Politics and Governance

A focus on  zero-sum trade reciprocity and bilateralism risks undermining United States engagement in Asia

The new National Security Strategy (NSS), which the White House rolled out on December 18, is long on self-described realism but short on geo-economic strategy. Proclaiming a return to principled realism, the NSS defines the international system as one of great power competition in which China and Russia are revisionist powers challenging the status quo and strategic competitors to the United States. The NSS also lays the charge that for several decades U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by the misguided belief that “engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners.”

This realist conceptual framework is a welcomed and long overdue departure from previous and successive administrations. However, the NSS triumphantly kills some darlings of liberal internationalist foreign policy only to replace them with a few of its own making—economic nationalism with a singular if not myopic obsession with trade reciprocity and bilateral trade agreements. To be sure, the White House is correct to take a tougher approach toward China on unfair trade practices, particularly involving intellectual property rights and technology transfer, as well as enhanced scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States. Also, greater trade reciprocity would strengthen the U.S. balance sheet vis-a-vis China on a bilateral basis.  

Such bilateral and retaliatory measures offer little in terms of challenging or offsetting China’s geoeconomic ground game in Asia. With only three years left in office, some of which will be focused on renegotiating NAFTA and KORUS, the administration will be hard pressed to negotiate enough bilateral FTAs in Asia to compensate for having withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). At a minimum, the White House would need to initiate and successfully conclude FTAs with Japan and Vietnam as well as resuscitate talks with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. This is a moon shot considering that the zero-sum priority on lowering trade deficits is likely to complicate or derail FTA negotiations—if not overall relations—with regional allies and emerging security partners.

Conspicuously, the NSS makes no mention of China’s Belt and Road Initiative—the most ambitious and potentially transformational geo-strategic project in the world—or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which together offer a parallel Sino-centric order or sphere of influence. Neither does the NSS recognize efforts by Japan and the remaining TPP members to move forward without U.S. participation or even acknowledge other regional multilateral trade initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which would exclude the United States. In short, the White House trade agenda risks setting up the U.S. to be caught on the outside of the trend in regional trade architecture to the benefit of China.

The strategic question for the White House is not simply whether its preferred trade and economic policies improve the U.S. balance sheet, but whether those policies will enable the U.S. and its allies to continue to write rules of global trade and finance and to compete with China at a geo-economic level. In this context, the NSS for all its hard-nosed and clear-eyed realism fails to lay out a coherent and comprehensive geo-economic road map that guides U.S. policy toward Asia while reassuring U.S allies and partners in the region.  

However, there is one bright spot that gets disjointed treatment within the document—promoting U.S. oil and LNG exports as well as high-quality infrastructure abroad. The White House should have highlighted the synergy derived from linking the two initiatives together and identified these areas as priority action items for the Indo-Pacific. The recently launched Japan–United States Strategic Energy Partnership that was accompanied by agreements by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), to promote high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, is a starting point for a much broader regional geo-economic strategy.  

In comparison, it is worth noting that in 2016 Japan pledged 200 billion USD over just five years to help finance its Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor with India in May 2017, and more recently announced a public-private initiative to provide 10 billion USD in financial support to build LNG and natural gas infrastructure in Asia.  

Going forward, the White House would be well advised to set aside its singular obsession with zero-sum trade reciprocity and the presumptive silver bullet of bilateralism to fully commit to a coherent and comprehensive geo-economic strategy with generously allocated resources if it wants to preserve the U.S. led rules-based order in Asia and counter China’s grand strategy to carve out a parallel Sino-centric order or sphere of influence. In other words, the United States needs to put money on the table now—even if it not reciprocated—or run the risk of “losing”  Asia in the long run.

Jeremy Maxie is an Associate at Strategika Group Asia Pacific. He tweets at @jeremy_maxie. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

"Globe" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Berto Garcia

In an interview with FOX News, EWI's William Parker offers his views on the Trump administration's possibly pushing for a cut in United Nations funding after the world body's General Assembly voted to condemn Washington's decision to relocate its Israeli embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Watch the full interview here.

Photo: "69th United Nations General Assembly" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by United Nations Development Programme

On December 13, the vice director of Russia’s National Defense Command Center, Victor Kalganov, and three prominent Russian Ministry of Defense officials made an official visit to North Korea. Kalganov’s trip to Pyongyang came after United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for renewed DPRK-U.S. diplomacy, and underscored Moscow’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the North Korea crisis.

