Ikram Sehgal

Roadmap for Afghan peace

EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal writes about dilemmas in U.S.–Pakistan relations surrounding U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Pakistan.

Before Clinton’s visit, Sehgal writes, the United States had two widely differing objectives: (1) to deliver a final wake-up call for Pakistan’s military and its intelligence services and (2) to try to stop the rapid deterioration in the U.S.–Pakistan relationship over accusations that the Pakistani intelligence service ISI is working with the Haqqani network. 

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News.

Security Measures in Southwest Asia

As foreign forces plan their exit from Afghanistan, one can question whether they achieved what they had set out to do and if not, as is the case, how will the world cope with unresolved mode of political governance and bilateral conflicts, migration and energy security as well as the concerns of nuclear weapons’ proliferation? The challenges involve linking the diverse nations economically and geo-politically, collective and collaborative action being crucial to enhancing security.

The present Afghan leadership is not capable of sustaining the present western model of democracy and governance; this has been imposed by the west in the mistaken belief that this is suited to a society which remains basically tribal and feudal despite technological advances. Former US Green Beret Captain Amerine who, alongwith his team of 10 Green Berets, was ordered in 2001 to protect Hamid Karzai when the original choice for topmost leader Maulvi Abdul Haq was captured and executed by the Taliban, recently disclosed to journalist Christina Lamb that his HQs had ordered him not to enter Afghanistan unless Karzai could guarantee 300 men on the ground. When they ultimately went in, Karzai, the future president of Afghanistan, could only gather 30 people together!

Europe is awash with constitutional monarchies; one must seriously consider the option of restoring the monarchy in Afghanistan while having a powerful PM, as it used to be before Sardar Daud deposed his cousin Zahir Shah, to ensure unity among the diverse ethnic groups.

The Afghan war has cost Pakistan heavily in human terms. While enhancing our defence and security budget we had to increase allocations for diplomatic efforts, and pay exorbitant economic and social cost estimated to be about US$65 billion. How can one begin to assess the cost to the image of Pakistan as a responsible entity in the comity of nations?

The US has incurred huge cost, some estimate Iraq and Afghanistan at US$4 trillion. Can they continue to do in the current economic climate and a rapidly diminishing appetite, with the EU members not willing to share the cost? What rankles is that there is little or no mention made to the direct cost incurred by Pakistan, as well as the virtual destruction of its socio-political and economic infra-structure. Long after the US and EU have abandoned the present leaders of Afghanistan to their fate, Pakistan will continue to pay a very heavy human cost, quite difficult to quantify the additional cost in socio-political and economic terms.

The 8th Worldwide Security Conference in Brussels organised by the EastWest Institute (EWI), one of the world’s leading think tanks, in cooperation with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and the Financial Times centred around: (1) sharpening appreciation of the existing security dynamics in Southwest Asia (SWA), (2) analysing new means of promoting collective security in the region, (3) and develop consensus for enhancing security.

In the climate of uncertainty and high risk, the western world must prepare themselves to manage more complex emergencies. Notwithstanding the broad consensus about a durable security policy, the western nations are not geared to address some of the challenges that exist and/or are anticipated in the future described is the present situation in a relevant paper as “a sense of disarray and retreat rather than a commitment to continual reassessment and policy innovation”.

The negative factors influencing the situation include (1) weak commitment among the states in the region to cooperate, to prevent, reduce and/or contain imminent violent conflict, (2) economic growth not consistent with required standard of living, (3) governance remaining weak with power shifting to local actors, ie warlords in the sub-regions, (4) with outside commitment weakening, political leaders facing domestic pressures are reluctant to stake their political future on cooperation. Several risk factors are (1) conflicting requirements of modernisation and tradition (especially religious fundamentalism), (2) likelihood of regional and internal conflicts with a potential for nuclear confrontation and (3) increasing dependence of Europe, Japan and China for energy on this region.

With the exit of the coalition forces, (1) power will shift from governments to both previously weak local actors and anti-state actors, (2) strong demand for democracy, respect of individual rights, adequately compensated employment, education and upward social mobility will impact the legitimacy of governments in the region and (3) military expenditures will increase. The policy recommendations include viz (1) increased coordination between the states of this region, (2) increased regional economic integration, (3) mobilisation of private sector investment in trans-border economic projects and (4) promotion of justice and rule of law for improving governance.

Facts about Pakistan’s sacrifices are generally glossed over, viz (1) the direct and indirect cost to Pakistan as well as collateral damage in both terms of blood and money as well as the lasting damage to its socio-political factors need to be quantified, (2) what about the cost of hosting three million plus Afghans in Pakistan for over two decades? and (3) the cost of Pakistan allowing transit trade without fees and (4) the effect of smuggling on Pakistan’s economy and (5) unrelenting hostile propaganda by the coalition-supported government in Afghanistan affecting public opinion in Pakistan.

