Politics and Governance

EWI’s Kostyuk Sheds Light on Czech Republic Cyber Challenges

Nadiya Kostyuk’s timely article, “International and Domestic Challenges to Comprehensive National Cybersecurity” appears in the latest edition of the Journal of Strategic Studies, using the Czech Republic as a case study.  

Kostyuk, EWI’s cybersecurity coordinator, argues in her piece that, “Domestic challenges that nations face in addressing cybersecurity in an effective and comprehensive manner include ambiguous legislation, recalcitrant officials and a lack of both fiscal and human capital.” 

Click here to read the full article: “International and Domestic Challenges to Comprehensive National Cybersecurity”

Photo credit: Mecanoeil

 

Austin Writes for New Europe on Russia's Naval Build-Up

Plans for a Russian naval renaissance are part of President Putin's broader strategy to gain geopolitical advantage in the international system, according to Austin. 

Read the full piece here on New Europe

Russia’s Naval Dream

With immaculate timing, given the crisis in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, Russia last week announced plans to rebuild a global naval presence. This follows an announcement in January that the navy will take delivery of 40 new ships and other vessels this year (though most are smaller ship classes). 

One of the new units to be commissioned this year is a ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarine named for the ruler of Kievan Rus’ in the 11th and 12th centuries, known now in Russian as Vladimir Monomakh. One millennium later, another Vladimir, this one a Putin, sees the history of Russia as inextricably tied to and deriving from that state of Rus’, first established in Kyiv (Kiev). For him the chain of political association is unbroken, notwithstanding the the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 2005, Putin declared this to be “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.

Putin has masterminded a naval renaissance in his country beginning in the middle of the last decade. He knows he cannot reverse the catastrophe, but he is determined to redress its effects as best he can, and this includes maintaining intimate political relations with Ukraine. The task remains not only incomplete but is now in serious crisis.

On 26 February, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, declared his country’s plans to establish a number of new foreign naval bases and to set up access rights elsewhere. His list includes Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles and Singapore. By October 2103, Russian port visits that year were up 35 percent compared with the previous year, according to Tom Fedyszyn writing in The National Interest in December. This plan for a global naval presence gives a clear pointer to the continuing high priority that Russia places on control of the naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea.  

The naval renaissance also includes an expansion of Russian naval basing and maritime air patrols in the Arctic, measures which were also announced in January this year. The move was a response to an order from President Putin in December 2013. One week after that order, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for defence industry, Dmitry Rogozin, announced plans to expand ship-building capabilities in the Russian Far East city of Khabarovsk. He said that Russia had a geopolitical duty to respond to discussions in NATO beginning in 2009 to beef up its Arctic naval presence.   

As Fedyszyn notes, the naval expansion is not without its growing pains, and the Russian navy remains a pale imitation of the Soviet navy in its 1980s heyday. But Russia is not counting on matching US naval capability any time soon. It is intent on a return to classic geopolitics.  The naval expansion is just one sign of the intent. 

Analysts in China understand this well. Writing in Global Times on 1 August 2013, Retired Rear Admiral Yang Yi made a plea for Chinese naval development to be based on a benchmark of the naval power of Russia. He said that Russia has the second largest navy in the world and China should aspire to emulate it.   

Russia, like China, and possibly relying in part on the latter’s naval power, believes that it can gain new geopolitical leverage from its own maritime renaissance. More importantly, Russia, like China, is determined to press for new geopolitical power. This is not the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence or common security. It is a return to zero-sum politics. This new Russian vision may be a pipe-dream, but we have to accept that this is how Russia’s leaders are thinking. However the Ukraine crisis plays out, Russia will not be abandoning its new “naval dream” anytime soon. Sevastopol is part of that dream.

Photo Credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery

Gady Writes for China-U.S. Focus on the Effects of Japanese Rhetoric

EWI Senior Fellow Franz-Stefan Gady describes how revisionist, reactionary rhetoric from Japan's Shinzo Abe is impacting U.S. relations with both Japan and China. 

Read the full story on China-US Focus

The United States will need to push Shinzo Abe harder to discard his revisionist stance on history.

