Politics and Governance

Dr. Parker offered three theses on Turkey’s changes as a result of the April 16, 2017 referendum: first, Turkey has become significantly more complicated since the 2016 coup attempt and the Referendum; second, Turkey is located in a challenging geographic area and it’s important to view Turkey from the perspectives of Turkey itself, its neighbors and of the United States, and understand where each other is coming from; and third, Turkey matters; and U.S.-Turkey/Turkey-NATO relationships matter even more.

He explained how Turkey, with a population of over 80 million people, exists in a complicated region of the world surrounded by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria, just across the Black Sea from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. He stated Turkey has the second largest military in NATO, and that four million refugees have come to call Turkey their new home in the past decade. To put this influx of humanity into context, it would be the equivalent of the United States suddenly receiving a flood of 16 million refugees over a decade, equal to the population of 14 states, or 61 percent of Texas. Dr. Parker noted that Turkey does not call these new residents “refugees,” preferring instead to call them “guests,” as a sign of respect from Turkish citizens.

Dr. Parker also discussed key results of the 18 changes made to Turkey’s Constitution as a result of the referendum’s passing, which effectively transition Turkey from a parliamentary to presidential democracy, and reset term limits. The changes also provide for elections to be held within 45 days of the presidential post being vacated for any reason, effectively preventing a military coup from turning into a new government.

The EastWest Institute (EWI), the National Institute of Strategic Communication at Peking University (NISC), the Centre for China & Globalization (CCG), and the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) convened on June 15-16 an international symposium entitled “’Afghanistan Reconnected’: Renewed Opportunities Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” in collaboration with the Embassy of Afghanistan to China, Kabul University and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Following the Belt & Road Summit in Beijing in May of this year, the EWI symposium was the first follow-up event dedicated to one particular country along the “New Silk Road.” Given the tragic backdrop of the recent terror attacks in Kabul, the symposium was a timely event in reinvigorating a collective hope for the future as the general consensus was that peace in the region is dependent upon a stable and thriving Afghanistan.

The event focused on how China’s new outgoing economic strategy can provide benefits for Afghanistan's stability, security and prosperity in a regional context. To this end, it aimed to build trust between political and business contacts among countries (India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) with significant interests in the future stability of the country as well as to develop policy recommendations for regional economic cooperation.

Conceived as a Track 2 dialogue, the symposium brought together parliamentarians, diplomats, academics and professionals from across the private sector and several international organizations. Despite being an unofficial event, significant assurances from speakers associated with the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) represented the authentic expression of Chinese government strategy.

Key Themes

As a consequence of Afghanistan’s weakened governmental institutions and endemic corruption, the need to address the very real concerns that BRI may forgo Afghanistan completely was a main topic of concern. However, amongst Chinese reassurances that Afghanistan is very much a central cog of BRI, other delegates warned that an unstable and economically regressive Afghanistan will also hamper the future success of its neighbors.

Chief among several tangible Chinese pledges was the commitment to further financial investment and professional training.  Improving and increasing the possibilities for people-to-people exchanges between all countries along the New Silk Road was also emphasized as a perquisite to BRI’s possible success.  Several Chinese speakers voiced China’s commitment to provide 10,000 scholarships to train Afghan researchers, managers and engineers to run 50 jointly-organized laboratories.  The mining industry, in particular, was identified as a specific area of win-win cooperation, as Afghanistan boasts rich deposits of several minerals and can benefit from the infrastructure and technical expertise of China to exploit these resources.

Along with discussions concerning trade and transit, investment and infrastructure, and energy cooperation, sustainable or “green” development was a new theme to emerge as a guiding principle of BRI. In order to ensure the New Silk Road is conscious of its environmental impact, there were calls for concerted efforts from the Chinese government and its international partners to share information in order to develop thorough regulation and policy. In addition to its abundant natural resources, Afghanistan also has masses of renewable energy potential waiting to be tapped into, such as 23,000 megawatts of hydropower which, if developed, could be exported to Pakistan. Furthermore, well over 200,000 MW of solar energy and tremendous possibilities for wind energy are yet to be realized. As a concrete outcome, cooperation between Kabul University and Poly Solar Technologies was concluded to help both the university train Afghan students and the company invest in the Afghan market.