What is unfortunate is that no mechanism exists for a dialogue to offset and deal with misperceptions and misrepresentations of facts. Accusations and allegations against Pakistan are based on unsubstantiated facts, using two recent examples, viz (1) Adm Mike Mullen’s unfortunate statement, just before retiring, that Pakistan’s ISI was complicit in the recent attacks on the US Embassy in Kabul alongwith the Haqqani network and (2) consequently Karzai accusing Pakistan of assassinating Burhanuddin Rabbani and using that as a convenient excuse to call off the Tripartite Conference.

The White House has distanced itself from Mullen’s assertion while at the same time encouraging Pakistan to “do more” about the Haqqani network. Given the slogans at Rabbani’s funeral accusing him for Rabbani’s death Hamid Karzai’s accusations were right on cue and understandable. Why indeed did Karzai call him back to attend that particular meeting where he was killed? How better to deflect the allegations in the wake of Mullen’s statement to the world’s favourite bugbear of recent times, the ISI?

While we certainly need to address our counter-terrorism efforts within the Pakistani heartland far better, Pakistan has fought insurgents in its border areas to a standstill at great human cost, taking ten times more casualties than all the coalition countries put together. No one wants to mention the three million plus Afghan refugees spread throughout our soil. Most of Al-Qaeda leaders have been killed by our security forces and 80 percent of Al-Qaeda suspects in Guantanamo Bay were captured by Pakistan.

The evolving consensus is to readjust the role of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) to help the nations find indigenous solutions and encourage countries having credibility in the region, like Turkey, to take a greater role, particularly in enhancing means of livelihood by innovative out-of-the-box thinking.

(Extract from speech given on Oct 3, 2011 at the 8th Worldwide Security Conference organised by the EWI in collaboration with the World Customs Organisation (WCO), Brussels and Financial Times on “Shaping collective security in Southwest Asia, are breakthrough measures possible?”)

 

 

Terms of Endearment

Outgoing chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen dropped the charade of being a staunch friend of Pakistan and in bare-knuckled testimony before the US Senate crucified the ISI as being complicit with the Haqqani network in the recent attack on the US embassy in Kabul. By default this also implicates his friend Kayani, who had headed the ISI before he became COAS. Why did Mullen choose his departure a few days after a good three-hour meeting with Kayani in Seville in Spain to rake Pakistan over the coals?

Not a man of many words, Kayani who had partnered with Mullen in papering over frequent tensions in the US-Pakistan relationship over the past four years must have been severely jolted. If nothing else the Pakistani COAS must be deeply embarrassed by this “unkindest cut of all”, Et tu, Mullen? Such trust deficit among the military heads of the two countries is counter-productive and will be difficult to overcome in the future.

The “Afghan leaders” propped up in Kabul by the US must now be really apprehensive about the US exiting Afghanistan. Soviet puppet Najibullah hanging publicly from an electric pole is not something people forget easily. No wonder Burhanuddin Rabbani, the peacemaker, was assassinated; some people have a vested interest in keeping the conflict going. The overwhelming public perception is that failing to meet its stated goals in Afghanistan, the US is passing the buck onto Pakistan, the ISI being a most convenient scapegoat for all perceived ills in the world even at the best of times. The US diatribe has further aroused public feeling against the US in the drawing rooms and streets of the country, even the most diehard friends of the US are aghast at the allegations made by responsible US officials.

The Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban is mostly concentrated in the Paktia and Paktika and later Khost. These fiercest of Afghan fighters are from the Zadran tribe. The Haqqanis only crossed the porous border into the adjacent Pakistani territory after the Soviet invasion; from here they operated against the Soviets with active help from both the CIA and the ISI. Where are the coalition forces bases that should have been formed in this area to “do more” in combating the Haqqanis? While targeting the safe havens of the Haqqanis on our territory, can we risk that the Waziris, who mostly inhabitant North Waziristan become collateral damage? Mostly rural guerrillas, Haqqanis seldom operate in the Afghan towns and cities since their very distinct facial features make them recognisable.

While all intelligence agencies maintain some links with the opposition, there is a vast difference between having contact and actively aiding and abetting terrorism. If it were the Haqqanis who attacked the US embassy in Kabul, they could have only homed onto their targets with active insider help within the city from the many guerrilla factions that have melted into the city’s population.

The Pakistan Army is most reluctant to open up a front against these fierce fighters without “casus belli”. Almost 200,000 of our combat troops are very heavily engaged in Swat, South Waziristan and other Fata agencies, some units have been out in the field for over two years. Pakistan’s available helicopter fleet can hardly support the ongoing operations; moreover our ammunition reserves have been seriously depleted. Going into Haqqani-infested areas will have a blowback that will make our present terrorist-ridden situation seem like a walk in the park, to do so would be illogical bordering on insanity. Time, space and logistics (and public sentiment) are against us at the moment.