Traveling recently to China for the China-US Youth Dialogue it quickly became apparent that the country most Chinese scholars wanted to have a conversation about when it came to discussing security-related issues was not the United States but Japan. 

The topic of discussion was the disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands. However, what worried my Chinese interlocutor more than Japan’s immediate naval action was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s blatant historical revisionism in regards to the country’s imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s. That, as my host explained, was subconsciously the greater fear for most Chinese policy makers: a neo-imperialist, confrontational Japan filled with racist ideology, immune to past mistakes, and once more possessed by the spirit of Dai-Nippon. “We trust the United States to act rationally in Asia, but not so with Japan; it’s aggressive behavior is the real danger to China!” one scholar from a prominent Chinese think tank excitedly told me during dinner in Changchun. 

While the Chinese fear of Japanese historical revisionism certainly has its hyperbolic elements, Japan’s alleged transformation into a “normal country” can certainly appear overwhelming to its neighbors. Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tutelage, Japan has increased the country’s defense budget by $ 11.7 billion over the next five years, passed a first-ever National Security Strategy that provocatively calls for the acquisition of beach-assault vehicles among other things, and created a new National Security Council to better coordinate policy with key allies. Abe and the Liberal Democractic Party (LDP) are also considering lifting a decade long defense export ban, and more importantly, are contemplating reinterpreting or simply circumventing Japan’s pacifist constitution – notably Article 9. All of this is done in the name of Abe’s so-called “pro-active pacifism”. 

Moreover, Abe is a strong supporter of the US-Japan alliance and is keen to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on ‘collective self defense’. The United States is overall supportive of Abe’s agenda as U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Caroline Kennedy, states: “Japan will be a more effective alliance partner if its Self-Defense Forces are able to help defend American soldiers or sailors if they are attacked.”

Abe’s revisionist rhetoric, however, increasingly clashes with Washington’s agenda of deescalating tensions in East Asia. For the United States to criticize Japan on its unwillingness to come to terms with the great sufferings its empire inflicted in Asia is tantamount to blasphemy for most LDP ears.  The stock response by many conservative Japanese politicians and commentators is to admit some wrongdoing but otherwise engage in generalizations: “Seen from the outside, Japan appeared to be invading China with imperialist intentions. Seen from the inside, however, most political leaders felt that Japan was being dragged into the swamp of war as part of some inevitable process.” a popular column in the Asahi Shinbun once stated. 

This is nothing new when one looks at the US-Japan trade negotiations of the 1980s and early 1990s, where Japanese negotiators were often just willing to conceit the most general points without going into any particulars. 

Also, when any discussion arises on Japan’s past misconduct such as the notorious treatment of the Chinese population in Mainland China,Malaya and Singapore or the sensitive issue of comfort women, Japanese conservatives are quick to point out that in fact the greatest atrocity of the Second World War was the dropping of the atomic bomb. 

Why is the United States putting up with this? 

According to Japan scholars such as Karl van Wolferen  the problem is that the United States Embassy and State Department – the principal US government entity dealing with such delicate matters -   have long had a tendency to echo the Japanese interpretation of many bilateral problems. The American historian Ivan P. Hall supports this assertion:  “Unlike the flow of ideas between the US and Europe, the Japan-US discourse is determined largely by a small group of Japanese and American experts on each other’s countries (…) this narrow channel of scholars, journalists, and diplomats serves increasingly to skew the dialogue in Japan’s favor.” 

More importantly, the Japanese are calling the United States’ bluff: Washington will not commit to any course of action that could substantially undermine the US-Japan alliance - the most important security agreement in Asia for the United States. US Foreign Secretary John Kerry did express his disappointment about Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasakuni Shrine but simultaneously, during a foreign ministerial meeting, confirmed the need for increased cooperation between the United States and Japan vis-à-vis China. 

Nonetheless, should Japan’s nationalist vitriol increase and Abe re-visit the infamous Yasakuni Shrine, praise the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, or again single out class A war criminals for praise, just to name a few of the available options, the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea will suffer. 

