Politics and Governance
Sehgal Says Fear of Blowback Hinders Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Efforts
Writing for The News International, Ikram Sehgal describes the government's challenges in fighting terrorism, including fear of retaliatory attacks in urban areas and links of terrorist groups to political players.
Read the full piece here on The News International.
The major problem facing this country is the vacillation of the government in dealing decisively with terrorists because of a fear of blowback in the urban areas if there is any major counter-insurgency operation in the mountains. The other reason is that some terrorists groups in Punjab have loose links with influential political elements. They not only fear their presence in their constituencies but depend upon them for their electability.
Both assumptions are only partially correct. Terrorist sleeper cells in the urban areas can cause both human and material damage. With the counter-insurgency operations being successful, this capacity has diminished considerably and will be further depleted when our troops go into North Waziristan.
While blowback is a distinct possibility, the extent of collateral damage will not be in keeping with the claim of the TTP. This canard is only force-multiplied in the public mind by their supporters and apologists who have good media access. No civilised society can allow such abhorrent people, who foment anarchy just to create sensation and increase their coverage in the media.
The TTP is keen for a ceasefire now because it has suffered considerable damage by the PAF’s precision hits, not only in North Waziristan but in Mohmand and other adjacent districts as well. The TTP’s rank and file do not possess equipment for snow warfare. While they can operate for a short time above the snow line, it is impossible for them to maintain hideouts in the snowy heights.
Until the snow melts in late April, the TTP will have to find hideouts in the valleys. There is a window of opportunity here where the militants are vulnerable to both air and ground interdiction. During spring and summer, they have numerous hiding places in the mountains to operate from. To compound their problems the precise nature of the attacks has unveiled two important facts: (1) the TTP has been infiltrated across the board by ISI operatives and (2) these operatives had the capacity to pass on information as ‘actionable intelligence’.
The TTP, therefore, desperately needs time to regroup. There is no surety that in the valleys it will not again be hit by the PAF, or more likely face a ground offensive by the Pakistan Army. While on the surface its spokesmen, and those helping it, maintain their charade of bravado, the TTP has been sending desperate signals through back channels seeking a temporary ceasefire. This has also been conveyed through intermediaries among the tribals who are not actively engaged against the government.
Contrary to the perception given to the public, but now expressed by the TTP’s inability to rein in its recalcitrant elements, both within its ranks and those that give it lip-service mandate, there is active infighting going on between some TTP factions. They vehemently disagree with each other about the conduct of the future war against the state in attempting to overthrow the present system of government and replace it with their model of a Shariah-complaint one.
Fazlullah has only lip-service dominance over the TTP; the Mehsuds mostly hate him. Moreover the displaced tribals that are not part of the TTP, particularly the Mehsuds, are aggrieved over being deprived of hearth and home. For the tribals it is not honourable to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Reports indicate they have been pressurising the militants to seek accommodation with the state so that they can return to their own tribal areas.
While the Afghan Taliban do not engage in or encourage any activity against Pakistan, they have an alliance of sorts with the TTP, mainly for the sake of convenience. The areas occupied by the TTP along the borders gives them depth and sanctuary. Because of the army’s successful CI operations, they feel the effect because their sanctuaries and bases are being denied to them. For them to maintain these in Pakistan has been a dire necessity.
Moreover, most religious militant groups in Pakistan send their fresh recruits for a few weeks into Afghanistan to gain battlefield experience. This manpower induction, even for a short time, is invaluable support for the Afghan Taliban. These battle-trained, if not battle-hardened, TTP personnel return to their various original militant outfits. The Afghan Taliban are pressing the TTP to somehow keep the peace with the Pakistan Army till the end of the year when they expect most (and maybe all) the coalition troops to leave.
The government must get its act together. More importantly, it must capitalise on the partial awakening of Imran Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PTI leader recognises now that there are TTP factions that will never stop acting against the state and society, and is now advocating a selective approach, targeting only those who show no inclination for peace. The misplaced perception in the mindset of the PTI rank and file that the TTP really wants peace has evaporated. However, some heavyweights in Imran’s media cell remain unguided missiles, causing him and the party damage.
The army and the ISI are on the same page. One major misperception being spread by TTP militants and enthusiastically espoused by some in the media is that there is a divide between the army and the ISI. This is sheer nonsense. The army has made huge sacrifices in the battlefield in a tremendous officer to men ratio (1:10-11).
