Politics and Governance

BY: SASKIA VAN GENUGTEN

Politicians and commentators commonly mention the need for “stability” and “stabilization” when referring to the current situation in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For the policy community concerned with Afghanistan and Iraq, this has been true for over a decade. Now, key international actors, regional players and local constituencies alike are similarly consumed with the question of how to put an end to the years of revolutionary uncertainty, upheaval and conflicts in several countries in the region—sparked by the 2011 Arab uprisings and exacerbated by domestic infighting and foreign meddling.

Indeed, most pundits agree that stabilization is what the broader MENA region desperately needs. Policymakers seem willing to work towards that goal of stability. But at the same time, a lack of consensus around what stability entails and how to get there keeps fueling instability instead.

When assessing international actors’ ideas concerning the meaning of “stability” and the process of “stabilization,” it generally is agreed that stability can be understood as an environment that is reasonably predictable and non-violent, while stabilization is a process that entails the blending of military means with other tools of statecraft and foreign policy. It brings together different, overlapping and interacting policy dimensions, which in institutionalized settings often is referred to as a “whole of government” or comprehensive approach.

Starting with the international reaction to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, experiments with blending military, political, economic, humanitarian and developmental tools—as well as elements of transitional justice and reconciliation—became the norm. In the past decade, Afghanistan has served as the most important litmus test for this approach. But unfortunately, for all the tryouts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, the stated ambitions versus realities on the ground have remained far apart and the few success stories, such as in Iraq’s Anbar province, short-lived.

The problem is that beyond the common, basic understanding of the two buzzwords, ideas differ regarding which non-military policy instruments should be part of the stabilization tool box, which instruments are priority, what the priorities are and whether a specific sequencing is appropriate. This already holds true when comparing approaches to stabilization within the West, and even within the different policy communities of a specific country. Military actors, for example, come to the table with different professional cultures and priorities from those working on the humanitarian and development aspects of stabilization.

Most importantly, with an increasing number of external actors, ideas about what the end state should be and what acceptable forms of stability are also have started to differ. Indeed, the number of voices and ideas increases significantly when actors from other parts of the world are equally involved with “stabilization operations.” The West might have an ideal society in mind while others, including Russia and the Gulf countries, have their own vision, reflecting what they believe makes for a stable situation.

Current developments in the MENA region, where the West is no longer the only cook in the kitchen, are shaped by this mismatch of explicit and implicit objectives and the differentiation in views regarding acceptable paths towards stability. Reflecting on recent experiences of stabilization efforts in the MENA region, Western policymakers can learn several lessons, including:

1. Democratization does not necessarily increase stability in the region. For Europe and the U.S.—the two dominant forces of stabilization efforts in the broader MENA region until several years ago—the envisioned end state tends to be one of increased democracy and liberal market economic practices. Initially, the ideas were derived from democratic peace theories in vogue in the 1990s, which argued that democratization and open markets would lead to more sustainable forms of peace. While potentially true in the long-run, in the short-term, political elections in conflict and transitional situations are likely to spark more violence and civil wars. The MENA region has been a case in point, with Libya and Iraq being prime illustrations.
    
2. Stabilization takes time and aftercare, with change needing to happen at many levels. Removing an undesired regime or throwing money at development projects, does not miraculously create a more stable and secure political environment. Corruption, radicalization and imperfect information play their respective roles and are difficult to tackle, with long-term root causes such as population growth, adverse effects of climate change and low oil prices compounding the precarious situation. While President Trump’s recent line on Afghanistan might sound appealingly simple (“killing terrorists” instead of focusing on nation-building), it is unlikely to be a winning strategy.
    
3. Europeans and Americans are no longer the only kids on the block. In recent years, many other actors have become actively involved in the MENA region. As they come in with different histories and different economic and political systems, their views on what stability should look like and the preferred path toward stabilization, also differ. New powers including Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are increasing their presence, while a resurgent Russia is trying to assert itself in the region. Competition between the permanent members of the UN Security Council illustrates this change. And in contrast to the West, these new powers do not yet suffer from “intervention fatigue” or squeezed defense budgets.

Renowned pundit Dominique Moisi, in a recent article, states the following:

Today, too, mainly European, or Western, approaches to ensuring stability in the Middle East no longer work. As a top European diplomat told me recently, the Middle East crisis is in desperate need of fresh thinking and new leadership.

Moisi makes a very important point: the first step Western policymakers need to take is to reevaluate their own thinking, reflect on their own definitions of stability and stabilization of the MENA region, as well as on how these might differ from—and, in particular, how these interact with—other important international approaches to stabilization in the region.

