Politics and Governance

NATO’s strength rests on three attributes of its member states: their commitment, capabilities and cohesion. The United Kingdom’s planned departure from the European Union will affect all three. In the short term, NATO’s productive Warsaw Summit in early July and reassuring statements and defense policy moves from UK Prime Ministers Cameron and May are hopeful. But the probable longer term Brexit scenarios suggest a net negative impact on NATO unless the United Kingdom and other Allies weather today’s populist/isolationist political currents and projected post-Brexit economic fallout to sustain the pledges of solidarity and investments made at Warsaw.

Self-inflicted Self-doubt

The surprise vote for Brexit in the June 23 referendum triggered one of the most volatile political and economic periods in the UK in decades. Within hours, the pound plummeted against the dollar, then-Prime Minister David Cameron announced plans to resign, and it became clear the victorious Leave camp had no feasible post-Brexit plans. The awkward self-consciousness and insecurity that journalist Rob Temple suggests defines the British as a people suddenly appeared also to define them as a nation. For many, the Brexit vote called into question the UK’s identity as a stable, prosperous, globally-engaged European power. Allies and adversaries alike have since looked to London for signals of continued commitment to European security.

Impact on Commitment

NATO’s bold agenda at its July 8-9 Warsaw Summit helped to allay concerns in the near term. With an eye on threats to its east and south, Alliance heads of state agreed on a renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defense and pledged concrete resources to those goals. PM Cameron reassured leaders in Warsaw that Britain is “not withdrawing from the world, nor are we turning our back on Europe or on European security.” Britain will lead NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in 2017. Cameron also announced Britain will serve as a framework nation in NATO’s new deterrence force in the Baltics (deploying soldiers to Estonia and Poland), commit aircraft to NATO’s air policing mission, and continue its deployments to the NATO mission’s in Afghanistan and the Aegean. The UK similarly reaffirmed its commitment to the counter-ISIL Coalition. This includes continued airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, training/advising of local Iraqi and Syrian partner forces, and humanitarian/stabilization assistance totaling over $3.3B for the Syria crisis alone.

Although Cameron’s successor Theresa May reaffirmed these commitments, whether the UK can sustain them in the longer term remains a function of bureaucratic capacity and political appetite. Regarding capacity, it remains unclear how much the eventual negotiation of Brexit and the requisite bilateral trade agreements and other treaties to replace the UK’s EU membership will distract Her Majesty’s Government from other priorities. Ministers are reportedly already sparring over the number of Foreign Office civil servants to be seconded to the new Brexit ministry. More fundamental is the question the UK will face on what sized appetite it has for its post-Brexit global role. Worryingly, the current foreign policy views of the UK’s major opposition parties range from NATO-skeptic to anti-nuclear deterrent to pro-Putin.

Impact on Capabilities

As part of its reassurance campaign, May’s government has hurried to reaffirm several of the planned investments in capabilities detailed in Cameron’s November 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and pledged to meet NATO’s benchmark of 2% of GDP for defense spending. In mid-July, the UK parliament voted to renew the UK’s Trident submarine-based nuclear deterrent, and the government announced $5B in deals at the Farnborough air show for sub-hunting P-8 Poseidon aircraft and Apache attack helicopters.

Despite this bullish short term signaling, the UK’s military capabilities in the longer term will hinge on economic circumstances and political appetite. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has projected a post-Brexit UK GDP drop ranging between 2.7-7.7% by 2030. Pro-Brexit skeptics have argued such gloomy scenarios have not yet played out, but that is largely because Brexit has not yet occurred. In the likely scenario of slowed or reverse economic growth, a Tory government may find it hard to resist past instincts to embrace austerity and slash the defense spending promised in the 2015 SDSR. Cameron’s austerity-driven 2010 SDSR left the UK without an aircraft carrier or sub-hunting aircraft and contributed to what one British general termed a “withered” force. (The 2015 SDSR already included some stretches: maintaining NATO’s 2% GDP benchmark required categorizing intelligence systems and military pensions as defense spending, and the SDSR lists Britain’s time zone among the UK’s strategic assets.)