Since North Korea fired four ballistic missiles towards Japan on March 6, the Russian government has devoted considerable diplomatic resources to resolving the nuclear standoff. Many analysts have cited Russia’s desire to increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and alignment with the North Korean regime as rationales for its expanded diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

While these factors have shaped Russian policymakers’ perceptions of the DPRK crisis, the best explanation for Kremlin’s active role in resolving the standoff is Russia’s desire to showcase its great power status to both its domestic audience and the international community. To this end, , Russian diplomats have rallied support from European and Asian leaders for a peaceful resolution to the North Korean crisis, and used a mixture of coercive diplomacy and back-channel negotiations to convince the DPRK to come to the bargaining table.

These diplomatic initiatives are principally aimed at preventing a war between the United States and North Korea. Much like how Russia’s successful diplomatic outreach to U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East on Syria helped soften Washington’s position on Assad’s removal, Kremlin policymakers believe that building an international consensus around the need to avoid war with North Korea will moderate President Donald Trump’s hawkish rhetoric towards Pyongyang. Enticing North Korea to the bargaining table would also assist this aim. If Russia can help successfully prevent a war, Moscow’s status as a conflict arbiter will increase tremendously, expanding Russia’s alliance network and Putin’s prestige at home and abroad.  

An Increased Voice

Russian policymakers believe that revealing the chasm in perspectives between Trump administration’s hawkish rhetoric and the international community’s perceptions will cause the United States to de-escalate and align with the international consensus. To facilitate this effort, Russia is trying to convince U.S. allies to support its preferred solution to the DPRK crisis and pressure Trump to refrain from military action.

Since March, Russia has emerged as a leading international supporter of China’s dual freeze proposal, which calls for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for the suspension of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills on the DPRK’s borders. Even though the United States has rebuffed the dual freeze proposal, Russia has reached out diplomatically to U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region to convince them to endorse the plan and pressure Washington to follow suit.   

For example, on August 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a bilateral dialogue with his German counterpart Sigmar Gabriel. Berlin’s subsequent expression of support for the dual freeze proposal gave Moscow’s position on North Korea critical legitimacy within the European Union.  

The Russian government has also attempted to expand support for the dual freeze proposal in the ASEAN bloc. On August 9, Lavrov announced the creation of a permanent Russia-ASEAN mission to bolster security cooperation with Southeast Asia on North Korea and transnational terrorism. Public statements expressing solidarity with the Russian position on North Korea by ASEAN leaders like Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte have also gained widespread coverage in the Russian state media, reaffirming the link between Moscow’s great power status aspirations and diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, Russian officials have leveraged improved relations with South Korea to shape Seoul’s perspective on the North Korea crisis. Moscow’s outreach to moderate members of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s inner circle has produced tangible results, as a group of Moon’s foreign policy advisors expressed tentative support for a dual freeze proposal on September 14.

If the Trump administration responds to Moscow-induced diplomatic pressure from U.S. allies by loosening its preconditions for diplomacy with North Korea and desisting from further military threats against Pyongyang, respect for Putin as a peacemaker will grow considerably. Such an outcome would  help Putin consolidate his nationalist base ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, and bolster the credibility of Russia’s arbitration ventures in other regions.  

Coercion and Co-option

To steer North Korea towards a peaceful course, Russia has combined coercive diplomacy with co-option. To highlight its displeasure with Kim Jong-Un’s brinkmanship, Russia supported the imposition of comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea on September 12. As Russia has replaced China as North Korea’s most trusted international partner, according to the DPRK’s February 2017 ranking of international allies, Moscow hopes its expressions of displeasure with Pyongyang will resonate with North Korean policymakers.

Even though Russia remains officially committed to implementing the entire UN sanctions regime against North Korea, in practice, Russian policymakers have distinguished between “legitimate” punitive sanctions worthy of full compliance and “counter-productive” sanctions that threaten North Korea’s economic stability.

Russia routinely violates sanctions against the DPRK that it deems to be counter-productive, believing North Korean aggression is more likely if Kim Jong-Un faces internal instability. As such, in November 2017 Russia increased oil exports to North Korea aimed at preventing  volatility and unpredictability associated with a potential collapse of the North Korean economy.