According to Kim Tae-hyung, security expert at Soongsil University, in South Korea: “Even if there were no historical conflicts at all, Japan’s pursuit of a greater security role would aggravate security jitters among its neighbors. But Abe’s nationalist moves further complicate efforts for regional cooperation and pose hurdles to the U.S. policy toward Asia. Taking advantage of the chasm in Korea-Japan ties, China would strive to strengthen its ties with Korea and make it difficult for Washington to increase the triangular security cooperation with its core Asian allies of Korea and Japan.”

Both Japan and China have developed a victim’s complex when dealing with each other. They instinctively like to exploit both nations’ sufferings during the war in order to skew world opinion in their favor. However, Japan, since it is democracy and allied with a Western liberal democracy, has a greater obligation towards objectivity and truth than authoritarian communist China. In that sense the United States needs to find firmer words for Abe Shinzo’s reactionary rhetoric.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute.

Photo Credit: Bernardo Fuller

Ukraine: Can it live up to its promise?

Writing for EWI's nextgen blog, Nadiya Kostyuk warns that Ukraine's violent protests may fuel yet another vicious cycle of corrupt politics. 

Blessed with vast natural resources, access to the Black and Azov Seas, and an educated youth population, Ukraine possesses—at least on paper—the necessary elements to establish itself as a prosperous, peaceful and dynamic nation in the heart of Eastern Europe. In reality, inept, dishonest and outright criminal leadership has continued to prevent the country from reaching its potential—a problem that began immediately after Ukrainians gained independence in 1991, and has since plagued the country. Corruption is the major reason why over a million Ukrainians (out of population of only 46 million) continue to gather in Kyiv’s Independence Square for the second time since 1991. 

Following the last few weeks’ chaos and violence, the seeming victory of the Ukrainian people has created an even more complex situation in the country. The populous unrest in the pro-Russian Crimean peninsular (opposed only by the “patriotic” Tatars) might be exacerbated by Vladimir Putin who silently (for now) observes the situation, while holding military exercises near the Ukrainian border and granting protection to ousted Ukrainian President Victor Yanukhovych. The divide in Crimea and the Western Ukraine is quite clear. The majority of the pro-Russian population in Crimea is ethnically Russian and was artificially transplanted to Crimea during Soviet times, while the western formerly Hapsburg-ruled provinces remain loyal to Ukraine. The ethnic identities in the rest of Ukraine, however, are “mixed and muddled.” 

Facing these challenges, Ukrainians must reform the government and elect a new president. 2004-heroine Yulia Tymoshenko, who was recently released from prison, is ready to run the country. But, because the public is now aware of her palatsy (palaces) and her daughter’s short vacation in Rome during the mass murders on the Maidan, she probably will not win. Western-nationalists, bilishist’ yakykh bidnosiatsia do “Nebesnoii Sotni” (most of whom belong to the “Heavenly Hundred”) pose more trouble by stating their “claim on power.” 

Vi zumily pozbutysia tsiieii rakovoii pukhlynu” (“You have removed this cancer from this country”) – words by Tymoshenko on the Maidan. Yes, hopefully Ukrainian politicians have learned their lesson about corruption (so to say CORRUPTION 101). However, how can they successfully work through this complex situation without increasing the number of casualties and factions within the country?

Looking back, the 2004 protests—when Ukrainian masses gathered to express their dissatisfaction with unfair elections—was a peaceful time compared to now. Ten years ago, one million protesters filled the Maidan, rhythmically chanting “Razom nas bagato! Nas ne podolaty!” (“Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!”)

Optimism abounded and euphoria was palpable once the crowd welcomed a new president, Viktor Yushchenko. The Orange Revolution surely represented a victory for the people; a correction of course for the young democracy, and a triumph of peaceful protest over political corruption and ineptitude. But did the dissidents of the Orange Revolution truly achieve their long-term goals? Yushchenko promised economic prosperity and European Union membership to his people. Like many leaders before him, however, he followed in the regrettable tradition of Ukrainian politics. Yushchenko succumbed to graft and nepotism, while exclaiming an ever-popular refrain for the nation’s politicians: Tsi ruky nichogo ne kraly” (These hands have not stolen anything). 