On the monetary front, the Royal United Services Institute has argued that the pound’s historic post-referendum decline relative to the dollar (a 15% depreciation as of October 4) means a projected yearly shortfall of £700M on average annual UK defense imports of £6.5B. Thus both the fiscal and monetary policy consequences of Brexit would potentially threaten the 2015 SDSR’s promised strategic investments (many with U.S. or European vendors) to grow the UK’s fighter aircraft and frigate fleets, increase its expeditionary capabilities, and recruit thousands more troops and intelligence analysts. Separately, should Brexit someday prompt Scotland to leave the UK, it would complicate the UK’s Scotland-based Trident fleet.

Impact on Cohesion

In July in Warsaw, NATO Allies showcased solidarity with the UK, but the longer term consequences of Brexit may test transatlantic cohesion. The surprise Brexit referendum victory has boosted sympathetic populist movements on the continent. Europe faces a fraught electoral calendar over the coming months, with major elections planned in Austria (October), Germany (February), Netherlands (March), France (May), and potentially Spain and Italy. Populist, often far-right parties currently have momentum in many of those contests, with the elections driven by economic and security fears vulnerable to exacerbation by apparent, opportunistic Russian influence efforts. A very different slate of European leaders could emerge from the 2017 electoral gantlet than those that signed the Warsaw Summit communiqué this summer.

In addition, likely contentious Brexit negotiations may strain cohesion among EU leaders. It can be difficult to compartmentalize political disputes and security policy. The UK has traditionally played a bridging role between the EU and NATO/U.S., leading the more transatlantic-minded camp of nations within the EU on issues such as defense cooperation and Russia. Until the day of its departure, the UK will retain its EU vote on any issue requiring consensus or qualified majority voting. But the UK’s voice will diminish as the other 27 members plan the EU’s future without it. This includes recent discussions on improving the EU’s own defense and security capabilities (which, could complement rather than compete with NATO, but only if coordinated properly). An upcoming test of the UK’s continued influence will be the next EU vote to renew Ukraine-related sanctions against Moscow – currently extended through January 31, 2017.

Mull, Britannia

Since the June 23 referendum, the UK government has done an admirable job of reassuring its Allies on NATO and Coalition commitments and capabilities investments. But if the reassuring message out of the Warsaw Summit is to survive longer term headwinds, London must be prepared to redouble those efforts: prioritizing defense spending in the face of economic setbacks, resisting policy distraction, and compartmentalizing intra-EU infighting regarding Brexit negotiations. The exact strategy will require understanding how (or even if?) Brexit will actually unfold, and, more importantly, answering the fundamental question of the UK’s post-Brexit role in the world. It would be Britain’s, Europe’s, and the international order’s loss if the UK were to step back from its traditional positive, outsized global and transatlantic security roles. Lord Hastings Ismay once quipped that NATO’s purpose was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Post-Brexit, perhaps to Ismay’s dismay, one might add “to keep the British engaged and relevant.”

Alton V. Buland is currently serving on a detail assignment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he last worked on Europe/NATO policy. The views herein are his own and do not represent those of the United States Department of Defense or the United States government.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

EWI CEO and President Cameron Munter addressed the Kiwanis Club of Atlanta to discuss "Chaos and Order: A New Diplomacy for the 21st Century" on September 27.

The event was facilitated by EWI Board Member Joel H. Cowan, a long time member of the Kiwanis Club of Atlanta, who was also in attendance.

Click here to learn more about Kiwanis International.

India is situated in one of the most important locations in the world: in between East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This, together with India’s strong economy and large population, means that India is primed to be the pivotal country for Asian security.

Nobody understood this better than Lord George Curzon, the erstwhile British viceroy of India. In 1909, he wrote:

“It is obvious...that India, must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added, in the world. The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, its great trading harbors, its reserve of military strength, supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment’s notice upon any given point either of Asia and Africa- all there are assets of precious values.”