Will those officers, some of whom who have done a stint in the ISI, support the jehadis inflicting great casualties among their own brethren engaged in CI operations? While the army is engaged in CI operations, the government could possibly give ISI the mandate, along with the legal cover it would need, to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations in the urban areas. This they can do today with only limited budgeting support in contrast with the long lead time needed to activate Nacta and a rapid response force (RRF).
Why is the government set on a course of seeking appeasement when the cacophony of pleas it is getting from backchannels confirms that the TTP is hurting badly, and has nowhere to go at present and in theimmediate future? One must leave room for negotiations, overt and/or covert. However, it is simplistic to suggest in the case of the TTP and its motivated supporters in society that you cannot both fight and talk at the same time. Talking can take precedence over action and sometimes fighting can come over negotiations, but one can both talk and fight.
In the present circumstances where the opposition forces are not united and those that claim to represent them have only limited mandate for those engaged in terrorism (and pure criminal conduct) against the state, it is ridiculous to suggest a ceasefire when the other side knows very well that it cannot neither rein in nor restrain its disparate elements. And certainly not those giving it nominal lip-service mandate at best, or none at worst.
One cannot ignore terrorism for the sake of those with a perverted mindset. Fighting it is the government’s responsibility and should be its priority. One clear unambiguous message for our present rulers: ‘blowback’ is a challenge you have to take on.
Photo Credit: martnpro
Stronger Together
Continuing its effort to connect the world’s women leaders–and bring women to the forefront to the global conversation–The Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention released a new event report on momentum-building meetings in Ankara, Turkey and Washington, D.C.
The report highlights the important role the group played in advocating for the successful implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, as well as the significant steps necessary to further empower women leaders.
The network’s crucial role is conveyed through the words of Ambassador Melanne Verveer, executive director, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security. “What you are doing in collaboration is truly remarkable. A network like this is so important, to let your sisters around the world know that they are not alone in their struggle. But that they are the agents of change,” Verveer said.
_
Crisis in Ukraine - March 12, 2014
EWI offers a daily situation report on Ukraine's unfolding crisis, featuring key developments and links to number of analytical pieces from foregin policy experts around the world.
Key Developments
- World leaders have issued statements condemning the upcoming Crimean referendum.
- In a joint statement, the leaders of the G-7, the President of the Council of Europe and the President of the European Commission have condemned Russia’s actions in Crimea as a violation of the Ukrainian Constitution and international law, including the UN Charter. In the statement, the leaders also called on Russia to stop the Crimean referendum and declared that they would not recognize the results due to the “lack of adequate preparations and the intimidating presence of Russian troops.” The statement went on to call on Russia to utilize diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict under the auspices of the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).
- The OSCE Chair has declared the Crimean referendum illegitimate as it is not in keeping with the Ukrainian Constitution and international law.
- The leader of Crimean Tatars, Refat Chubarov, believes that Russia will rig the referendum and has called for a boycott.
- Ukrainian leaders have appealed for financial assistance, revealing that the Ukrainian treasury has less than $500,000 and needs $4 billion to prevent a default on its debts. An IMF team is currently in Kiev assessing and finalizing Ukraine’s financial needs.
- In a joint statement, the leaders of the G-7, the President of the Council of Europe and the President of the European Commission have condemned Russia’s actions in Crimea as a violation of the Ukrainian Constitution and international law, including the UN Charter. In the statement, the leaders also called on Russia to stop the Crimean referendum and declared that they would not recognize the results due to the “lack of adequate preparations and the intimidating presence of Russian troops.” The statement went on to call on Russia to utilize diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict under the auspices of the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).
- The EU has finalized a seven-page document setting sanctions against Russia, including travel bans and asset freezes. The measures, targeted at individuals who have undermined and threatened Ukrainian sovereignty, are being coordinated with the U.S., Canada, Switzerland, Turkey and Japan. In their meeting next Monday, EU foreign ministers are expected to approve the measures.
- Acting on a request from Ukraine, the OSCE has called on its member states to provide unarmed observers to deploy to eastern and southern Ukraine. So far, twenty-five states have responded positively to the request. An earlier OSCE observer mission to the Crimea was halted by checkpoints setup along Crimea’s border.
- Mustafa Jemilev, a representative of Crimean Tatars, is in Moscow this week on the invitation of Russian leaders. This invitation is seen as a part of a charm offensive by Russia to win the support of Tatars for the Crimean referendum.
- Interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk is to meet with Obama today at the White House.
- Ukraine’s media regulator has ordered the country’s cable providers to stop transmitting Russian language television.
