided to Taseer by the Punjab Elite Police, Qadri readily confessed to killing the late governor because he disagreed with his opposition to the Blasphemy Law. Trust that must be inherent between a bodyguard and his ward was not sacrificed at the altar of material gain but for a more sinister reason, an extreme interpretation of ideology. Given that Qadri had already aroused suspicions among his superiors and colleagues, it is still unclear how he managed to get himself detailed in the squad protecting Salmaan Taseer in Islamabad.

What is far more mystifying (and a cause for real concern) is the role of the other Elite personnel in the security detail. Trained personnel are programmed to react instantaneously to danger. Their failure to take any action whatsoever to interdict Qadri while he was directing a burst of automatic gunfire at Taseer at point blank range put into contention their active (or at the least, passive) complicity.

One aspect has become terrifyingly clear in the aftermath of the Taseer assassination, how does one ascertain the fidelity of guards assigned to provide security to key personnel? This particular incident raises the serious question of infidelity on the basis of ideology. As a member of the provincial police force, and also part of the Elite Force, Taseer’s killer would normally have had his background checked many times, yet there seems to have been a dangerous chink in the vetting process that was not detected. It only requires one or two persons posted on duty at key places to cause mayhem. How good is our verification of antecedents and the physical vetting process?

The All-Pakistan Security Agencies Association (APSAA) insists upon its members not only doing a thorough vetting process but has institutionalised this process. However, given the Taseer assassination one shudders to think what the state of the private security services sector could be. With hundreds of private security services companies operating, a strict monitoring of the process of conducting background verification checks of their employees entrusted with guarding of the lives and property of their clients is necessary. It makes this the most critical aspect of guarding in Pakistan. APSAA members have been fighting a losing battle against the overwhelming perception among the populace that instead of preventing crimes they should (or could) have prevented, the guards themselves go about committing the crimes, or are involved in what at times are heinous crimes.

While this is not exactly true, there have been occasions when a private security guard who was hired to protect property steals it himself or with the help of his associates. This has been unfortunately played up by the media. The question about a guard’s fidelity or his honesty has become extremely important, especially today because we are dealing with cutting-edge terrorism.

All over the world security guards have to go through a mandatory verification process. In many countries background checks are conducted by the local police. Many times this is supplemented by scrutiny by other agencies mandated to do so. In the Netherlands, for example, security guards have to undergo a criminal background check by the local police department in the area where the private security company is located.

While there are similar laws in Pakistan, it costs money to have backgrounds verified electronically and physically. The issue of parliamentarians’ fake degree has clearly shown what a tedious, time-consuming task it is. Moreover, is it accurate? The common factor where security guards deputed to guard banks (or other large establishments) were themselves found involved in robberies, some were successful while some were not, was the false or doctored documents/information given by the security guards to their employers at the time of employment.

For example, the mobile telephone applications had false information and were not verified. Even fake computerised national identity cards (CNICs) were used to get employment. It is painfully obvious that lack of proper verification of antecedents and screening of background allowed the criminals to succeed. Despite the claims of Nadra, proper verification of antecedents or documents is not done. The result is that in many cases genuine Nadra card had fake information about the person! Given such glaring loopholes in the system, many people ask whether it is really difficult for terrorists or those with extremist agenda to infiltrate critical facilities by hiring on as security guards. That is not a frightening possibility, it is a reality.

What, then, should be done? Of course the laws are there, but implementation is very lax. This has to change. More often than not, everyone is content with looking the other way until after an incident occurs. It must be ensured without exception that all personnel who have unaccompanied (or accompanied) access to sensitive areas and who will perform guarding duties must go through extensive background checks. These checks must include criminal background checks, checks against terrorist watch lists as well as the usual verification of documents and antecedents provided by them.

The major problem is that clients are of two kinds: institutions or individuals. While individual clients have to depend upon the company’s statement of the guard’s fidelity, the institution employing their services have security managers to check this aspect out. Unfortunately, even MNCs sometimes do not give much the importance to background checks they deserve. Many security managers merely pay lip-service to completion of the documentation process and their corporate bosses gloss over this. Most fall back on the excuse that it adds to costs.