During the discussions, participants drew attention to how BRI can both learn and expand from previous initiatives which attempted to revitalize and reestablish the centrality of the Old Silk Road in global economics. Several philosophies underpinned previous attempts, but BRI’s strength lies in its extensive research and identification of significant focus areas, including Afghanistan.  A major task for BRI in this regard is to address the large trade imbalance between China and Afghanistan by creating stronger trading links through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

When considering the more polarizing foreign policy emanating from Washington, a significant geopolitical observation to come out of the symposium was the prospect for BRI to be a driving force in convincing regional states to put aside their differences in order to foster a richer culture of cross border cooperation. With over 20 terrorist groups said to be operating in Afghanistan, several delegates dispelled the myth that a difference between “good” and “bad” insurgent groups exists. Delegates, therefore, expressed the hope that both the U.S. and China would use their leverage over Pakistan and Afghanistan to work towards a common understanding of combatting violent extremism, and at the same time towards connecting the two countries through the existing and new rail and road systems. EWI’s CEO Cameron Munter, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, pointed out that BRI and the converging interests of the U.S. and China represent not only an immense mobilizer of unprecedented economic opportunities, but also an opportunity to strengthen institutional capacities and state building.

These arguments echoed Afghan President Ghani’s sentiments just a week prior, while he was in Astana, Kazahkstan as part of the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where he expressed his willingness to step up cooperation in transportation to enhance connectivity. Chinese influence is seen as a potential driver for brokering bilateral agreements regarding border management control along the hotly contested, and often tense, Durand Line. A common complaint, reiterated several times throughout the symposium, was that despite hundreds of agreements and MoU’s in place between Afghanistan and its neighbors, these policies often go unimplemented. In terms of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese/U.S. influence was envisioned as serving the dual purpose of providing an independent check on illegal crossings and assisting with trade management processes for trucks transiting goods in and out of either country.

Contrary to more pessimistic reports amongst geopolitical and international relations analysts, and with respects to other local infrastructure projects in the region, delegates at the event highlighted the potential synergies between the Iranian Chabahar and Pakistani Gwadar ports. Some see the construction of the two ports as physical manifestations of the wider geopolitical tensions in the region, especially considering the former is largely viewed as an avenue by which India and Afghanistan can increase trade by circumventing Pakistan. Yet, it was the compatibility of the two ports which garnered most discussion at the symposium with comments that Gwadar could complement the overall function of Chabahar by handling any spillover cargo. Moreover, the short distance between the two ports was seen as the ideal reason to implement a feeder vessel service, transporting both cargo and people to greatly enhance the economy and build trust between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

All parties to the symposium were thus unanimous in their insistence that Afghanistan will be an indispensable building block in the realization of BRI as it shall provide the bridge between east and west. More importantly, all delegates agreed BRI offered a unique chance for the countries of the region to focus on their mutual interests, rather than their mutual differences, in pursuit of economic prosperity and peace. As one delegate put it succinctly, this is a chance the region must not pass up.

Whenever there is an international security issue that merits the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China’s intentions are often questioned. Is China willing to work and solve crises within the international order or is it intent on replacing them? While China was once excluded from this order, it is now truly enmeshed in it.

Looking at China’s interactions with international security concerns—particularly with regard to “Rogue” states—can give us some answers. In any society, members are socialized to rules and they either adapt or get shunned. Likewise, states must observe key norms and values or be characterized as an outcast.

While there is no exact definition of a rogue state, it usually refers to a nation that is or has been a cause of regional/international instability, a target of UNSC action, an experienced internal disorder, a member of the developing world with an authoritarian ruler/group of rulers, and a state sponsor of terror. With these actors, numerous norms are at play. China’s interpretation of its role in international institutions, conceptualization of non-intervention/sovereignty, and non-proliferation play a major part in its interactions. Sudan, Iran and North Korea are perfect examples to illustrate China’s various responses. Each is a textbook rogue state, but for different reasons.

North Korea

China’s relationship with North Korea is complicated. While China is perceived to have significant influence over the nation, the reality is more complex. China maintains relations with Pyongyang to somewhat preserve stability. During the first Nuclear Crisis, China left the U.S. to deal with the Koreas. The U.S. had wanted  China’s help, but North Korea did not want them involved.

