Politics and Governance

Since China’s economic reform starting in 1978, each Chinese leader has followed the tradition of promoting his own signature governing slogan.  Deng Xiaoping is remembered for the concept of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," President Jian Zeming is known for his nebulous governing "Theory of the Three Represents,” and President Hu Jintao for his ambition to achieve a "Harmonious Society." Following their footsteps, President Xi Jinping is extensively promoting his own signature slogan: the “Chinese Dream.”

President Xi’s Chinese Dream is a necessary and timely concept, which he made public for the first time in the China National Museum, surrounded by an exhibition documenting foreign invasions since the First Opium War in 1840, in particular. The painful humiliations that the Chinese nation suffered at the hands of the West and Japan are regularly revived by China’s leadership to energize and motivate the Chinese masses to participate in the Chinese Dream. Xi’s Chinese Dream can be seen as the spiritual dimension for which an increasingly wealthy and educated Chinese society is yearning.

While various Chinese groups (armed forces, farmers, officials, businessmen, etc.) have their own distinct interpretations of what the Chinese Dream means and how it should be achieved, there is little controversy over its ultimate goal: "fulfilling the great renaissance of the Chinese race," i.e. the Han race. Hence, the Chinese Dream is essentially a nationalistic ambition. And while love and pride for one’s own culture, history, and country are not problematic per se, if not managed adequately, nationalism can nurture an undesirable sentiment: chauvinism, in this case, Han chauvinism.

Among the 56 officially recognized ethnic groups in China, the Han is by far the largest and influential one. It represents 92% of the Chinese population and has dominated the culture and politics for most of China’s 5,000-year long history. In the current China, Han are in full control of China’s politics, economy, and socio-cultural values. Han consider their way of life and culture superior to others, resulting in them having strong chauvinistic tendencies. That Han chauvinism, or Hanism, poses a serious threat to China’s unity and stability have been extensively recognized by China’s leadership.

Han chauvinism: A recognized threat to China

Communist Party of China’s (CPC) leaders such as Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi have warned about the threat that Han chauvinism poses. As early as 1938, and often thereafter, Chairman Mao cautioned Han officials about prevailing Hanism as a source of interethnic conflict and the need to eliminate it in order to achieve ethnic unity, the very foundation on which China’s stability should stand:

Interethnic relationships are conflictive in certain regions due to Han chauvinism. Party members cannot tolerate this and we should deeply criticize Han chauvinism that occurs among party members and cadres... We should correct this mistake immediately. 

To correct Han chauvinism, Chairman Mao advised Han officials to be more humble, to listen to ethnic minorities’ grievances, and to accept their criticism. As for Premier Deng Xiaoping, he believed that Han chauvinism should be eliminated before asking minorities to do the same with their own chauvinisms:

As soon as Han reject Han chauvinism, the ethnic minorities will also be willing to reject their own narrow nationalism in return. We cannot ask from ethnic minorities to reject their narrow nationalism without first honestly rejecting the one big nationalism (Hanism).

Most recently, in 2014, President Xi Jinping and other CPC high-ranking officials discussed the threat of Han chauvinism during the Ethnic Affairs Work Conference, and released a statement emphasizing that “ethnic unity is the lifeline of Chinese people of all ethnicities and that to protect it we should stand firmly against great Hanism and ultra-nationalism.” These quotes illustrate the fact that CPC’s leadership continues to be aware of the magnitude of the threat that Han chauvinism poses to the Chinese nation.

It seems, however, that the CPC has not yet been successful in harnessing it and now, the Chinese Dream might further reinforce Hanism. Despite China’s globalization, the Han continue to consider other cultures as inferior, resulting, for example, in the Han feeling that their culture and history is far superior to those of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang territory in northwest China. As a consequence of their discriminatory treatment by the Han, the Uyghurs feel that their identity is under attack and that they are being treated as second-class citizens in their own homeland.

Han chauvinism seems to have been growing stronger in Xinjiang, particularly since the Urumqi riots in 2009, and it is dangerously undermining Beijing’s efforts to achieve harmonious interethnic relations by impairing Han officials from understanding Xinjiang’s socioeconomic, political, religious, and security tensions. If the chauvinistic tendencies from which the Han community suffers are not recognized and addressed, Xinjiang’s interethnic relations will worsen and could become a significant source of instability and threat to China.

