Politics and Governance

What will President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia look like? Similar to so many other subjects concerning the presidency of Donald Trump, details are sparse but there are already some indicators where the relationship could be heading.

The first official reaction, that came from Russian president Vladimir Putin after Trump’s surprising victory, laid out the foundation for future cooperation: “Building a constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington—one based on principles of equality, mutual respect and a real accounting of each other's positions — is in the interest of both nations and the world.”

On the surface, this demonstrated that Russia hopes the relationship can be fundamentally reshaped. Among other things Moscow may long for recognition as an equal power. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to see President Trump as a partner. Conversely, judging from his election rhetoric, Trump, as a transactional leader, is of the view that it will be possible to cut deals with the Russian president.  

As a result, the U.S.-Russia relationship is bound to improve in the short run should the United States accommodate Putin’s desire to be seen as an equal. It may even influence developments in Syria and help break the political and military stalemate in the country. In their first phone conversation on November 14, Trump and Putin discussed Syria and agreed to “uniting efforts in the fight with the common enemy number one – international terrorism and extremism,” according to a Kremlin statement.

Indeed, it seems that the new U.S. leadership, including the team the president has started to assemble, identifies terrorism and radical extremism as the main security threats currently facing the United States. As a result, a political compromise of some sorts on Syria paired with joint U.S. Russian effort to eradicate the Islamic State can be expected to address this priority.

U.S.-Russia frictions may arise, however, over the situation in Ukraine (and in the post-Soviet space in general). Unlike in Syria, a country outside Russia’s traditional zone of influence, Moscow claims privileged status in Ukraine underlined by red lines that no post-Soviet state should dare to cross. These red lines have become increasingly more rigid since 2008 when Russia expressed its disapproval of Georgia’s aspiration for NATO membership and subsequently engaged it in a military conflict.

In 2014, Russia stepped up its demands on former satellite states. Since then it not only views NATO accession as a firm red line, but it would also not tolerate any cozying up towards the European Union or the West in general. Moscow gives the impression that the declaration of neutrality or non-alignment would not be sufficient reassurance for smaller post-Soviet states any longer. These demands, if not met, would deprive those states of a large portion of their sovereignty.

President Trump will have a choice to either accept or reject Russia’s zone of influence. If, despite the many shortcomings that Kiev continues to present, Ukraine is “sold out” to Moscow, doubts about the upcoming administration will arise in many European capitals. It will raise the question whether the United States should contribute to the re-division of Europe into two distinct zones of influence: that of an “enlarged” west and a “reduced” east with some countries still dithering in-between.

Ukraine will not accept any agreements without U.S. guarantees. If none will be forthcoming, it is difficult, for example, to imagine that Kiev would accept the decentralization of power in Ukraine and provide a special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk areas under the Trump administration when it did not agree to it during Obama’s terms in office.

The President-elect will have to take into account that nobody in Washington’s foreign policy and security establishment will recommend weakening the Transatlantic link and provide further reason for the Europeans to doubt the credibility of NATO and U.S. security guarantees. It is apparent that the recent farewell trip of President Barack Obama to Europe aimed at reassuring the European allies that the campaign comments of Trump dismissive of NATO should not be taken literally. However, it remains to be seen how President Trump will reconcile his likely non-interference pledge in the post-Soviet space while assuring United States allies and partners in Eastern Europe.

In the end, the question will be whether a middle ground can be found between retaining U.S. leadership in the world without alienating Moscow. However, monitoring the evolution of Russia during the Putin era and its readiness to pay attention to international actors only when their messages are backed by hard power and strong commitment, it is unlikely that Trump’s policy predicated upon non-interference, will leave much room for the United States to press its interests with a Putin-dominated Russia.

The Trump administration, touting its ostensibly-ready disposition to compromise and nativist regard may also feed into populist sentiments in Eastern and Central Europe, where populists such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Beata Szydlo and Jaroslaw Kaczinsky in Poland try to cling to power and could see Trump’s likely non-interference doctrine in the post-Soviet space as a justification to model their politics on Vladimir Putin’s autocratic style.

