Politics and Governance

The EastWest Institute (EWI) has released Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Policy Assessment, the sixth and final report from the institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, which provides a comprehensive and updated assessment of the Afghan drug trade and the role that both the United States and Russia might be able to play in countering this shared threat.

The Joint Policy Assessment represents a consensus assessment by both U.S. and Russian technical and policy experts and is intended to serve as a toolkit based on which relevant stakeholders can formulate policy solutions on cooperative bilateral and multilateral measures to reduce the threat of Afghan narcotrafficking. These key stakeholders include policy officials and interlocutors in the United States, Russia, Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, as well as regional and global organizations.

“The scale and intensity of the Afghan narcotrafficking threat has increased in past years, and despite differences in the national priorities and interests of the United States and Russia, this remains an issue of mutual strategic concern for the two countries and the region as a whole,” notes Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute. “It is critical for both countries to manage and mitigate the Afghan narcotrafficking threat and foster cooperation on this issue—even in this prohibitive climate for improved U.S.-Russia relations.”

The final installment under EWI’s Afghan Narcotrafficking series, the Joint Policy Assessment follows five successful consensus-based reports: Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment (2013); Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios (2015); Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan's Borders (2015); Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development (2016); and Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows (2017).

Established in 2011, the Working Group has also garnered positive feedback and support from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN), in addition to various multilateral organizations/agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Fully committed to the critical importance of Afghanistan, and the urgent need for continued U.S.-Russia cooperation, the EastWest Institute will establish a new Joint Working Group to assess the threat of terrorism in the war-torn country. Over the course of two years, the Working Group plans to convene in Moscow, Washington, D.C., Brussels and Astana and produce a joint threat assessment, which will be disseminated to key policy officials and interlocutors.

Please click here for the full report.

Click here for the executive summary.

In the first week of June, the European Commission officially launched the European Defence Fund―a financial vehicle to support defense research and cooperation across European Union (EU) member states. This important step comes as no surprise: with the British “Brexit” referendum one year ago, and the American presidential election in November ushering a shift in U.S. foreign policy, continental European countries have felt growing concerns over NATO’s commitment to their defense. Recent geopolitical unrest has further reinforced these fears: from Russia’s conventional and hybrid threats to the rise of the Islamic State and overall instability both in the Balkans and in the Greater Middle East.

In this light, it is only natural that Europe wants to strengthen its defense cooperation to achieve more effective security, superior deterrence and wider global influence. The European Defence Fund can partially serve these goals by addressing the historical weakness of past European cooperation projects, namely the incapacity to generate economic efficiency through adequate scale (larger production runs decrease the unit cost of production). However, as we enter the Second Machine Age―the era of accelerating computer power, automation and increasing digital connectivity―three main aspects deserve attention in the context of growing geopolitical uncertainty surrounding Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

Navigating Current Realities

First, past multinational joint programs like the Tornado and the Eurofighter, often touted as signs of success, belong to history books. Though still touted as a sign of success, and pursued by national policymakers and bureaucrats in Brussels, large joint cooperative projects are unlikely to deliver the benefits they used to in the past; the growing complexity of military technology is making these programs progressively less likely to achieve their intended goals. It is becoming increasingly difficult for countries to pool together their technological expertise to deliver effective weapon systems.

Future large-scale programs, in other words, will need to have a single, capable prime contractor and individual European countries will have to accept unequal work-share agreements. Whether such a single prime contractor is a transnational European company such as Airbus (France, Spain and Germany), MBDA (France, Spain, Italy and Germany), Leonardo (Italy, UK and Poland) or Thales (France, UK and the Netherlands) or a national company able to allocate only subcontractor work abroad is a purely political decision. Work-sharing agreements that split systems integration responsibilities across many countries and companies are not going to work any longer.

Second, European countries have to leverage opportunities brought about by progress in software and processing power. The faster development cycles of payload (e.g. missiles and sensors), for instance, call for modular designs, common standards and harmonization of interfaces to enable rapid upgrade and modernization of existing platforms. So far, however, EU member states have resisted these measures, being more interested in restricting competition from foreign producers. Thus, in many realms, Europe needs market-based cooperation, not politically mandated cooperative projects. Similarly, EU countries should openly embrace the capabilities of non-traditional or commercial companies for the development of strategic capabilities, such as unmanned systems, cyber and satellites. In contrast, they have primarily tried to preserve the position of their national champions: one of the many results is that no EU country has been able to develop a single medium-altitude, long-endurance drone yet. All programs, awarded to EU heavyweights, have in fact failed thus far (see Gilli and Gilli’s chapter in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of European Armed Forces).

Third, commercial technologies are driving innovation not only in the civilian but also in the military realm thanks to the opportunities offered by machine learning, big data and robotics. To reap the benefits of this transition, European countries must make a concerted effort to enable the exploitation of commercial technologies. To this end, European countries should keep in mind the challenges that lie ahead. For example, current regulations on Intellectual Property Rights are based on the premise that defense technology is a product of government funding. Thus, governments retain some rights over technology. Commercial companies or civil research labs are legitimately concerned that by entering the defense business, these regulations may harm their long-term economic interests. Moreover, both the defense acquisition regulations and the military procurement workforce are currently unfit for dealing with commercial technology. Innovative commercial companies do not work along the lengthy and rigid defense procurement time cycles and do not find appealing working with organizations that espouse significant compliance demands. Similarly, while the current defense procurement workforce is specialized in dealing with the defense acquisition process, it is less suited to deal with and respond to the more agile world of commercial companies. As such, appropriate reforms are needed. Finally, the potential benefits from exploiting commercial technologies will be larger if European countries pursue a concerted and harmonized approach.