Furthermore, Chinese chauvinism has already started poisoning China’s personal relations in foreign countries. For example, Chinese businessmen and officials traveling to Central Asian countries ignore local traditions and values, resulting in increasing tensions with the local populations. Kazak, Kirgiz, and Tajik already feel uneasy, if not fearful, of the increasing presence and influence of Chinese in their respective countries. If unchecked, one can argue that Chinese chauvinism could turn President Xi’s Chinese Dream into a domestic and international Chinese nightmare by having long term detrimental effects on the global perception of China. In turn, negative perception could gravely undermine well-intended massive development projects such as the “One Belt, One Road Initiative.”

The Chinese leadership and officials should recognize the existence of Han chauvinism among them and follow Chairman Mao’s advice to make concerted efforts to ensure that Han Chinese become more humble, respect different ethnicities, and accept input and criticism. By harnessing Chinese chauvinism, the Chinese Dream could help revive China’s historical glory.

Patrik Meyer is a fellow with New America’s International Security Program conducting research on issues related to China's One Belt, One Road Initiative.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond’s April 2016 visit to Hong Kong wasn’t unusual because he warned the Chinese government over human rights infringements, or defended the territory’s long tradition of the rule of law. Such is par for the course for British diplomats. What made it unusual was that this was the first time a foreign secretary had visited Hong Kong in five years.

Since Britain handed over Hong Kong to China, the former colony has proven to be a thorn in the Anglo-Sino relationship. While no longer sovereign over Hong Kong, the UK hoped that institutions that made the territory such a success—a market economy, freedom of speech and the rule of law—would continue under the One Country, Two Systems regime. Consequently, the UK pledged to stand up for Hong Kong’s liberties after it was returned to China. But ever since China canceled or downgraded diplomatic meetings with British officials in displeasure of David Cameron’s reception of the Dalai Lama in 2012, the Prime Minister has been noticeably quiet where it concerns Hong Kong, even in the face of the largest pro-democracy protests since the 1997 handover and the recent disappearances of booksellers who had printed material that criticized Beijing.

This comes as no accident. Britain has refocused its relationship with China on trade, according Chinese President Xi Jinping a state visit last year. Later, it frustrated the United States by joining the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

While the UK might stick up for human rights—as Hammond did on his visit—the message coming from London is clear: when it comes down to it, trade trumps human rights and other political concerns. China critics despair that for short and medium term economic gains, London is kowtowing to Beijing.

Objectively, a shift in British policy for trading purposes makes sense; however, when put in context of Britain’s decidedly benign relationships with its other former colonies, this shift seems less logical.

Britain has generally pursued a post-colonial foreign policy that aims to bolster democratic and liberal norms; even when it uses force, it often does so for humanitarian reasons or to uphold the will of the international community.

This approach is best reflected in Britain’s post-colonial infrastructure, which is based more on soft rather than hard. The Commonwealth champions democracy and human rights (as well as sports and culture); Rhodes Scholars are often public relations triumphs; and the “special” relationships with former settler colonies—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—underpin global politics, culture and commerce. Unlike countries like France, which has stayed militarily involved in its former colonies to this day, Britain’s interventions in its former colonies have been few and far between. For example, although France has intervened in former African colonies dozens of times since decolonization, Britain’s sole such intervention in sub-Saharan Africa was in Sierra Leone.

While realpolitik certainly plays into British foreign policy and its decisions to go to war, in recent decades, it has been violations of international norms—like internationally-recognized borders, human rights and democracy—that have prompted intervention. And Britain has applied those ideas universally. The Blair Doctrine—itself a form of historical legacy rooted in Britain’s sense of itself as a historically important nation with a duty in the world—was applied to ex-colonies and non-ex-colonies alike: by Prime Minister Tony Blair in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Iraq (incorrectly, as it were); a version of it has been applied by David Cameron in Libya, Syria and Iraq.

