Politics and Governance

The former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Joseph Nye has been a central figure in American foreign policy for the last four decades. He has served in the United States government as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.

He has written many influential books. Best known is Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. His most recent book Is the American Century Over? (Wiley, 2015) argues that the United States remains the critical power in the world and that current trends suggest it will maintain that position, although the nature of its power will shift.

Clearly, China is the rising power in the world. And yet I wonder whether the inevitable competition between the United States and China necessarily has to end in a bitter confrontation. I think that such an anticipation is culturally based with no real basis in reality. How do you think the fates of the United States and of China will be interlinked? Do you think that good relations are critical to the United States maintaining its global position?

China’s size and its high rate of economic growth will bring it closer to the United States in terms of the basic resources for influence over the next few decades. Such an evolution does not necessarily imply that China will surpass the U.S. as the most powerful country. Even if China were to suffer no major domestic political setbacks, many of the current projections for its future growth are simple linear extrapolations of current growth rates and those rates are likely to slow in the future. Moreover, looking only at economic projections can result in a one­dimensional understanding of power because one ignores the strengths of the U.S. military and American advantages in terms of soft power. Also, we should not overlook China’s geopolitical disadvantages within the context of the internal Asian balance of power. China’s position is less favorable by comparison than America’s relations with regards to the Americas, Europe, Japan, India and other countries. 

On the question of absolute decline, rather than relative American decline, the United States faces serious problems such as debt, general access of the population to adequate secondary education, growing income inequality and political gridlock at home. Although these issues are important, they are ultimately only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger we can find favorable trends for the United States in terms of demography (not the serious aging of the population that we find in East Asia), technology (lead in research and the creation of new fields), and energy. And there are abiding factors that favor the United States such as its geographical location and its enduring entrepreneurial culture. 

As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. America has many problems, but it is not in absolute decline in the sense that the late Roman Empire was. The current trends suggest that the United States will remain more powerful than any single state in the coming several decades. 

I think that ultimately the greatest challenges for the United States will not be that it is overtaken by China, or overwhelmed by some other contender. Rather the United States may well be faced with a complex landscape of power resources made up of both states and nonstate actors that pose unprecedented challenges. The task for the United States increasingly will be to organize alliances and networks that can be mobilized to effectively address an increasing number of new transnational problems. And increasingly we will be challenged to organize such complex multilateral cooperation for their solution. 

Contrary to the claims of some who proclaim this century the “Chinese century,” we do not see any signs of a post­American world. That said, although American leadership will continue, it will take a different form than it did in the 20th century. As I wrote some time ago, the paradox of American power is that although the United States has tremendous assets, unmatched in the world, nevertheless the only superpower cannot go it alone. 

I do not think that China should make the mistakes that the United States made. For example, China should not be a free rider on global issues, benefiting from the global order but not actively contributing to it. The United States did so in the 1930s and it was a major error. 

The American share of the world economy will be less in this century than it was in the middle of the past century. But the greater challenge will be responding effectively to the simple complexity of new challenges. That means newly emerging countries and a panoply of nonstate actors. These new challenges will make it difficult for even the largest power to wield influence and organize action. In the end, I feel that rather than China, the greater challenge for the United States will be institutional entropy. 

Why did you feel there was a need to affirm America’s strengths at this particular moment? What are the reasons that some are led to underestimate America’s capabilities?

In the 1990s, I wrote that the rapid rise of China could cause a global conflict similar to that described by Thucydides in his monumental study of the disastrous Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. Thucydides concluded that the rise of Athenian power instilled a fear in Sparta that set in motion an escalation of tensions and conflicts. 

Today, I think that such a scenario of overt conflict between China and the United States is unlikely in the current environment. There are, however, analysts who insist that China cannot rise peacefully. 

And then there are those who draw analogies to the geopolitical tensions that brought on World War I, specifically how Germany surpassing Britain in industrial power brought the order in Europe into question. In this respect Thucydides’ other warning is important to bear in mind: the belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. There is a possible scenario in which each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations in accordance with that assumption which then are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears. Such a vicious cycle can be set in motion. 

An accurate assessment of power relations is essential to prevent miscalculations in policy. There remains a concern that as China grows more nationalistic, it faces the dangers of hubris. Similarly, there is a risk that the United States will overreact to fears of dangers posed by the rise of China and exacerbate the situation. 

Fortunately, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to pursue any overly ambitious dreams in the next several decades. Costs matter. It is easier to indulge one’s wish list for future expansion if you are looking at a menu with no prices attached. Thus, if Chinese leaders try to match the United States in any meaningful manner, they will have to contend with the reactions of other countries, as well as with the constraints created by their own objectives of continued economic growth and the pursuit of external markets and resources. 

