Politics and Governance

A high-level U.S. delegation led by EastWest Institute (EWI) CEO and President Cameron Munter held three days of meetings with top Chinese officials and experts from June 12-14, 2017, in Beijing. The meetings were part of the 11th U.S.-China High-Level Security Dialogue and were organized by EWI in partnership with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).

The High-Level Security Dialogue is an annual dialogue between U.S. and Chinese academics, former and current military and government officials and business leaders. This year’s dialogue occurred during a time of political transition in both countries with the Trump administration in its first six months in the United States and China preparing for its 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Candid and substantive discussions during the dialogue covered a range of challenging topics affecting the bilateral relationship, including the impact of domestic factors on U.S.-China relations; Asia-Pacific security topics, particularly the North Korea issue; globalization; and trade and economic issues.

In addition to a full day of dialogue at CIIS, the delegation also visited the China Reform Forum, the National Defense University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University. Delegates met with Minister Wang Yi and Vice Minister Zheng Zeguang at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vice Minister Guo Yezhou of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and officials from the United States and Republic of Korea embassies in Beijing.

Pictured: Ambassador Cameron Munter shaking hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. 

In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Cameron Munter, President and CEO of the EastWest Institute, said that China's trade push in Afghanistan would "make an enormous change in the way countries in the region see one another."

Munter was speaking during an international symposium in Beijing last week, which was co-organized by EWI's Afghanistan Reconnected Process. The conference—the first one dedicated specifically to the trade plan between Afghanistan and Beijing—focused on ways to unlock both Afghanistan's and the broader region's economic potential during a vital time of transition as well as on on fresh opportunities provided by China's Belt and Road Initiative. 

Click here to access the article at the South China Morning Post. 

Although there has been no concrete evidence that votes were unlawlfully altered during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, a leaked National Security Agency report appears to prove that Russian hackers attempted to compromise the electronic poll book software in numerous states. The scope of this hacking has not yet been determined, but, regardless of the possibly unprecedented interference, cybersecurity experts are already looking toward making future elections as free from outside influence as possible. They cite greater reliance on paper ballots and post-election audits as possible solutions to ensuring greater voter legitimacy down the line. 

Stressing the necessity of finding a proper solution as soon as possible, EWI Global Vice President Bruce McConnell told USA Today, “Maybe we dodged a bullet this time and there was no actual vote tampering. Next time we may not be so lucky.”

Click here to access the full article on USA Today. 

Kawa Hassan, Director of EWI's Middle East and North Africa Program, was on Kurd Connection to comment on the latest developments in the Europe-United States relationship. The segment, aired on June 30, focused on the speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel about the fate of the European Union following the G7 talks in Italy.

Some highlights from Hassan's remarks are:

• Climate change is not only important for Europe, but also affects the entire globe and humanity. The European Union spent a lot of time and effort to lobby most countries to sign the Paris Climate Agreement. America's withdrawal from the agreement is a big blow to multilaterialism that aims at achieving and implementing joint actions to address the global impacts of climate change. 
• On May 28, Chancellor Merkel told an election rally in Munich that the EU cannot completely rely on the U.S. and UK. The tone and frankness of the speech is unprecedented since she is known to be cautious in her public statements and speeches. Partly, this has to do with the upcoming election in September in her country, and partly has to do with a broad European concern about the policies and unpredictable character of U.S. President Donald Trump. This tone symbolizes a shift in trans-Atlantic relations. Merkel made it clear that the EU should be less dependent on the U.S. and more dependent on itself. 
• To an extent, Trump has a point when he reiterated at a NATO meeting in Brussels that other member states have failed to meet the 2% spending commitment. The EU must be willing to increase its defense spending. Furthermore, at the same NATO meeting, Trump did not reiterate his commitment to Article 5 of NATO. These are fundamental changes in the trans-Atlantic alliance but they don't  necessarily herald the end of NATO and G7 because of three factors:
  • The U.S. is still the largest economic and military might in the world;
  • The EU still needs U.S. military protection against external threats; and
  • The U.S. remains a big market for EU products.

Watch the interview below courtesy of Kurd Connection, a joint program of Voice of America Kurdish Service and NRT, the Satellite Kurdish TV. Hassan's remarks begin around the 0:12 mark.