Our civilian and military sacrifices compare at a ratio of almost 10:1 to all Afghan civilian and coalition forces put together. The Afghan National Army (ANA) casualties number only a few hundred against our thousands, the less said about them the better. One incongruous thought, why the sudden concentrated diplomatic and media offensive by the US? Is it an amazing coincidence that every time the PPP coalition is in danger of a meltdown, the army and the ISI are put on the block by the US to relieve the existential threat to this inept and corrupt government?

Notwithstanding the rhetoric from the US about attacking Haqqani safe havens in North Waziristan, and Pakistan giving “a suitable reply”, both are nonsense. US “boots on the ground” in Pakistani territory is not a viable option, and not for political reasons alone. The US gameplan is to exit Afghanistan according to an enhanced schedule with the minimum casualties; this will only mean more body bags.

While one can expect escalation of drone attacks, and possibly even cruise missiles and limited air incursions, will the US risk a fire fight with the Haqqanis that could involve the Pakistan Army, and US coffins flying into Dover Air Force Base? One can expect an escalation in the war of words but not direct conflict. On our part, nobody in his right mind would counsel confrontation with the US, that is not an option. One would be stupid to go that route.

The US Congress would do this country the greatest favour if it passes the Bill to cut off aid to Pakistan, this government can than declare freedom! First, we should re-affirm our commitment to continue fighting the war on terror, but on our own terms. Second, we must pull out as many troops as we can from Fata and mobilise the tribal militias as in the past. Third, we must not take any further aid of any kind, economic or military, saddled with conditions. Fourth, we must charge transit fees (and the wear and tear to our infra-structure) at internationally acceptable rates for all goods passing through Pakistani territory.

These fees should be paid at points of entry, and fifth, we must clearly define the parameters of future collaboration with the US in the war on terror, this should include intelligence sharing, drone strikes, overflights, etc. This should spare the US administration from their present discomfort of giving us aid subject to all sorts of intervention by uninformed members of Congress playing to the conservative gallery which believes in bombing all problems into oblivion, and damn the consequences.

What exacerbates the US-Pakistan relationship is that no defined “terms of engagement” exist. This grey area allows each country to push its own agenda with motivated interest, this serves to create festering problems. While we lurch from crisis to crisis the underlying threat of crossing a fail-safe line will not only be detrimental for the US and Pakistan but will have long-term effects on future peace and stability on all the countries of this region. We must define clearly the “terms of engagement” for the future; “out of the box” thinking must remove the rough edges that mar the relationship between us. A well-defined “terms of endearment” will provide for a genuinely productive and meaningful relationship in the future.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Socio-Political Factors and National Security

National security in the traditional sense is connected with the idea of sovereignty; territorial security means freedom from risk of danger of destruction and annihilation by war, physical violence and/or aggression from outside. Traditional threats emanate from inter-state conflict and cross-border aggression. Since the nation state is supposed to have a monopoly of power for protecting the life and property of the members of the nation, they are deprived of power to defend themselves against aggression. The focus therefore previously being on external threats, state security has dominated the national security agenda.

With progressing globalisation, borders have become increasingly irrelevant, thus reducing the probability of external aggression. Conversely threats to a country’s security emanate internally because of lack of economic development, unemployment, failing internal security because of religious, sectarian and/or ethnic strife, shifting of identities in the wake of globalisation, radicalisation of society and growing terrorism thereof being recent additions. It has not been possible in our relatively new nation state to properly work out the national identity and borders, both traditional (external) and internal security threats have started to overlap. Societal security is the prime responsibility of the state; our rulers have generally cold-shouldered this to our lasting detriment, as we can now see on graphic display. Societal threats undermine national cohesion and identification with the state, the resultant radicalisation and extremism results in law and order situations, rioting, rise of criminal gangs and gang wars, due to money-laundering and easy availability of weapons because of the nexus between corruption, organised crime and terrorism.

A credible accountability system is missing, without proper investigation, effective prosecution and delivery of swift, untainted justice is not possible. Perjury is not only rampant but is the order of the day, credible witnesses are in short supply and even they are susceptible to influence, by use of money and/or the force of public office. Our Supreme Court (SC) has become captive to endless bureaucratic manoeuvring, fighting a losing battle against a virtual bag of administrative tricks to defy and/or frustrate their judgments and instructions. Both the NICL and Haj cases are likely to enter the “Guinness Book of Records’, sophisticated filibustering making them into an endless exercise without a likely outcome. Failure to fulfil the main function of maintaining law and order to protect lives and properties of its citizens and ensure impartial, even-handed justice hastens the deterioration of the state and its institutions. The failing identification with the state impacts negatively on the connection between citizen, the government and the army. This dissolution of the Pakistani identity results in growing influence of foreign interests, this spawns intervention and support for secessionist movements like in Balochistan.