Every word that Curzon wrote a century ago holds true today. As the British-run Indian Empire, India was the primary political and military force in Asia and the Indian Ocean basin for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. British-led Indian forces garrisoned Aden and Singapore, fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and China, and patrolled the high seas from Zanzibar to Hong Kong.

However, after the partition and independence of India in 1947, India’s role as pivot for security in Asia slipped away for two reasons: ideological and geopolitical.

Ideologically, the Indian leadership under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected the power politics that they saw reminiscent of a bygone, imperialistic era; nonetheless, by envisioning a major role for India in the non-aligned movement, Nehru did not reject the concept of India as a major player in world affairs. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, was less idealistic, but most of her attention focused on domestic issues and when it did come to power politics, on South Asia. But, as events have proven since, history is far from over, and India has since begun to rediscover the vitality of having a security strategy.

Geopolitically, independent India found itself in a very different situation than British India, despite occupying most of the same territory. First, economically, it was weaker and no longer backed by a global financial empire. Its limited resources, moreover, were channeled mostly into development and domestic spending rather than an international security apparatus. Second, India had no need initially to maintain the same posture as the British geopolitically. Most British bases and colonies in Africa and the Middle East were acquired to protect the route between Britain and India, something which was no longer relevant after 1947. Additionally, after World War II, the United States replaced Britain as the primary guarantor of freedom of navigation and security on the oceans. India thus had no great incentive to replace Britain as the main power in the Indian Ocean.

Third, the chief security and geopolitical threat for India after independence was Pakistan, on its northwest frontier. Not only did Pakistan’s emergence cut India off from a direct land route to the Middle East and Central Asia, it focused most of India’s attention on regional geopolitics. Together with the border dispute with China, India’s attention was taken up mostly by its neighboring countries, and was unable to look at a grander strategy.

The end of the Cold War, the decline of the non-alignment ideology, and a changing security situation in both the Middle East—political instability and the rise of terrorism—and in East Asia—the rise of China have changed the Indian calculus. Furthermore, the rise of India to great power or near great power status due to increased economic growth, nuclear weapon capacity and military spending changed the way that Indian leaders, both left and right, viewed the world. If India wants to be a security pivot for Asia again, it needs to roll back the ideological and geopolitical reasons that caused it to stop being a security pivot in the first place.

Ideologically, India for the most part has shed its aversion to power politics. It has actively engaged its neighbors and countries farther afield, such as Tajikistan, Iran, and Vietnam with security and economic proposals. But domestic politics continue to take up an inordinate amount of the attention of its political class. This is to be expected: India, a union of diverse cultures and peoples is almost a continent unto itself. Its political system further encourages an almost constant need to campaign, negotiate, dispense largesse. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has managed to place foreign affairs at the top of India’s agenda, but the initiatives of one prime minister need further institutionalization if they are to be maintained for decades.

Geopolitically, India has begun to play a greater role in Asian affairs. In order to achieve a stronger position in Asia, India has to up its game in four realms:

First, and most importantly, India has to consolidate its regional position. As long as it is primarily focused on South Asia, especially Pakistan, but also combating inroads made by China into the region, it will be unable to look at the larger geopolitical and security picture. While India by its sheer size and location can probably remain the dominant power vis-a-vis China in regards to its smaller neighbors and retain influence in Afghanistan, it will have to find a way to deal with Pakistan. South Asia is the world’s least economically integrated region in the world and transportation links are weak. India can attempt two strategies for its region, which I shall loosely dub the “21st Century” and “19th century” strategies. The first strategy would be to pursue integration and cooperation. This would tie Pakistan to India more closely and negate its desire to block Indian land trade. The second strategy would be for India to encourage the disintegration of Pakistan into its component parts, each friendlier to India, something unlikely but becoming likelier as time goes by.

