Politics and Governance

Similar to the United States and France, Iran is to set to have a new President in what’s shaping up to be a polarized election between current moderate President Hassan Rouhani and his conservative counterpart—Ebrahim Raisi—who is also custodian of the wealthiest charity and business conglomerate in the Shia world. On Friday May 19, over 50 million eligible voters in Iran will take to the polls.  
 
The Iranian election will have a profound socio-political impact domestically. Even after the much celebrated 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers, the country continues to suffer from a stagnant economy and unemployment. The Rouhani administration inherited former President Ahmadinejad’s broken economy of negative three percent and lifted it to a 26 percent growth rate since 2013. However, one of Rouhani’s biggest promises in the 2017 election is the lifting of the “non-nuclear” sanctions. Ahead of Friday’s election, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that “the Supreme Leader regards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a test for our counterparts, and if our counterparts show interest to find resolution we have the readiness to enter other stages.”
 
With just a few months into Donald Trump’s presidency, the Iranian election will also have significant implications on the United States, as well as its regional neighbors. It remains to be seen how President Trump will address Iran. All this while Europe has already shown vested interest in a post-sanctioned Iran and is welcoming to what can be a promise of an open Iran. More importantly the majority young population of Iran—with 50 percent of them under the age of 30—the Iranian people strive to belong to an international community and they will choose whoever can deliver them a glimpse of that hope.
 
To further unpack the 2017 Iranian presidential election and its regional and global implications, EWI Visiting Scholar Tara Kangarlou spoke with Dr. Sadegh Kharazi (pictured), one of Iran’s most prominent diplomats who served as the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations and France under President Mohammad Khatami. 
 
Q: The election is shaping up to be a close race between President Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi—who many in the West suspect to be a favorite among the conservatives. How do you evaluate the Rouhani-Raisi match? What are some of the key make or break points for both candidates?

Kharazi: “There has been no insignificant election in Iran; because each election is a reflection of the country’s foreign policy and domestic political climate, while being entwined with an element of surprise and an unpredictable result. This time around, the elections are even more important because of the unfinished implementations of JCPOA, Trump’s election in the U.S., and unique regional conditions in particularly with Syria, Iraq, and the hostile behavior of Israel and Saudi; and its result will no doubt affect the region.”

Q: One of the biggest success stories under President Rouhani was the nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers back in 2015. Do you think that’s a big enough score to gauge people’s vote for the second term?

Kharazi: “The nuclear deal removed a huge dam that was in front of the nation and the people of Iran; and today it needs to be mended, taken care of, and honored by its foreign signatories. This can indeed help Rouhani’s re-election.”

Q: You are a diplomat, a politician, and a strong voice among the moderates and the reformist majority in Iran. Which candidate do you think will help Iran’s economic boost, global engagement, and strength in supporting regional stability? Why?

Kharazi: “I consider Rouhani an appropriate choice at the moment who can help economic growth, diplomatic openings, and renewed political opportunities for Iran. Rouhani’s motto is ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the international community. This will ultimately lead to economic progress and growth under a calm and stable umbrella that’ll be a direct result of a better international cooperation.”
 
Q: Some regard Iran as one of the very few actual Democracies in the Middle East, while many others in the West—especially the United States and its allies doubt the “electoral process” in Iran and argue otherwise. How much influence do people’s votes truly have?

Kharazi: “Take a closer look at the United State’s allies in the region. Are any of the Saudi, Bahraini, or Qatari systems of governance based upon any sort of “election?” Let’s not go far and just look at what happened in Turkey recently—why has there been no criticism from the U.S. toward Turkey’s referendum? One of the biggest indications of a Democracy in any country is the election of an “opposite party” to that of the ruling government. For example, after Khatami there came Ahmadinejad and after Ahmadinejad you had Rouhani elected. You can also look at the shake up of our conservative parliament into a reformist one. Also, the excitement and prowling of the candidates and their supports to gain majority votes—in and of itself—is a loud indication of the power of the people’s vote.”
 
Q: When running for president, candidate Trump expressed criticism of the nuclear deal. How do you think Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy approach will be toward the U.S. and preserving the JCPOA? How will Rouhani’s be?

Kharazi: “All Presidential candidates have accepted JCPOA as an international agreement. Disagreement in reaching our demands falls in the helm of our Western counterparts.” 

