Politics and Governance

Speakers included Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh, professor at the University of Jordan and well-known security and political analyst, and Dr. Edmund Ratka, designated head of the Amman Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The discussion was moderated by Wael Abdul-Shafi, EWI MENA program associate.

After several years of crippling economic challenges, recently exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Jordan has become more dependent on foreign aid, with the European Union (EU) as one of its most important donors. Meanwhile,  Jordan’s traditional regional alliances are changing dramatically, shifting the political environment’s perception of threat towards both its neighbors as well as international partners. Within this framework, the briefing focussed on Jordan’s role in the region and how this reflects on its relationship with the EU. 

The discussion began with participants emphasizing that Jordan—due to its relative stability, strategic geopolitical position and moderat politics—has often been seen by the international community as a mediary for furthering relations and cooperation in the Middle East. To this end, one speaker aptly asserted that as a small country, Jordan's strategic role lies in “power of policy rather than in policy of power”; thus, Jordan has the potential to become a hub for regional dialogue. The speakers remarked that the EU, as well as individual European countries, have long considered Jordan a key partner in the Middle East. 

One speaker pointed out that because the EU prioritizes Israel’s security and is aware that there cannot be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without Jordan, it continues to invest in Jordan’s stability. The discussants also emphasized that the EU considers Jordan an important partner, not only when it comes to cooperation on key issues such as the refugee crisis and military operations against ISIS, but also in Amman’s role as a focal point for international organizations working on the Middle East at large. 

However, one speaker observed that as regional alliances are changing, Jordan is presented with a challenging moment in its foreign policy. With a direct connection to the Gulf and Israel, and the growing potential for Iraq to emerge as a hub for regional connectivity and cooperation, Jordan risks exclusion from international efforts, including on the Palestinian issue. Augmenting this point, one speaker raised Jordan’s lack of balanced relations with its direct neighbors, specifically conflict-ridden Syria, as well as Iraq. Another participant noted that in the past several years, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. 

In light of these developments, one discussant remarked that Jordan should reshape its foreign policy by redefining its relationship with its direct neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq and Israel, as well as the wider region, including a rapprochement with Gulf countries and renewed relations with Iran. As one speaker elaborated, having a Hashemite King who is neither Shiite nor Sunni can be an asset in developing relations with Iran. 

Concrete examples of cross-border cooperation mentioned during the briefing included Jordan’s assistance in developing regional railways, energy projects and ports. Jordan can also reactivate the Port of Aqaba  to support  Saudi Arabia’s plans to build NEOM, a cross-border city in the Tabuk Province that would combine smart city technologies and tourism. Furthermore, Jordan could also provide aid to its neighbors in coping with the COVID-19 pandemic. As one speaker noted, this would further secure continued EU interest in and financial support of Jordan. 

The discussants emphasized that the EU should not take Jordan’s stability for granted, given the multiplicity of conflicts in Jordan’s immediate neighborhood. The speakers suggested that the EU should engage Jordan as a partner in its regional diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, one speaker pointed to the role the EU could play in deterring and discouraging external actors from pushing Jordan to take sides in ongoing regional conflicts. Jordan truly has the potential to connect the entire region. As the briefing concluded, it is in the strategic interest of the EU to assist Jordan in becoming a “kitchen of solutions for the conflicts of the region.” 

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday October 6, 2020: “The Economic Dimensions of the Conflict in Yemen”

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

The deadly blast that ripped through the Port of Beirut on August 4 provided a tragic reminder of Lebanon’s systemic problems: a deficit of good governance, widespread corruption and a politicized judiciary apathetic to any semblance of accountability. More than a month since the blast, as Amnesty International detailed in a recent statement, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Lebanese authorities “have no intention whatsoever of fulfilling their responsibilities of conducting an effective, transparent and impartial investigation.”