Duly fanned by a well-meaning but immature media, paying little attention to core national interests, the vacuum provides a robust platform for promoting radical ideas, readymade for religious exploitation by extreme elements, making an alternative form of a purely Islamic state with all its ramifications resonating with the public. The spread of terrorism is detrimental to economic growth, the bad investment climate and the lack of development is extremely detrimental to the economy. The diminishing value of individual lives makes killing condonable and justifiable (Karachi killing, collateral damage). Despite the so-called truce between the warring political parties within the coalition government, hundreds of people have died during the past month alone. The consequent ugly cycle of unemployment and high inflation leads to stagflation. There is flight of both capital and manpower from the country, weakening the economy further. The failing economy destroys jobs and incomes, creates more poverty and destabilises society leading to fuel riots, electricity riots, water riots, food riots, etc, desperation in the mass psyche of citizens, suicides, destruction of families, etc. This creates favourable conditions for criminals and terrorists, further impacting negatively on the overall security. This diverts the right amount of attention and the material support necessary for external security. A whole process of cataclysmic changes is taking place in the political, economic and social transformation in South Asia. The structures of governance being diversified and differentiated, only lip-service is given to poverty reduction and improving governance. In such conditions corruption is rampant.

The Anna Hazare backlash we are seeing in India was waiting to happen, the more violent form being manifest in the four decades-old Maoist Naxalite movement. With an economic transition in the region, the majority of countries have inculcated globalisation to address their economic crisis. This has accelerated the process of growth but the impact of globalisation has not been accompanied by the reduction in poverty or improvement in human development through the formation of social capital. Increases in population growth is by itself a time-bomb. Pakistan’s security interests can be best served if elements having disruptive potential to our socio-political profile are contained, thereby giving no excuse or opportunity to our detractors and enemies to take undue and adverse advantage. Factors responsible for the declining social and human security and strengthening of extremism have to be identified. The human element remains the biggest resource for Pakistan, the government must utilise this to promote safety of the population and counter the threat of extremism engulfing this nation. The political leadership and all other stakeholders (who have a vital role to play) must agree to cooperate and formulate a national strategy to eradicate this menace. To cope with external threats, Pakistan has to keep up both conventional and nuclear deterrence necessary but should at the same time aim at socio-political solutions for long-term sustainable alleviation of our problems. The army has had increasingly to deal with internal strife instead of securing the borders. Other than drawing crucial reserves away from countering the aggressive defence postures of the Indians, they are forced to devote time and effort to burgeoning internal problems of different dimensions. Fighting against ones own population can put stress on any army in the world, raising adverse perceptions among the populace, extremely dangerous for a country that thrives on glorifying its armed forces.

The international media is fully mobilised against Pakistan’s critical national security assets, but of more serious concern is not only the erosion of local media support, but rather an antagonistic view from some motivated sections. The compromise of the media’s integrity is extremely detrimental to the national aims and objectives. The concerted campaign against the ISI, and by extension the army, is deliberately motivated despite our sacrifices not being matched in the war against terror by all the coalition partners in Afghanistan put together. The unfortunate irony is that an instrument of war – the armed forces – is also the ultimate guarantor of internal peace. One can understand it not being part of the decision-making process where democracy is institutionalised, in less developed countries this is a paradox. This leaves absolute power, at least in democratic theory, in the hands of a pre-modern feudal and agrarian mindset elected through a tainted process on fraudulent votes, as the ultimate arbiters of nation security and societal society, and by default, the destiny of the nation. Who will make the change? (Extracts from Part-II of the Talk on ‘Linkages between Socio-Political Factors and National Security” given recently at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad).

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Pakistan's Stance on Fissile Material

On December 16, 1993, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the “negotiations of ‘a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, negotiations for the FMCT continue to be stalled on various issues.

The US contributed to the stalemate by refusing to accept international mechanisms for verification and insisting that National Technical Means (NTMs) were adequate to ensure compliance. The Obama Administration broke the impasse last year by its pledge to support international verification.

Fundamental differences between the 65 members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the purpose and scope of the FMCT has failed to evolve its final draft.  With every member has the right of veto, countries have the right to halt negotiations, if the national interests of any member country is targeted the next stage is not possible.  Many members question whether it would be a measure of nuclear non-proliferation or would address the issue of stockpiles of fissile material possessed by some States through progressive and balanced reduction to promote nuclear disarmament.

Pakistan refuses to sign the FMCT because of its apprehensions that a fissile material ban should cover existing stocks of fissile material instead of simply halting future production, a position backed by several other CD members, primarily from the developing world. Most nuclear weapons possessors, including India, insist on a production cutoff that does not address current stockpiles.