Q: Today the Middle East region is suffering from multiple unrests in Yemen and the six-year-old crisis in Syria. There is a great opportunity for regional powers (Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Saudi Arabia) to work together in resolving some of these matters) but just this past week, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Price, Mohammed Bin Salman said that Saudi won’t engage in any dialogue with Iran, accusing it of following an “extremist ideology.” How would you comment on the Saudi position?

Kharazi: “It’s mind boggling that the Saudi’s accuse Iran of having ‘extremist ideologies’. Do we see any other outcome in their support of radical religious groups other than fostering hostility and terrorism? Let’s remember which country supported ISIS in Iraq and Syria and which country fought against ISIS. Throughout history, Iran has always been in support of the middle ground and tolerance. Even the Islamic Revolution of 1979 falls within the more peaceful revolutions in history. Unlike the classic revolutions in history we didn’t see rivers of blood or massacres. The Saudi’s comments are humorous to me. I encourage your readers to read and study the history, implications, and ideologies of Wahhabism; and also do a bit of research on Shiism. Then they will be able to see the truth behind such remarks.”

The report lays out the differing strategic perceptions of the United States and China with respect to some of the most topical and challenging issues on the U.S.-China agenda today. These starkly differing perceptions inform and exacerbate actual policy and fuel mistrust and broad mutual strategic suspicion.

By exposing the diverging perceptions of the two countries and bringing those perceptions into the fabric of bilateral discourse more explicitly and honestly, this report creates the basis for a more honest, substantive, constructive, fruitful and mutually beneficial dialogue.

Background:

In the first hundred days of his tenure in the White House, President Donald Trump has had to devote considerable attention to the United States’ single most consequential bilateral partner:  China. 

The issues currently on the U.S.-China agenda share several commonalities: they are top-tier issues that garner presidential attention in both the United States and China; they are contentious, in the U.S.-China context, to the point of raising the prospect of direct conflict (e.g., a hot war or a “trade war”) between the United States and China; and they represent enduring, and seemingly intractable, challenges. These issues also share another less obvious commonality: they are issues where the U.S.-China perceptual divide is as much a part of the problem as the actual interests or policies in question. 

Key Issues Addressed:

• The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
• The stability of the Korean peninsula, including specifically, the deployment of the THAAD system
• U.S. reconnaissance operations in the Asia-Pacific region
• Disputes in the East and South China Seas
• Cross-strait relations
• Cybersecurity 

The full report is available here.

After spending the past few months skeptical of reviving the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from in January just after he took office, Japan has changed tack and is now looking to press ahead on finalizing the major Pacific Rim trade deal with the 10 other signatory states. The about-face on the TPP by Japan, which is the largest remaining economy in the deal, came ahead of a critical meeting this week of the signatories, known as the TPP-11, looking for a path forward without the United States. 

The meeting, held in Toronto, was a first step to discuss whether the TPP is still possible in some form without Washington’s support. Japan, Canada and other member countries were not optimistic earlier this year. Now, though, Japan is leading the push for a new agreement that it hopes could be finalized, in the best-case scenario, at the end of this year on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings in Vietnam.

Under the rules of the current agreement, it is impossible to move forward and ratify the TPP without U.S. involvement. Therefore the focus is on constructing some kind of new cover for the TPP-11 with the same framework and rules negotiated in the TPP. The absence of the U.S. remains a major hurdle, especially because several members, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, made tough concessions on market access simply due to the U.S. inclusion in the deal.

During his first week in the White House, Trump seemingly rang the TPP’s death knell by signing an executive order outlining the U.S. withdrawal. While not a surprise given Trump’s campaign promises, that doomed initial hopes from Japan and other TPP members that the Trump administration might back off its earlier rhetoric and realize the economic and strategic benefits for the U.S. of the major multilateral deal. 

Read the full article here.

The EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the Tehran-based Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office, convened a dialogue in Tehran in December 2016 as part of EWI’s “Afghanistan Reconnected Process;” a multi-year program aimed at contributing to Afghanistan’s future stability by encouraging regional cooperation.

The Tehran dialogue extended to both policy makers and the business community to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing Iran as an essential neighbor of Afghanistan. The dialogue aimed to deliver relevant policy recommendations that have a reasonable prospect of implementation. Specifically, discussions focused on identifying obstacles to trade, transit and energy cooperation between the two countries, and proposing viable solutions to these obstacles. The present briefing, jointly issued by EWI and IPIS, is intended to highlight the findings of the dialogue and the resulting recommendations. 