India’s regional position impacts the second factor that India should pursue: its naval capacities. India should fully leverage its oceanic position, because this is a sphere where it has the most to gain. Both terrain and geopolitics limit its ability to project major land forces outside of the subcontinent. India needs to focus more on its navy, with its army having the capacity to be primarily successful in a defensive or amphibious posture.

Third, even if India ought to focus on the sea, it should not neglect becoming a land force in its traditional peripheries, particularly in Central Asia and Afghanistan. While it will not be able to match the enormous influence China and Russia have in Central Asia, it should still ensure that it has a seat at the table. In Afghanistan and Iran, however, India needs to make sure that it remains a major player. It has enormous leverage with Afghanistan that it has not yet fully used to its advantage.

Fourth, India must continue to engage countries all over Asia, both for the sake of concluding friendly bilateral diplomacy, and for the sake of positioning itself as an alternative to other powers in the region. It is behind China, Russia, and the United States as a power to be reckoned with in the great game of Asian geopolitics. However, it can continue to engage countries like Vietnam, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others.

While India should focus on all four factors, it is likely to have the most success with the first two—consolidating its regional position and expanding its naval capacity. Because of its strong need, cultural ties and the fact that it is the dominant power in South Asia, India can mold the subcontinent to its benefit over the next couple of decades. It also has the advantage of an enormous unfulfilled potential to become the Indian Ocean’s dominant naval power. It can expect some support and cooperation from the United States and little rivalry from anyone else, including China, which is still focused primarily on rivals in the Pacific Ocean. This approach may also aid in relations with the Middle East, where it has strong cultural and political ties.

India’s policy of being friendly with everyone has lead to a security situation where it is the jack of all trades and master of none; this begs the questions whether it should focus on its strengths and matters of particular importance. Only then can it be in a position to become a security pivot in Asia in future years. Again, it remains to be seen if the larger role in international relations that Narendra Modi envisions for India can be institutionalized; however the narrower focus of regional dominance and naval security are likely to be pursued as a matter of course by any government.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an international relations analyst, editor and writer, who contributes to The Diplomat and The National Interest. He received his Master of Arts in Security Studies from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he concentrated in international security. You can follow him @akhipill.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

In the lead-up to the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, the EastWest Institute's Regional Security Initiative has released a major report, Afghanistan Reconnected: Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture, which highlights problems in regional cooperation in the areas of trade and transit and energy, offering actionable recommendations that have been developed over three years of consultation with participants in the Afghanistan Reconnected Process, a high-level network including members of governments, the private sector, business leaders, and experts throughout the region. 

This report aims at encouraging government and private sector actors in the region, as well as the broader international community, to sustain momentum and commitment towards the development and stabilization of Afghanistan despite the declining security situation.

The report includes an introduction by Ambassador Sabine Sparwasser, Chair of the International Contact Group on Afghanistan, Special Representative of the German Federal Government for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and chapters addressing various issues areas, prepared by project experts.

Please use the following link to access the complete report. 

Click here to learn more about the Afghanistan Reconnected Process and to access previous reports.

After Obama and Xi meet, their governments tell different stories

When top U.S. and Chinese leaders meet, there is always a gap between the ways the two governments describe the meeting’s content and outcomes in public. Each will naturally craft its narrative to speak to the home audience. When President Barack Obama made his last visit to China this month, some tried and true gaps remained. Chinese government releases, for instance, continued to emphasize the “new model of major-country relations between China and the U.S.,” while the White House sang its own greatest hits of “manag[ing] differences constructively and expand[ing] practical cooperation in regional and global standards” and Obama himself winked at the Chinese phrase without adopting it wholesale.

Deep in the U.S. “fact sheets” and Chinese “outcome list,” however, one can observe more substantive differences of emphasis and priority. Since the content and language in those documents is in many ways approximately parallel, a close read reveals instances where one government wants to make a point that the other doesn’t. Here are three differences worth noting from earlier this month:

‘Commitments’ vs ‘consensus’ on cyberspace and commercial hacking

Both the main U.S. “fact sheet” and the Chinese “outcome list” reference the parallel statements on cyberspace issues made by Obama and President Xi Jinping during Xi’s state visit to Washington in September 2015 and note the two new dialogue channels established at that time. The U.S. text, however, pointedly calls the presidents’ statements “cyber commitments,” and elaborates, that they include “combating malicious cyber activity and hacking, and not conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain.”