Thus I continue to welcome a peaceful rise for China and I believe that with thoughtful statesmanship serious conflicts can be avoided.

When we try to assess the U.S.­China relationship, it is valuable to look back to the past, like the completion of Athens and Sparta, or the United States and Great Britain, or Great Britain and Germany. But it is also true that we are witnessing technological developments today that are simply unprecedented in human history. The advancement of computer processors at an exponential rate has transformed some aspects of international relations, and complicated the relationship of the United States with the world. This development cannot be found in history books because it has never happened before.

It appears that technology will not only determine wealth and power, but also transform the very nature of international relations.

The U.S. will likely maintain its technological lead for the next five to ten years, and probably beyond then. It is impossible to predict fifty years in the future. U.S. spending on research and development is currently about 2.9 percent of GDP, an amount exceeded only by the spending of South Korea, Japan and Germany. China and the European Union are closer to 2 percent of GDP. Equally significant is the strong entrepreneurial culture and the access to venture capital in the United States which pushes forward technological change. 

I am not as optimistic about the United States and its prospects for the future in science and technology without radical reform. I worry that the overall level of competence is slowly dropping in relative and in absolute terms. 

If one looks at the technologies that are often cited as most transformative for this century we find generally that the United States remains at the forefront of new developments. This statement holds true for biotechnology, nanotechnology, and remains true for the next generation of information technology. 

Some suggest that climate change is a game changer at multiple levels. First, the response to climate change will require a new level of engagement with the world as equals that the United States may find difficult. And secondly climate change means that the United States will suffer because the economy is too deeply invested in oil. Just as the United States was able to pull ahead of Britain because Britain was too deeply invested in coal in the last century, could it be that this time around that China will find it easier to move to solar and wind power because it is not as invested in oil? 

Also it may be that the U.S. military cannot make the shift as quickly to addressing the security challenge of climate change because it is so deeply invested in weapons of the past. 

I regard climate change as a very important issue. China is now the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide and it has become the world’s largest oil importer. By the 2020s, the shale revolution may mean that North America will no longer be an energy importer. Much of the shale gas will be able to displace coal and oil which produce more greenhouse gases. 

China also has massive shale resources, but it has been slower to exploit them. Overall the U.S. is better placed than China to respond to climate change. That said, the challenge of climate change is going to require the cooperation of the United States, China, India and other nations. No one country will be able to solve this problem on its own, or to escape its consequences. 

Although it may be true that U.S. power will continue longer than many had anticipated, the “death of distance” that rapid technological development has brought about, to quote Frances Cairncross, is increasingly making China a big part of the United States economy itself, and a part of American corporations.

Will not the future U.S. be deeply integrated with China, perhaps to a degree unprecedented? 

The U.S. and China are deeply entangled, and that state is largely a good thing. Deterrence of destructive military or cyber actions can rest on denial, punishment, or entanglement. China and the U.S. would each suffer if they launched a nuclear strike, or took down each other’s electric grid. That discourages such drastic acts. In the economic realm as well, China cannot afford to dump its dollars onto world markets because such an act would hurt them as much, or more than, it would hurt the U.S. As Robert Keohane and I wrote about power and interdependence forty years ago, where there is symmetrical interdependence, there is not much power. 

To read the interview at The Diplomat, click here.

To read the original version of the interview at Asia News, click here. 

Hassan was quoted in The Christian Science Monitor's November 3 article, "Are Kurds closer to realizing their dream of an independent state?"

As quoted in this article: “Regionally, the biggest challenges facing the Kurds is first internal division and fragmentation,” says Kawa Hassan, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the EastWest Institute in Brussels. “If the Kurdish house is not in order they cannot achieve independence.”

“Second is the opposition from neighboring countries and the United States against Kurdish independence. Third is the lack of economic infrastructure that could be the basis of economic independence.”

“Of course things change very quickly in the Middle East,” adds Mr. Hassan. “Syria is crumbling. Iraq is crumbling.... The most feasible scenario is federations or Kurdish confederations.”

To read the full article at The Christian Science Monitor, click here.

To read the article on El Universal, click here. (Spanish)

In the past years, although Japan has been interested in possible energy supplies from Central Asia, it has not been active enough in the region.

However, recent circumstances have brought forth an appropriate time to explore further the rising opportunities that the two sides have to offer each other. Without putting up any tough competition to China, Japan will like to secure a firm foothold in the region and also to enter joint ventures in a few infrastructure projects for which it has advanced technological edge, better know how and more technical expertise to offer.