The short honeymoon between Trump and Putin may well be followed by a long and difficult marriage. The problem may stem from the fact that some passing pronouncements of Donald Trump during the election campaign will be difficult to harmonize with the incoming Republican administration’s declaratory, value-based policy and interventionist instincts including in the post-Soviet space. This uncertainty in Washington will only add to the unpredictability and volatility in U.S.-Russian relations over the long-term.

Pal Dunay is Professor of NATO and European Security Issues at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views expressed in this article are his own.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has been a critical part of ensuring stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, however, new challenges from peer competitors to cyber attacks are testing the USN like never before. To understand the Navy’s strategy for dealing with these issues, EWI Senior Fellow Franz-Stefan Gady spoke with Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden, Commander of Naval Surface Forces.

Earlier this year you ordered a “stand down” owing to a series of equipment and human failures on board the Littoral Combat Ships. Are the critical issues behind these developments strategic or technical in nature?

There is no question that the vast majority of our LCS Sailors are doing the right thing every day, but it is crucial that every Sailor is able to follow the proper procedures, and this is why we conducted a stand down. There were a few instances of human error that contributed to engineering casualties on some littoral combat ships. The stand down focused on addressing procedural compliance issues and reminding our Sailors of the importance of operating equipment in accordance with established procedures. Given that we are operating two completely different and complex ships, along with the fact that each new ship slightly deviates from the last version of the particular variant, it was important that we took the time to review our processes, discuss various issues, and share lessons learned.

Click here to read the full article on The Diplomat.

While the world is still fixated on the aftermath of the surprising election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, there is a political storm brewing in East Asia involving one of Washington's most important allies — South Korea.

Park Geun-hye, South Korea's embattled president, is just barely clinging on to office as her administration has come under intense criticism for its alleged collusion with a controversial outside adviser, Choi Soon-sil, who has been inappropriately close the leader. This has led many in South Korea to accuse the president of having a "shamanistic relationship" with a non-sanctioned consigliere.

Read the full commentary on Al-Jazeera here.

For years, Europe has been running from one crisis into the next, the Greek financial disaster, the Ukraine conflict, the refugee inflow, the terrorist attacks, the Brexit, the rise of right-wing populism, the Italian banking trouble … the EU and European countries are in continuous trouble-shooting mode, and recent elections and referendums, some with unexpected or unwanted results, don’t make it any easier.

China has been watching quietly from afar how Europe grapples with its challenges. While a German saying—used to describe an event of little significance—goes that one couldn’t care less when a bag of rice falls over in China, the Chinese view on what happens in Europe does matter nowadays.

That said, the EU as a whole, i.e. as a supranational institution, has seldom been of great interest neither for the Chinese media nor for the Chinese public. For instance, in People’s Daily, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), among 39,683 articles and commentaries between April 2015 and April 2016, less than 0.5% had to do with EU–related affairs. Paradoxically, it is thanks to the multiple European crises, especially the refugee crisis and the Brexit, that the EU has recently become a more prominent topic in the Chinese media. It is worth examining why the mostly state controlled media have an interest in doing so, and why the Europeans should care.

China, the wounded Elephant

Any attempt to understand current developments in China must take history into account. China has an elephant’s memory, for instance of how the late Chinese Empire was humiliated by Western powers in the 19th century. Actually, the debate among Chinese elites, whether the western system and western democracy could serve as a model for China’s development, began some 200 years ago. In the mid-19th century, a group of reform-oriented mandarins blamed China’s defeats in the opium wars on the backwardness of Chinese industry and military, coupled with an encrusted political system based on traditional Confucian values. These reformers propagated a western style modernization. This cost some of them their heads. The rulers rejected the proposed westernization, as they concluded that the western system and values were unsuitable to rule this vast and diverse country. Isn’t it striking that you can hear almost the same argument from Chinese leaders nowadays?