There is also the training aspect. Trained instructors can easily find out the inclination of various students by cleverly posing some pointed questions. To the credit of the APSAA they have training schools but even a cursory check will reveal that not all members avail of this facility.

Given the fact that organised crime has a nexus with terrorism and there is potential relationship between criminal history and terrorist activity, serious thought must be given to more extensive criminal background checks of employees in the private security services sector. All armed and unarmed guards must also undergo a stringent training programme. Because radical thinking has increasingly crept into mainstream society, criminals/extremists are able to infiltrate the ranks of law enforcement in Pakistan.

The federal ministry of interior does insist upon strict verification of individuals. The provincial home departments, whose job it is to actually monitor the private security companies, also do so. Unfortunately only lip-service is paid to monitoring. Only a far more extensive and exhaustive process carried out by third-party monitors will make this exercise effective. Funds must be specially allocated for this.

Given the possibility of infidelity, the ultimate question that a diligent security manager must answer is: is the vetting process credible? If not, who will monitor and guard the guards?

Click here to read this column in The News International.

US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta raised a storm signalling that US and Nato troops in Afghanistan will transition from a combat role to a “training, assist and advice” role by late 2013, a year earlier than the mandated 2014 schedule. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney had earlier railed against US troops fighting a war of independence for another nation.

Political expediency now dictated his calling Panetta’s withdrawal announcement “misguided” and “naive.” “Why should you tell the people you are fighting with the date you are pulling out your troops?” Echoing his sentiments Senator John McCain said none of the US military commanders had recommended the drawdown. The US commander in Afghanistan, Marine General John R Allen, cautioned that “the drawdown schedule is more aggressive than anticipated.”

Ambiguity is bedevilling US strategic decision-making for the last 50 years. How to come up with correct geopolitical conclusions when politics comes into conflict with military objectives? President Obama cautioned against setting goals beyond US responsibility, the means thereof and the primary US interest. President Eisenhower lived by the premise: “Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader context, the need to maintain balance in and among national programmes.” Less than three months after becoming president in 1961, an inexperienced Kennedy caused the “Bay of Pigs” disaster.

He redeemed his reputation in 1962 by imposing a naval “quarantine,” foiling the Soviet attempt to put land-based medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba that would have permitted them to attack the US mainland almost without warning. Kennedy did not listen to his generals wanting an immediate pre-emptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, which would certainly have led to a nuclear holocaust. The public showdown was matched by concurrent secret diplomatic talks leading to reciprocal US withdrawal of its missiles from Italy and Turkey.

Obama’s 2008 platform called for lifting the US economy out of the dumps into which it was sinking and getting the US out of the Iraq and Afghan cauldrons. A full US review of the options saw his military and civilian advisors hopelessly divided about Afghanistan. His commanders in the field, Generals Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, recommended a “military surge” to combat the Taliban. Others, led by Vice President Joseph Biden, counselled a staged withdrawal. Obama’s instinct was to cut US losses and exit Afghanistan, but he chose not to second guess his military advisors and opted for the middle course of a limited military surge, with the caveat being a 2014 withdrawal date beginning in stages in mid-2011.

The Afghan escalation in 2010 duplicated the escalation of the Vietnam War, strategically incoherent and not supporting any overriding interest or purpose. The military promised a better job in stabilising Afghanistan and restoring peace, but without really forensically examining what the job actually was or should be. Forced into resigning for making inappropriate remarks about his civilian superiors in the chain of command, McChrystal’s much-trumpeted foray into Helmand province fell far short of accomplishing the desired results. Gen Petraeus took ownership by stepping down from his Central Command appointment to take over. Without real success in any of his stated objectives in Afghanistan, Petraeus has since retired, to head the CIA.

Lt Col Daniel Davis, into his fourth combat deployment (and his second in Afghanistan) wrote in his article “Truth, Lies and Afghanistan” in The Armed Forces Journal: “What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by US military leaders about conditions on the ground. I am hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground. Anthony Cordesman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies noted that the ISAF and the US leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.

Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead. They (the military leadership) were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.”