China’s more active role began after North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Talk in 2003, starting the second crisis. China predominantly limited itself to mediation or facilitation. North Korea’s nuclear test—and its abrupt notification to China—drastically changed the situation. China issued a harsh condemnation and allowed sanctions. Each subsequent test resulted in harsher sanctions and calls for talks. For Xi Jinping, China’s president, relations with North Korea started off on the wrong foot. In the short time between Xi becoming General Secretary and President, North Korea conducted a satellite launch and its third nuclear test, clearly a provocation. As a result, China supported further sanctions.

North Korea has continually ignored China’s calls for restraint. North Korea’s two nuclear tests last year further strained relations. In response to those tests, the U.S. and China worked together to strengthen UNSC sanctions. China even worked with the U.S. to maximize the impact of these new sanctions, having either vetoed or watered down the previous ones. As North Korea continues to be an issue, China will further enforce sanctions and call for restraint.

Iran

Dealing with Iran shows gradual but noticeable change in China’s approach. Iran’s quest to build a nuclear weapon, combined with its connections to terrorist groups, defines its status as a rogue. In the 1980s-1990s, much of the China-Iran relationship revolved around the sale of weapons and weapons technology. However, prioritizing relations with the U.S., China canceled weapons sales and nuclear assistance. This underscored that Iran was purely business.

Continuing into the 2000s, China viewed a nuclear Iran as a bilateral problem between the U.S. and Iran. China delayed referrals to the IAEA and the UNSC—giving Iran a chance to prove its peaceful intentions. When that failed, China pushed for Presidential Statements, then lighter resolutions, until Iran’s non-compliance could no longer be ignored.  China continually called for mediation and publically called for cooperation.

As Iran repeatedly failed to comply with international requests, sanctions grew harsher. China remained active in Iran, but allowed for sanctions. UNSCR 1929 in 2010 paved the way for unilateral sanctions, and while China did not publicly agree, they privately instructed some companies to observe them. This helped bring Iran back to the table for the negotiations that would become the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Here, China was viewed as a key mediator. China was said to have persuaded Iranian leadership of the benefits of the deal and became more actively involved.

Sudan

Sudan shows a clear evolution of China’s adaptation to unexpected circumstances. Initially, Sudan earned its rogue moniker through its 1990s connections with Al-Qaeda and the crisis in Darfur.  China’s relationship with Sudan was initially based out of mutual necessity—Sudan needed trading partners and China needed oil. China continued this “business is business” approach up until the peak of the Darfur crisis. International attention focused on the conflict and pulled China—and the 2008 Olympics—into the discussion. As China wanted to look like a responsible power, they had little choice but to act.

While dragging their feet in the UNSC, China appointed a diplomat to specifically deal with the crisis and sent high-level officials to Khartoum to obtain Omar al-Bashir’s compliance. These efforts broke past precedent and clearly indicated a shift in how China interpreted non-intervention/sovereignty. The referendum for South Sudanese independence continued this trend—from non-involvement in the peace agreement to active acceptance and support of UN efforts to ensure a fair vote. Shortly after independence, South Sudan fell into civil war, further intensifying China's role. China acted as a mediator, but after initial failed attempts, finally sent their first ever battalion of UN military peacekeepers. This emphasized how it viewed its role and further muddied China's definition of non-interference.

Constructive Engagement

Each example shows that, while imperfect in implementation, China understands the role it should take in international affairs and increasingly acts in such a way. China’s inaction was a result of not viewing issues as their concern. However, as their interests and roles within the international community grew, China became more involved in searching for solutions. This role has intensified with a willingness to address issues in their own way. China began addressing these cases through mediation, and while this is still a preference, its toolbox has expanded to include influence, peacekeeping and even sanctions.  

China’s role has moved beyond a strict definition of non-interference and sovereignty to a more “constructive engagement" that understands the values of upholding international norms. Their actions now more accurately reflect its presence in international affairs and are conducted in the interest of maintaining stability and ensuring peaceful resolution. This clearly shows that China’s membership in the international system has resulted in an internalization of values and norms and that China has chosen to stay within the international community rather than go outside it.  