Prohibiting future production would freeze the imbalance between Pakistan and India, making the treaty discriminatory and Pakistan-specific.  Pakistan would be at a permanent disadvantage in the nuclear equation with India because of India’s greater fissile material stockpiles. Attempting to cap Pakistan’s atomic program, the US has tried to stop our enrichment of fissile material, asking us to return the fissile material it had furnished in 1960 (which we could not do having consumed the same as per agreement).

India’s civilian nuclear deal with the US, its growing conventional military superiority over Pakistan, its long-term plans for a ballistic missile defence system and evolving dangerous war strategies such as “Cold Start” puts pressure on Pakistan’s declared goal of maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. As the Indian war machine acquires more offensive and defensive capabilities, the more Pakistan would need to ensure its own viable nuclear deterrent.

Through the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement and the consequent Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) India can escape the cap on the size of its nuclear arsenal, the waiver allows it to conclude agreements with countries, including Russia and France, to supply it with nuclear fuel, allowing acquisition of hundreds of nuclear warheads. India can increase its fissile material stocks qualitatively and quantitatively and divert most of its indigenous stocks to its weapons programme. It can even abrogate its international understandings in the future to redirect the externally supplied fuel meant for civilian purposes to nuclear weapons development.

India’s pursuit of ballistic missile defence (BDM) for which it seeks help from Russia, Israel and the US and development of a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) capability will alter the strategic balance in the region. Pakistan has no option but to respond by accelerating its own missile development programme and develop more warheads, for which it will need more fissile material.

Islamabad’s position in the past called for a declaration by the parties of their stockpiles, an agreement on “balance” in stocks (reflecting the requirements of different countries and a reduction in excess stockpiles).  Without verifiable elimination of fissile material stocks and concerned only with stopping future production of nuclear material is inherently discriminatory not serving the purpose of global nuclear disarmament.   Freezing inequalities would place Pakistan at a strategic disadvantage in the South Asian region. The issue of fissile material stocks is important not only for the goal of global zero but Pakistan’s survival as well.

Alternatively the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) has been proposed. All existing stockpile of fissile material should be disposed off as well as a ban on future production of fissile material. This proposal also reflects US President Barack Obama’s mission of “Nuclear Zero”. Presently this plan of disarmament is only an idealistic theory i.e. first arms control measures (FMCT) must be implemented and only than measures for disarmament taken.

Pakistan’s position was articulated clearly Dr. Shireen Mazari during the debate on FMCT in the CD in Geneva in February this year, to quote "We may accept the FMCT in about five to seven years down the road because by then we will have built up a proportional fissile reserve to India's as a result of our plutonium production picking up”, unquote. She added, “it was time for Pakistan officials to stop being apologetic about their nuclear development, India has been evolving conventional strategies such as Cold Start, pre-emptive war, limited war as well as low intensity warfare doctrines in order to get out of nuclear deterrence stalemate in a way”.

Without seeking to achieve parity with India, Pakistan has to maintain the status quo, by upgrading its non-conventional weapons capabilities i.e. better and more accurate delivery platforms, more plutonium (instead of uranium) based warheads for its ballistic and cruise missiles (because they ensure a better ratio of yield versus weight of the fissile material used per warhead) and ensures second nuclear strike capability by deploying plutonium based warheads on its subs. This does not achieve parity with India but maintains status quo. The delay will enable Pakistan accumulate sufficient plutonium stocks before negotiating over it.

Fazal H. Curmally eloquently summed up that Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has hit a wall, “the World is changing and this change could be a constructive change instead of a destructive change or a change where the acrimony intensifies. It will depend on the wisdom of the leaders who are in positions of power and can influence what the new shape of things looks like. Irrespective of what anyone says, possession of a nuclear weapons programme is your ticket to a world power status. All the pontifications of experts that this is not the case do not alter the situation. You can’t be overlooked ever again. You have become a member of the Big Boy’s Club and will be counted when push comes to shove. The FMCT talks came to a grinding halt in 2010 because according to William Langweische, in his book The Atomic Bazar, “….transformed this runt called Pakistan into something like a runt with a gun,” this delayed the progress in framing an Agenda. New Economic and nuclear realities are rewriting the shape of the Non Proliferation regime of which the FMCT is a part.”

Unless Pakistan is treated at par with other countries and given its due right, Pakistan has no recourse but to continue to block the FMCT that remains intensely discriminatory towards Pakistan’s national interest.

As a measure of our detente with India which has conventional superiority, we have the nukes and the means to deliver them, is it a surprise that the Pakistan Army and the ISI are targetted ad nauseam?  Without “Balkanizing” them, how else would our nuclear assets be “secured” to the satisfaction of our detractors?