Government Statements
Statement of G-7 Leaders on Ukraine – March 12, 2014:
OSCE Chair says Crimean referendum is illegal in current form – March 11, 2014
OSCE – Ukraine requests continuation of visit by unarmed personnel – March 11, 2014
Analytical Pieces
Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders, “And the Winner in Ukraine Is … China,” The National Interest, March 12, 2014
Rajan Menon, “A Ten-Point Plan for Ukraine,” The National Interest, March 12, 2014
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “How Putin Can Use Crimea,” The National Interest, March 12, 2014
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Ukraine Should Have Kept Its Nukes,” The National Interest, March 12, 2014
Harry Kazianis, “5 Ways Russia’s Ukraine ‘Boomerang’ Could Strike Asia,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2014
Brenda Shaffer, “Pipeline Problems: Ukraine Isn’t Europe’s Biggest Energy Risk,” Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2014
Jeffrey Tayler, “Sorry, Putin Isn’t Crazy,” Foreign Policy, March 11, 2014
Crisis in Ukraine - March 11, 2014
EWI offers a daily situation report on Ukraine's unfolding crisis, featuring key developments and links to number of analytical pieces from foregin policy experts around the world.
Key Developments
- The Crimean regional assembly has been threatened with dissolution by the Ukrainian parliament upon a failure to cancel the planned March 16 referendum. Crimean lawmakers, in the meantime, have adopted a resolution that will have Crimea ask to join Russia if that measure is approved by the referendum. Russian lawmakers have announced that they will discuss legislation on March 21 to admit Crimea into Russia.
- Released details of the referendum offer two options to Crimean voters: to join the Russian Federation or to remain as a part of Ukraine under an abolished 1992 Crimean constitution that gave Crimea the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s acting Defense Minister Ihor Teniukh has revealed that only 6,000 troops were ready for combat due to years of neglect by previous Ukrainian governments. Oleksandr Turchynov, the acting president, has established a new National Guard by mobilizing internal police troops to augment existing military forces.
- In a speech from Rostov-on-Don, Russia, ousted Ukrainian President Yanukovych asserted his claim to be the rightful president and denounced the May 25 Ukrainian presidential elections as unlawful. He accused the U.S. and the West of backing an ultranationalist and fascist government in Ukraine, warned that the Ukrainian government would spark a civil war, and urged the Ukrainian military to resist the government.
- Conflicting stories have been released on the failure to arrange a meeting between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian President Putin.
- A brief televised exchange between Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that Kerry had rejected an invitation to travel to Russia for consultations.
- The State Department claimed that Russia was not prepared to engage with the U.S. and were unwilling to meet with officials from the new Ukrainian government.
- John Kerry is in Ukraine with an offer of American aid and technical assistance. Touring the streets of Kiev, Kerry lit a candle at one of the makeshift shrines dedicated to some of victims killed in February’s protests.
- Western leaders have met in London to discuss the implementation of sanctions (including asset freezes and travel bans). Sanctions could come into effect as early as this week if Russia fails to respond to Western mediation efforts.
- Pro-Russian forces have closed Crimean airspace to all commercial flights.
- In what is seen as an American gesture of support for its eastern NATO allies, the U.S. has begun a series of military exercises with Poland. Meanwhile, naval exercises in the Black Sea between the U.S., Bulgaria and Romania have been delayed by weather. While the U.S. has claimed that both military exercises were planned before the onset of the Crimean crisis, Polish President Bronislav Komorowski expressed oblique concern for the Crimean situation.
- NATO will deploy early warning aircraft to Romania and Poland to monitor the Ukraine crisis.
Government Statements
Jen Psaki, “Daily Press Briefing – March 10, 2014 – Ukraine,” U.S. Department of State, March 10, 2014
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/03/223197.htm#UKRAINE
“U.S. Will Beef Up Air Operations in Poland,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 10, 2014
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121808
Analytical Pieces:
Eugene Chausovsky, “Ukraine’s Increasing Polarization and the Western Challenge,” Stratfor, March 11, 2014
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraines-increasing-polarization-and-western-challenge
Chausovsky is an Eurasia Analyst and Director of Europe and Former Soviet Union Analysis for Stratfor.
Bruce P. Jackson, “How to Overcome the Ukraine Stalemate,” The National Interest, March 11, 2014
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-overcome-the-ukraine-stalemate-10029
Jackson is the president of the Project on Transitional Democracies.