Daniel Johanson is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London focusing on Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea, Iran and Sudan.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

The geopolitical backdrop of Moon's visit is framed around an increasingly provocative regime in North Korea and an administration in the U.S. that seems focused on forcibly changing the calculus of Pyongyang's decision to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons program. The stakes will be especially high because Moon—a progressive with dovish tendencies towards Pyongyang—is looking to demonstrate unity with President Trump without sacrificing his own policy goals of engaging the North diplomatically. There are also valid concerns in Seoul on Trump's protectionist rhetoric and his desire to amend—or maybe even withdraw from—the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

During Moon's election campaign, his rivals from both the conservative and progressive sides launched salvos at him outlining his dubious approach to dealing with North Korea and his sceptical take on the U.S.-South Korea alliance remaining at the core of Seoul's security ethos. They questioned Moon's flip-flopping on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea and his pledge to "review" the decision.

Despite THAAD being already deployed and operational, Moon has now made good in some sense on that pledge through his suspension—pending a probe's findings—on the deployment of an additional four missile launchers (there are already two launchers active and operational).

Washington's position, before the Moon-Trump meeting, is that Seoul's change of heart on THAAD is not only upsetting the operational effectiveness of the missile defence system (which is aimed to both defend South Korea and the more than 30,000 US troops in the country) but also is simultaneously weakening the credibility of the deterrence value of the US-Korea alliance. Moreover, some reports have indicated that Trump himself is "furious" over Moon's decision to suspend the full deployment of the launchers.

Read the full article here at Al Jazeera.

While mounting tensions in recent years have caused U.S.-Russia relations to deteriorate—and as a matter of course, bilateral channels of communication to freeze—EWI has managed to sustain dialogue on this common threat. As a forum for cooperative engagement, the working group regularly brought together U.S. and Russian technical and policy experts to share knowledge, make consensus assessments and deliver innovative and concrete policy solutions to counter Afghan narcotrafficking that would have traction in both countries, as well as in the larger relevant policy communities.
 
In the course of its implementation, the working group engaged and consulted with a number of experts and officials from key stakeholders, including Afghanistan, Iran and the Central Asian states. The working group also garnered positive feedback and support from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN), in addition to various multilateral organizations/agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 

Published in April 2013, the working group’s first report, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, provided a summary of the experts’ consensus findings on the scope and threat of Afghan narcotrafficking. In subsequent years, the working group also prepared issue-specific reports on the following: (1) an assessment of the post-2014 security, political, and economic situation in Afghanistan and the expected impact on narcotrafficking and counternarcotics efforts; (2) border protection against narcotrafficking around Afghanistan and in Central Asia; (3) alternative poppy-free development strategies for Afghanistan; and (4) flows of Afghan drug money and laundering in the international financial system. A sixth and final report, a joint policy assessment, will comprise a compendium of the group’s key recommendations and updated assessments on the overall narcotics situation in Afghanistan and is expected to be released in July 2017.

PREVIOUS REPORTS

Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, April 2013

In English

In Russian

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios, February 2015

In English

In Russian

Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders, April 2015

In English 

In Russian 

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development, July 2016

In English 

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows, June 2017

In English

Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Policy Assessment

Anticipated release date: July 2017

EWI CEO & President Cameron Munter is featured in the Diplomatic World magazine and discusses the unique work of the institute.

Munter talks about the various processes in which the institute works in order to bring together key stakeholders and bridge differences to prevent conflict.

The former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan also shares his insights on current global topics and future challenges in the diplomatic world.

To access the full story, click here.

Given the extent of the structural shifts in politics in post-2003 Iraq, the level of destruction in the liberated areas and the depth of distrust among communities, the challenge of post-ISIS recovery could not be greater.  To create an inclusive political order in Nineveh and provide a successful model for other parts of Iraq, policy- and decision-makers must engage in constructive debate, share visions and develop strategies tailor-made for the province.

To facilitate such debate among local, national and international stakeholders, the EastWest Institute co-organized a dialogue and workshop with the Middle East Research Institute (MERI). Held in Loosdrecht, Netherlands on May 31 to June 1, the event brought together representatives of Nineveh’s ethnic and religious communities, members of the Nineveh Provincial Council, the Iraqi Federal Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and a selection of international donor countries and international non-governmental organizations.

The aim of the workshop was to:

• provide a platform for strategic, thought-provoking and action-focused dialogue on the process of post-ISIS reconstruction in Nineveh over the short, intermediate and long-term.
• support the development of coherent policy responses to the most pressing issues facing Nineveh whilst taking into account the political, sectarian, and ethnic diversity of the province.

The EastWest Institute and MERI will publish a policy report from the event.