Politics and Governance

On January 16, 2016, EastWest Institute Perot Fellow and Vice President David Firestein appeared on Voice of America (VOA) Mandarin Service to comment on the 2016 Taiwanese presidential elections, which resulted in the election of Taiwan's first-ever female president. He addressed the implications of Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ing-Wen's landslide victory on cross-Strait and U.S.-China relations and discussed its ramifications for the ongoing U.S. presidential election campaign. 

On Tsai Ing-wen’s victory, commitment to “status quo” and impact on relations between Taipei, Beijing and Washington, DC:

Firestein argued that Tsai Ing-wen recognizes the importance of cross-Strait stability for Taiwan, the mainland and the United States. Firestein noted that the U.S. was unsurprised by the results of the election and that U.S. policy towards Taiwan generally remains unchanged regardless of which party governs Taiwan. In Firestein’s view, maintaining the imperfect status quo in terms of both Taiwan’s status and relations between Washington, Beijing and Taipei is currently the only tenable arrangement. Tsai has already promised to be communicative with the mainland in order to maintain stability, and although the mainland would have preferred a Kuomintang victory, it is also painfully aware of the negative consequences of interfering too deeply in Taiwan’s affairs. If both the mainland leadership and Tsai can continue to show restraint and move forward cautiously, cross-Strait relations can remain stable. To this end, the U.S. will continue to pursue “dual deterrence”—pressing both sides to show restraint in order to maintain peace.

On the U.S. response to the outcome of the election:

Firestein believes that the election will not change the United States’ existing policy toward Taiwan, which is codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the 1982 Six Assurances and the Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. Furthermore, in Firestein’s view, Tsai has internalized some important lessons from previous DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s handling of cross-Strait relations and relations with the United States as evidenced by her strong pledge to maintain stability in cross-Strait affairs and by her stated focus on improving the livelihood of ordinary people. Firestein believes that former Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and current Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visits to Taipei and Beijing, respectively, in the wake of the election are not acts of preventive diplomacy per se, but rather are intended to affirm the continuity of longstanding U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

On the timing of the latest U.S. arms sale package to Taiwan:

Firestein states that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain a sore point for U.S.-China relations; he also notes that the four-year gap between the previous arms sales package to Taiwan and the latest package (2011 to 2015) is the longest a U.S. administration has gone without notifying Congress of its intent to sell arms to Taiwan since the arms sales first began. Firestein noted the Obama Administration’s efforts to limit the scope of the latest arms sale package relative to recent past packages and to execute the notification as discreetly as possible; by announcing the arms sale just before Christmas, a typically quiet part of the year, the administration was able to minimize fanfare surrounding the announcement. Firestein noted that the announcement attracted some criticism from the DPP as it was seen by some as potentially bolstering the Kuomintang in the election, but as evidenced by the landslide DPP victory, it ultimately had little effect on the election’s outcome.

On 2016 U.S. presidential candidates’ views on Taiwan:

Firestein noted that although China has been discussed in the ongoing U.S. presidential campaign, the Taiwan issue has not been mentioned by any of the candidates in either party. With the attention of U.S. foreign policy mostly focused on other issues such as the Islamic State, terrorism, the Middle East, Russia and North Korea, Taiwan is not considered a top-priority issue. He stated that most Americans do not think of Taiwan as a place where conflict will occur. Firestein also stated that all of the major U.S. presidential candidates hold relatively mainstream views of China. The China-related rhetoric that has been heard in the campaign have largely concerned trade, the exchange rate of China’s currency and other such issues that have dominated the U.S. policy debate on China in recent years.

Recommendations on managing cross-Strait relations:

Firestein emphasized that the U.S. need not change its policy on the Taiwan issue. On the contrary, with respect to the specific issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Firestein noted that the U.S. should adhere to its existing laws and policy commitments, including the Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. Looking at the Chinese side of the equation, Firestein suggested that China reduce the number of ballistic missiles in southeastern China currently aimed at Taiwan as a good-faith confidence-building measure. He expressed the view that if China could moderate its stance on Taiwan, doing so would likely help China achieve its own aims, while also creating a climate more conducive to continued peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

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Click here to watch the interview.