Chinese state media use the European crises as a proof for the flaws of the western system and western democracy

From the tens of thousands of articles we screened and analyzed, I want to share with you just a couple of quotes. Here are some (translated from Chinese by the author) which speak for themselves:

“The so-called ‘universal values’ promoted by the West have brought disaster to the Middle East and caused the refugee crisis.”  – Zhang Weiwei, Dean of China Academy, Fudan University”, CCP magazine “Qiu Shi (Search for the Truth)” 02/15/2016

“The refugee crisis is the result of a self-righteous democracy idea"  - Wu Sike, China's former special envoy on mid-east, People’s Daily, 10/07/2015

In addition to making the Europeans responsible for their crises, some commentators have identified the United States as the main culprit behind the scenes:

“This refugee crisis was triggered by the United States, who provoked the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, ... the United States are the culprit, Europe is siding with the bully.” – Chen Shuguang, Professor from Wuhan University, CCP magazine “Qiu Shi” (Search for the Truth), 12/15/2015 

The Brexit, in particular, offers an ideal case to argue for the falsehood of democratic elections and referendums:

“The defects of making a national-level decision with an arbitrary referendum are obvious……it was ‘tyranny of the majority’ ” Xinhua News, 06/26/2016

“The key to understanding England’s current disorder is that its ‘Western democracy’ is only a façade, and that the real decisions are taken in the backroom by powerful economic groups.” Luo Siyi, Renmin University, Global Times, 07/04/2016

The reasons for launching such opinions in Chinese media are manifold. The Chinese government has learned to be more aware of public opinion, and bad news from abroad are a fine distraction from internal problems, and apt to fuel patriotic emotions. But that is only one side of the coin. We also need to take a closer look at China’s regional and global ambitions.

China’s Going Out Strategy: Occupy the periphery to encircle the center

While Europe is busy with managing various crises, China is buying up the world. In 2015, President Xi Jinping announced an investment of $250 billion USD in Latin American and Caribbean countries over the next 10 years, and a 60 billion USD investment in Africa over the next three years. At the same time, ASEAN-China trade volume increased from eight billion USD in 1991 to 472.2 billion USD in 2015. That’s by nearly 60 times within 25 years. China’s annual investments in the EU are over 20 billion euros, whereas the annual investments from the EU in China are only 10 billion euros. Beijing prefers to talk to London, Paris and Berlin directly rather than via the EU. Despite concerns from the United States, 14 EU member states became founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Germany alone injected 4.5 billion USD into the AIIB.

China also established new platforms with selected groups of EU member states, such as the “16+1 cooperation” of China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries, while a wide range of cooperation agreements in energy, infrastructure, trade and tourism, etc. was concluded in this format. China is also reaching out to northern and southern Europe to establish similar platforms. While Europe does need Chinese investment in the wake of the various financial crises and a stagnating Euro-zone economic growth, not everybody is amused about this piecemeal approach. Is China pursuing a strategy of “divide & conquer” towards European countries?

China’s most ambitious and far-reaching “One Belt, One Road” project which aims at developing infrastructures and trade in ASEAN countries, Central Asia and Europe has also triggered concerns. Actually, China’s investments are moving on, from Asia and Africa gradually towards Latin America, the U.S. and Europe.

 Those who know the game of Go, or“The Art of War“ by Sun Tzu—Mao Zedong was a great fan of both—may recognize some familiar strategic moves, such as “Occupy the periphery to encircle the center”.

While China’s proactive overseas investment strategy is evident, a parallel paradigm shift in China’s foreign and security policy remains less noticed. China has moved from its long time non-interference policy towards actively engaging in e.g. the peace process in Afghanistan and—albeit indirectly—even the Syria conflict. China is now the second-largest contributor to the United Nations peacekeeping budget, right behind the United States. This lays the ground for China having a substantial say on where the UN will engage and where not. By the way, if you added up contributions of EU member states to the UN budget, the EU would stand as the biggest contributor and could exert a dominant influence—if only member states got their acts together to speak with one voice.

Is China the biggest winner of Brexit?

China sees the European crises as a good chance to buy up strategic assets in Europe and reach better deals as the EU member states are competing against each other. Look at the recent takeover of the German robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese company Midea, or the construction of the nuclear power station Hinkley Point C in England.

In a nutshell: On the domestic front, the European crises and the “snapshot” referendums have given the Chinese leadership welcome proofs for discrediting the western system and western democracy. And in the international arena, a weakened Europe already helps China to play a more important role economically; it is foreseeable that a divided Europe will be even more dependent on China. In the medium term, China will also have a better position for negotiating tricky issues like lifting the EU arms embargo, having China’s market economy status recognized, and in the long term even for promoting the Chinese view of global issues, such as sovereignty and human rights. Is it fair to say, as blogger and economist Dr. Li Xiaopeng put it, that “China is the biggest winner of Brexit”? 