Calls for an international investigation are undoubtedly justified, given Lebanese distrust of state institutions. But from the onset, Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun—an ally of Hezbollah—has rejected any consideration of an international probe, claiming that the aim of an international inquiry would be “to miss the truth.” Aoun’s reason for his refusal is obvious: an international investigation would circumvent a judicial process that he and his allies control, and would risk exposing them to criminal negligence. President Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and their allies, have played a central role in the appointment of judges, especially to the Higher Judicial Council (HJC)—a panel of 10 judges meant to ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary. In the investigation into the port blast, the HJC turned down two nominations of independently-minded judges to lead the probe before accepting the nomination of Fadi Sawan, a judge politically aligned with the FPM, Hezbollah, and their allies.

The politicization of Lebanon’s judiciary has repeatedly undermined its objectivity. For cases where political allies are suspect, investigations are perfunctory or non-existent. While the government’s reaction to the explosion is one example, myriad problems impacting the welfare of Lebanese citizens remain unpunished. For instance, subsidized medicine and flour are smuggled into Syria depriving the Lebanese of basic commodities. Exchange offices launder money and prop up a black-market currency exchange that undermines monetary policy. 

The Lebanese government’s reaction to the port explosion mirrored its response to the ongoing economic disaster: shifting blame and finding a scapegoat. A favorite tactic is to weaponize the judiciary by using FPM-connected judges to incriminate legitimate businesses. One example is the politically-motivated prosecution of ZR Energy, a relative newcomer to the local fuel market, which has historically been dominated by a handful of politically connected companies. In what has devolved into a wide-ranging scandal that has implicated the FPM and Hezbollah, ZR Energy was wrongfully investigated and charged in delivering defective fuel in an obvious attempt to distract from the Ministry of Energy and Water’s inability to address Lebanon’s longstanding power blackouts. Notably, the Ministry has long been controlled by the FPM and Hezbollah and has added an estimated 1.2-1.8 billion USD annually to the country’s budget deficit, while delivering little to no electricity. This latest case of scapegoating demonstrates that the judiciary is not only a mechanism used to hand out passes to businesses and officials that run afoul, but also has been weaponized to clear the playing field of business adversaries.

Lebanese leaders are now under international pressure to implement much-needed reforms to bring the country back from the brink of economic and political collapse. French President Emmanuel Macron provided a clear roadmap that, if followed, would unlock much needed aid. On September 8, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned two former ministers for providing “backdoor deals” and relying on Hezbollah for “personal gain and gains for their political allies ahead of the needs of the Lebanese people.” Two Hezbollah connected companies were also sanctioned on September 17. These sanctions send a strong message to the Lebanese ruling elite that they must take politics out of due process and form a government independent of the politicians who have bankrupted the country.

It is becoming clear that similar pressure will be needed to ensure that the Lebanese judiciary is provided with the necessary autonomy to pursue impartial investigations, rather than condemning the political opponents of the FPM and Hezbollah. Lebanon deserves, and the international community must demand, a truly independent investigation into the devastating Beirut port blast. The United States and the broader international community should prioritize bolstering accountability in the next cabinet as Lebanon picks up the pieces and recovers. Judicial accountability must extend not only to potentially negligent port authorities, but also to the political leaders who turned a deaf ear to warnings that tons of ammonium nitrate were being stored steps away from the heart of the city. Only then will the Lebanese people have a chance to rebuild their shattered city, tattered economy and restore their faith in government institutions.

Raymond Karam is the chief program and development officer at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He previously served as an Associate and the Washington, D.C. representative for the EastWest Institute where he led initiatives with partners in the Middle East on issues of regional security, nonproliferation, economic development and environmental governance.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Институт «Восток-Запад» (ИВЗ) сегодня публикует русскоязычную версию экспертного доклада «Терроризм в Афганистане: совместная оценка угрозы». Доклад представляет собой итоговый отчет созданной под эгидой Института россйско-американской неправительственной рабочей группы по противодействию терроризму в Афганистане. В докладе, подготовленном американскими и российскими авторами, дается беспристрастная оценка терроризма и вооруженного конфликта в Афганистане, а также исследуются вопросы борьбы с терроризмом в более широком геополитическом контексте отношений США и России. Английская версия отчета была выпущена в свет 27 мая текущего года.