The Chinese text refers instead to a “consensus” (共识 in the Chinese-language version) instead of a “commitment”—no mere translation hiccup, since the Chinese document uses the word “commit” or “commitment” (承诺) dozens of times. The Chinese document also emphasizes “common interests and responsibilities in cyberspace,” while omitting the hot-button U.S. issue of commercial espionage.

The differences continue: The U.S. document reports the two governments “affirmed the development of a ‘scorecard’” for cases to be reviewed by officials at upcoming meetings and named several specific categories of cybersecurity concerns—none mentioned in the parallel Chinese paragraph. The Chinese document meanwhile mentioned a forum on technology and violent terrorism to be held in October, something the U.S. fact sheet omits. While cyberspace policy dialogue appears more robust than a year ago, differences clearly remain.

Counterterrorism and the home audience

The U.S. and Chinese governments both expressed an intent to share more information on terrorism suspects. There is significant tension, however, in how the two documents characterize their relationship in a UN Security Council committee that designates terrorist entities. The U.S. version is vague, saying both governments “reaffirmed their commitment to communicate and cooperate…to designate terrorist entities” in the UN process. The Chinese version more concretely notes “appreciation that the U.S. designated the East Turkistan Islamic Movement [ETIM] under the U.S. Executive Order 13224 and supported its listing” in the UN process. Only the Chinese version mentions two upcoming counterterror meetings: a vice-ministerial “China-U.S. Counterterrorism Consultation” and a workshop on improvised explosive devices.

What to make of these differences? Counterterrorism is a highly sensitive issue for U.S.-China cooperation. The two governments share concerns about potential attacks within their borders and against their interests abroad, but counterterrorism cooperation has sometimes been stilted over factors including differing views on the nature of the threat. The Chinese reference to ETIM allows the statement to praise U.S. recognition of a Chinese government concern, but the U.S. government designation of ETIM as a terrorist group dates back to 2002, when Obama was an Illinois State Senator. Today, ETIM is no longer considered an active entity by many U.S. terrorism experts. Chinese officials appear more eager to highlight bilateral counterterror cooperation, and the dated reference raises the question of remaining differences between the two governments.

Missing from the laundry list

In several areas, the Chinese document simply “goes there” while the U.S. documents do not. In these areas, the most visible discrepancy is one of emphasis. U.S. officials may be just as committed to these efforts as their counterparts, but they chose not to feature them. Given the number of topics, however, it seems unlikely they were all really discussed in a short bilateral meeting. Including them may allow Chinese officials to signal continued support from top leaders for ongoing bilateral processes that take place lower in the bureaucracy.

Among the topics missing from the U.S. laundry list but given their due in Beijing:

• People-to-people exchanges, including bilateral meetings on tourism, a China Garden Project slated for groundbreaking in Washington before the end of October, and Chinese arts exhibitions (including a Qin and Han Dynasty show at the Met in New York early next year);
• Extra details on sub-national cooperation between regional and local governments;
• Interaction in the Asia-Pacific, with the Chinese document saying “the two sides emphasized that China and the United States are both major countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”
• A joint commitment to resolve the crisis in Syria and coordination on South Sudan (though they did include identical language on Iraq); and
• A special note that “the two sides reiterated their support for the United Nations playing an important role in international affairs” (in addition to identical language on “multilateral institutions” and global development).

Reading between the sides

It was obvious that the intended headline both governments sought to project from this meeting was the continuation of bilateral cooperation on the global climate process, and the two presidents had a well-covered event with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to officially join the Paris agreement. A close read of the two sides’ diplomatic messaging reveals what else they want to broadcast to smaller audiences of specialists policymakers. Deeper in the documents lie areas where perfect harmony between the parallel statements was never achieved and, therefore, where observers can watch for movement next time: Obama and Xi have one more likely chance to meet, at the APEC summit in Peru in November.