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

De-Radicalization

EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal examines why religious and political extremism have flourished in Pakistan—and what needs to be done to counter those trends.

Literally meaning the ‘land of the pure’, Pakistan has been in the grip of extremism of one sort or the other - ethnic, linguistic, sectarian and religious – almost since its birth. Six decades after independence, we continue to struggle with basic issues relating to identity, democracy and constitutionalism. Elections are always a saga of fraud and violence.  Student militias and weaponry were introduced into our universities under the garb of student unions in the 70s, the rampant murders of political opponents and deteriorating law and order situation transformed Pakistani society into a fertile ground for what has become one of our biggest headaches.  Contrary to popular perception, radicalization is not confined to religion alone. Anyone can be a radical i.e. a minister, a driver, an officer or a cleric - ignorance being the basic factor behind radicalization.

Pakistan today is perceived by the international community to be one of the most radicalized nations.  After driving the Soviets out, Mujahideen groups, which had poured from all over the world into Afghanistan to fight the infidels, indulged in years of infighting among themselves.  Forsaken by their own countries and with nowhere to go, many crossed over into Pakistan and settled in the border areas.  They have played a significant role over the years in radicalizing local groups.  To add to this, tribesmen in FATA have been influenced throughout history by events in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s history of political chaos, economic mismanagement and religious exploitation has spawned disillusionment among the masses. Without a robust political platform the youth were especially affected.  This situation was tailor-made for religious organizations, those with a radical bent, providing a platform leading young people in directions without sense of balance in their lives. Religious and political extremism has flourished like never before.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are the most radicalized areas.  This malaise is afflicting us because of a weak and outdated system of governance, influence of the Islamist political parties, lack of public participation in political and governance process, etc. Other factors are lack of development and progress, widespread poverty, acute unemployment, inflation, food insecurity and absence of social justice for the people. Some structural causes related to the war on terror has resulted in resentment in the people and radicalism on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, viz Taliban’s exclusion from the Afghan government, Pakistan’s policies as a key US ally are seen as being harmful to Pakistan, the government’s failure to halt US drone attacks, issue of Afghan refugees, etc.

Analysts and counterterrorism practitioners believe that if the extremism and terrorism threatening almost every country in the world is to be defeated, there is a need to go beyond security and intelligence measures. Pro-active measures must be taken to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and rehabilitating those who have already embraced extremism. De-radicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values. This concept is manifested in the counter and de-radicalization programmes to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters in many countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of these programmes have been influenced by work on de-radicalization and re-integration of former terrorists being carried out in Saudi Arabia.  The success of the Saudi strategy is composed of prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare programmes.  Increasingly using unconventional and “soft” measures to combat violent extremism has borne some very positive results. Saudi authorities claim a rehabilitation success rate of 80 to 90%, only 35 individuals have been re-arrested for security offenses. Their rehabilitation campaign seeks to address the underlying factors that facilitate extremism and prevent further violent Islamism. Others in the region, including the United States in Iraq, have adopted a similar approach.

To its credit the Pakistan Army has started de-radicalization programmes on its own, one school has been set up in Swat Valley aimed at de-radicalizing young children who were either forcibly or voluntarily mixing with various militant groups operating in the country. Organizers of this first of its kind boarding school in Pakistan say it is providing a small but valuable window into the backgrounds of Pakistan's young fighters and the triggers that vault them into the hands of militants. The Center is called "Rastoon," meaning "Place of the Right Path." There are other Centers in the Swat Valley -- another one for men, one for women and one for adolescents. Officers at this school, aided by psychologists, have spent months researching whether and how Taliban helpers and sympathizers could be de-radicalized.

More resources need allocation because of the growing numbers of child fighters. As opposed to people in older groups, children are extremely vulnerable to the militant threat because of their youth and innocence, they can be manipulated and brainwashed by a group's ideology without much effort. In her article “Pakistan’s Child Fighters”, Kulsoom Lakhani makes a case for this Center, “as a pilot school, to apply best practices from successful programmes of rehabilitating child soldiers in other countries. For example, in Sri Lanka, the government established numerous transit centers as part of a complex programme to rehabilitate former child soldiers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The ICC alongwith the Sri Lankan Cricket Association and UNICEF have partnered a program using cricket to rehabilitate and engage these children”. Before he became Adjutant General of the Sri Lankan Army, my own Coursemate from 34th PMA Long Course, MajorGeneral Ananda Weerasekera, was the Head of the Rehabilitation Program for theJanatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP) hardcore who had surrendered at the end of a particularly tough and bitter counter-terrorism campaign in the early 80s.  Thanks to him and Coursemates late Maj Gen “Lucky” Vijayratna (killed in action) and Maj Gen Siri Peiris, who became Chief of General Staff Sri Lankan Army, I was lucky to have witnessed the program at first hand.