Only by thoroughly understanding the world views, objectives and approaches of other external (and domestic) actors involved, as well as by appreciating the changing balance of powers between these key external actors, can the West expect to promote its own “ideal” in the Middle East’s increasingly crowded marketplace of ideas.   

Saskia van Genugten is Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy and co-director of the Academy’s “Stabilization Research Initiative.”

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo credit: "Flag of Egypt all over Tahrir Square" (CC BY 2.0) by RamyRaoof

Hundreds of senior leadership positions in the federal government are currently vacant. This issue has plagued Democrat and Republican administrations alike. This matter is not about what political party controls the White House, Senate or House of Representatives; it is about process.

The United States faces a host of significant issues at home and abroad. Staffing the government with competent and capable Americans will contribute to the resolution of these problems. Instituting mandatory timelines for federal nominations and confirmations could be an important step forward in addressing vacancies in critical positions.

We recommend Congress change the law to mandate timelines for federal nominations.

Read the full commentary on The Hill.

Photo: Wikimedia

China and Pakistan have been faithful allies since the early 1950s. The Sino-Pak relationship has proved to be fundamental for both countries, deriving mutual benefits from their strong diplomatic alliance and economic ties. Therefore, it came as no surprise when Pakistan welcomed President Xi Jinping in April 2015 to inaugurate the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor“ (CPEC), a key project under China’s ambitious One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR).

CPEC is designed to connect the city of Kashgar, in China’s landlocked Xinjiang province, to the port city of Gwadar in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, offering a vital infrastructural network linking China to the Arabian Sea. CPEC commits Pakistan’s land and resources to a massive 62 billion USD investment that will have tremendous socio-economic and geopolitical implications for the partnering nations and the region as a whole. Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who advocated for the venture, characterized CPEC as a “game changer” that would bring about a transformational change and pull the nation out of its economic misery.

Indeed, Pakistan’s financial and geostrategic position may enjoy a considerable advantage courtesy of CPEC. However, any real gains will require an appropriate execution of this ambitious initiative coupled with a sound understanding of how the Sino-Pak collaboration will relate to the competitive interests of major regional stakeholders, in particular, the U.S. and India.

Perceived Gains

The planned 15-year-long collaboration encapsulates projects that span across Pakistan’s five provinces, focused on improving the country’s infrastructure and power generation capabilities while producing an estimated 700,000 jobs. Unfolding at a steady pace, approximately 19 projects have reached completion making it the fastest developing of OBOR’s proposed corridors.

China’s investment has fostered greater economic activity in Pakistan and paved the way for a more robust GDP growth. Pakistan now ranks 115th on the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness scale for 2017-18, a jump of seven positions over the previous year, and earlier this year was upgraded to the MSCI Emerging Market Index, which has further enhanced prospects for future foreign direct investment. Additionally, the World Bank, in its Pakistan Development Update for 2017, projected that the nation’s economic growth could reach 5.8 percent in 2019, partially owing to the investment inflows from CPEC. Moreover, CPEC has managed to attract interest from Iran, as conveyed by President Hassan Rouhani last year, as well as from Russian investors who are keen on exploring investment options.

Importantly, Pakistan’s global image has also undergone a drastic makeover. Where Pakistan was harboring fears of isolation and was largely being overlooked for its extremely volatile security situation, it is now increasingly being recognized as an important regional player in South Asia.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

While CPEC paints a promising picture, not everyone is optimistic about this venture. Business insiders have expressed grave concerns that China will have a disproportionate economic advantage, a sentiment validated by a breakdown of CPEC’s recently published “Master Plan.” For instance, the plan briefly highlighted how Chinese investments are tailored to facilitate the Kashgar Prefecture, and also mentions China’s aspirations towards building the largest textile production and export processing base in Xinjiang. Such developments would mean a serious competitive disadvantage for Pakistan’s textile sector and local industries in general.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s provinces have always been divided by their own self-interests and it is only a matter of time before these divisions pose barriers to CPEC’s progress. Today, the tribal leadership in Balochistan views CPEC as a tool for exploitation that compromises local rights and interests and has warned both the government and China to halt the project with immediate effect. Equally critical are the emerging security concerns such as the recent grenade attack on Gwadar Port, while the murder of two abducted Chinese nationals has created a daunting scenario for the safety of the deployed workforce necessitating Pakistan to establish a Special Security Division to guard CPEC.