Click here to watch David Firestein discuss the 2016 U.S. presidential election in Mandarin.

Senior retired flag officers of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force traveled to Beijing, China to meet with retired flag officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to discuss critical issues in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. The delegations spent one-and-a-half days in off-the-record dialogue and also met with sitting members of China’s Central Military Commission.

The dialogue sessions covered a range of topics of importance to the United States and China. Discussion focused on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States; measures for building trust between the U.S. and Chinese militaries; maritime issues in the South and East China Seas; and other issues of mutual interest such as U.S.-China relations under the next U.S. presidential administration, North Korea and counterterrorism. Both sides agreed that cultivating communication and mutual understanding between the militaries of the United States and China is essential for fostering the cooperation necessary to address the world’s most difficult issues.

Since 2008, the Sanya Initiative has regularly brought together retired American and Chinese generals and admirals in order to build stronger military-to-military ties between the United States and China.

Click here to download the report. 

On Saturday, Jan. 16, Taiwan will hold a critical election that is likely to see the country vote in its first female president, Tsai Ing-wen. If elected, Tsai, who currently holds a double-digit lead in most polls, would herald a new era of politics in Taiwan and establish only the second government led by the liberal Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after more than seven decades of political dominance by the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party.

Adding to the intrigue is the race between the DPP and the KMT for the legislature, known as the Legislative Yuan. The KMT currently has 64 of its 113 seats, all of which are being contested in Saturday’s election. If Tsai’s party wins the Legislative Yuan as well as the presidency, it would give the DPP an unprecedented amount of authority to rule—and it would mean the KMT losing control of the legislature for the first time in Taiwan’s history. An outright DPP legislative victory is less certain than the results of the presidential election, but most polls are currently predicting a DPP majority there.

The election in Taiwan will be closely watched in the region, especially in China, which fears that ties with Taiwan, which were warming under the tenure of the current president, Ma Ying-jeou, may cool with Tsai in office. But it isn’t just Beijing. Other countries in the region will also be monitoring the results, in particular Japan. Tokyo’s relationship with Taipei is complex and suffers from many of the same historical legacies and grievances that continue to inhibit Japan’s relations with other neighbors, including China and South Korea—although ties with the latter did improve last month with a deal over the painful issue of “comfort women” during World War II. Despite their differences, Japan and Taiwan have largely been able to transcend them and focus more on a stable strategic relationship, buttressed by trade and common values, such as democracy and the rule of law. 

To read the article in its entirety on World Politics Review, click here. 

Firestein was quoted in VOA on January 13. The article is published in Russian.

As quoted in this article: It was a compelling speech that served as an effective ‘closing argument’ for his two-term presidency. Obama laid out the key themes of his presidency and addressed, in a pretty direct way, the critiques that have been leveled on his policies and leadership style over the past seven years. Whether one accepts his arguments or not, I thought they were put forward skillfully and persuasively – and, indeed, with a disarming sense of humor in a number of instances.

To read the full article at Voice of America, click here. (In Russian)

China's artificial island building in the South China Sea is a product of defending its historical territory claims and not a case of territorial expansion, an Australian expert has told Xinhua.

China's reclamation efforts in the Nansha Islands, though not illegal, have shocked strategic analysts despite the moves being made so China avoids conflict with other claimants who have already occupied all "natural" islands in the area.

"The idea that the building of these artificial islands is somehow creeping territorial expansionism is really not what China thinks it is," said Professor Greg Austin, fellow at the EastWest Institute in New York and visiting professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

Austin, a former Australian intelligence analyst turned academic who has studied the South China Sea for over 30 years, said China is defending historical claims that were first made in 1933 by the then government and date back almost five centuries.

"China is trying to keep alongside a position against the rival claimants who have occupied all of the natural islands. China's only natural option was to build up these artificial Islands."

The land reclamation efforts are essentially a catching up of what other regional claimants have previously done: expand the islands they hold and build "what you might call reasonable forward posts that are habitable," Austin said.