«Несмотря на продолжающуюся напряженность между США и Россией, Афганистан и борьба с терроризмом остаются редкими, динамичными областями для продолжения конструктивного двустороннего диалога», - отметил Владимир Иванов, директор Рабочей группы и программы ИВЗ по России и США. «В этот критический момент на пути Афганистана к миру, в то время как вооруженное насилие в стране продолжается, для США и России как никогда важно лучше согласовывать свои усилия по борьбе с терроризмом и поддержке мирного процесса в Афганистане. Согласованность политики этих двух глобальных игроков имеет критическое значение не только для безопасности и стабильности Афганистана, но и для региона, и мира в целом».

Перейдите по ссылке здесь, чтобы увидеть полный текст доклада.

Итоговоый доклад Рабочей группы призван служить аналитическим инструментом для политиков и экспертного сообщества, стимулом для совместных действий США и России. В отчете представлен обзор ситуации в области безопасности и мирного процесса в Афганистане с учетом политики, приоритетов и интересов США и России; дается анализ вооруженных террористических группировок, действующих в Афганистане; исследуются интересы безопасности различных региональных заинтересованных держав по отношению к Афганистану. Также рассматриваются проблемы, связанные с управлением границами, торговлей оружием и финансированием терроризма в раздираемой гражданской войной стране.

В отчете предлагается несколько приоритетных тем для дальнейшего диалога между США и Россией, в том числе:

• Противодействие угрозе безопасности, связанной с перемещением террористов с Ближнего Востока в Афганистан и с северо-запада Пакистана на север Афганистана.
• Содействие международным гарантиям для устойчивого прекращения огня и проведения продуктивного межафганского переговорного процесса.
• Определение размеров остаточного контингента военных и контртеррористических сил США.
• Разработка стратегии взаимодействия с Талибаном и поддержание рычагов влияния (будь то санкции, военное давление или другие средства), которые стимулируют переговоры и соблюдение Соглашения о мире в Афганистане.
• Понимание возможностей влияния США и России на региональных игроков, включая Пакистан и Иран.
• Создание предпосылок для обеспечения нейтральной внешней политики Афганистана в будущем.
• Обеспечение потенциала для более широкой роли ЕС и НАТО как заинтересованных сторон в мирном процессе в Афганистане, как в качестве партнеров для содействия Афганистану в области безопасности, так и участников его постконфликтного восстановления.

Созданная в октябре 2017 года, Рабочая группа в течение двух лет проводила встречи американских и российских экспертов по политическим и техническим вопросам в Москве, Вашингтоне (округ Колумбия), Брюсселе и Вене. С тех пор деятельность группы получила положительные отзывы и поддержку со стороны ключевых собеседников, включая Государственный департамент США, Министерство обороны США и Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, а также Организацию Североатлантического договора (НАТО) и Организацию по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ).

Click here to listen to the interview on Deutsche Welle (in Arabic). Hassan’s comments begin at 05:16 and end at 34:00.

Read an English summary of Kawa Hassan’s remarks below.

Before heading to Baghdad from Beirut, Macron announced a “new initiative,” in collaboration with the UN, aiming to support and safeguard Iraqi sovereignty. However, little information, if any, is known about this initiative—this makes it very difficult to talk about its details. Macron wanted to visit Iraq in September last year, but was delayed due to the eruption of popular protests in Iraq in October 2019, and the overall political situation in the country. 

The ambitious French president would like to play a more active political, economic and even military role in the Middle East. France’s historic role and interest in Lebanon is clear. His visit to Baghdad comes at a critical and sensitive time for Iraq, and the region in general, as the overall situation in Iraq remains very complex. The cabinet of Al-Kadhimi, Iraq’s Prime Minister, wants to restore state sovereignty and control militias.