In exchange for this vital material support, Russian diplomats have held bilateral dialogues with North Korean officials aimed at convincing Pyongyang to accept diplomatic negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program. If Russia can convert the goodwill accrued from Putin’s post-2014 rapprochement with North Korea into a diplomatic breakthrough, Moscow will highlight its diplomatic independence from China and great power status in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Russian government’s efforts to steer the United States and North Korea towards a peaceful course has increased its credibility as a diplomatic stakeholder in the region. Arguably, based on its ability to maintain a line of communication with both North Korean officials and pro-engagement members of South Korea, Russia is presenting itself as a useful partner for U.S. policymakers seeking a peaceful resolution to the DPRK nuclear crisis.

As Washington’s current strategy of combining sanctions against North Korea with periodic engagement of China struggles to gain traction, the prospect of Russia as a go-between in the crisis may take on increased relevance.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Entering the Kremlin walls." (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by SusieQ158

Ambassador Cameron Munter shares his view of the changing art of diplomacy. He sits down with the What’s Your Why? podcast from Wyoming Humanities, which brings influential people to Wyoming to share ideas and perspective. What’s Your Why? captures these amazing stories and delves deeper into their “why.”

"Diplomacy is the art of having the other guy have it your way," says Ambassador Munter. Listen to the full podcast below:

Photo: "Diplomacy" (CC BY 2.0) by Macsous

Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, is a civilian-run organization that according to their code of conduct aims to provide “disaster and war response in Syria, to carry out search and rescue operations and to save the maximum number of lives.” The organization was founded in 2013, two years after the civil conflict broke out in Syria. To date, the organization has saved 60,000 lives and currently has 3,600 members that carry out its mission primarily in Hama, Daraa, Aleppo, Homs, Al Qusayr, and Damascus among other cities across this war-torn country.

In 2016, the organization was the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award, recognized for “outstanding bravery, compassion and humanitarian engagement in rescuing civilians.”

Munir Mustafa is the Deputy Director of the Syrian Civil Defense. Prior to the civil war, Mustafa was a firefighter in his hometown of Aleppo who decided he no longer wanted to serve the Syrian government and instead started  a “civil defense” unit in 2012. He is among the first civilians who joined the White Helmets. According to Mustafa, since 2013, the organization has lost 207 of its members in the line of duty. He recently sat down with EWI Fellow Tara Kangarlou to discuss the work of the SCD and lessons from a war-torn Syria.

Q: Raqqa and Deir ez Zor are among the two recently liberated cities in Syria that are no longer controlled by ISIL forces. However, there is ambiguity and struggle over the political governance of these liberated areas. As a humanitarian organization, what’s the best governing solution that would help maintain the safety of the citizens in these two areas?

MM: We are an impartial organization and our sole mission is humanitarian support. We provide rescue services and much needed relief for people and neither care nor can we influence which political party or country or government has governance over the region or a city, but trust that consideration will be given to the welfare. As per our mission, what matters is if we can support the people.

Q: How difficult is it for the White Helmets to work in places like Raqqa or Deir ez Zor?

MM: White Helmets is not allowed to operate in the areas that are controlled by the Assad regime or Russia and their allies; but if we were allowed access into those areas we would have no problem providing support for the local population. The White Helmets first operated in groups and missions but later joined forces and the organization was formally founded in 2013-2014, a few years after commencement of the war,and that’s why the Assad regime sees us as part of the opposition and deems us illegitimate. They don’t recognize us. We offered multiple times to go into different areas that can benefit from our support—areas that are controlled by the regime, like suburbs of Damascus, parts of Aleppo—but they rejected us every single time.

Q: Considering that the majority of ISIL strongholds are being liberated inside Syria, what are some of the immediate threats that Syrians face? How is White Helmets responding to ISIL liberated areas?

MM: While Daesh (ISIL) is gone, there are other groups and militias—including the Shia and “Zeynabis” emerging in these areas that will ultimately lead to clashes; so not all those liberated places can be considered as secure. On the other hand there are other areas that were liberated by Daesh, like Jarablus and Al baab that are controlled and supported by the Turkish government, where we have been successful operating in and have opened three more centers there.

Q: There are multiple besieged areas inside Syria that have faced horrific humanitarian conditions and shortage of food, healthcare, and are denied basic necessities. Many UN and international relief agencies have not been able to access these areas. How successful has the White Helmets been in operating in besieged areas?