Another major point of concern is asset risk. CPEC’s financing is primarily based on a set of Chinese grants and concessionary loans, and failure to deliver on financial gains means Pakistan will have much to lose, particularly considering the country’s track record of debt obligations to the IMF and World Bank. Under the pressure of such exorbitant loans, Pakistan could be in jeopardy of forfeiting a stake in its own land and resources. This prospect has prompted certain Pakistani lawmakers to compare CPEC with the East India Company, arguing that any incoming capital could very well be offset by an even greater outflow. The handover of the Hambantota Port  following Sri Lanka’s debt crisis and inability to repay 301 million USD to China is often raised as an example of what could go wrong in Pakistan.

Within this context, the increasingly close relationship between the United States and India has also become a point of interest for Pakistan. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently suggested solidifying a free and open “Indo-Pacific” and endorsed India as a responsible regional partner. India has always maintained its stance against CPEC suggesting that the corridor passes through disputed territory and that it is non-compliant with the Indian ideals on “Belt and Road” projects. On the other hand, the U.S. has a strong interest in sustaining a balance of power in Asia and maintaining regional stability. However, the Trump administration has expressed doubts over Pakistan’s role as a counter-terrorism ally, straining current relations. Arguably, U.S. support of India’s claims could further add fuel to the fire and create bottlenecks for CPEC.

The Road Forward

Driven by geostrategic interests, China’s architecting CPEC means it is naturally the frontrunner for the lion’s share of  anticipated returns. In contrast, Pakistan’s bifurcated leadership, administrative inadequacy and lack of operational transparency make it imperative for the incumbent government to prioritize effective project implementation and to exercise sustainable long term policies if it wishes to achieve envisioned gains. The highly anticipated CPEC Long Term Plan is set to be finalized at the upcoming 7th Joint Cooperation Committee meeting in Islamabad and should provide a more realistic benchmark for Pakistan’s cost and benefit analysis.

Pakistan’s policymakers also have a crucial task at hand in balancing the possibly broad implications of the growing U.S.-India nexus. Pakistan cannot afford to lose its alliance with the United States if it wishes to safeguard its national security in the long run, necessitating enhanced bilateral cooperation that recognizes areas of shared interests and encourages the U.S. to adopt, at a minimum, a neutral perspective on CPEC, appreciating its potential value for Pakistan.

CPEC remains a remarkable initiative and many of its industrial and economic benefits are already materializing. Ultimately, despite internal and external pressures, Pakistan’s ability to adequately leverage and monetize this commitment will determine CPEC’s real worth to its economy, its citizens and its standing in the region.

Farwa Aamer is a Research Associate for the EastWest Institute’s Asia-Pacific Program.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo credit: "Xinjing 2013 mountains Pakistan border_M" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by peteropaliu

The European Union is riddled with overlapping problems. The euro currency crisis, diverging policies on Russia and Turkey, irregular migration patterns, rising nationalism, terrorism and Euroskepticism are just a few—not to mention the Brexit. With all of these issues piling up, it's little wonder that some EU leaders have judged the European project to be on the brink of its demise. As Martin Schulz, the former president of the European Parliament, put it in 2015, "the failure of Europe is a realistic scenario." But just as many have assumed the Continent's collapse to be a reality, two political figures have offered much-needed optimism for Europe's future.

Click here to read the full article on Stratfor.

Photo credit: "European Parliament in Strasbourg" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Council of the EU

BY: VALBONA ZENELI

In Europe, there is a clear understanding that unresolved ethnic and geopolitical conflicts are threats to regional stability. Stabilization of the European Eastern neighborhood has been a security imperative for the European Union (EU) for some time. A principal goal of the 2016’s EU Global Strategy and the revised European Neighborhood Policy is to invest in the resilience of Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgina, Moldova and Ukraine.

The EU’s primary objective in the EaP is to fund the development of democratic institutions, good governance and economic development. However, there exists a dilemma within the region when it comes to its economic integration with the EU, resulting in new divisions and dissent amongst states.

All EaP countries would like to take advantage of closer economic links with both the EU and Russia via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Politically and economically, the integration dilemma between the EU common market and the EAEU remains deeply divisive—the EU is the largest economic block in the world, while Russia’s regional focus appeals to some EaP nations.

According to IMF data, in 2016, the average income per capita in the region was 3,378 USD per year, which is only eight percent of the EU’s average per capita income. Moldova is the poorest country in the region with only 1,871 USD per capita, in 2016. When considering a weak regional recovery following the global economic crisis—which saw an average economic contraction of negative six percent in 2009 (with the exception of Azerbaijan)—hopes of catching up with the rest of Europe are fading.

In the current environment, Russia remains a significant player, exerting influence using economic, energy and political leverage. Understandably, the combination of internal vulnerabilities and external pressures creates a very challenging situation, where instability and lack of economic security support a cycle of weak governance, high levels of corruption, poverty and inequality, and weak economic development.