In 2006, just two short years following the “revolution,” Yushchenko abandoned his promise of Ukraine entering Western Europe’s embrace. After appointing Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister, Yushchenko’s 180-turn was complete: clearly, the president’s goal was to further entrench ties to Russia, and not to turn outward. But, instead of a Soviet-style occupation, Ukraine would bind itself with proverbial chains—promises of cheap natural gas and bailout assistance that allowed Yushchenko to patch over gaping wounds in Ukraine’s economy. Predictably, much of the Ukrainian population, especially those residing in the Western half of the nation, were not convinced. They voted Yushchenko and his party Nasha Ukraiina (Our Ukraine) out of power and the “Razom nas bagato! Nas ne podolaty!” chants were quietly resumed by a new choir. 

Nearly a decade has passed since the Orange Revolution and people have returned to Maidan, for a similar reason: they are tired of being obmanytumu i obkradenumu (lied to and stolen from). The source of the current protests were broken promises by now-President Viktor Yanukovych, who reneged on a free-trade agreement with the European Union, opting instead “for a $15bn package of Russian credits and cheaper gas to support Ukraine’s ailing economy in November [of last year].” Though a split does exist between Eastern and Western-minded Ukrainians, this time there was consensus on fighting corruption. While these protests started in a peaceful manner, similar to 2004, they have resulted in violent action and murder,  with 82 people killed and 500 hospitalized, since February 2014. Apart from the official statistics, it is estimated that many more are being treated in cafes and churches such as Natsional’na Philarmonia (The National Philharmonic of Ukraine) and Mikhaylivskiy Sobor near Khreshchatyk Street (A Kiev Main Street). 

What has changed from 2004 to 2014 that has sparked such violence? Do the protestors believe that destroying state property in a country already strapped with debt will improve their living standards? Is Ukrainians killing each other the answer to a nation’s woes? The answer, alarmingly, may be yes. Because of the breakdown of social order, the Ukrainian presidency—irrespective of who gains power—will likely be overhauled to a weakened parliamentary republic, akin to most Western European governments. Following these constitutional changes, Ukrainians will hold new elections in May 2014, but most of the same parliament members now holding office will be reelected, similar to the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. 

Ukrainians are likely to see this rerun of terrible political leadership because they have yet to internalize and apply the rule of law, or other institutional concepts that allow Western democracies to flourish. The root of failing Ukrainian democracy is the ghost of dishonest bureaucracy—a remnant of this proud nation’s Soviet past, and one it shares with other nations east of the former Iron Curtain (including Russia). In Ukraine, where payment is expected to secure a job or university placement, the culture of Soviet-era wheel greasing is deeply imbedded into the social fabric. As such, those who are fighting today might find themselves continuing the cycle of bribery if they assume power. Ukrainian mentality tolerates corruption because corruption is all the society has known. As the lyrics to The Who’s “Won’t Get Fooled Again” go, “meet the new boss; same as the old boss.”

A younger generation of Ukrainians may force meritocratic reforms to take hold in decades to come, but, until then, Ukraine and its former Eastern Bloc counterparts will go through successions of economic mismanagement and protest. Voting and constitutions cannot, in and of itself, change nearly a century’s worth of bad habits and practices. Let’s hope that Ukraine’s new bosses realize their time in parliament will be brutish and short if they opt to ignore the need for structural reform, much as their predecessors have since 1991. 

Neither the EU nor Russia can solve the country’s problems: only Ukrainians can save Ukraine. For the sake of ending current bloodshed, and preventing future conflicts, let’s hope that changes resulting from the Revolution of 2014 are real and that Ukrainians won’t get fooled again.

Nadiya Kostyuk is a program coordinator for EWI's Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative. She grew up in Berezne, Ukraine. 

Photo Credit: snamess

Russia and Allies Towards Post-2014 Afghanistan

Overview

On Thursday March 6, 2014, Senior Research Associate of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Marcel de Haas will launch his report on Russia and Allies – Toward Post-2014, Afghanistan.

Click here to view full report: Russia and Allies – Toward Post-2014, Afghanistan

 

Gady in The National Interest on "Learning to Forget in Cambodia"

As EWI senior fellow Franz-Stefan Gady writes in The National Interest, Cambodia still struggles to come to terms with lasting effects of the Khmer Rouge's brutal reign.  