MM: It’s incredibly difficult to operate in these areas. We can’t transport any needed equipment in these areas, including much needed medicine, medical and rescue equipment that would make a tremendous difference on the ground; so instead, where can make an impact, and the only thing we can do in this circumstance, is to transfer funds to trusted, local contacts who are operating there.  However, the process is not easy as it takes a lot to channel funds into those areas—more than 10 percent gets cut out in fees and commissions along the way. The besieged areas are the most difficult places to work in and support, but this is the price we have to pay to ensure some degree of impact.

Q: There have been talks and also some steps forward creating “safe zones” inside Syria. How successful can this idea be towards stopping the bloodshed?

MM: The creation of safe zones is in theory a great idea. If you have safe zones where you can start running a political dialogue then you may then have a possibility to reach a political solution for the crisis. Conversely, if you have safe zones where airstrikes are still ongoing—as is the case presently—then there is no point. For safe zones to be successful there needs to be a system of international monitoring and supervision that can guarantee safety.

Q: Seven years into this crisis, over 16 million people are internally displaced and five million are scattered across the Middle East as refugees. How do you view the prospect of a political transition in Syria ending the crisis?

MM: Syrian people won’t ever accept Bashar Hafez al-Assad as their President—especially after all the attacks we’ve seen—including the chemical massacres. In particular, they consider him a criminal, and therefore they can't acknowledge his leadership. The International Criminal Court and United Nations condemned the Syrian regime for his responsibility for many massacres, most recently the Khan Shaykhoun massacre which involved the use of  chemical sarin gas that killed more than 90 people and caused many injuries. There have been numerous massacres by the use of barrel bombs in Aleppo city and many hospitals and civil defense centers were targeted because they were providing assistance and medical treatment to civilians. All this is part of a systematic criminal mentality on the part of the Syrian regime. Theoretically and practically Assad remaining in power is an impossible notion. I do not believe the Syrian people will ever accept him for the the degree of sadness and despair he has inflicted on every single household. How can he possibly remain as president?

Q: How can the international community and the United States help stop the bloodshed? And then support a political transition?

MM: First, if you want to stop the bloodshed, you have to understand the cause of this bloodshed. Most of the bloodshed is caused by airstrikes. On a percentage basis, I would project airstrikes account for approximately 70% of the deaths, as conducted by the Asaad regime and Russia. If the flights can be stopped, then the damage will be reduced to the approximately 30% caused by the mortar shells and rockets that cannot reach far distances but are on the frontliones of the fighting. In order to stop this we need to deploy peace teams and monitoring forces under the auspices of the United Nations. To stop the air war over Syria we need international agreements that will exert pressure on Russia and the Assad regime.

Q: Based on your first-hand work on the ground, what are the three mains things Syrians need in Syria?

MM: First, stop the fighting and bloodshed. Then, find a political solution, and finally a plan of reconstruction, which includes allowing the safe the return of displaced persons and refugees. However, we cannot talk about any negotiation or peace plans without stopping the killing inside Syria, and aircraft targeting of civilians. Only then we can talk about sitting at the negotiating table, followed by a process to hold accountable individuals  accused of war crimes, and Bashar Al-Assad should be the first one of them. Finally, we can talk about the political solution and actual reconstruction to rebuild Syria again.

Q: You were a fireman before the war broke in Syria. What made you resign from your post and join the White Helmets? Aren’t you afraid of living inside Syria especially given the work you do?

MM: I was a fireman and yes, my work was a humanitarian effort, but after the war broke out, it became political and I was no longer serving people and community. Rather, I was dispersing protesters and people who opposed the regime. It was then that I decided that I no longer want to serve as a fireman and have my role be politicized. If one day, firefighters once again become a humanitarian organization that it was previously, then I will proudly go back to this profession.

As regards my personal welfare regarding the work I do—Syria is home, and you can’t leave home, regardless of the circumstances.

Q: If you could have a message for the U.S. President, on behalf of the White Helmets and the Syrian people, what would you tell President Trump?

MM: The United States is one of the strongest—if not the strongest country in the world—and I would ask President Trump to use all this power and weight to exert pressure on the Assad regime and Russia to end the bloodshed. I would ask him to help stop the conflict immediately  and push toward a political solution. President Trump recently helped Syria greatly in defeating ISIL, and I believe he has the same capacity to end the bloodshed caused by Assad and Russia.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Palmyra - تدمر" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by J_Llanos

This year represents the centennial of the communist takeover of Russia, which indelibly marked the transition from Tsarist Empire to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. was a menace not only to the free world, but also to its own people. Despite its collapse and Russia’s independence over 25 years ago, many in Washington still cannot allow themselves to imagine, let alone manifest, a productive relationship with Russia.