The terrorist organization ISIS still poses a threat to Iraq and the region but is no longer as powerful as it was in its heyday [from 2014 to 2018]—ISIS ideology, however, is not dead. France has played, and still plays, an important role within the global coalition against ISIS. It is true that there are external interferences in Iraqi internal affairs and these interferences should end, but what is crucial to remember is that the biggest threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqi state is not ISIS, nor external players, but rather the corruption of the ruling elite and their lack of political will to implement true, not token, reforms. 

Iraq is a battleground for regional conflicts and proxy wars between the U.S. and Iran. Turkey has been attacking PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The question remains: why has Iraqi sovereignty been violated by external players? The post-2003 ruling class has failed in establishing a strong state that respects the rights and sovereignty of Iraqi citizens and the sovereignty of the state itself due to the fragmentation of the political landscape of Iraqi politics- some powerful political parties possess strong relations with Iran, while others have strong ties to Turkey and other states—all at the expense of the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. 

I think President Macron primarily wanted to send a message to Turkey [and not Iran] when he stressed Iraqi sovereignty. Therefore, we need to place this French focus on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state within the context of the broader regional confrontation with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and Lebanon. Having said that, the Iraqi government and political parties can benefit from this regional conflict and Macron’s ambition to assist Iraq and decrease external interference. While France can’t support Iraqi sovereignty directly at this time, Iraqi diplomacy can use French political ambitions and assistance to bolster Iraq’s diplomatic position in the security council. 

At the moment, France is not in a position to confront American and Iranian influence in Iraq, but it can continue its important role in the war against ISIS and support economic reforms and reconstruction in ISIS liberated areas. However, this all depends on the willingness of the Iraqi ruling elite (and the Lebanse ruling class in the case of Lebanon) to implement long-overdue structural reforms. No power in the world, including France, can support Iraq if Iraqi leaders do not display a willingness to save Iraq [from systemic corruption they themselves created after 2003]. Currently, such political will is absent. However, the October Uprising of 2019 created a new reality—the Iraqi protest movement, despite being weakened [due to oppression and COVID-19], has become an important player in internal politics and to some extent, in the calculations of external players. Though the Al-Kadhmi cabinet has a plan and is serious in its attempts to implement reforms, intentions alone are not enough. The coming weeks and months will be crucial for Al-Kadhimi to deliver on his reform promises and restore security. 

The Iraqi constitution recognizes the federal status of the Kurdistan Region—in this regard, I don’t see any threat to Iraqi sovereignty. But Baghdad and Erbil have serious disagreements on the distribution of the revenues of natural resources, regional budget and disputed territories. Both sides need to possess political will to solve these problems. It is worth noting that there are [at times] calls for decentralization and even federalism in Southern Iraq. Iraqi leaders should [heed popular calls for redistribution of political and economic powers] through establishment of a state based on real citizenship and respect for the diversity of Iraqi society regardless of religion, sect and ethnicity.

We don’t have enough information as to why Macron didn’t visit the Kurdistan Region; perhaps it was due to time constraints or political reasons. Macron did meet with the President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani in Baghdad, however, as there is a history of good relations between France and the Kurdistan Region. But while many Kurds have a romantic view of French support for the Kurdistan region, at the end of the day, sober and strategic interests guide and define France’s Kurdish policy, not emotions. France supports a stable, federal Kurdistan Region within a united and stable Iraq.

Sudan’s recent measures to decrease strict Islamic restrictions clearly show the country’s break from a radical form of Islamic ruling associated with the former president Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019. This article will focus on the relationship between political Islam and extra-regional actors in Sudan, arguing that external influences could negatively affect Sudan’s transition towards a democratic government in the face of increased economic and social pressure.