William Partlett, “Yes, Crimeans Do Have a Choice – And a Good One,” The National Interest, March 11, 2014
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/yes-crimeans-do-have-choice%E2%80%94-good-one-10026
Partlett is a postdoctoral fellow at Columbia Law School.
Jamie Metzl, “Back to the Future in Ukraine and Asia,” Project Syndicate, March 10, 2014
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jamie-f--metzl-says-that-russia-and-china-are-reenacting-nineteenth-century-norms-of-international-behavior
Metzl is a partner in a New York-based global investment firm and a senior fellow at the Asia Society. He formerly served on the National Security Council and the State Department during the Clinton administration.
Alexander J. Motyl, “Is Losing Crimea a Loss?: What Russia Can Expect in Ukraine’s Rust Belt,” Foreign Affairs, March 10, 2014
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141020/alexander-j-motyl/is-losing-crimea-a-loss
Motyl, an Ukrainian-Amerian, is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.
Kori Schake, “The White House Needs to Shut Up: Every time the administration opens its mouth, it’s only making things worse in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2014
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/10/obama_putin_ukraine_russia
Schake is a fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Marina Lewycka, “Ukraine and the west: hot air and hypocrisy,” The Guardian, March 10, 2014
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/10/ukraine-and-west-hot-air-hypocrisy-crimea-russia
Leonid Bershidsky, “Anti-War Russians, an Endangered Minority,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2014
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-10/anti-war-russians-an-endangered-minority
Video
National Interest Interview of Alexey Pushkov – March 10, 2014
http://nationalinterest.org/video/interview-alexey-pushkov-crimea-10031
Pushkov is the head of the foreign affairs committee within the Russian legislature.
Crisis in Ukraine - March 10, 2014
EWI offers a daily situation report on Ukraine's unfolding crisis, featuring key developments and links to a number of analytical pieces from foreign policy experts around the world.
Key developments
- Interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk will meet with President Obama on Wednesday at the White House. Yatsenyuk will also address the UN Security Council in New York City on Thursday.
- Over the weekend, world leaders have conducted a series of phone conversations trying to garner international support for their viewpoints:
- President Obama spoke separately with Prime Minister Cameron of the U.K., President Hollande of France and Prime Minister Renzi of Italy. Obama welcomed the unified stance taken by the U.S. and Europe against Russian military intervention in Crimea.
- Obama also spoke with Presidents Berzins of Latvia, Grybauskaite of Lithuania and Ilves of Estonia. The Baltic leaders welcomed last week’s deployment of U.S. fighters to the region, while Obama expressed continued U.S. commitments to its NATO allies.
- In separate phone calls with Chancellor Merkel and President Obama, President Xi Jinping of China urged restraint and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
- In phone conversations with Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Merkel, President Putin claims that Russian actions in the Crimea were in accordance with international law and that the new Ukrainian government was failing to curb “ultra-nationalist and radical forces.”
- President Obama spoke separately with Prime Minister Cameron of the U.K., President Hollande of France and Prime Minister Renzi of Italy. Obama welcomed the unified stance taken by the U.S. and Europe against Russian military intervention in Crimea.
- In a press conference in Kiev, Geoffrey R. Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, has stated that the U.S. will not recognize the results of the Crimean referendum scheduled for Sunday, March 16. These statements were echoed by Antony Blinken, the deputy national security advisor, in D.C.
- In response to U.S. sanctions, the Russian Defense Ministry warns that it is considering freezing international inspections of Russia’s nuclear weapons that are a part of Russia’s commitment to nuclear arms treaties.
- Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, has warned that the failure of the Budapest Memorandum may force Ukraine to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russia. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by the Russian Federation, the U.S. and the U.K. guarantees the sovereignty of an independent Ukraine in return for Ukrainian accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the surrender of all Ukrainian Soviet-inherited nuclear weapons to Russia.
- Kiev estimates that there are 18,000 pro-Russian troops currently in Crimea. “Russian troops have deployed along the Crimea’s borders to block the movement of Ukrainian troops.
- As the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned anti-Russian violence in eastern Ukraine, Russian news agencies are reporting a looming pro-Russian uprising in the region.
- Western officials are trying to find ways to alleviate the stranglehold of Russian natural gas on Ukraine that include larger natural gas exports from the United States, reversing natural gas from Western Europe back to Ukraine and diversifying natural gas imports from countries other than Russia.
- Ukrainian television channels have been shut down in the Crimea and replaced by Russian state television.