The reelection of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani as President emphasizes the support for stability and re-engagement with the international community—something that will be a relief for China.

Hassan Rouhani’s clear win in the Iranian election bodes well for the region, as well as for China’s interests. This reelection ensures a level of continuity that would have been difficult to retain under his opponent Ebrahim Raisi, who, in general, appeared to want a return to Ahmadinejad’s Iran. While China’s relationship with Iran would likely have remained similar under either leader—the stability brought by Rouhani is clearly preferred.  

The Campaign

The uncertainty of the campaign and global trends towards populism worked together to make the Iranian election nearly impossible to predict.  Generally, it was described as a ‘referendum on Rouhani’s job performance.’ With many Iranians dissatisfied with the growth of the economy since the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a Rouhani win was never a sure thing.  Shortly before the election, one of the other major conservative candidates dropped out and endorsed Raisi, making it seem like the conservative vote would all go for Raisi. If Raisi would have won, Iran would likely have to turn away from international investors and eventually moved away from the nuclear deal.

Raisi’s campaign underscored that he was a nationalist – focused on Iran solving its own problems, while Rouhani highlighted that he was a globalist—seeing the benefit of a more open economy. Part of Raisi’s campaign platform hinged on voters believing that the promised benefits of the JCPOA had not materialized and that the Iranian economy would benefit more from his guidance.  His campaign was filled with populist rhetoric claiming that he could improve the economy better than Rouhani.  Aspects of the campaign mirrored the election in 2005—when a populist Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani faced off—but Raisi’s message seems to have not had the expected impact.

Raisi’s campaign also made China into a scapegoat of sorts, as it has in the past, for a reason that Iran’s economy is not doing as well as it could—a doubling of the import of Chinese-made goods. This, however, works both ways—both imports from China and non-oil exports have increased since Rouhani started his term—66.5 percent and 73 percent respectively. Oil, still the major export, rose modestly by 4.3 percent. Compared to Ahmadinejad’s second term, in Rouhani’s first term non-oil exports have grown from 18.7 billion USD to 32.4 billion USD. Unemployment has also decreased from 15 percent when he took office to 10 percent last year.

Even though it was not clearly fleshed out, Raisi’s foreign policy left something to be desired. Overall, he told reporters that he would ‘establish ties with every country except Israel.’ Some reports, however, viewed his key policy advisor (and at that point potential foreign minister) to be Saeed Jalili, a frequent critic of the JCPOA who wants Iran’s foreign policy role to be more revolutionary—challenging perceived hegemony in the world.  Jalili was a nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad from 2007-2013.

As a result of the Ayatollah’s approval of the nuclear deal, it would be difficult for anyone to unilaterally move Iran away from it. Raisi ‘express[ed] respect for the nuclear deal,, but made it clear that it was not the solution to Iran’s economic problems—as it had been marketed. Essentially, Raisi’s foreign policy agenda would have been similar to Ahmadinejad’s.

Rouhani won—now what?

Realistically, Rouhani’s win means that we should expect to see a continuation of his current policies—and that’s a good thing for almost everyone involved. China, in particular, will view this positively as it will all but ensure that regional stability is maintained—at least by Iran. Stability is continually preferred by Beijing as it allows for more political predictability and maintains stable economic conditions. During his term, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric became trying and stability was constantly threatened, so a similar administration would be disastrous—especially with the Trump administration. After Rouhani won his first term, he began a refreshing process of reengaging with the international community. Rouhani’s reelection with 57 percent of the vote will give him further support as he moves ahead with reforms and continues to further Iran’s ties with the rest of the world.  

Even as the Trump administration moves to ‘review’ the JCPOA, the vote of the Iranian people shows the world they have clearly chosen to support the process and gives China a strong reason to continue to support the JCPOA. This should be a clear sign that Iran wants to keep progressing under the agreement—any move away from full implementation would be squarely on the United States.  Reengagement with the U.S. will likely be difficult, but beneficial in the long run.