An excellent paper on “Counter-Recruitment Initiative” (CRI) was presented by Hans Giessmann of the Council of Counter-terrorism of the World Economic Forum (WEF), urging Global Leaders to promote the creation and dissemination of counter-terrorism initiatives within identity-based communities to separate terrorists from the larger groups, especially of ethnic or religious peers which terrorists take hostage for legitimising violence against innocent people and for propagating their case in communities they claim to protect. Promoting tolerance, dignity, respect and empathy, CRI proposes to preventing people from becoming attracted, radicalized and ultimately recruited, by addressing the grievances which make people susceptible to hate speech and the propaganda of terrorist networks.

To win the ideological battle the bane of poverty, one of the prime factors fuelling radicalism, must be addressed. The ranks of militants have flourished because of social and economic inequalities in our society, the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the erosion of the middle class. That radical clerics are behind radicalism may be true but it is not the whole truth.  The Government must take pragmatic measures to empower the masses by broadening the country’s economic base and address the inequalities in society 

Gist of the paper prepared for the Seminar on “De-Radicalization” organized by the Pakistan Army in Mingora, Swat on July 4-7, 2011.

After Bin Laden: A Pakistani View

The greatest, most expensive manhunt in history, employing human and material resources far beyond anything else in recorded times, culminated at about 3 a.m. on Sunday, May 1, 2011. With a shot to the head over the left eye, and maybe another one in the chest, Osama bin Laden’s decade-long evasion of those seeking him “dead or alive” came to an abrupt end. US president Barrack Obama, who earlier had given the definitive “kill” order and watched the whole operation by live video feed, said, “Justice has been done.” Bin Laden met his end very much like he lived – violently. Belatedly but ultimately, the US got its point across to those who harm its interests: you can run, but you cannot hide – not forever, at least.

A “hideout” less than a kilometre away from the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), Kakul was mortifying for someone who graduated nearly 46 years ago from this revered institution. In hindsight, given the utter incongruity of it, it was extremely clever for the most wanted man in the world to take deep cover literally a stone’s throw away from where Gen Kayani had only recently addressed the graduating cadets being commissioned into the army.

The isolated fortified villa was not suspicious by itself. Many such high-walled entities exist all over the Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces, for security reasons but also to keep prying eyes of neighbours away from the womenfolk. Allegations of such impropriety having often led to deadly fire fights, it is not surprising that neighbours tend not to be as nosy as in other areas. Given the proximity to possible Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) support further up in the mountains, Abbottabad was well chosen.

Conversely, one may ask, if there was indeed Pakistani collusion, what moron would be so stupid as to hide Bin Laden in a major garrison town, albeit one full of foreign NGOs in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake?

Four US helicopters took part in the surgical operation, lifting an elite US SEAL unit to rappel down ropes onto the roof of the compound. The fire fight lasted only a few minutes, the commandos stayed on the ground for nearly 45 minutes, collecting a virtual intelligence treasure trove of computer hard drives, a hundred or so storage discs and documents. Before picking up Bin Laden’s body and taking one captive, they carried out a quick screening of the dozen-plus people left alive, mainly women and children.

From Jalalabad in Afghanistan to the target location would have taken the raiders over (or near) three bases of the Pakistani air force, including the very active army helicopter base at Tarbela engaged in ongoing operations in Swat. Having myself flown extensively in the area as a helicopter pilot beyond Abbottabad along the Karakoram Highway (KKH), it was most surprising that the PAF radar units, fixed and mobile, failed to pick up all this aerial activity even slipping through radar blind spots, particularly at that time of the night. Obviously the radars were jammed. That does not bode well for our air defences – the frequencies were compromised.

From Jalalabad to Abbottabad and back, with 45 minutes’ hovering time at the target location, is quite an extended time for choppers to go without refuelling, even with a disposable fuel tank. Where was the “forward base” located where fuel bowsers refuelled the choppers? Somebody has to take full responsibility for this atrocious operational failure in not scrambling our fighter aircraft. Has anybody the conscience to fall on his sword?

Grudgingly acknowledging Pakistani collaboration helping the US close in eventually on Bin Laden’s hideout, the extent of “actionable intelligence,” if any, is unknown. Being kept out of the loop for “security reasons” in the actual operations is embarrassing for us as a nation. That we remained totally oblivious militarily of either Bin Laden or the operation, both smack of gross incompetence as was suggested by outgoing CIA Chief Leon Panetta.