Executive Summary 

Iran’s re-entry into the global fold presents a number of unprecedented opportunities, positioning the country to contribute considerably to the development of neighboring Afghanistan in the coming years. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s strategy of fostering regional economic cooperation as the linchpin for long-term growth and stability in Afghanistan will encourage and even necessitate Iranian participation. As a vital neighbor emerging from global isolation, Iran can serve as a critical partner in this long-term plan, and also in the efforts of the international community.  

Tremendous opportunity exists to increase trade and economic cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan. Sharing a 936km border with trading routes through Herat in Afghanistan’s north, water sharing agreements on the Helmand River, and mutual opportunities for resource development, Iran is well-positioned as an integral member of Afghanistan’s regional development sphere. The India-supported construction of Iran’s Chabahar port represents an important step toward taking advantage of Iran’s access to deep water points. Opportunities also arise in addressing the massive trade imbalance between the two countries. At the end of the Iranian calendar year in March 2016, Afghanistan exported less than 26 million USD in non-oil trade to Iran, while importing only 2.5 billion USD from its neighbor in return. 
Iran stands ready to increase its role in Afghanistan, but there are clear obstacles to maximizing the potential of the Iranian/Afghan relationship: namely, poor connectivity and infrastructure, a deteriorating security situation, endemic corruption in Afghanistan, an absence of contacts and networks between Iranian and Afghan business people operating in either country, unfavorable visa policies and tariffs, and a lack of trust in the Afghan market.

Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan to create a more secure environment is vital to long term economic growth in both countries. Iranian influence both in western Afghanistan and in a broader regional context can serve to improve security, assist Afghan governance improvements, and implement long term regional economic plans grounded in trusted agreements. A genuine partnership between Afghanistan and Iran, as well as strengthened regional and international efforts toward cooperation, will be crucial for future prosperity in the coming decades.

Download the full report here.

On April 28, David Firestein was a guest on “Pro and Con,” a popular live, Mandarin-language one-hour talk show on the Voice of America. Firestein offered commentary on President Donald Trump’s first 100 days and, also, on the Administration’s approach to China and Russia, as well as the triangular dynamics between the United States, China and Russia.

Firestein observed that though the Republican Party controls the White House and the United States Congress, and though the majority of Supreme Court Justices were also appointed by Republicans, passing major legislation, such as health care or immigration reform, remains challenging owing to deep intra-GOP rifts. Firestein also noted that his earlier prediction of broad continuity in U.S. policy toward China is seemingly thus far being borne out, while President Trump’s stated desire to improve relations with Russia has been thwarted, owing to the unexpected political fall-out from the Russian involvement in the U.S. 2016 presidential campaign alleged by U.S. agencies and other observers.  

Among non-native speakers of Chinese, Firestein is among the most frequently invited and widely recognized commentators on U.S. politics and foreign policy on the air today. The Voice of America Mandarin Service has over half a million YouTube subscribers.

On April 17, EWI President & CEO Cameron Munter spoke about on a wide range of global issues, particularly a new diplomacy in the 21st century and how diplomacy needs to adjust amid all of the new challenges. Watch:

Munter also discussed the topics in his appearance on the college's podcast "Free Food (for Thought)," including his thoughts on success. Before joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Munter taught European history at the University of California Los Angeles. He also has been Professor of International Relations at Pomona College in Claremont, taught at Columbia University School of Law, was a Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and has two honorary doctoral degrees. Listen:

Munter chatted at length with Pakistani journalist and human rights activists, Beena Sarwar, at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center about women's role in peace and security in Pakistan.

The former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan said there are Pakistani institutions "that keep women from reaching their full potential" including "a calcified political system, a juridical system that is underfunded and not efficient, and an education system that is woefully underfunded." 

Despite the misgivings, Munter quickly added that there are "long term trends in Pakistan which can favor some progress in this world."

Munter added that "the overarching passion about education in Pakistan extends to all classes, and extends to boys and girls. The professions in the country [lawyers, doctors, engineers] may overtime become feminized so the public sphere in Pakistan can change not suddenly, but incrementally by a gradual familiarization of people in a public role where women are accepted."

Listen below:

For details about the Belfer Center, visit here.

