Middle East & North Africa

The seventh edition of the Brussels MENA Briefing, co-hosted by the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), in partnership with the Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative, was dedicated to the economic impact of the ongoing conflict in Yemen—a war that started in 2014/15 and has since turned the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis according to the UN. 

The Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative aims to contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention, economic stabilization and sustainable development in Yemen by building consensus in crucial policy areas through engaging and promoting informed Yemeni voices from all backgrounds (the "Development Champions") in public discourse on development, economy and post-conflict reconstruction in Yemen, and by positively influencing local, regional and international development agendas. It is implemented by CARPO, DeepRoot Consulting and the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies and is generously funded by the European Union and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Yemen.

The speakers of this briefing were Laila Tawfik Anaam, development champion, co-founder and managing director of the Yemen Loan Guarantee Program at the Social Fund for Development in Yemen, and Rafat al-Akhali, founder and managing director of DeepRoot Consulting. CARPO President Marie-Christine Heinze moderated the session.

When discussing the economic impacts of the war in Yemen, what needs to be emphasized first, the speakers argued, is the plight of the Yemeni population. 80 percent of Yemenis are living in poverty with approximately 70 percent of them lacking access to water, sanitation and health care. This leaves 24.3 out of 29 million Yemenis in need for humanitarian aid. A spike in unemployment further complicates the living conditions, particularly among the youth, where unemployment is estimated at 50 percent.

One of the speakers explained that approximately 40 percent of Yemeni households have lost their primary source of income in both the private and public sectors. It was emphasized that fisheries and agricultural entrepreneurs, in particular, had been hit hard by the devastating effects of the war.

In addition to that, it was outlined that the banking sector has effectively collapsed and that the monetary system has become dysfunctional. Both speakers referred to the severe consequences caused by the split of the Central Bank of Yemen, which has led to conflicting monetary policies. It was highlighted that those government agencies that provided regular income for both public servants, as well as recipients of social welfare have either halted or interrupted their services.

The experts shed light on the grim prospects for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Yemen, which are heavily impacted by closures of and restrictions at sea and airports, as well as land border crossings, which make any form of cross-border trade extremely difficult and cost-intensive. Mobility within Yemen has been reduced massively, it was pointed out, because of the country’s infrastructure—i.e., roads, bridges, tunnels, etc.—being destroyed during the war and because of the high number of checkpoints and lines of conflict that need to be crossed.

Basic needs of companies, such as electricity, pose serious challenges for entrepreneurs, it was explained. They are dependent on private generators, which too often cannot operate due to fuel shortages in the country.

What SMEs in Yemen direly need, according to one speaker, is a legal framework which enables them to operate at sea and airports and border crossings, an overall easing of taxation and the establishment of supporting microfinance institutions with lending capital. It was reiterated that the agricultural sector (fishery, livestock, etc.) should be prioritized in this effort as this would help to address food insecurity.

In general, the war should be seen through the lens of economics, one speaker argued. It is a battle for the “commanding heights” of the country’s economic resources and institutions. It was highlighted that there are currently no real economic incentives for any party to stop the war.

It is important, it was established, that any peace agreement for Yemen entail a clear roadmap for economic stability. The ongoing UN-led peace efforts, it was argued, fall short of addressing the economic drivers of the conflict.

What needs to be put on the agenda, one speaker urged, is the need to re-establish one Central Bank, ensure the resumption of the payment of public sector salaries, define a way to reach an agreement on how to allocate natural resources revenues, and to clearly outline the path towards reconstruction and economic recovery.

While this is a major task, one speaker recalled precedents and blueprints of similar approaches in the past, namely the Dayton Accords and their focus on the Central Bank board and governor in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Accra Agreement, which entailed a Governance Reform Commission and a Contract and Monopolies Commission; and the case of Angola, where economic power-sharing in the Cabinda Province was part of the conflict settlement strategies.

It was recommended by both speakers that for the European Union to play a role in conflict-resolution in Yemen, these economic factors not only serve as important issues to raise, but as points of departure for European initiatives to support the Yemeni process through diplomacy, aid, investment, capacity-building and efforts for reconstruction and reconciliation.

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, November 3, 2020

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

Jordanian Foreign Policy in Light of Regional Geopolitical Shifts 

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

Speakers included Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh, professor at the University of Jordan and well-known security and political analyst, and Dr. Edmund Ratka, designated head of the Amman Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The discussion was moderated by Wael Abdul-Shafi, EWI MENA program associate.

After several years of crippling economic challenges, recently exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Jordan has become more dependent on foreign aid, with the European Union (EU) as one of its most important donors. Meanwhile,  Jordan’s traditional regional alliances are changing dramatically, shifting the political environment’s perception of threat towards both its neighbors as well as international partners. Within this framework, the briefing focussed on Jordan’s role in the region and how this reflects on its relationship with the EU. 