That’s what makes Britain's turn toward China and away from Hong Kong puzzling. For the first time in decades, it seems the Treasury is setting China policy, not the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

And it’s not just in China. Britain went from informally banning Narendra Modi from the UK (it didn’t accord him diplomatic immunity as an opposition leader and didn’t promise he wouldn't be arrested in relation to communal riots in 2012) to welcoming the Indian Prime Minister with a state visit, shortly after the Chinese one in 2015, in order to boost UK-Indian trade ties.

But these attitudes aren’t unprecedented. In fact, such a trade-based foreign policy resembles a much older historical legacy. Trade was the foundation upon which the Empire was founded—Singapore, after all, was founded by the East India Trading Company, and Hong Kong was itself won in a trade war. Today’s Asia policy is, in a weird sense, Empire redux.

The difference is that while trade was once the vanguard of British engagement, today, it is its vestige. Britain, having lost its empire, hasn’t so much found one role, but two, based in two different imperial legacies. It is now a regional power, not a global one (albeit its ‘region’ is decidedly large--and includes the Mediterranean, Levant, Europe, and much of Africa). In those regions—which include Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan—it is mounting a full-throated defense of liberal norms. But where it can’t project force, like in Asia, it has shifted to more pragmatic, soft powered-based relationships, principally based on trade.

If history is any guide, however, Britain will be unable to achieve its goals in Asia by focusing on trade alone. The East India Company-ruled India was absorbed into the Empire. Trade with China was established only by naval flotilla, (multiple) Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion intervention. Singapore and Hong Kong—both trading cities—were also British naval bases. And of course, when the rising Japanese hegemon disturbed order in the Asia-Pacific region, Britain had to defend its territories (and trading prerogatives) during World War II.

Asia is a very different place today. Britain is not about to use military force there, nor should it. In an era of limited resources, it is wise to refocus as a regional power; in any case, imperial ambitions are no longer appropriate. But that doesn’t mean it should eschew Asian geopolitics altogether. If there is one lesson Britain can learn from its historic adventures, it’s that unsettled politics ultimately disrupt trade, no matter how distinct the particular issues seem. Democratic norms and a respect of human rights, after all, contribute to stability, as does the fair settlement of multilateral issues like border disputes. That Asia— especially China—is beset with challenges on all of these fronts is a significant risk for any country seeking to do business there and to develop a long-term economic relationship.

A foreign policy that champions trade while remaining myopic on politics, democracy and human rights doesn't just contradict Britain’s principles—it will ultimately be counterproductive to its commercial ambitions.

Scott Bade is co-author of More Human: Designing a World Where People Come First. He tweets at @scottabade​.

To read this article on The Diplomat, click here.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

On May 26-27, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hosts his counterparts at the G7 Leaders Summit in Ise-Shima. The summit is to address a number of issues such as a unified approach to spur global economic growth and joint approaches to mitigate military escalation in Ukraine and Syria. But, arguably the most important area of discussion at the summit will focus on increasingly tense maritime disputes in East Asia.

During last month's G7 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Hiroshima, all sides agreed on a maritime security communique that prioritised the issue, and stressed the importance of a rules-based order underpinned by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (PDF).

The communique specifically pointed the finger towards Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas, noting "strong opposition to any intimidating, coercive or provocative and unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions."

The G7 grouping also targeted China by condemning its land reclamation in the South China Sea and the development of "outposts for military purposes".

China's Activities

This emphasis on maritime security is appropriate and necessary considering the significant developments over the past year, which continue to erode freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Specifically, China has been looking to coercively alter the status quo in both the East and South China Seas through a range of pressure tactics.

In the East China Sea, Beijing unilaterally declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 and continues to engage in a sustained strategy of challenging Japan's effective control of the disputed Senkaku islands.

China has also been bolstering the size and capabilities of its coastguard and has started to arm its vessels sailing near the disputed waters.

In the South China Sea, the situation has been devolving more acutely. Over the past two years, China has been ramping up its land reclamation and infrastructure building projects in the region.

On Fiery Cross Reef, west of the Spratly Islands, China has expeditiously worked to reclaim nearly 3 million square meters through dredging activities. Beijing is also building an airstrip, deep harbour and an array of military equipment aimed at maintaining and projecting effective control in the region.