According to US Energy Department estimates, in 2020, the Chinese demand for oil will reach 13 million barrels per day, while that for natural gas will rise to 100 billion cubic meters per year. In order for Central Asian states to develop the infrastructure to meet such rising demands, it will need exploration and transportation support structure with much advance technology which is available with Japan. As the Kashagan oil reserves in Kazakhstan and the Galkynysh reserves in Turkmenistan are developed for production in the coming years, Japan is interested to benefit from joint ventures with these two major oil supplier states. This comes at a time when the Iranian energy reserves are about to open up for foreign ventures. Especially so, when an agreement on Caspian Sea is expected in 2016 among the five littoral states namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia.

Additionally, there are chances for progress on Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) pipeline. Therefore in the medium term, short windows of opportunity will be taken up by others if Japan delays any further in making its move. In future, the central Asian energy companies will need much advanced technologies which are not always available with their Russian or Chinese partners. To overcome this limitation, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan will be exploring how to take advantage of Japanese involvement in such project.

Factors which contribute to hitherto dormant relations included long distances, higher costs and the business environment in the Central Asian states that, to many Japanese investors, appeared both un-prepared and unfavourable in the past years. In the past years, Japan’s reluctance as an ‘island nation’ to considerably invest in land-locked Central Asia provided China an open field which took maximum advantage of such opportunity. The Chinese influence in every Central Asian state is an established reality as Beijing did not miss many opportunities for making investments and entering joint ventures in many spheres where as Japan’s progress in this sphere has been comparatively slow. Akio Kawato, a former Japanese ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, has pointed out to Japan's NHK news channel that the Central Asian states will not like to become completely dependent on China and hence seek to deflect such dependence and to drive maximum leverage by making various investing nations compete with each other in the region.

The Central Asian states will benefit from greater interest, closer attention and increased prospects for short and medium term investments. According to a Japanese diplomat in Tashkent, representative of Japanese enterprises aim to conclude partnership contracts in Central Asia worth 17 billion dollars particularly in projects involving the conversion of fuel resources to value added products such as plastics and chemicals. According to Japan’s Daily Nikkei, major Japanese companies are involved in a number of key projects in Central Asia: Japan’s Sumitomo Investment Corporation has received orders to build a $300 million thermal power plant in Turkmenistan. Toyo engineering has won a contract for building an $800 million petro-chemical complex in Turkmenistan which is scheduled to complete in 2018. Kawasaki Heavy Industries has received an order from TurkmenChemya for building a gas to gasoline conversion plant by 2018. According to Tokyo’s Diplomat Magazine, five Japanese companies plan to complete an agreement to build a purification plant at the Galkynysh gas field worth $8.3 billion (1 trillion yen), which will be funded in part by Japanese banks.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has signed agreements to build a natural gas to fertilizer plant in Uzbekistan while Toshiba Corporation aims to export its nuclear plant technology to Kazakhstan.

At a time when falling oil prices have compelled the Central Asian states to attract investment in diverse ventures they have become comparatively eager to benefit from the Japanese co-operation.

Japan neither has the clout nor the capacity or desire to compete with the Chinese and Russian influence in the region. However, it would welcome to be seen as an additional partner which can bring in much needed technical expertise to the region. However, Japan has still many chances for offering its plant technology to the central Asian states.

With the Chinese investment expected to rise in the coming years, Japan may like to carve out its own niche in the Central Asia engineering plants and industries especially when those states aim to diversify the destinations for exporting their oil and gas. Japan will like to pursue its technology for energy diplomacy in those states.

In Central Asia, Japan is seen as an attractive investment partner. On its part, Japan seeks to participate in infrastructure projects that can improve communication, commerce, power- transmission and energy transport from Central Asian to South Asian states. Japan describes such an approach as ‘Corridors of Peace and Stability’ in the context of encouraging what it promotes as ‘open regional co-operation’.

Click here to read the article in Uzbek. 

Click here to read the article in Kyrgyz. 

Iraqi Kurdistan — officially known as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) — is the country’s only autonomous region. Compared to the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan enjoys more stability, security, political pluralism, and freedom for civil society. From 2003 until 2013, the region witnessed an unprecedented economic boom. During the U.S.-led war to depose Saddam Hussein, the Kurds were some of the United States’ most reliable allies, and today they are playing a pivotal role in the fight against the Islamic State. These stark differences from the chaotic rest of the country have led many to describe the KRI as the “Other Iraq.”

But today, this nascent democracy faces its most severe and probably decisive crisis since the end of its civil war in 1998, which had pitted the region’s two main political camps against each other. Today’s crisis touches upon two core democratic principles: the peaceful transfer of power and government accountability. It is the outcome of this crisis — and not just the fight against the Islamic State — that will determine the development of democracy in Kurdistan. 