Col Davis asks: “How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by US senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect-and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve-to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.” Those doubts are widely shared, if not usually voiced in public, by officers on active duty.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) requires $4.7 billion annually, approximately 447 percent of government revenues. An understandable burden, but a mismatch of both the performance level expected and the fiscal calculations about the country’s anticipated revenues in the future. The IMF estimated $6 billion yearly on the civilian side for the next five years, and even till 2023, $15-20 billion is additionally required annually for the Special Operations Command (SOC) that will take up the slack when Coalition forces gradually scale back combat operations. Given the current US economic realities, who is going to foot the bill?

According to Obama, “the current US deployment in Afghanistan is neither a ‘counter-insurgency’ nor ‘nation building.’ The costs of doing either would be prohibitive.” His contention is that the resetting of strategic balance by the US will mean the scaling back of strategic interests but that the US will remain a global power with an essential leadership role to play. Obama cites an unlikely source, The World America Made by Robert Kagan. The key Romney policy advisor says that overreaction to short-term events-including the financial crisis – overlooks the continued economic, military and political dominance by the US, but “the US could still slip into decline if it slashes the military spending too dramatically."

Panetta’s drawdown pronouncement gives Obama the ability in an election year to claim that instead of a precipitous withdrawal he would be phasing out the war in Afghanistan like he successfully managed to in Iraq. Our problem is that the US can opt out of a tough neighbourhood, albeit both at moral and material cost (more importantly that of reputation), we can’t! However we can hold accountable those leaders who got us into this mess and those who kept us there. To paraphrase Col Davis, the Pakistani soldiers living, fighting and dying at 10-12 times the Coalition ratio deserve their leaders to tell them the truth. 

Pakistan cannot shed tears over something it has no control over, US strategic decision-making and mistakes thereof. Ours is not to reason why, ours is but to gear up to cope with the residual eventualities, preferably in 2014, or in a worst-case scenario, even earlier by the end of 2013.

The feudal mindset is conditioned to accept defeat militarily, never in sports and/or politics. The sportsmen’s spirit rhetoric that the British endlessly spout is just that, rhetoric. Casting aspersions of the nasty kind after being “Aj-mauled” and “Rah-mmed” was certainly not cricket. Two of Pakistan’s world-best young fast bowlers were successfully framed for “spot-fixing,” and subsequent humiliation at the hands of our spinners four times in a row must be frustrating and painful.

During the traditional “Pakistan Lunch” at the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Summit 2012 at Davos two days earlier Imran Khan was emphatic about cricket: “We will win.” He confidently predicted a similar sweep in politics for Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in the next elections. Nearly 250 WEF participants crammed “Lounge East” of the “Steigenberger Belvedere” to hear Imran Khan in his element. 

In sharp contrast Prime Minister Gilani was being his usual bland-faced evasive self across town. Except for Jahangir Tareen, none of the speakers preceding Imran Khan in presenting the positives in Pakistan that the world is deaf, dumb and blind to, belonged to the PTI. Tareen was very impressive and eloquent about the necessity of good governance to really tap Pakistan’s potential. The speakers provided Imran the perfect platform to expound upon his vision despite the country being plagued by perennial bad governance complicated by the “war on terror.” 

Industrial tycoon Husain Dawood spoke about massive opportunities in business and industry, banking titan Zakar Mahmood eloquently laid out the amazing stability in our banking and finance industry while public health expert Dr Sania Nishtar was articulate about possible reforms in Pakistan. No words can really describe Dubai-based expatriate Yum International and “Mera Passion Pakistan’s” Irfan Mustafa doing what he is best at besides his job, being passionate about Pakistan!

One is indeed fortunate to have witnessed the charisma that Ms Benazir Bhutto exuded at the WEF in 1994. Another Pakistani’s charisma was on display 18 years later to the day. Davos-ians are a hard-bitten lot, the heads of state and/or government, academics, business and industry potentates, media giants, political figures, etc., are no gullible pushovers. Well received at Davos in January 2011, Imran Khan at his brilliant best in 2012. The instant feedback from virtually a world’s “who’s who” was elevating, despite our current problems force-multiplied by adverse and motivated media vibes, the message of Pakistan’s rising political phenomenon radiated hope. 