Graham Webster (@gwbstr) is a senior fellow, U.S.–China relations, of the Paul Tsai China Center and a lecturer at Yale Law School. Sign up for his free e-mail brief, U.S.–China Week.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

Last month, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a number of naval drills in the Sea of Japan, termed “a confrontation drill”, aimed at simulating a potential maritime conflict. Of course, Beijing caveated—with little attention to strategic planners in Tokyo and Washington—that the exercise was “not aimed at any one country”. The drills, which follow a significant uptick in tensions over the past few months in the East and South China Seas, are telling on Beijing’s strategic intentions to push back against what it sees as a coordinated and sustained effort by the US and its allies—principally Japan—to “name, shame and contain” China.

Indeed, the past year has seen a marked deterioration in Japan-China relations, especially as a result of increased tensions in the East and South China Sea. One of the big watermarks has been the decision on July 12, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, to award the tribunal ruling to the Philippines in its dispute with China over the latter’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, largely centered on its intentional ambiguity surrounding the infamous “nine-dash line”. Beijing has predictably responded by calling the ruling a “waste of paper” and has assembled its diplomatic influence in the fractured Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to disrupt potential unity on whether the ruling should be respected. 

The full article can be accessed here.

The EastWest Institute's Brussels Center hosted a preview of its forthcoming report, "Afghanistan Reconnected: Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture" on 7 September, 2016. The preview was held in the presence of H.E. Mrs. Adela Raz, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs of Afghanistan. Also in attendance were Ms. Khojesta Fana Ibrahimkhil, Director General of Human Rights and Women's Affairs, and Mr. Shoaib Habibi, Deputy Director General of Economic Cooperation, both of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, as well as representatives of the Embassies of Afghanistan and other interested countries, EU institutions, the European External Action Service, and Brussels-based think tanks and NGOs.

H.E. Mrs. Raz delivered a keynote address detailing the progress Afghanistan has made and the challenges still facing it, with a particular regard to matters of governance and regional economic cooperation. The country has achieved much in terms of the representation of women and youth in the government, and demonstrates a willingness to integrate into the region and play a substantial role in regional affairs. For the past two years under the National Unity Government, a major priority of Afghanistan has been economic development, and for the first time in recent history, Afghanistan's economic strategy is proactive rather than reactive, looking forward and planning ahead instead of simply responding to present circumstances. 

International investments in the country, says H.E. Mrs. Raz, have not been wasted. Significant potential is there, however, challenges remain. Afghanistan has the highest levels of illiteracy and youth unemployment in the region. Corruption and lack or transparency are endemic, and though necessary work is being done to combat this, the problem remains substantial and will not be solved overnight. Security issues and the rise of extremism and terrorism, as well as rampant trafficking of drugs and narcotics, plague not only the country but the region as a whole. 

Now is the time for the region to collectively think about challenges. Large regional projects and initiatives have shown that although geopolitics are a challenge in the region, trade and transit remain matters in which all actors have a mutual interest. In that front, there is strong will from Afghanistan and its neighbors to move forward. As the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan approaches, during which EU donors will likely reaffirm their levels of commitment to Afghanistan, the country and the region are at a critical juncture. What is crucial at this key moment is for the international community to indicate to Afghanistan that it does not stand alone. 

The EastWest Institute's "Afghanistan Reconnected: Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture" report, which is scheduled for publication and launch in the coming weeks, outlines the current geopolitical situation and advances made in regional economic cooperation in the fields of trade and transit and energy. The report highlights problems in these areas, and in particular offers actionable recommendations developed over 3 years of consultation with participants in the Afghanistan Reconnected Process, including members of governments, the private sector, business leaders, and experts throughout the region. The following preview outlines the key points and recommendations. 