Prior to 1917, Russia was the only major power in the world with which the United States had neither a war, nor serious diplomatic dispute. It even supported and defended America during its formative and most vulnerable years—the American Revolution¹ and Civil War. Thus, President Jefferson declared, “Russia is the most cordially friendly to us of any power on earth” and President Lincoln’s Secretary of State stated, “[Russia] has our friendship, in preference to any other European power.”² Notwithstanding constitutional differences between the Russian monarchy and American democracy, their relationship blossomed.

In our current political climate, each nation blames the other for meddling in domestic and international affairs. Foreign malfeasance cannot be tolerated, but should the United States not seek bona fide deals with Russia for the sake of America’s national interests? Meanwhile, recurring sanctions against Russia have forced it to align with China versus the United States. Continued hostilities only increase the chances of direct confrontations—be they political, economic, cyber or nuclear. Arguably, America has more at stake in these scenarios long-term.

In addressing Washington and Moscow’s destiny, White House spokesperson Sarah Sanders opined, “I think a lot of that depends on Russia.” Yet, Russia has already made proposals to partner with America in business, anti-terrorism, and European security. Despite current turmoil, it is now incumbent on the U.S. to re-establish mutual respect and take Moscow up on its offers. Why? Because, history reveals and pragmatism dictates that constructive cooperation with Russia is in America’s best interests.

As the Russian Federation detoxes from its Soviet occupation, Washington should likewise cleanse itself of the biased disposition it has toward Moscow. The moment has come to shift U.S. foreign policy away from the obsolete Cold War paradigm and re-imagine a businesslike relationship with Russia.

Russia and America after the U.S.S.R

The emergence of Soviet communism in Russia led to a geopolitical and social calamity of immense proportions. This criminal regime, architected by Vladimir Lenin, relinquished moral authority by building its foundation on the bones of over 60 million of its own people whom it exterminated over several decades. During this era, the Soviets erased the bond America and Imperial Russia once shared.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 offered an unparalleled opportunity for the United States to re-establish a constructive relationship with a newly liberated Russia, which was distancing itself from its Soviet past, restoring traditional values, and seeking partnership with America. Unfortunately, some Beltway insiders stood in the way of this rekindling. But, why?

For its part, Russia has tried to engage the United States. In 2000, his first year in office, President Putin suggested joining NATO to President Clinton. In 2007, Putin offered President Bush a compromise on joint missile defense. After his election in 2008, President Medvedev proposed working together on several key initiatives, and President Obama committed to "resetting, but also broadening" ties. Regrettably, Russia’s propositions were not earnestly welcomed by the establishment.

After 9/11, Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush to offer sympathies. He even “coordinated with central Asian nations to allow U.S. forces… to use military bases of the former Soviet Union” and provided intelligence in support of America’s war in Afghanistan. These actions were unimaginable during the Cold War. Washington should have recognized Moscow’s gestures for what they were—the strongest indication of Russia’s sincere desire to partner with the U.S., engage constructively, and eschew Soviet ideological paradigms.

Russia’s efforts should have catalyzed a reassessment of its renewed potential as a strategic partner. But Washington failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Instead, it continued to treat Russia as the U.S.S.R (justifiably “America’s number one geopolitical foe” in a bygone era). This inability of the entrenched Cold War establishment to differentiate Russia from the Soviet Union plagues our relations to this day.

While Russia inherited certain Soviet attributes, including a seat on the UN Security Council, Soviet-era monuments, and commemorations of the Great Patriotic War for its defeat of Nazi Germany, it draws stark contrast from the communist regime—diplomatically, economically and ideologically. Thus, it is essential to recognize that Russia is not the holistic successor of the U.S.S.R., and being Russian is not the same as being Soviet—these identities embody two entirely different mindsets, values, and traditions.

Contextualizing Current Russo-American Relations

Despite media coverage that paints Russia as “the enemy and aggressor,” sober context helps one understand its actions as reactionary. For instance, regarding Crimea’s annexation, critics of Russia often fail to acknowledge the catalyzing event—a February 2014 coup d'état in Kiev that overthrew Ukraine’s president. This threatened Russia’s access to one of its few warm-water ports and its Black Sea Naval Fleet—established under Catherine the Great in 1783. While these aspects do not necessarily justify annexation, they do contextualize Moscow’s reaction to the political upheaval in Kiev. In covering suspected Russian interference in the 2016 American presidential election, commentators omit documented U.S. meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Time Magazine memorialized one such intrusion with its July 15, 1996 cover-story featuring a cartoon of Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, waving an American flag—the caption reads: “Yanks to the Rescue: The Secret Story about how American advisers helped Yeltsin win.” Historical context does not defend electoral meddling, but helps one see these events as connected incidents, not isolated episodes.  