On November 4th, 2016, EWI Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President David Firestein sat down with “Focus Talk,” a Voice of America Mandarin Service current affairs program, to discuss the impact of the FBI’s decision to reopen the investigation into Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s email controversy. Firestein later delved into the potential legal crises that might await either candidate should they be elected to the Oval Office.

On November 8, Kawa Hassan discussed live on NRT News, a Kurdish language news television network in Iraqi Kurdistan, about what the two possible outcomes in the U.S presidential election would mean for the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Syria. Below are some key points from Hassan's comments:

• Given the economic, political and military importance of the U.S. in global politics, this election will have a huge impact on global issues ranging from the fight against ISIS, the future of Iraq & Syria after the military defeat of ISIS, to U.S. relations with Russia, China, and the European Union. 
• Both presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton of the Democratic Party and Donald Trump of the Republican Party, have diametrically opposing world views. Broadly speaking, Trump is an isolationist, while Clinton is an internationalist. Trump would focus on the U.S., while Clinton would be more engaged in Middle East issues. This would have profound impacts on their polices in the Middle East. 
• Clinton's personality is also different from that of President Barack Obama.
  • Whereas Obama was very cautious in dealing with Russia in Syria and did not want to have a substantial engagement in Syria, Clinton is known to be more assertive. If Clinton becomes a president, there is a possibility she will take a tougher stance against Vladimir Putin's Russian policy in Syria by attempting to impose a no-fly zone through closer cooperation with Arab Gulf countries. She might also consider giving more arms to Kurdish groups fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. But beyond more military engagement (excluding boots on the ground), it is not clear whether Clinton would develop and implement a political vision for post-ISIS Syria and Iraq to deal with the myriad of conflicts plaguing both countries.
  • It is true that Clinton has called on Iraq to "get its political house in order", but it is not clear whether she would develop a comprehensive political vision and strategy to help Iraqis to get their house in order. 
• Clinton also favors a tougher stance on Iran compared to Obama. Saudi and other Arab Gulf leaders would therefore hope that Clinton would put more pressure on Iran in relation to the nuclear deal and its influence in the region. 
• The biggest issue with Trump as president is his unpredictability and populism. If Trump becomes president, many regional states will be nervous about his approach towards the complex conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as the fight against ISIS. Trump has signaled that he might be ready to cooperate with Putin in Syria. This would make Arab Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, very nervous. They fear that Trump will "hand over" Syria to Putin. Trump's populism could also have a big impact on Middle East politics. His populist rhetoric might strengthen the grip of autocratic leaders like Syria's Bashar al-Assad on power. In conclusion, his policies probably will strengthen Putin's influence and create a bigger support for radical groups like ISIS.        

Watch the full interview here.

In a prime time interview with "Kurd Connect", a joint program between Voice of America's Kurdish Service and NRT, the independent Kurdish Satellite channel, Hassan underlined three conditions that would translate the military defeat of ISIS in Mosul into a lasting political settlement. Hassan made his comments as coalition forces are making gains in the offensive to recapture Iraq's second largest city from the terrorist organization.

Hassan said it was highly possible that ISIS would ultimately lose Mosul. But, he added, the bigger question was what would happen afterwards.

The liberation of Mosul, said Hassan, could lead to a new beginning for Iraq and the emergence of an inclusive Iraqi state provided three conditions were met: 

• Iraqi authorities should regain the trust of the Moslawis, the people of Mosul. This is important because the sectarian policies of Iraq's previous government and the collapse of the people's confidence in the Iraqi army and post-2003 Iraqi state led to the ISIS takeover in June 2014.  
• The United States, United Nations, European Union, donor countries and regional states should set up a special fund for the stabilization and reconstruction of Mosul. The humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Mosul are immense. The international community and regional states can play a positive role in rebuilding Mosul by committing to financial resources. This will send a signal to the Moslawis that they will not be abandoned once ISIS is defeated. 
• International and regional powers should play a positive role in bridging the divide between the diverse Iraqi communities to reach mutual compromises regarding territorial disputes, distribution of wealth and power sharing.

Hassan's comments can be accessed in full here, beginning around the 6:45 mark. The interview is in Kurdish.