The main result for Sino-Iranian relations will be a continuation and possibly intensification of current relations. More infrastructure investments will likely be made—given Iran’s enthusiasm with the One Belt, One Road concept. In general, though, deals made before the election—such as China’s redesign of the Arak nuclear reactor as well as whatever OBOR projects already underway—will continue as scheduled. Overall, this election shows that continued stability and reform is important to Iran, something that China will be happy with.

Daniel Johanson is a PhD candidate at King’s College London focusing on Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea, Iran and Sudan.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

The Task Force on the Future of Iraq, convened by the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, has completed its year-long project to identify ways to support the Iraqis in stabilizing their state, facilitate the defeat of extremist groups like ISIS and building the basis for long term stability in the country.
 
Kawa Hassan, director of the EastWest Institute’s Middle East and North Africa program, was one of 20 experts invited to take part in the Task Force on the Future of Iraq. The Task Force was chaired by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Executive Professor, Texas A&M University; Former Ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon.
 
“It has been a tremendous honor to represent the EastWest Institute in this distinguished, policy-oriented group of recognized Iraq experts,” said Hassan. “It is with great pride that our recommendations on the paramount importance of good governance and real reforms—as preconditions to defeat ISIS and violent extremism—may add value to the security goals of Iraq and the wider region.”
 
Over the course of 2016, the task force brought together the world’s leading Iraq scholars, experts, and former policy practitioners to conduct a rigorous inquiry into how the United States could best protect its national security interests and promote Iraqi interests through targeted and effective engagement in Iraq. Task force experts traveled to Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaimani, Najaf, Amman, Berlin, and twice convened in Washington, D.C. to engage with Iraqi policymakers, civil society actors, and religious leaders. 

Download the full report here.

Photo credit: "Kalar Castle" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Joshua Zakary

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe staked his line in the sand on his controversial plans to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution by 2020. The timing of Abe’s announcement, on Japan’s Constitution Day, was no coincidence, as this year marked the 70th anniversary of the country’s charter, which was enacted during the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II. Abe’s push for constitutional change is divisive in Japan since it focuses on a clause in Article 9 that “renounces war” completely as a means to settle international disputes. 

Specifically, Abe wants to include a reference to Japan’s military, known as the Self-Defense Forces, within Article 9 and officially recognize their role through the constitution. The Self-Defense Forces have been de-facto accepted constitutionally for decades, but the Abe government argues that this should be spelled out more clearly and concretely through a revision to Article 9. 

Abe thus far has noted that he will not touch the current clauses in Article 9, likely in order to avoid greater controversy and backlash in Japan. In principle, the inclusion of additional language on the military is a reasonable and not far-reaching change. But the symbolism of any constitutional revision means much more given Japan’s postwar political culture, and that is likely to cost Abe political capital going forward.

The move has also stoked criticisms from many of Japan’s opposition parties, given Abe’s clever and even guileful approach of advocating for constitutional revisions as the president of his ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party. This loophole allowed Abe to avoid technically pushing the issue from his position of prime minister, since the constitution does not permit proposals for amendments from anywhere except the legislative branch. A second concern arose surrounding the venue where Abe chose to make the plea—at a gathering of the Nippon Kaigi group, a notorious right-wing group that has affiliations with Abe and many other members of his Cabinet. 

The tensions over constitutional revision may give some life to the fledging political opposition in Japan. But questions remain on the position of the main opposition party, the Democrat Party, as many of its members have also acknowledged the need for debate and potential changes to the constitution. There will likely be divided opposition on the issue in the coming months, to Abe’s advantage.
 

Click here to read the full article on World Politics Review.

On May 15, 2017, Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President of Strategic Trust-Building and Track 2 Diplomacy David J. Firestein joined Voice of America's International Edition to discuss claims that President Donald Trump revealed classified information in a meeting last week with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the White House.
 
Firestein noted that although the focus of the media has been on whether the alleged breach of classified information is deleterious to U.S. interests, the media has not devoted as much energy in reporting on the source of the allegations and the means by which such information has come to light. As relatively few participants were present in the meeting, the anonymity of the source of this information continues to raise questions.
 
Firestein then commented on the difficulty in assessing the damage of a statement without knowing exactly what was said, and accordingly, more well-informed conclusions will be made with greater authority as further details and context become available.

Listen to his comments below, beginning around the 2:00 minute mark.