In dealing with Russia, certain politicians and pundits have practiced foreign policy by crayon—full of name calling and unproven accusations. Notwithstanding valid disagreements one may have with President Putin, he is an accomplished leader and should be treated accordingly. He guided his country’s turn-around from near ruin in 1999, carried approximately 30 million Russians out of poverty, and increased life expectancy from 65 years to 71.6 in a little over a decade.³ Russia is now a significant economic power and geopolitical force. Thus, the question arises: is America better-off insulting Russia with tired Cold War rhetoric or is a businesslike approach based on mutual interests worth a try?

Why Re-Imagine Russia Policy Now

U.S. sanctions on Russia have not had their intended effect and, instead, damaged America’s long-term economic interests. The 2014 sanctions necessitated Russia’s pivot to Asia away from the West. Research by Macro-Advisory Partners indicates a Russian recovery from prior sanctions—with GDP increasing to 1.4 percent in 2017 and 1.9 percent in 2018, and business confidence reaching pre-sanction levels.⁴ More worrisome for America, estimates now show trade between Russia and China growing to over 200 billion USD in a few years.⁵ By contrast, U.S. trade with Russia was a paltry 20.3 billion USD in 2016.

Since sanctions are self-defeating, perhaps pragmatic cooperation will be more productive. To this end, America cannot revert to Cold War habits. It must rebuild trust with a new cadre of diplomats and policymakers who seek commerce over conflict, and possess Russian cultural fluency. Why can this approach work? Many Americans who visit and work in today’s Russia are pleasantly surprised to find more areas of agreement with its people than typical stereotypes allow.

While the Soviet mentality lingers and will take time to dissipate, the new generation of Russians is very much like us and wants a positive relationship with America. I experienced these sentiments when meeting with President Medvedev, in both Moscow and Silicon Valley in 2010. While visiting San Francisco, he sent his first tweet, hung-out with Steve Jobs, and met entrepreneurs over coffee. This period was arguably the peak of Russian-American relations in the 21st century—full of promise. Unfortunately, old habits got in the way again—NATO incursions and regime change in Libya fractured this brief Russian-American détente and prevented more win-win opportunities.

There is an undeniable truth: Russian-American relations will outlast their current presidents. The U.S. needs to think practically and longer-term—recognizing the potential of a constructive relationship with Russia, a nation that was one of its strongest allies for nearly 150 years.

Even during Soviet times, with polar-opposite ideologies and far more subterfuge on both sides, open channels of communication were maintained through the height of the nuclear threat to elude mutually assured destruction. In the current cyber-age, effective negotiation, rules-of-engagement, and productive diplomacy are arguably even more critical to the preservation of national security.

Today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union. It offers the United States much to gain from a renewed positive relationship. Most young Russians are strikingly different from old Soviets. Thus, as Russia moves away from its Soviet past and embraces its seminal traditions, which are more aligned with classical Western values, perhaps it’s also time for American politicians and media elites to reconsider attitudes, policies and rhetoric entrenched in Cold War doctrine.

We need to find ways to encourage dialog, resolve conflicts, and do business. If not, then the U.S. may succeed in provoking new hostilities, ideologically “losing” the younger generation of Russians, and creating yet another enemy. Just as President Reagan “had the imagination to see beyond the ubiquitous Cold War stereotypes that seemed to be set in stone,” it’s time again to re-imagine the Russian-American relationship before it’s too late.

^{1. Frank A. Golder, "Catherine II. and the American Revolution," The American Historical Review (1915), 92.}

^{2. F. A. Golder, The Russian Fleet and the Civil War, The American Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul.,1915), 811.}

^{3. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 5.}

^{4. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 1, 17.}

^{5. Macro-Advisory Ltd., “July 2017 Macro Monthly,” 50.}

P.N. Loukianoff is an American entrepreneur/investor with over 20 years experience in Russian-American ventures, and contributing author of Russia and the U.S.S.R: What They Never Tell You. Contributor: Michael Loginoff, an American graduate student at the University of Oxford in Russian & East European Studies.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the authors and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Sea ice off western Alaska" (CC BY 2.0) by NASA Goddard Photo and Video

Ambassador Cameron Munter discusses the political situation in Lebanon, following the surprise resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Munter talks to Voice of America, beginning around the 7:28 mark.