China has also been conducting similar activities on our man-made islands, including Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, in an unprecedented cycle of escalation.

Other claimant states in the region, including Vietnam and the Philippines, have also engaged in land reclamation activities—but the scope and speed of these initiatives is not comparable with China's efforts.

The U.S. Push

The timing is critical for the G7 leaders to make a unified statement that the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific cannot be held hostage by Beijing's attempts at maritime suzerainty.

The fact that this G7 summit is hosted by Japan, the only Asian country in the grouping, underscores the importance of not downplaying the destabilising actions in the maritime domain.

Additionally, the importance of a strong message on maritime security is paramount considering this summer's looming decision by the UN-backed Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) regarding a case submitted by the Philippines against China over jurisdiction rights in the South China Sea.

In response to China's ramping up of activities before the PCA decision, the U.S. continues to push forward on its Freedom of Navigations Operations in the disputed waters - much to the anger of Beijing, which has the most expansive claim in the area.

Washington has also made other moves to counter China's expansive claims, such as a key base deal to rotate US marines in the Philippines and a lifting of the decades-old arms embargo with Vietnam.

Potential Outcomes

Despite this, there is little sign that Beijing will halt its expeditious pace of land reclamation in the area and indeed looks to be solidifying its presence through a sustained build-up of infrastructure on key reclaimed features such as Mischief and Fiery Cross Reefs.

The G7 summit provides a perfect opportunity to underscore the importance of transparency and freedom of navigation in Asia's seas.

At Ise-Shima, the leaders should publicly call for a transparent and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and call for tangible steps for a robust Code of Conduct (PDF).

The summit also provides a venue for unilateral and bilateral statements of support for ASEAN states and a pledge to increase non-lethal assistance and capacity building for their coastguards - often the frontline responders in these waters.

Finally, and most importantly, leaders need to make a clear statement that Asia's prosperity and security are inextricably linked to the freedom of navigation and trade in its seas.

J. Berkshire Miller is the director of the Council on International Policy and a fellow for the EastWest Institute's China, East Asia and United States (CEAUS) Program. He tweets @jbmllr.

To read this op-ed in Al Jazeera, click here. 

On April 8, 2016, EastWest Institute Board Member General T. Michael Moseley delivered the keynote address for the America’s Future Series National Security Symposium in Dallas. 

Gen. Moseley articulated threats to the post World War II security order, and how American leadership and engagement with allies can address these challenges. He encouraged the audience of business leaders to question the presidential candidates on their plans for strengthening America’s security and spirit of service, in consideration of the next generation.

Chief Operating Officer Dr. William J. Parker participated in the subsequent panel discussion moderated by former Dallas Mayor and Kaplan CEO Tom Leppert. Dr. Parker identified addressing the national debt, reforming the military acquisition process and formulating a Grand Strategy as urgent, crucial components of strengthening American leadership, and biological weapons as a tremendous threat in need of international cooperation. He discussed the EastWest Institute’s role in reducing international conflict and building trust.

Board of Councilors member Meredith Walker introduced James Megellas, age 99 and the 82^nd Airborne’s most decorated officer of World War II, for the presentation of the 2016 Megellas Award to Roger Staubach, Naval Academy graduate, former Dallas Cowboys Quarterback, and executive chairman of JLL Americas. Inaugural recipient Admiral Patrick Walsh thanked Mr. Staubach for his courage, character, and philanthropic leadership with Allies in Service, which supports veterans in transition. 

Click here to read more about the America's Future Series.

On March 18, 2016, EWI Perot Fellow and Vice President David Firestein appeared on Focus Talk, a Voice of America Mandarin Service current affairs program, to speak about the 2016 U.S. presidential primary campaign. Commenting in Mandarin, Firestein addressed the ongoing U.S. primary election process, the impact of the March 15 "Super Tuesday 2" contests on the race overall and Republican candidate Donald Trump's prospects for winning his party's nomination in spite of resistance from the Republican Party elite. 

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Go here and here for some of Firestein's other media appearances on this topic.