See the full story on The National Interest

Learning to Forget in Cambodia

“Every time my wife hears the name Khmer Rouge, she starts sobbing uncontrollably” Neng Bunrong, a thirty-five-year-old tour guide from Kampung Chan in Eastern Cambodia mechanically states, interrupting a short summary of Cambodian history in front of the main entrance to the temple complex of Angkor Wat on a humid January afternoon. His wife, forty and mother of four children, witnessed the killing of twenty-four members of her family in the 1970s when Pol Pot’s young henchman came to her village. According to Bunrong, she only survived because after shooting her family, the perpetrators ran out of bullets when they came to her and instead smashed the young girl’s head and left her for dead in a shallow ditch until villagers rescued her a few hours later.

He stands next to two stone columns flanking the entrance to the Ankor Wat temple complex. They are littered with bullet holes—a silent testimony to Cambodia’s violent past and tacitly amplifying Bunrong’s horrid story.

It is cliché for a westerner to begin an article on present day Cambodia with a reference to the Khmer Rouge (or with Angkor Wat for that matter) similar to any overhasty reference to the Third Reich when discussing aspects of present day German culture. Yet as George Orwell argued in an essay in the 1940s, “What can the England of 1940 have in common with the England of 1840? But then, what have you in common with the child of five whose photograph your mother keeps on the mantelpiece? Nothing, except that you happen to be the same person.” Thus, to leave out the Khmer Rouge in discussing present day Cambodia appears to be similar to disowning a disreputable family member; by the act of physical exclusion, they manage to permeate every family gathering more powerfully than they ever could in person.

A similar process appears to be still in the works in Cambodia where the country still has a long way to go to confront its murderous past. For example, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), having spent more than US$200 million since their establishment in 1997, has managed only to indict five people for genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. Only Kaing Guek Eav (Comrade Duch), the warden of the infamous S-21 prison camp where thousands of Cambodians were tortured and executed, got life imprisonment. One accused died during the trial, while the proceedings were suspended for a second culprit.

Brad Adams, the director of Human Rights Watch in Asia is quoted as saying that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has spent years obstructing the proceedings of the court, a statement supported amply by many experts. One of the reasons is that the incumbent government and Hun Sen’s party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), is still permeated with former Khmer Rouge members. Sen himself was a Khmer Rouge battalion commander before he defected to Vietnam in the 1970s. He surreptitiously took an interest in the proceedings and tried to exercise control by handpicking Cambodian judges and legal staff.

Many circles of society feel that the government should simply “let sleeping dogs lie.” When Nuon Chea, second in Pol Pot’s regime, which killed about 1.7 million Cambodians, surrendered to Hun Sen along with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge who had been hiding in the jungles of Thailand and Western Cambodia for decades, Sen stated, “The time has come to dig a hole and bury the past.” It took more than nine years to have Chea arrested and put on trial. A verdict is expected in early 2014.

This attitude is also supported by the Buddhist notion of individual helplessness (95 percent of Cambodians are Theravada Buddhists) and a belief in the supernatural where it is thought not unwise to literally disturb the sleep of the ghosts of the past. Traveling in Cambodia, one encounters many little temple shrines in villages and towns filled with offerings for the spirits haunting the innumerable “Killing Fields”. In Tuol Sleng prison (S-21), where at least 15000 inmates were murdered, every lunchtime staff member of the prison-turned-genocide-museum leaves food out for the ghosts.

One of the results of the unwillingness to publicly (and privately) accept the horrors of the Khmer Rouge is the exceptionally high rate of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) cases in the country. One psychiatrist estimates that 47 percent of the Cambodian population is suffering from PTSD, with around 50 percent of children born to Khmer Rouge survivors suffering from secondary PTSD. According to the journalist Joel Brinkley’s account, even Khieu Kanharith, the government information minister, is suffering from PTSD-induced recurring nightmares of finding his family on the ground on their knees when he returned home for execution in the 1970s. One of the automatic coping mechanisms of people affected by PTSD is the avoidance of people, places, and situations that trigger memories of the traumatic event, yet merely relying on this one coping strategy will guarantee violent throwbacks and continued suffering if otherwise left untreated.