Listen to his remarks here.

Click here to read a Q&A with Munter following his meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun.

Photo: "Faraya Mzaar Ski Resort, Lebanon" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Paul Saad

Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute, following a series of high-level dialogues in Lebanon the week of November 27, shares his insights and observations on the political scenario evolving in the country and across the region.   

Q: Lebanon is again making front page news. What is at the root of the unfolding political crisis in Lebanon?

There's a basic Lebanese crisis: it's a diverse country, but one which (unusual for the region) has a functioning constitution that seeks to share power and prevent conflict. The immediate Lebanese crisis occurred when Prime Minister Hariri, in Saudi Arabia (where his family has traditionally had extensive business interests) announced on Saudi TV that he was resigning. Upon his return to Lebanon, he has worked with other leaders to remain in power, and is almost certain to keep his job. In a broader sense—will this lead to tension or even violence? I don't think so. Lebanon is resilient, and the whole episode has cemented support, even among Shia Muslims and Christians, for Hariri, a Sunni Muslim. 

Q: Based on your meeting with President Michel Aoun, what is the current sentiment about the ongoing situation and prospects for engaging the key actors and fostering stability in the country, and thus the wider region?

President Aoun, as well as other key leaders in Beirut, told us that they expect things to remain calm. There are differences of opinion, to be sure. But all parties told us they seek stability at this time. 

What may we expect to happen? In the short run, there's an “era of good feeling”: the Lebanese have rallied around Hariri and there may be a month or two in which accords may be reached. But the leadership is aware that external issues—in Israel, on the peninsula, to the north—will have an as yet unknown impact.

Q: The primary question on people’s mind is whether Prime Minister Hariri is likely to remain in office? Beyond that what lies over the horizon? Is there a real concern of escalating tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or Hezbollah and neighboring Israel?

Hariri will remain in office. It seems clear that efforts by the Saudis to press him have failed (and one wonders what that game plan of the Saudi leadership might be). Of course, given Lebanon's location, the country is vulnerable to pressure if Saudi-Iranian tensions rise, or if Israel and the Hezbollah within Lebanon square off. But everyone is watching to see what will happen in Syria, now that the military campaign against the Islamic State has been successful. How that plays out will have a significant impact on the actions of the players in Lebanon. 

Q: Is it possible that Lebanon may be dragged into a proxy style conflict similar to what we have witnessed in Syria, Iraq and Yemen?

I think it's unlikely there will be a proxy war in Lebanon. The Riyadh episode has actually brought the Lebanese together for the time being. There's a window of opportunity for the constitutional coalition to work together to address both foreign and domestic issues. Let's hope the leaders take advantage of this opportunity. 

Q: Lebanon hosts nearly two million Syrian refugees. Is there concern that a potentially volatile situation may trigger a new refugee crisis?

Meanwhile, Lebanon, with a population of approximately six million, hosts 1.7 million refugees from Syria (not to mention Palestinians who have been in the country for decades). Should the fragile peace fail, those refugees would seek shelter elsewhere—something that no one wants to see. The Lebanese leadership wants stability at home and ultimately, the reconstruction of Syria that would allow most refugees to return home.

It will be interesting to see if the humanitarian tragedy of Syria and Northern Iraq leads to international agreement on rebuilding: the reconstruction of Mosul or Aleppo would be an enormous step towards alleviating the strain of refugee support in the region. But to date, I don't see Europeans, Americans, Russians, Chinese or anyone else taking the lead on this issue.

Photo: "Harissa Cathedral From Ghosta, Lebanon" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Paul Saad

On October 24, the Chinese Communist Party concluded its 19th Party Congress with the unveiling of the new leadership lineup, a cornerstone political event it has held every five years since the death of Mao Zedong. Prior to the Congress, there was a great deal of speculation concerning the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee – and to a lesser extent the Party’s Central Military Commission – with China observers watching for signs of Xi Jinping’s tightened grasp on China’s political system.