On March 9, 2016, EWI's Perot Fellow and Vice President David Firestein appeared on a Shanghai Media Group broadcast to comment on recent trends in China's foreign policy and U.S.-China relations. Firestein addressed international perceptions of China's approach to the South China Sea and the overall continuity of China's foreign policy, and also assessed the impact of the U.S.-China agreement on cybersecurity reached at Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States in September 2015.

Click here to watch the video. 

Last December, the Obama Administration notified the United States Congress of its intent to make available to Taiwan an arms package valued at $1.83 billion. It was the first notification to Congress of a planned U.S. arms sale to Taiwan since 2011, ending the longest gap between such notifications since the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (the Republic of China) to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland in 1979.

Many observers were surprised that the announced package wasn’t larger, given the length of time it had been since the United States had last announced such a sale. The smaller-than-expected scale of the package, coupled with the timing of the announcement—a decent interval after the state visit of President Xi Jinping to Washington, a month before presidential elections in Taiwan in which the KMT was clearly sputtering, and, perhaps most importantly, in the relatively quiet news week before Christmas—suggested to some that the United States was making an effort to limit the negative impact of the announcement on U.S.-China relations. And in fact, China’s reaction to the news was unusually subdued. The episode blew over quickly, with the U.S.-China relationship evidently no worse for the wear.

At face value, the fairly quiet way in which the matter was handled suggests that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, long an irritant in the U.S.-China relationship and a major bilateral trust-drainer from the Chinese point of view, are now a thoroughly manageable issue. But the low-key tone around this latest announcement masks a more fundamental, if perhaps less immediately perceptible, truth about the overall cross-Strait equation: namely, that the status quo is, for different reasons, sub-optimal from the standpoint of Taiwan, mainland China and the United States; or to put it another way: that current policies, taken as a whole, are actually failing all three stakeholders.

This is easiest to see when looking at the matter from the perspective of Taiwan. In 1979, Taiwan was widely viewed as having the capacity to defend itself effectively, and over a long period of time, in the event of a conventional attack from the Chinese mainland. The general assessment was that Taiwan possessed a military capability sufficiently robust to repel an amphibious assault, defeat China or at least fight it to a draw in the air, and ensure Taiwan’s continued survival and way of life for a protracted and perhaps indefinite period of time. But today, after some 37 years—and after about as many billions of dollars’ worth of Taiwan arms purchases from the United States during that period—the virtually unanimous assessment is very different:  the cross-Strait balance of power has shifted so dramatically in favor of the mainland that, for the first time in its history, Taiwan is now vulnerable to existential military defeat at the hands of the mainland.

Making this point more emphatically than perhaps any other expert on record, cross-Strait military analyst Mark Stokes told a key U.S. Congressional commission in 2010, “every citizen on Taiwan lives within seven minutes of destruction” (principally via China’s massive and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan), something that indisputably was not true in 1979 (when China lacked a ballistic missile capability altogether). So much for the idea that U.S. arms sales are helping Taiwan maintain its self-defense capacity; and so much for the idea that status quo policies are benefitting Taiwan.

Given the sharp deterioration in Taiwan’s net security position relative to the mainland, one might conclude that things are at least going well for the mainland. But in fact, that is not the case, either. Mainland China’s ultimate objective regarding Taiwan is reunification—essentially, by any means necessary, but with a stated preference for a political solution rather than a military one. With this ultimate objective in mind, China has deployed a massive ballistic missile arsenal in southeastern China, the primary purpose of which would appear to be to coerce Taiwan. Judging the cross-Strait picture against the mainland’s goal of reunification, it is fair to say that China is further from the attainment of that goal today than at any time since 1949. That may sound counterintuitive to those who view the closer economic and cultural integration of the mainland and Taiwan in recent years as evidence of an inexorable trend toward convergence and ultimately unification, presumably on terms defined by the more powerful mainland. But the reality is, pro-(re)unification sentiment is close to an all-time low, as evidenced by any number of recent public opinion polls.