Image credit: BennCraig/BelferCenter

It's hard to overestimate the importance of France's presidential election. As many experts have noted, the winner will have an enormous impact on the very form, indeed the existence, of the European Union, the common currency, and the future of European politics.

Sunday's first round has given us clarity on the choices. The final on May 7 will give us a new French President.

Now it seems that Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen have made it to the runoff. Already this is historic: for the first time since the founding of the Fifth Republic, the traditional left-right parties have been shut out of the final round. Most devastating is the collapse of the Socialists, who drew single digit support, continuing a trend in Europe among social-democratic parties that we've seen not only in Britain and the Netherlands, but indeed throughout the continent. It's not too much to claim that the choice now is not between left and right, but between open and closed: open societies and open markets and open borders versus more limits on civic freedoms, more protectionist economies, limits on immigration. Comfortable welfare-statism is on the outs.

Imagine, then, what has happened in France: working class voters have left the Mitterrand/Marchais bloc, many of them moving to the nationalist positions of Le Pen; conservative voters have splintered from the days of the Chirac coalition, many of them voting for Francois Fillon (who just missed passing Le Pen into second place), others moving further right; those on the hard left voted for Jean-Luc Melenchon (who was not far behind Fillon). Fillon and Socialist Benoit Hamon have already come out in support of Macron in the runoff, making a victory for this most moderate candidate more and more likely. But it's sobering that well over 40 percent of voters voted for the far right, and both Le Pen and Fillon make no secret of their admiration for the Russia of Putin.

And so, due to the structure of French electoral politics, the prohibitive favorite will be Macron, a man committed to the EU, to the common currency, to NATO, and the traditions of the west. And this only because of a few percentage points among voters. Still, we're entitled to ask whether, with the victory of Van der Bellen in Austria, of Rutte in the Netherlands, we've seen the cresting of the populist tide in the west. My answer is: not so fast.

First, we haven't seen the results of the second round yet. Even though the analogy of Le Pen to Brexit or Trump is hardly apt (polls showed Remain and Clinton ahead by 2-3 points, while initial polls show Macron with a 30-point lead over Le Pen in the May 7 final), one never knows.

Second, the underlying dissatisfaction that motivated so many voters to reject traditional candidates remains, and the underlying weaknesses of and challenges to the EU have not gone away.

So instead it may be that we've entered a mature phase of the new politics of the West that emerged last year. These politics challenge the verities of the post-1989 world, especially since Europeans now note that while one used to talk about how Europe would affect the world, one now talks about how the world might affect Europe. In such a situation, even someone like Macron, if he's elected, can't turn back the clock and govern like it's 1999. The new issues, and the new political landscape, will be with us for a long time. But at least in France, fears that these issues would spark an immediate and possible wrenching realignment in international politics and structures do not seem to have been borne out.

In March, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe toured France, Germany, Italy and Belgium with the primary aim of shoring up the prospects of a trade pact with the European Union that has been under negotiation since 2014. The overarching objective of Abe's visit was to underscore Japan's support for freer trade amid rising protectionist sentiment.

But while trade headlined the trip, Tokyo is also looking to the 28-country EU and its large member states for greater attention to Asia-Pacific security issues. This is especially true in the light of provocations by North Korea in recent months. Japan also continues to be concerned by Beijing's destabilizing activities in the East and South China seas.

Abe stressed the importance of bolstering security cooperation with EU officials in Brussels and with leaders of several European states. Abe and French President Francois Hollande agreed on the importance of freedom of navigation and open seas, and pledged to undertake joint naval drills in the future. Tokyo and Brussels confirmed broad agreement on the importance of international norms and laws in the maritime domain.

But Tokyo remains concerned about the level and prioritization of security relations within Japan's broader relationships with Europe, the lack of European engagement in dealing with the problems posed to Japan by China, and the approach from Brussels, as well as some individual EU states, to security flashpoints in East Asia.

An example of this was the EU's underwhelming response to a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which concluded that there is no legal basis for China's extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Brussels called for the ruling to be respected, but stopped short of urging its full implementation. European countries have also been less than attentive to destabilizing activities in the Korean peninsula and the East China Sea.

Why is this the case? Essentially, there is concern in Tokyo that Europe is unwilling to commit a meaningful presence—both in diplomatic and military terms—to the region to demonstrate a united approach in support of international rules and norms, such as the freedom of navigation.

Read the full commentary on Nikkei Asian Review here.