The evolving Party

The most anticipated act of this Congress was arguably a symbolic one: the codification of Xi’s “Thought” into the Party’s Constitution, specifically entering his name into the Constitution. The eventual product, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” is said to put Xi on the same level with Mao and above previous leaders Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and even Deng Xiaoping. This it does, at least nominally. While this may change how Chinese officials speak of their leadership, it does not necessarily change their beliefs. One suspects there are a great many officials who still hold Deng’s bona fides in much higher regard. Also worth noting is that Xi has not placed himself above Mao, suggesting that this Daedalus respects an upper limit.

The 19th Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) appears to have consolidated Xi’s power as expected. It is still composed of seven leaders, including Xi and three close allies, but the three non-allies are said to be powerless. Add to that Xi’s establishment during his first term of a multitude of leading small groups, and we can see that effective control of the top leadership lies in his hands. Unlike Xi’s ascension during the 17th Party Congress in 2007, this session revealed no clear successor, leaving wide open the possibility that Xi will serve as China’s paramount leader beyond the 10-year precedent that his two most recent predecessors set.

Causing the greatest stir in Western media was Xi’s October 18 work report at the beginning of the Congress. Some analysts picked up on the theme of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as “a new choice for other countries,” a not-too-subtle challenge to the U.S.-favored international system. Reinforcing this is the idea of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project said to be filling in the leadership gap left by U.S. abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The problem with these ideas is that China has yet to offer the world a sustainable alternative model of development, as for example in Ghana.

China’s immediate goal is simply to make the world safe for China’s Communist government. The text of the speech makes clear that the “new choice for other countries” is not Chinese socialism, but reliance on Chinese capital should one’s government prove unable to cooperate with the broader international system. If this mode of development does ultimately displace the status quo, it will surely be because America and its allies fail to muster the strength to stand up for their own values, not because of any challenge from China.

The PLA reformed

In his opening speech, Xi set out the benchmarks of “defense and military forces modernization” by 2035 and the “creation of a world-class military force” by mid-century. Although guessing the meaning of Party jargon can be hazardous, these two goals appear to indicate, respectively: (1) technological and organizational parity with other leading military powers; and (2) parity of combat power, meaning the ability to project force at will.

As for the Central Military Commission (CMC), we saw it shrink down to a manageable seven from its previous 11. Overall, this new structure is easier to understand:

(1) Xi is CMC chairman and commander in chief;

(2) On the second rung are two vice chairmen, Air Force hardliner Xu Qiliang and former equipment development chief Zhang Youxia; and

(3) Just below the vice chairs are four members: former missile force commander Wei Fenghe, former Army chief Li Zuocheng, former Navy political commissar Miao Hua, and corruption fighter Zhang Shenmin.

These vice chairs and members will each have designated portfolios, likely in line with their previous duties. Also notable is their truly joint backgrounds, with representatives of each of the four traditional PLA services. Below these lie a scrum of major department heads (in particular the Joint Staff Department), service chiefs and theater commanders.

When senior military leaders from the United States and other countries visit China, the PLA will likely designate a counterpart from the fourth tier (e.g. service chief for a service chief, regional commander for a regional commander, etc.) and possibly grant a meeting with the CMC vice chairman or member responsible for foreign military relations.

Regarding military-to-military relations, we should expect more of the same from China. Under Xi’s direction, U.S.-China mil-to-mil has expanded significantly in spite of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other factors. Although there have been questions on the U.S. side concerning the value of these exchanges, the annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military affairs shows that military contacts have continued at a robust pace. It remains to be seen how the Trump administration will manage them in the future, although it may be that an overall decrease in mil-to-mil activity is offset by refocused cooperation on key issues.

At the next National People’s Congress (China’s national legislature, not to be confused with the Party Congress) in February or March 2018, we should see the designation of a new Minister of National Defense, which most expect to be one of the new CMC members. With his representatives fully in place, Xi will be able to claim a level of control over the PLA not seen since Deng pushed his military reforms through in the 1980s.

Overall, we see Xi in firm command of the government and military apparatuses. The ensconcement of his allies as civil and military officers and enshrinement of his name are as much reflections of his power as they are the means of keeping it. This Congress was thus an evolutionary step in Xi’s program of internal control, although we should not confuse this with the deliberate chaos of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. It should come as no surprise should Xi choose to stay beyond 10 years, and barring a serious setback, the decision may very well rest with Xi himself.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a program analyst for the U.S. Navy. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute.

Photo: "07-11-2013 Em Pequim, o vice-presidente" (CC BY 2.0) by Michel Temer - Fotos livres, com o crédito.