Meanwhile, the independence-sympathetic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is just coming off its most decisive electoral victory in history—a landslide triumph by Tsai Ing-wen in the presidential balloting and an equally monumental win in the Legislative Yuan, where the DPP now commands a majority for the first time ever. Indeed, based on the results of Taiwan’s last six presidential elections, the trend line is unmistakable: the DPP is generally gaining voter share, moving from relative marginality (just 21% of the popular vote) in 1996 to electoral dominance (over 56% of the popular vote) just twenty years later. And the hard demographic reality is that those in Taiwan with the strongest personal, familial and historical links to the mainland are dying off with each passing year and decade; and a very vibrant and distinct sense of uniquely Taiwanese identity has concomitantly blossomed in place of those disintegrating links. When it comes to the issue of reunification, time is clearly not on the mainland’s side. And thus, it is evident that the status quo isn’t any more advantageous to mainland China than it is to Taiwan.

Nor is the status quo serving the United States well. The stated purpose of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which are mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, is “to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”; though it is not articulated explicitly, that envisaged self-defense capability is clearly understood to be relative to the mainland, which has always been seen in the United States (and Taiwan) as constituting the only credible military threat to Taiwan. A corollary of this basic policy purpose is that the United States wants to minimize the likelihood that it will have to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict that would potentially pit the United States against China in a hot war an ocean away from the U.S. mainland. This is why the United States, for decades, has articulated an enduring interest in the cross-Strait issue being resolved peacefully and in accordance with the will of people on both sides of the Strait. But what has happened in recent decades? The balance of power, as noted above, has shifted sharply in favor of the mainland, Taiwan is less secure relative to the mainland than at any time in the island’s history, the costs to the mainland of a possible campaign against Taiwan have decreased, and, as a result, the likelihood of a cross-Strait conflict has actually increased on the aggregate. In 1979, China would not have felt a conventional war with Taiwan was necessary (given the high level of support for the “one-China” construct that existed in Taiwan at that time) or winnable; today, the available evidence suggests that China believes such a war might be more necessary—and more winnable. And thus, the likelihood of conflict is greater, even if marginally; and concomitantly, the likelihood of the United States becoming embroiled in a cross-Strait conflict has likewise increased, even if marginally.  In short, the status quo around the cross-Strait issue is failing the United States, even as it is failing Taiwan and mainland China.

The issue of Taiwan is unlikely to devolve into a conflict in the immediate future.  But the issue is also less settled and benign than commonly thought. Current assessments of the cross-Strait situation are predicated on the notion that the status quo, however delicate, is the optimal state of affairs—basically, the “least-worst” scenario that is actually practicable. But this is not the case. Though the situation could be worse, it could also be better; smarter policies are available, achievable and necessary. (See here for one set of concrete policy recommendations put forward by the EastWest Institute.) Looking for the potential hot spots in the world or in East Asia, Taiwan does not typically rise to the fore. Going a little deeper, however, and applying the criteria of one new theory of major international conflict, it is clear that the China-Taiwan dynamic includes all the key ingredients for conflagration:  at least one state actor, at least one non-democracy, at least one non-nuclear power, the implication of at least one existential or identity-related national interest, and a healthy dose of exceptionalist thinking (in this case, on both sides). Reducing the threat of a cross-Strait flare-up will require vision, wisdom and skill. But above all, it will require the realization that, in fact, there can be a better status quo for all.

Click here to read this article on The Diplomat.

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In an article published on March 11, 2016, Firestein said the Chinese commitment was perhaps expressed clearly by President Xi Jinping during his state visit to Washington last September.

"The seriousness with which China seems to be taking this whole process had made an impression on the U.S. policymakers," said Firestein, as quoted in the article. Firestein was talking about the process of providing more substantial evidence to American authorities when dealing with extradition of corruption fugitives. 

Firestein, who speaks near native-level Chinese, concluded that such commitment would help U.S. officials make decisions that were well-informed and would likely lead to more repatriations of convicted or alleged criminals.

To read the full article, click here.

As part of his recent visit to Moscow and engagement with leading thinkers on key issues that can help re-build trust and cooperation between Russia, United States and its European partners, Dr. William Parker, COO of the EastWest Institute, was interviewed by Sputnik Radio. Here, Dr. Parker shared his insights on areas where the United States and Russia, building on mutual interest, can find additional scope for cooperation, in particular in the fight against ISIS.

Click here to listen to the complete interview.