Cambodia has experienced high economic growth rates in the last decade fuelled by the garment industry, which employs around 500,000 (mostly female) workers and accounts for some US$5 billion in exports each year, which constitutes around 70 percent of all exports. The current protests by the garment industry workers that have pressured the government also have seen its fair share of Khmer Rouge analogies. As Sun Thun, a protester and teacher from Kampong Thom province, put it, "During the Pol Pot regime, the government was very cruel and killed people. It is the same today." Due to the inadequate public debate on the subject, Pol Pot still seems to surreptitiously insert himself into the political discourse; this has belittled the magnitude of the slaughter in the 1970s.

In one way, all of this is understandable; there is some truth to Hun Sen’s statement that it is necessary to bury the past in order to move on—at least for a while. Under Hun Sen, despite being a despicable ruthless power-obsessed quasi-autocrat, the country has lived in relative peace and seen unprecedented economic development for the last decade—something quite revolutionary given Cambodia’s recent history. Perhaps then it is necessary to temporally practice “strategic forgetfulness” rather than quixotically embark on a crusade to do justice, even if the heavens fall.

Something like strategic forgetfulness—a temporary forced amnesia until memories of the past are not as fresh and vivid—can of course never be official government policy; however, even in Europe, countries such as Austria and Germany after the Second World War subconsciously (often with both tacit and open government support) practiced strategic forgetfulness. In both countries, there was a silent and a tacit consensus not to talk openly about what had happened between 1933 and 1945, a consensus that was often amplified by PTSD. As a result, many lower-ranking mass murderers, war criminals, and architects of the Holocaust were never brought to justice, and former Nazis occupied high positions in both the private and public sectors for decades.

Inadvertently, this code of silence also inhibited the expansion of a more open democratic discourse in both countries well into the later decades of the twentieth century by generating an atmosphere where certain debates could just not be held and people in power not challenged. As a consequence, it took the wider public in both countries decades to grasp the magnitude of what happened during the Nazi dictatorship. As was the case in Europe in the twentieth century, in Cambodia today, time is justice’s biggest opponent.

Austria and Germany were of course democracies during this period in a way that Cambodia has never been. Cambodia’s autocratic structure—formed in spite of its ostensibly democratic institutions—only strengthens the code of silence, and vice versa. It is a small step from personally refusing to talk about one subject (one’s own history during the Khmer Rouge period) to accepting external censorship from powers above (the Cambodian government’s suppression of opposition activities). Self-censorship and censorship require the same mindset.

As the saying goes, “you can throw nature out the window with a pitchfork, and yet she will always return through the backdoor.” By subconsciously suppressing discussions on the genocide in Cambodia, the nation guarantees that the effects will linger, poisoning politics for years to come. The more the public and the government refuse to deal with this period, the more forcefully it will return through the backdoor.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative. Follow him on Twitter (@HoansSolo).

Photo Credit: Earth Hour Global

U.S.-China Sanya Initiative 5th Meeting Report

The EastWest Institute in partnership with the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) convened the 5th meeting of the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative, which took place on December 9-13, 2013. 

Senior retired flag officers of the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps traveled to Beijing and Chengdu, China to meet with retired senior generals of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to discuss critical issues in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. The delegations spent two days in off-the-record dialogue in Chengdu and also met with General Zhang Yang, director of the General Political Department of the PLA and member of the Central Military Commission, and General Li Zuocheng, commander of the Chengdu Military Area. 

The Chengdu dialogue sessions covered a range of topics of military and political importance to the United States and China. Discussion focused on Taiwan; cybersecurity and regional security in Northeast Asia; and also addressed other issues such as the U.S. rebalancing strategy to Asia, North Korea, the East China Sea, Islamic extremism and managing the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. Both sides agreed that cultivating communication and mutual understanding between the militaries of the United States and China is essential for fostering the cooperation necessary to address the world’s most difficult issues.

Since 2008, the Sanya Initiative has regularly brought together retired American and Chinese senior generals in order to build stronger military-to-military ties between the U.S. and China. EWI expects to host the next round in the United States in 2014.

 

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Chinese Media Coverage

Vice President David Firestein was interviewed on China's Global Times regarding our recent report on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Threading the Needle: Proposals for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan, and the concept "Concurrent Unilateralism," an idea introduced by EWI. 

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