Below are two select pictures from the event.

The previewed document can be accessed below and downloaded here.

Here are some excerpts of the interview, which can be accessed fully here.

Q: There has been a major shift in the party preferences of Asian Americans. Is it about the candidates or are Asian Americans becoming Democrats?

A: I think there are three main factors that account for the shift. One of them, I think, is economic. All voters care about the state of the American economy, care about how they’re doing in the U.S. economy. I think one thing that’s happened since George H.W. Bush was elected in 1988 is that a lot of Americans have come to view the Democratic Party as the party that has been in power when average Americans have done the best, when they’ve had the best success economically and financially. A lot of people point to the eight years that Bill Clinton was president as an extraordinary period of economic growth. I think that over these years—rightly, wrongly, accurately, inaccurately, it’s a very subjective thing—a lot of voters, including Asian American voters have come to regard the Democratic Party as the party that delivers growth. If you compare that with the record of George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, a lot of people have come to the assessment—notwithstanding some of the financial and economic difficulties in recent years—people just do better under Democratic presidents. I’m not judging that, but I think that’s one reason why people probably may have shifted their voting patterns in the way that you’ve described.

Another is, I think culturally the United States as a whole has  become somewhat more liberal on matters like gay marriage. So I can imagine that, probably 25 years ago, a generation ago, Asian American voters probably thought about social issues in more conservative terms and I think is probably the case today. And that trendline is pointed in the direction of the Democratic Party.

Finally and maybe most significantly, and this is speculation but it’s one interpretation I have for the shift that you mentioned. I think Asian Americans as, if you will, minority voters probably 25, 30 years ago, would have been hard for them to imagine, if you will, a fellow minority becoming the president of the United States. It had never happened before Barack Obama. I think there were some number of Asian Americans that felt a sense of excitement about that.

Q:  The favorability number for Hillary Clinton is higher than Donald Trump among Asian American voters. Why do you think Asian Americans like Hillary Clinton more?

A: I think we’re seeing the trendline in the race now where the numbers seem to be opening up for Hillary Clinton in a way that wasn’t even the case one or two months ago. I do think there has been a shift, I think we’re going to continue to see that shift. Again, my personal prediction is we’re going to see a majority, a growing majority of Americans opt for Hillary Clinton. It’s not that Hillary Clinton is seen as a flawless candidate by any means, but I think that people are looking at the two candidates and making a comparison. The numbers and the polls all seem to favor Hillary Clinton.

I don’t know if there’s a specific reason that Asian Americans, as distinct from Americans from other different backgrounds flocking increasingly, evidently, toward Hillary Clinton. But I do think there’s a sense that, of the two candidates, one has had, if you will, more qualifying experience, more relevant experience and a style of speaking and thinking about the issues that seems more appropriate for president. I think that is probably the overarching dynamic with respect to the Asian American community as well.

I also think that Asian Americans, in some cases many times removed from the immigrant experience and in some cases, very recent immigrants, look at the fact that Hillary Clinton was secretary of state and she accumulated a lot of experience dealing with the world, dealing with Asia. I suspect that‘s viewed as a positive thing as well.

The geopolitical and security challenges posed by China and North Korea will dominate the agenda of new Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada in the coming months. Yet a sustained effort to nurture Japan's defense relationships with like-minded partners will also be needed.

After its alliance with the U.S., there is arguably no more critical partner for Japan's security than South Korea. Unfortunately, due to histrionics on both sides, the bilateral security relationship has lagged in recent years and enhanced security relations remain politically challenging for Seoul.

The appointment of Inada as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's cabinet shake up on Aug. 3 was controversial due to her hawkish security views and her previous positions on contentious historical issues. Inada has been a frequent visitor to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan's war dead, a habit that has already raised alarm with China and South Korea. Abe's choice of Inada for defense was also surprising considering the high-profile nature of the post after the passage of last year's controversial legislation to allow the military to back up overseas allies.

Read the full commentary in Nikkei Asian Review here.