- Planned U.S. aid to Ukraine has become entangled in a political dispute over the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund that would grant more control to emerging powers. Republicans fear a loss of American influence and express an unwillingness to use taxpayer money to bail out fiscally irresponsible countries like Ukraine.
Government Statements
Analytical Pieces
Andong Peng, “Ukraine – A Case for Chinese Involvement,” The Diplomat, March 10, 2014
Edward Luttwak, “Russia Wants Much More Than Crimea,” New Republic, March 9, 2014
Condoleezza Rice, “Will America heed the wake-up call of Ukraine?,” Washington Post, March 7, 2014
Steven Pifer, “Honoring Neither the Letter nor the Law,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2014
Keith Johnson, “Help Is Not on the Way,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2014
Matthew Gault, “This Is Why Russia Wants Crimea,” Medium – War is Boring, March 7, 2014
Paul Pilar, “More Sanctioning Madness,” The National Interest, March 6, 2014
YiYang Cao
Marten Explains Ukraine on The Daily Show
Kimberly Marten, a member of the EastWest Institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, and a professor of Political Science at Barnard College at Columbia University, appeared on The Daily Show on March 6 to discuss the situation in Crimea. During the interview, she highlighted the dynamics of Russia’s foreign relations and the potential effects of the decision to enter Crimea, offering recommendations Russia can take to “save-face” and promote positive outcomes for Ukraine.
To watch segment, click here: The Daily Show
Gady in The National Interest: Ukraine Can Choose Neutrality
Writing for The National Interest, Gady suggests Austria's post-WWII model of neutrality and non-alignment as a viable solution for Ukraine's current crisis. The plan would necessitate economic guarantees and alleviation of security concerns.
Read the full story in The National Interest.
Austrian Neutrality: A Model for Ukraine
The crisis in Ukraine is spinning slowly out of control. An aggressive Russia under the leadership of a man who once deemed the end of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century” is pursuing a neo-Soviet foreign policy for Ukraine to remain firmly in Russia’s orbit—an effort doomed to fail due to the deep political rift dividing the country. Consequently, given this neo-Soviet style of Realpolitik, it may be wise to examine the history of Soviet foreign policy under ostensibly similar circumstances in Europe to inform the present day debate surrounding Ukraine.
The most obvious scenario is the Allied-Soviet negotiations between 1945-1955 over the fate of Austria, which eventually concluded with Austria’s declaration of “perpetual neutrality,” the departure of all Soviet and Allied military forces from Austrian soil in 1955, and the ratification of the Austrian Independence Treaty in the same year. Likewise, neutrality also may be Ukraine’s most viable option. In fact, the now discredited Viktor Yanukovich stated in his inauguration 2010 “challenges that the international community face mean we have to join together in a larger format. We are ready to participate in this process as a European, non-aligned state.”[1] Indeed in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, passed on July 1, 1990, it says that Ukraine has the “intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles…”[2] To this date, however, no further steps have been taken towards Ukrainian neutrality.
After Austria’s defeat as part of the Third Reich (1938-1945) in the Second World War, Austria roughly faced five distinct potential futures.
First, the country could become another European “People’s Democracy” dominated by the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. Marshall plan beginning in the summer of 1947 and the fact that only parts of Austria were under direct Soviet control made this an unviable option for Soviet leadership.
Second, Austria could have turned entirely towards the West. Some influential Austrian politicians advocated NATO membership as early as 1949, yet the Soviet Union was opposed to such an endeavor for obvious reasons and would not withdraw its troops, knowing Austria would join the Western alliance.
Third, Austria could have been divided on the lines of occupied Germany as two separate states. This fear was especially acute during the years of the West Berlin blockade (1948-1949). A split-up, however, was not in the Soviet Union’s interest since the strategically important Western half of Austria quickly would have joined NATO.
Fourth, Austria could have remained permanently occupied by Allied and Soviet forces if no political solution was found, which was not a farfetched scenario given the occupation and breakup of Germany during the Cold War.
Last and the most relevant to Ukraine, Austria could have opted to become another buffer state between the East and West—a “second Switzerland”—and declare its neutrality.
Ukraine today faces similar options as Russian troops settle into Crimea: side with the “East”, side with the “West”, break up the country, or restore territorial integrity in exchange for neutrality. Of the four options, neutrality appears to be the most viable scenario. A closer look at the Soviet position in 1955 vis-à-vis Austria is warranted.
Two factors made the Soviet Union agree to the withdrawal from Austrian soil in April 1955—economic concessions and the guarantee that Austria would remain militarily neutral during the ongoing Cold War.