Change in Step with Technology

Today, European countries require a broader range, and thus, more expensive and complex portfolio of capabilities to address the newer and broader set of threats with which they are confronted. The European Defence Fund makes several important and useful proposals in this respect. However, the current wave of technological change is undermining one of its assumptions: the centrality of joint multinational armament projects must give way to adopting a more flexible approach to technological advances. If European countries want to enhance their military capabilities, it will require a paradigm shift in the way Europe perceives and handles technology, industry and procurement. It is a daunting prospect but one that is inevitable if Europe wants to afford the broader set of capabilities and closer degree of collaboration that a bigger security role requires.

Nicolò Debenedetti is President of Aleph-Analisi Strategiche, Bocconi University in Milan. Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Mauro Gilli is Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies of ETH, Zurich. This article summarizes and updates the recent Brief for the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Iraq is at a crucial crossroads. The Iraqi government, backed by the United States and its coalition partners, is on the brink of retaking all major urban territories once occupied by ISIS. While very encouraging, the global coalition’s focus on militarily defeating ISIS obscures the fact that Iraq is beset by worsening sectarian tensions and proxy wars, political dysfunction and growing humanitarian crises. These perils, left unaddressed, will not only cripple international and diplomatic efforts, but also plunge Iraq further into instability and conflict long after ISIS is defeated on the battlefield.

The future of Iraq is important, not just for Iraqis but for the region and the international community. What the international community and regional states do or do not do will have a significant impact on that future. Today, by consolidating and capitalizing on the gains that the Iraqis, United States and international community have made in this second war against violent extremism in Iraq, the hope is that the same global coalition can avoid becoming entangled in a third and fourth and finally pave the way for rebuilding Iraq politically and economically.

In brief, the reality on the ground is as follows: the loosely held anti-ISIS alliance—which includes the Iraqi army, Shia militias, Sunni tribal units and Kurdish peshmerga forces—will likely dissolve; Iraqi-Kurdish contention over oil and gas revenues, budgets and land disputes is growing; and intra- and inter-Iraqi competition between and within communities over power and influence is flaring.

Additionally, corruption, falling oil prices, a declining economy, and high levels of devastation from cycles of ravaging war against the Islamic State will not only continue to undermine Iraq’s recovery and stability but will also be a key factor in disenfranchising Iraqi society, particularly the youth. This point is critical. Violent extremism flourishes in societies where state institutions are seen as oppressive, corrupt, ineffective and illegitimate. Unfortunately, all these factors are present in today’s Iraq.

Click here to access the full analysis.

Writing for the Nikkei Asian Review, EWI Senior Fellow Jonathan Berkshire Miller reassessed the recent Qatar diplomatic crisis through the lens of Japanese business interests. Although the impact might have been minimal up until now, Miller contends that Japan should remain vigilant and closely monitor the conflict's evolution over the next couple of weeks and months. 

For now, Miller writes that Japan should be wary of entangling itself any further in the geopolitics of the region, even as it needs to juggle cordial business ties with both Qatar, one of its largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers, and the Saudi-led coalition, which provides it with most of its energy needs. That being said, Tokyo should look into taking advantage of the instability in order to secure a more Japan-friendly contract with Qatar's state-run petroleum company. The sanctions of the Saudi-bloc have weakened Doha's hand and Japanese utility providers could definitely demand greater flexibility at the negotiating table. Moreover, Miller highlights that "the unfolding drama in the Gulf should be a stark reminder to Tokyo of the need to diversify its LNG suppliers to ensure reliability." 

Click here to read the full article at the Nikkei Asian Review.

On June 12, EWI President and CEO Cameron Munter talked to Voice of America’s International Edition to discuss the role of the U.S. on the world stage under President Donald Trump. 

Asked about his take on other foreign leaders pursuing a more globalist foreign policy in the wake of Trump’s ‘America First’ vision, Munter replied that "There are two ways to look at this. One way is you can’t rely on the United States implies we can’t trust the United States. That’s very negative and very harsh way of looking at it. There’s another interpretation of [what Merkel said] that I think is a little less apocalyptic…and that’s that Europe must pull its weight in defense…[Europe] can’t just be an economic  superpower and not be a military and political security superpower." 

Commenting on Trump’s decision to pull out of the Paris Climate Accords, Munter stated that although the decision shows clarity within the Administration’s policy objectives, it does constitute "a huge symbolic blow that the world’s biggest country, which has been a leader in this area, is now the outlier. It is a symbolic blow to the idea of solidarity. It is a symbolic blow to the image of the United States as a leader."

Munter went on to say that "if we are to ignore the way in which multilateral institutions have worked, we will be leaving a world that we’ve used very much to our advantage in my opinion for the past 70 years."

Listen to his discussion below, beginning around the 6:20 minute mark.