The discussion began with participants emphasizing that Jordan—due to its relative stability, strategic geopolitical position and moderat politics—has often been seen by the international community as a mediary for furthering relations and cooperation in the Middle East. To this end, one speaker aptly asserted that as a small country, Jordan's strategic role lies in “power of policy rather than in policy of power”; thus, Jordan has the potential to become a hub for regional dialogue. The speakers remarked that the EU, as well as individual European countries, have long considered Jordan a key partner in the Middle East. 

One speaker pointed out that because the EU prioritizes Israel’s security and is aware that there cannot be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without Jordan, it continues to invest in Jordan’s stability. The discussants also emphasized that the EU considers Jordan an important partner, not only when it comes to cooperation on key issues such as the refugee crisis and military operations against ISIS, but also in Amman’s role as a focal point for international organizations working on the Middle East at large. 

However, one speaker observed that as regional alliances are changing, Jordan is presented with a challenging moment in its foreign policy. With a direct connection to the Gulf and Israel, and the growing potential for Iraq to emerge as a hub for regional connectivity and cooperation, Jordan risks exclusion from international efforts, including on the Palestinian issue. Augmenting this point, one speaker raised Jordan’s lack of balanced relations with its direct neighbors, specifically conflict-ridden Syria, as well as Iraq. Another participant noted that in the past several years, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. 

In light of these developments, one discussant remarked that Jordan should reshape its foreign policy by redefining its relationship with its direct neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq and Israel, as well as the wider region, including a rapprochement with Gulf countries and renewed relations with Iran. As one speaker elaborated, having a Hashemite King who is neither Shiite nor Sunni can be an asset in developing relations with Iran. 

Concrete examples of cross-border cooperation mentioned during the briefing included Jordan’s assistance in developing regional railways, energy projects and ports. Jordan can also reactivate the Port of Aqaba  to support  Saudi Arabia’s plans to build NEOM, a cross-border city in the Tabuk Province that would combine smart city technologies and tourism. Furthermore, Jordan could also provide aid to its neighbors in coping with the COVID-19 pandemic. As one speaker noted, this would further secure continued EU interest in and financial support of Jordan. 

The discussants emphasized that the EU should not take Jordan’s stability for granted, given the multiplicity of conflicts in Jordan’s immediate neighborhood. The speakers suggested that the EU should engage Jordan as a partner in its regional diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, one speaker pointed to the role the EU could play in deterring and discouraging external actors from pushing Jordan to take sides in ongoing regional conflicts. Jordan truly has the potential to connect the entire region. As the briefing concluded, it is in the strategic interest of the EU to assist Jordan in becoming a “kitchen of solutions for the conflicts of the region.” 

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday October 6, 2020: “The Economic Dimensions of the Conflict in Yemen”

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

The deadly blast that ripped through the Port of Beirut on August 4 provided a tragic reminder of Lebanon’s systemic problems: a deficit of good governance, widespread corruption and a politicized judiciary apathetic to any semblance of accountability. More than a month since the blast, as Amnesty International detailed in a recent statement, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Lebanese authorities “have no intention whatsoever of fulfilling their responsibilities of conducting an effective, transparent and impartial investigation.”

Calls for an international investigation are undoubtedly justified, given Lebanese distrust of state institutions. But from the onset, Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun—an ally of Hezbollah—has rejected any consideration of an international probe, claiming that the aim of an international inquiry would be “to miss the truth.” Aoun’s reason for his refusal is obvious: an international investigation would circumvent a judicial process that he and his allies control, and would risk exposing them to criminal negligence. President Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and their allies, have played a central role in the appointment of judges, especially to the Higher Judicial Council (HJC)—a panel of 10 judges meant to ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary. In the investigation into the port blast, the HJC turned down two nominations of independently-minded judges to lead the probe before accepting the nomination of Fadi Sawan, a judge politically aligned with the FPM, Hezbollah, and their allies.

The politicization of Lebanon’s judiciary has repeatedly undermined its objectivity. For cases where political allies are suspect, investigations are perfunctory or non-existent. While the government’s reaction to the explosion is one example, myriad problems impacting the welfare of Lebanese citizens remain unpunished. For instance, subsidized medicine and flour are smuggled into Syria depriving the Lebanese of basic commodities. Exchange offices launder money and prop up a black-market currency exchange that undermines monetary policy. 

The Lebanese government’s reaction to the port explosion mirrored its response to the ongoing economic disaster: shifting blame and finding a scapegoat. A favorite tactic is to weaponize the judiciary by using FPM-connected judges to incriminate legitimate businesses. One example is the politically-motivated prosecution of ZR Energy, a relative newcomer to the local fuel market, which has historically been dominated by a handful of politically connected companies. In what has devolved into a wide-ranging scandal that has implicated the FPM and Hezbollah, ZR Energy was wrongfully investigated and charged in delivering defective fuel in an obvious attempt to distract from the Ministry of Energy and Water’s inability to address Lebanon’s longstanding power blackouts. Notably, the Ministry has long been controlled by the FPM and Hezbollah and has added an estimated 1.2-1.8 billion USD annually to the country’s budget deficit, while delivering little to no electricity. This latest case of scapegoating demonstrates that the judiciary is not only a mechanism used to hand out passes to businesses and officials that run afoul, but also has been weaponized to clear the playing field of business adversaries.