The Soviet Union had economic interests in both oil fields in lower Austria as well as Austrian-based German companies seized by the Soviets after the war. The Soviets only eventually conceded to a withdrawal based on a rigorous reparation and compensation plan proposed by a French official called the “Cherrière-Plan”.
On the national-security front, Austria agreed to remain neutral in the ongoing Cold War by not joining either of the two military alliances or allowing the stationing of foreign troops on Austrian soil.
Other issues that ultimately were resolved during negotiations were the status of the Croatian and Slovene minorities in the country, the prohibition of another “Anschluss” with Germany, and the role of former Nazis in Austrian politics.
All of this, next to other external political developments, cleared the way for the Austrian Independence Treaty of May 15, 1955, making Austria a de facto buffer state between East and West. De jure neutrality was guaranteed by the enshrinement of a “perpetual neutrality” clause in the constitution of the Austrian Second Republic in October of the same year.
As Victoria Potapkina points out in a paper discussing Ukraine neutrality and using Austria as a case study: “The key country to Austria’s situation was the Soviet Union (USSR) toward which it had to pledge not only military, but also ideological neutrality.”
This has two implications for the current political crisis in Ukraine.
First, the economic interests of Russia must be satisfied in order for her to save face. For example, a symbolic short-term guarantee that Ukraine will remain dependent on Russian oil and gas in the intermediate term by stalling drilling concessions to Western oil companies such as the Exxon Mobile Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell in exchange for nonintervention in Ukrainian domestic affairs could be a start. (In return Putin will certainly have to say goodbye to Ukraine joining his Eurasian Union, which at this stage is no longer a real option in any case.) Also, perhaps the heavy industry sites in eastern Ukraine could be declared special economic zones (SEZ). From the side of the IMF and the West, this must be matched with substantial financial aid (The country owes $13 billion in debt this year) over a short amount of time—a “Ukrainian Marshall Plan”—to ensure Ukrainian economic development and alleviate any public outcry such concessions most likely would cause. The European Union has already pledged a $15 billion USD aid package, which is a step in the right direction. In the long term the Ukrainian economy will need to diversify, and the United States has promised aid to that effect in the amount of a $1 billion USD loan guarantee (Trade with Russia is already in decline. Less than 6 percent of Russia’s foreign trade is going to Ukraine).
Second, Russia’s security concerns must be alleviated. Multilateral negotiations (perhaps under the auspices of the UN or OSCE) should be initiated immediately to outline a nonaligned, perpetually neutral Ukraine in Kiev, Moscow, Washington, and Brussels. As Mykola Sungurovskiy from the Razumkov Center points out: “Presence of militarily mighty neighbours involves the need of reliable external guarantees of neutrality.”[3] Ukraine neutrality will only be an option if a binding agreement with the European Union, Russia and the United States as guarantors can be signed. As the case of the “Budapest Memorandum”[4] shows, nothing short of a formal treaty will do in this case. As in Austria and Switzerland, the added benefit of this on the domestic front could be the forging of a new Ukrainian national identity based on a perception of neither being in the “Eastern” or “Western” camp.
Austria sacrificed the province of Southern Tyrol to gain full independence; Ukraine will, in all likelihood, have to concede the Crimea, if not additional territories in the East. In addition, a host of internal issues still must be resolved in a neutral Ukraine: ethnic tensions, ultranationalism, the membership of Ukraine in the Commonwealth of Independent States and other international organizations, a viable economic strategy, a plan to diminish the influence of the oligarchs and a strategy to fight corruption, among others.
A further breakup or military conflict in Ukraine is in no one’s interest, and space still remains for maneuvering. The geographic proximity to Russia and Ukraine’s energy dependence will certainly show the limits of genuine Ukraine neutrality. Still, a diplomatic dialogue among all key actors involved on the subject may have a defusing impact. As the I.R. scholar Viktoria Potapkina concludes in a paper entitled “Ukraine’s Neutrality: A Myth or Reality” in 2010: “Neutrality can be considered as one of the main feasible solutions to certain ongoing problems in Ukraine.” Ukrainian neutrality appears to be the least conflict-prone choice; therefore, diplomats carefully should study the negotiation process leading to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. Despite various differences, it is a unique case study of the establishment of a buffer state in a much-contested geographic region, including how it maintained its territorial integrity and its political independence.
Franz-Stefan Gady is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative.
Photo Credit: Valerii9116