Iraqi Kurdistan’s president since 2005 has been Masoud Barzani, whose family has ruled the conservative Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) since its establishment in 1946. Barzani was originally supposed to serve for eight years, as stipulated by the draft constitution. But a 2013 deal between the KDP and its erstwhile rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), extended his term for an additional two years. This deal was pushed through the regional parliament despite fierce resistance from the opposition and civil society, who called the extension unconstitutional. But, as of August 19, even this two-year extension has now passed — and the KDP has refused to respect the agreement. Barzani still clings to the presidency. His recalcitrance has plunged Iraqi Kurdistan into a deep constitutional crisis.

The region is now deeply divided. Four main parties – Gorran (the Movement for Change), the PUK, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group — are calling on Barzani to step down. These four parties, who might be described as the “constitutional camp,” are calling for a genuine parliamentary system in which the president is elected by parliament and is therefore accountable to it. In contrast, Barzani’s KDP and some of its smaller allies (locally known as “political shops” since they were either created or supported by KDP and PUK) want Barzani to get an additional two-year extension. They also argue for a presidential system that would give the president immense power. Only Barzani, they argue, can lead Iraqi Kurdistan in the fight against the Islamic State and thus win the Kurds an independent state — the latter being something that all Kurds, regardless of political persuasion, wholeheartedly favor.

Barzani appears determined to hang on. In a recent interview, his nephew (and current prime minister), Nechirvan Barzani, said that even the president himself acknowledges that his term has expired, and that his staying in power is therefore illegal. But he wants to remain in power until 2017, when the new election is scheduled, to lead the fight against the Islamic State.

Meanwhile, due to the stark decline in oil prices (as well as endemic corruption, general mismanagement, discord with Baghdad, and the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State), Kurdistan is facing a severe economic crisis after years of positive growth. The crisis has delayed payment of salaries to civil servants, led to shortages of fuel and electricity, and prompted growing social protests. The constitutional crisis compounds these problems and has fragmented Kurdish society to the core.

Instead of becoming the president of all Kurds, Barzani has remained the president of his own party only. He has been unwilling to take the serious steps necessary to address Kurdistan’s many challenges. He has failed to tackle high-level corruption. He has neglected to implement urgently needed reform of the military and the intelligence and security forces. He has balked at creating an independent judiciary — or, for that matter, any of the institutions required for a democratic statehood. And he has done nothing to bring perpetrators of human rights violations — from his party and others — to justice.

Rather than the unifying leader Kurds so desperately need, Barzani has become a source of division. Instead of relying on internal legitimacy, he has turned to regional and international sponsors to remain in power: the three most influential players in Kurdistan — the United States, Turkey, and Iran — support the unconstitutional extension of Barzani’s term. These countries claim that this bolsters the fight against the Islamic State and will provide stability in Kurdistan and Iraq. For them, it seems, “stability” is more important than democracy.

In its bid to keep Barzani in power, the KDP has resorted to intimidation, violence, threats to re-establish separate governments (which would essentially amount to partition of the region), the manipulation of judicial institutions, and the co-optation and coercion of intellectuals and journalists.

In an attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully, the four parties that oppose extending Barzani’s presidency have presented the KDP with two options they can accept. In the first, parliament will choose a new president, granting him extensive powers. In the second, the people will elect him directly, but as a largely symbolic leader with mostly ceremonial powers. But at an October 8 meeting, the opposing sides failed to reach an agreement. The “constitutional camp” is under immense pressure from its increasingly frustrated supporters to stick to its demand that Barzani should leave power peacefully. But the KDP seems in no mood to compromise, leaving everyone in a bind. The political stalemate has resulted in demonstrations by protesters calling for jobs, payment of back wages, and resignation of Barzani. Five people were killed, reportedly by the KDP security forces.

The KDP has accused Gorran of surreptitiously organizing attacks by protesters on his offices, and physically prevented the speaker of parliament (who is from Gorran) from entering Erbil. (The party has also withdrawn its recognition of his position as speaker.) In addition, Prime Minister Nechiravan Barzani sacked Gorran ministers and replaced them with KDP officials. Gorran says the government is no longer legitimate. The political polarization has reached a climax and no resolution to the stalemate is in sight.

Barzani had a unique opportunity to enter history as the first Kurdish president to abide by democratic rules and step down. Sadly, he has chosen to do the opposite. By so doing, he is critically endangering Kurdistan’s fledgling democracy and the unity the Kurds so badly need to achieve independence.

As the Arab Spring has shown, however, sham internal stability supported by external powers provides neither security to a people nor legitimacy to their aspirations for statehood. Defeating the Islamic State and democratizing Kurdistan are the only ways to ensure long-term genuine stability and prosperity in a crucial region that is at the forefront of the fight against violent religious extremism. In the photo, anti-Barzani protesters challenge security forces during clashes in Sulaimaniyah, in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, on October 10, 2015. 

To read this piece at Foreign Policy, click here.