The 9/11 atrocity against the highly symbolic “Twin Towers” and the Pentagon, the 3,000-plus US victims (including passengers in United Airlines Flight 93) left a permanent scar on the American psyche, nurturing a deep psychological yearning for revenge, ironically a very Islamic concept of “an eye for an eye.” Obama reiterated this presidential diktat to “kill or capture” the perpetrator of the 9/11 atrocity, soon after taking office. The spontaneous reaction of widespread joy on Bin Laden’s death was evident among the citizens thronging the streets across the US at midnight, congregating symbolically at “Ground Zero” in New York and outside the White House in Washington DC. Maybe not for crass political reasons (the presidential stakes were high for Obama if anything went wrong) but for psychological ones. It was important that the finger on the trigger be American. A rambling Osama bin Laden in the dock would have been a symbolic living martyr fomenting more terrorism.

The calculated risk in the human element notwithstanding, a physical operation was the pragmatic choice, rather than a missile attack. That revenge was derived ultimately by US hands satisfied its ecstatic citizens, even the most diehard Republicans weighed in to praise the Democrat president, the one they had only just been labelling as “weak and indecisive.”

A very significant vocal minority in Pakistan remains enamoured by Bin Laden despite his brutal excesses. The US said that for reasons of operational secrecy, Pakistani participation was not feasible. Certainly, no one would have trusted anyone in the civilian government about the impending operations; might as well announce it on CNN or the BBC! But the fact that the American chose also to keep the military hierarchy in the dark shows a lack of respect for our tremendous sacrifices. By far, most Pakistani citizens (5,000-plus military and over 30,000 civilian ones, making for roughly 10 times the number of American losses) have died in this war. However, highlighting Pakistani involvement would have force-multiplied terrorist retaliation in the heartland. It probably made good political sense to let Americans take credit for dealing with this “hot potato.”

One may not agree with what all the ISI does or with its motives and methods, but it still happens to be one of the prime institutions protecting the country’s core interests. We have to support firmly the soldiers dying every day in counterinsurgency operations, notwithstanding the many times more collateral civilian damage suffered by those killed in the streets and mosques. There will be extraordinary pressure within the US to exit Afghanistan now that Bin Laden is dead, a long struggle against terrorism looms ahead of us and we need the US, and they do need us. Bin Laden, alive or dead, does not matter. The fight is far from over!

Pakistan’s detractors are having a field day, converting conjuncture into fact. Scurrilous speculations are being bandied about regarding our intelligence agencies. The data collected from Abbottabad by the raiding party as well as the captives’ interrogation report assumes great importance. For Pakistan’s future as a credible entity in the comity of nations, the real truth, whatever it may be, must come out. Anybody cooperating with terrorists needs a short shrift. On the other hand, the US has all the evidence to either clear or indict “Pakistani collaboration,” official or unofficial. The blunt message to our US allies must be unequivocal: put up or shut up!

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Expanse of Soft Power

Writing for the News, EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal advocates Soft Power strategies and explains their increasing prevalence in global politics.

In a follow-up to last week’s commentary on Hard Power strategies, Ikram Sehgal explores Soft Power, which he defines as “the ability to make others do what you want, what they otherwise would not have done,” based on what an actor represents.  The currencies of Soft Power are “values, culture, policies and institutions,” as opposed to the currency of money and military strength used in Hard Power strategies.

Sehgal argues that the use of Soft Power has been on the rise in the years since 9/11 and attributes the increasing prevalence of Soft Power strategies to their success at uniting actors, as well as globalization and the diffusion of media power.  Sehgal envisions that, in the future, Pakistan could increase its projection of Soft Power by focusing first regionally and then globally.

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

Limitations of Hard Power

For Sehgal, Hard Power – “measures geared toward coercing or threatening other entities into compliance” – is an overused and rarely effective strategy in global community.  Seghal argues that while Hard power may be successful in the short term, in the “long term, the gains by its use can be elusive.”   The success of Hard Power strategies is crippled by a number of inherent limitations.

Seghal considers the “defining limitation of hard power is that those who project ‘Hard Power’ will always be held to fickle public cynosure in the long-term.”  Not all actors have the capacity to engage in Hard Power and are eager to judge those that do, based on weaknesses to the strategy.  States wishing to engage in hard power strategies are crippled, according to Seghal, by the relatively small number of tools at their disposal, namely, military intervention, economic pressure, and now, cyber war, which limits their options.  Seghal believes that when Hard Power policy fails, a country’s “credibility deteriorates [and] international cooperation diminishes as attitudes of distrust tend to grow.”  This, in turn, makes it less likely that states will engage in Hard Power when a justifiable need arises.

Seghal argues that the continued reliance upon Hard Power by nations such as the United States stems from an inability “to admit that military dominance generally does not always work.”  This perpetuates the myth that military strength can ultimately assure security – a myth that Seghal believes to be false.

Despite maintaining that  there is a time and place for Hard Power to be used, Seghal ultimately warns that “advocates for Hard Power must remember that its use in the ‘global village’ will have adverse consequences about their image, however just the cause.”

Click here to read Sehgal's piece in The News

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