Competing Orbits

The difference in allegiances of the EaP nations is increasingly apparent. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are signatories to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), bringing relations between these countries and the EU to new economic levels. Meanwhile, Armenia and Belarus have opted to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in partnership with Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Azerbaijan remains neutral).

Countries are free to choose the trade agreement that best serve their trade and economic interests. In the case of the EaP region, it is important to look at the essential differences between the EU and the EAEU, their purpose, complexity and attractiveness.  

Informally formed in the 1990’s, by 2015, the EAEU has since grown into an established economic union. The EAEU’s mission mimics the EU’s in its intention to encourage economic integration through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. To date, it has proven ineffective, with statistics showing a six percent decrease in trade between EAEU partners in 2016.

In contrast, the EU continues to engage in trade with all nations in the region more frequently than the EAEU, excluding Belarus. The DCFTA has significantly increased trade between the EU and the three signatory countries. The EU is the largest trading partner for Moldova with 64 percent of its trade (40 percent for Ukraine and 32 percent for Georgia). Because all three countries together make up only one percent of the EU’s total trade, there remains scope for even greater growth. Most importantly, the DCFTA is not only about trade liberalization, but also serves to increase the competitiveness of domestic companies across the region, making them increasingly attractive to foreign investment. Currently, the entire EaP region attracts less than 0.5 percent of global FDI.

The EAEU’s four trillion USD common market consisting of 182 million consumers represents less than two percent of global GDP at the current exchange rate. Members of the EAEU are too different in terms of economic development and structure, and econometric calculations suggest that the EAEU causes more trade diversion than trade generation. Most importantly, the EAEU market is based on extractive industries and not on innovation and know-how, which raises important questions about future regional capacity and competitiveness. Arguably, while access is easier to the EAEU, a political agenda dominates the economic one.

Ultimately, the EAEU’s main objective is to negotiate comprehensive treaties with its largest economic partners—the EU and China. While no real progress can be achieved with the EU until its own current political crisis is resolved, there is ongoing dialogue to involve EAEU countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China appears to be more interested in investing in those countries that have signed the DCFTA with the EU, owing to broader opportunities and easier access for Chinese products to the European market.

The Path Forward

Importantly, DCFTA requirements are meant to achieve a legal approximation to the acquis communautaire that would formalize technical standards for products and establish an EU-like regulatory environment. Certainly, in the short run, there are challenges associated with the implementation of DCFTA, including adjustment costs owing to industrial restructuring, loss of market share and structural reforms, as well as the growing need for infrastructure investments.

That notwithstanding, in the long run, the economic effects on the DCFTA countries—Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—are likely to be positive due to regulatory framework convergence with the EU, which will help attract FDI—increase competitiveness, foster trade and productivity gains—allowing for income growth and better quality of life.

Although EU integration seems to be a distant prospect for the EaP countries, at a minimum, if they were to follow the DCFTA integration requirements now, they would be well on their way to modernizing their economies and becoming more competitive in regional and, perhaps, global markets.

Dr. Valbona Zeneli is the director of Black Sea Eurasia Program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Berlaymont" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Eoghan OLionnain

On Sunday, the conservative People's Party (OVP) won the Austrian legislative elections, putting its leader, 31-year-old Sebastian Kurz, on a path to become the country’s youngest chancellor. The OVP secured over 30 percent of the vote, not only defeating the socialist party (SPO) of incumbent Chancellor Christian Kern but, more important, scoring a major victory over the populist right-wing Freedom Party (FPO), which had one of its best results yet. This was no small feat.

Only six months ago, the OVP trailed in third place behind the SPO and the FPO, which was in the lead with 29 percent of the popular vote. (Indeed, throughout 2016, as well as the last six months of 2015, polls indicated that the FPO had a solid lead over the other two parties, which put FPO leader Heinz Christian in pole position to become the next chancellor.) But in May, after Kurz, who had been serving as foreign minister since 2011, took over leadership of the OVP, the party began to climb in the polls. Kurz performed well during the televised debates, running on a platform that was tough on immigration but pro-market, pro-business, and pro-EU. He also projected experience, highlighting his ministerial position while simultaneously playing the role of an opposition politician with his movement, the New People’s Party, or the New OVP. He campaigned under the slogan “Zeit für Neues” (Time for Something New), a rebranding that gave the old party a facelift while leaving its structure in place.

In a sense, what Kurz did was inject respectability and rationalism into what was at heart a populist platform. 

Click here to read the full article on Foreign Affairs (paywall).

Photo credit: "Sebastian Kurz" (CC BY 2.0) by EU2017EE