"We shouldn't allow our shock at China's building up of artificial islands to somehow convince us that this is naked aggression by China. It's not naked aggression," Austin said, noting the threat to commercial shipping is "completely fabricated."

"There is no evidence of any Chinese government attack or pressure on any commercial shipping in the South China Sea since 1949 when the Communist Party took control of the Chinese mainland, and even before."

The only countries to ever use significant force against commercial shipping in the South China Sea were the Japanese and allied forces against each other in World War II.

Austin all but rejected assertions of a regional conflict between China, the United States and other claimants as stressed by U.S. Republican lawmakers - in an election year - following the first test flights of commercial aircraft landing on Yongshu Jiao.

Instead, Austin suggested the current rhetoric is "stoking the level of political intensity," given Vietnam and the Philippines also have airfields and military assets in the disputed areas.

"What this is about is geopolitical positioning," Austin said.

"The complaint now is that the Chinese have outdone the Vietnamese and the Philippines," from a greater access to wealth and capability to build the airfields.

"The recent tensions in the South China Sea are serious (but) they're more political than military," Austin said.

He said it is time for Chinese and regional authorities to be "a bit more creative" and called on China to take a leadership role and settle the dispute once and for all.

"As senior Chinese officials have said in the last two weeks, China showed great flexibility, great responsiveness in negotiating disputed land boundaries along its border in the last 20 to 30 years, including the disputed border with the former Soviet Union and Russia," Austin said.

"We're really looking to China now to see how it can apply its creativity to try and settle down its dispute."

To read this article on Xinhua News, click here. 

The new year has not started off well at all for China, what with its stock market plunge and the latest provocation by not-so-neighborly North Korea. Regardless of its veracity, the announcement of a hydrogen bomb test constitutes a major dis to China, especially in light of recent efforts by China to improve ties between the two sides.

I agree that China can play a significant role in exerting more pressure on North Korea, including through its economic leverage and support of U.N. sanctions. However, expectations of what China can or cannot do to elicit a positive change in North Korea’s behavior need to be tempered against the fact that relations between these two countries have changed under their current leaders.

Kim Jong-un’s actions, including this week’s announcement, indicate a desire for North Korea to be respected as a nuclear power and an unwillingness to be a junior partner to China. Chinese president Xi Jinping has moved away from his predecessors’ practice of staunchly standing by North Korea as an historical ally; three years into his term as Chinese Communist Party general secretary, he has not yet met with Kim, opting instead to foster closer ties with South Korea.

China’s open criticisms of North Korea’s actions, especially the latter’s repeated nuclear tests, reflect not only thinning patience over North Korea but also frustration over a diminishing ability to gain accurate insights into Kim’s motivations.

The North Korea nuclear issue is also a prime example of a “cooperation conundrum” for China and the United States. Both share a common interest and goal in seeking denuclearization of North Korea and the Korean peninsula. But their approaches have differed, largely due to diverging strategic concerns.

U.S. concerns about the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea to its Asia allies—especially Japan and South Korea—and to U.S. soil have been a key driver behind efforts to strengthen security cooperation, such as the recently revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines (reflecting Japan’s more proactive defense posture) and a possible U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. These developments have left China jittery about their effects on its security and strategic deterrence.

China itself faces a delicate balancing act. Repeated brinksmanship by Kim may encourage China to undertake or support a further mix of incentives (e.g. diplomacy) and especially disincentives (e.g. sanctions) to rein in North Korea. Yet, it may still hold back, due to worries about overplaying its hand and forcing North Korea into a corner, eliciting instability on China’s border, and possibly leading to eventual Korean reunification and a U.S. ally on China’s doorstep.

Any discussions between the U.S. and China on coordinating efforts to stem the North Korea nuclear problem will need to take those concerns into account. Another question for the U.S., China and the international community is whether North Korea denuclearization is still a realistic goal in the foreseeable future. With this latest nuclear test—North Korea’s fourth—Kim appears to have answered with a resounding “no.”

To read this article on China File, click here. 