Islam, the Sudanese Revolution, and External Actors

Although the break from a strict Islamic rule stems from the decades-long political mismanagement by al-Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP), it should not be seen as independent of Sudan’s political environment, in which extra-regional powers use an Islamic political narrative to advance their geostrategic interests. As such, Turkey and Qatar are considered backers of political Islam and are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Sudan’s al-Bashir was an offspring. By contrast, the UAE and Saudi Arabia oppose Islamic political ideologies. These intra-Sunni politics are played out among others in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. 

Click here to read the full article on African Liberty.

Click here to read an Indonesian translation of the article on Republika.co.id.

Building on themes from EWI’s recently released report, Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment, the roundtable brought together American and Russian policy and technical experts to exchange views on the many uncertainties and complexities surrounding the pending drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan and its likely ramifications for the stability and security of Afghanistan’s neighbors. 

As allegations of Russian bounties on U.S. soldiers have further aggravated bilateral tensions, and intensified violence in Afghanistan has cast doubts on the war-torn country’s prospects for peace, the roundtable provided a rare opportunity for candid dialogue on Russian and American concerns vis-à-vis ever-evolving security threats in Afghanistan and the prospects for continued bilateral cooperation in this arena.

Discussion focused on several possible outcomes of the U.S. troop withdrawal, including the resurgence of terrorist and militant actors in Afghanistan and increased Pakistan-India rivalry; the short- and long-term consequences for regional players, such as Pakistan, India and the Central Asian states; and the role of regional actors in ensuring the stability of Afghanistan following the United States’ departure. Participants also highlighted the obstacles facing the intra-Afghan peace talks and political reconciliation. 

EWI plans to host a second virtual roundtable later this summer focused on U.S.-Russia cooperation on economic development and connectivity in Afghanistan and the region.

The webinar brought together four high-ranking female business leaders, two each from Algeria and Morocco, to take part in a cross-border business dialogue aiming to promote greater economic connectivity between the two countries. It marked the second event in a year-long project, which commenced with an initial conference early this year on “Food Security and Agriculture” in Berlin.

Funded by the German Foreign Office, the project seeks to promote a climate of trust by bringing pragmatic business professionals together to identify creative solutions for circumnavigating the closed border currently preventing the two countries from conducting greater cross-border trade.

During the two-hour discussion, participants highlighted the shared economic complementarity from which both countries could and should profit. A border closure since 1994 is the chief reason behind both countries’ inability to tap into this economic potential. All parties participating in the webinar argued the political standstill behind the installation of the closure is the primary trade complication that unnecessarily drives the business communities on either side of the border to export to third countries in Europe rather than with each other.

Even during these unprecedented times of the COVID-19 crisis, the political situation between Algiers and Rabat continues to prevent both countries from governing in more practical terms, as personified by the fact Moroccan-made face masks and other PPE are still mainly exported to Europe rather than across the border, despite a huge demand in Algeria.

A particularly noteworthy topic during the debate centered on female cooperatives and women’s business organizations, with participants noting these types of female associations are much more prevalent among rural women in Morocco than in Algeria. Participants from both countries agreed that a much more intense exchange between female-run cooperatives at this level would greatly benefit rural communities on either side of the border by providing employment, as well as special know-how and marketing for region-specific agricultural products. Furthermore, all parties identified trade fairs as a unique platform for entrepreneurs to work closer together and exchange ideas.

Finally, towards the end of the discussion, the German-Algeria Chamber of Commerce AHK, together with German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), launched the creation of a business platform for the regional medical sector. This initiative is a first step in generating greater contact between business professionals from Algeria and Tunisia (with the hope of eventually incorporating Morocco) to exchange information, experiences and modes of best practice as a catalyst for greater cooperation and regional integration.  

EWI’s Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue is an ongoing project within its Middle East and North Africa program and its next conference is scheduled to take place in October this year either in Berlin or via video conference. 

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.