With entire groups of political activists at every layer, from the PPP to the PML-N, joining at the grassroots level, Imran Khan will sweep any free and fair elections as he confidently predicts, a management team for transition into good governance will be much harder to craft. The ANP and the PML-Q are in virtual disarray, and their cadres are defecting wholesale to PTI. When so many expectations are placed by so many on one human being alone, the danger is that while political weaknesses can be overcome, human failings can be exploited by friend and foe alike for their own selfish interests.

One cannot discount the tremendous contribution made by the Rangers in Karachi. By instilling a modicum of political stability with active help from the intelligence agencies, they have raised aspirations for massive economic emancipation. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and fellow justices in the Supreme Court deserve the ultimate kudos. The law enforcement agencies got the judicial cover badly needed to enforce the rule of law that the government intentionally and criminally abdicated to protect their “target killers.” Time to replicate the “Karachi Model” for Pakistan?

Finance Minister Dr Abdul Hafeez Shaikh (on John Defterios’ CNN Debate about Emerging Markets) and Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar (on the South Asia panel with Young Global Leaders, YGL, and Imran Khan) did extremely well. Khar politely fobbed off Imran Khan’s public offer to her to emulate three other former Foreign Ministers Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Khurshid Kasuri and Sardar Assef Ali and join the PTI. What political party or leaning any Pakistani who comes to Davos belongs to does not matter, that he (or she) represents the country in good light is all that counts.

My fellow panellists in the “Global Security Context” Session were Richard Haas of the Council of Foreign Relations, John Chipman of the IISS, Yan Xuetong of China’s Tsinghua University and Moon Chung-In of Korea’s Yonsei University. William T Davell’s WEF Summary reflected my views. “The US withdrawal from Afghanistan promises to be troubling for Pakistan, which currently hosts three million refugees. The Afghan army is likely to collapse if the US stops footing the bill. With troubled relations with the US falling below the level of a partnership or alliance, Pakistan can be expected to rely more heavily on China for help, although the Chinese are making it clear they do not want to become involved militarily.” 

Pakistan has been receiving economic help for decades, even when the Chinese could not really afford to give it. The ongoing joint production of modern fighter aircraft and tanks is a credible military reality for which one must commend all previous governments, Nawaz Sharif’s, Benazir Bhutto’s Musharraf’s. 

Richard Haas could not resist taking a pot shot at Pakistan’s “agenda.” Every country has an agenda about its core interests. Anybody who claims otherwise is a hypocrite. Our “agenda” is real: the three million refugees on our soil and the long difficult border we share with Afghanistan. The US can walk away at will whenever they are militarily and/or economically and/or emotionally exhausted and the US public cannot bear further loss of US lives fighting a war with no crucial interest or strategic meaning for the US. 

To quote then Senator Barack Obama in an anti-war rally in Chicago in 2002, “I am not opposed to wars, I am opposed to a dumb war.” A decade later his presidency is bogged down trying to extricate the US military with honour from a really dumb war. The US can still “declare victory and go home,” but Pakistan does not have the luxury of walking away, we will have to cope with the bloody aftermath and clear their mess like we have done previously.

“Experts” in different sectors from all over the world confidently give diverse predictions every year at Davos of what is likely to happen in the future. Why is it that they are mostly wrong? One was witness in Davos on the first day of the “Arab Spring” in Egypt in January 2011 coinciding with Muammar Gadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam being contemptuously dismissive of the movement as being of no real significance. Before the year was out Saif’s father was dead, captured on the run he himself has an uncertain future awaiting trial for atrocities committed on the people. Destiny is unforgiving when the masses are aroused. You can run with your money, you cannot hide!

Our land reforms being a total farce, the feudal mindset inherited from the British is alive and well in Pakistan, camouflaged under the garb of a democracy it allows our rulers to run riot. What does destiny have in store for Pakistan and our corrupt leaders? Constitution or no Constitution, the equation is simple: either they go or the nation does!

Sehgal describes interrogations, fellow prisoners, the help of sympathetic Indians and Americans, and the process of escaping from the camps of an undeclared war.

Read the full story at The Week.