In 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, following a period of American preoccupation with Vietnam and China, declared a “year of Europe.” More recently, after President Barack Obama announced a US strategic “pivot,” or rebalancing, toward Asia, many Europeans worried about American neglect. Now, with an ongoing refugee crisis, Russia’s occupation of eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea, and the threat of British withdrawal from the European Union, 2016 may become, by necessity, another “year of Europe” for American diplomacy.

Regardless of slogans, Europe retains impressive power resources and is a vital interest for the United States. Although the US economy is four times larger than that of Germany, the economy of the 28-member EU is equal to that of the US, and its population of 510 million is considerably larger than America’s 320 million.

Yes, American per capita income is higher, but in terms of human capital, technology, and exports, the EU is very much an economic peer. Until the crisis of 2010, when fiscal problems in Greece and elsewhere created anxiety in financial markets, some economists had speculated that the euro might soon replace the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency.

In terms of military resources, Europe spends less than half of what the US allocates to defense, but has more men and women under arms. Britain and France possess nuclear arsenals and a limited capacity for overseas intervention in Africa and the Middle East. Both are active partners in the airstrikes against the Islamic State.

As for soft power, Europe has long had wide appeal, and Europeans have played a central role in international institutions. According to a recent study by the Portland Group, Europe accounted for 14 of the top 20 countries. The sense that Europe was uniting around common institutions made it strongly attractive for the EU’s neighbors, though this eroded somewhat after the financial crisis.

The key question in assessing Europe’s power resources is whether the EU will retain enough cohesion to speak with a single voice on a wide range of international issues, or remain a limited grouping defined by its members’ different national identities, political cultures, and foreign policies.

The answer varies by issue. On questions of trade, for example, Europe is the equal of the US and able to balance American power. Europe’s role in the International Monetary Fund is second only to that of the US (although the financial crisis dented confidence in the euro).

On anti-trust issues, the size and attractiveness of the European market has meant that American firms seeking to merge have had to gain approval from the European Commission as well as the US Justice Department. In the cyber world, the EU is setting the global standards for privacy protection, which US and other multinational companies cannot ignore.

But European unity faces significant limits. National identities remain stronger than a common European identity. Right-wing populist parties have included EU institutions among the targets of their xenophobia.

Legal integration is increasing within the EU, but the integration of foreign and defense policy remains limited. And British Prime Minister David Cameron has promised to reduce the powers of EU institutions and to subject the results of his negotiations with the Union’s leaders to a popular referendum by the end of 2017. If Britain votes no and exits the EU, the impact on European morale will be severe – an outcome that the US has made clear should be avoided, though there is little it could do to prevent it.

In the longer term, Europe faces serious demographic problems, owing to low birth rates and unwillingness to accept mass immigration. In 1900, Europe accounted for a quarter of the world’s population. By the middle of this century, it may account for just 6% – and almost a third will be older than 65.

Although the current immigration wave could be the solution to Europe’s long-term demographic problem, it is threatening European unity, despite the exceptional leadership of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In most European countries, the political backlash has been sharp, owing to the rapid rate of the inflows (more than a million people in the past year) and the Muslim background of many of the newcomers. Again, an important American diplomatic interest is at stake, but there is not much the US can do about it.

There is little long-term danger that Europe could become a threat to the US, and not only because of its low military expenditure. Europe has the world’s largest market, but it lacks unity. And its cultural industries are impressive, though, in terms of higher education, whereas 27 of its universities are ranked in the global top 100, the US accounts for 52. If Europe overcame its internal differences and tried to become a global challenger to the US, these assets might partly balance American power, but would not equal it.

For US diplomats, however, the danger is not a Europe that becomes too strong, but one that is too weak. When Europe and America remain allied, their resources are mutually reinforcing.

Despite inevitable friction, which is slowing the negotiation of the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, economic separation is unlikely, and Obama will travel to Europe in April to promote the TTIP. Direct investment in both directions is higher than with Asia and helps knit the economies together. And while Americans and Europeans have sniped at each other for centuries, they share values of democracy and human rights more with each other than with any other regions of the world.

Neither a strong US nor a strong Europe threaten the vital or important interests of the other. But a Europe that weakens in 2016 could damage both sides.

To read this article on Social Europe, click here.