Lebanese leaders are now under international pressure to implement much-needed reforms to bring the country back from the brink of economic and political collapse. French President Emmanuel Macron provided a clear roadmap that, if followed, would unlock much needed aid. On September 8, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned two former ministers for providing “backdoor deals” and relying on Hezbollah for “personal gain and gains for their political allies ahead of the needs of the Lebanese people.” Two Hezbollah connected companies were also sanctioned on September 17. These sanctions send a strong message to the Lebanese ruling elite that they must take politics out of due process and form a government independent of the politicians who have bankrupted the country.

It is becoming clear that similar pressure will be needed to ensure that the Lebanese judiciary is provided with the necessary autonomy to pursue impartial investigations, rather than condemning the political opponents of the FPM and Hezbollah. Lebanon deserves, and the international community must demand, a truly independent investigation into the devastating Beirut port blast. The United States and the broader international community should prioritize bolstering accountability in the next cabinet as Lebanon picks up the pieces and recovers. Judicial accountability must extend not only to potentially negligent port authorities, but also to the political leaders who turned a deaf ear to warnings that tons of ammonium nitrate were being stored steps away from the heart of the city. Only then will the Lebanese people have a chance to rebuild their shattered city, tattered economy and restore their faith in government institutions.

Raymond Karam is the chief program and development officer at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He previously served as an Associate and the Washington, D.C. representative for the EastWest Institute where he led initiatives with partners in the Middle East on issues of regional security, nonproliferation, economic development and environmental governance.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Click here to listen to the interview on Deutsche Welle (in Arabic). Hassan’s comments begin at 05:16 and end at 34:00.

Read an English summary of Kawa Hassan’s remarks below.

Before heading to Baghdad from Beirut, Macron announced a “new initiative,” in collaboration with the UN, aiming to support and safeguard Iraqi sovereignty. However, little information, if any, is known about this initiative—this makes it very difficult to talk about its details. Macron wanted to visit Iraq in September last year, but was delayed due to the eruption of popular protests in Iraq in October 2019, and the overall political situation in the country. 

The ambitious French president would like to play a more active political, economic and even military role in the Middle East. France’s historic role and interest in Lebanon is clear. His visit to Baghdad comes at a critical and sensitive time for Iraq, and the region in general, as the overall situation in Iraq remains very complex. The cabinet of Al-Kadhimi, Iraq’s Prime Minister, wants to restore state sovereignty and control militias.

The terrorist organization ISIS still poses a threat to Iraq and the region but is no longer as powerful as it was in its heyday [from 2014 to 2018]—ISIS ideology, however, is not dead. France has played, and still plays, an important role within the global coalition against ISIS. It is true that there are external interferences in Iraqi internal affairs and these interferences should end, but what is crucial to remember is that the biggest threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqi state is not ISIS, nor external players, but rather the corruption of the ruling elite and their lack of political will to implement true, not token, reforms. 

Iraq is a battleground for regional conflicts and proxy wars between the U.S. and Iran. Turkey has been attacking PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The question remains: why has Iraqi sovereignty been violated by external players? The post-2003 ruling class has failed in establishing a strong state that respects the rights and sovereignty of Iraqi citizens and the sovereignty of the state itself due to the fragmentation of the political landscape of Iraqi politics- some powerful political parties possess strong relations with Iran, while others have strong ties to Turkey and other states—all at the expense of the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. 

I think President Macron primarily wanted to send a message to Turkey [and not Iran] when he stressed Iraqi sovereignty. Therefore, we need to place this French focus on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state within the context of the broader regional confrontation with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and Lebanon. Having said that, the Iraqi government and political parties can benefit from this regional conflict and Macron’s ambition to assist Iraq and decrease external interference. While France can’t support Iraqi sovereignty directly at this time, Iraqi diplomacy can use French political ambitions and assistance to bolster Iraq’s diplomatic position in the security council. 

At the moment, France is not in a position to confront American and Iranian influence in Iraq, but it can continue its important role in the war against ISIS and support economic reforms and reconstruction in ISIS liberated areas. However, this all depends on the willingness of the Iraqi ruling elite (and the Lebanse ruling class in the case of Lebanon) to implement long-overdue structural reforms. No power in the world, including France, can support Iraq if Iraqi leaders do not display a willingness to save Iraq [from systemic corruption they themselves created after 2003]. Currently, such political will is absent. However, the October Uprising of 2019 created a new reality—the Iraqi protest movement, despite being weakened [due to oppression and COVID-19], has become an important player in internal politics and to some extent, in the calculations of external players. Though the Al-Kadhmi cabinet has a plan and is serious in its attempts to implement reforms, intentions alone are not enough. The coming weeks and months will be crucial for Al-Kadhimi to deliver on his reform promises and restore security. 

The Iraqi constitution recognizes the federal status of the Kurdistan Region—in this regard, I don’t see any threat to Iraqi sovereignty. But Baghdad and Erbil have serious disagreements on the distribution of the revenues of natural resources, regional budget and disputed territories. Both sides need to possess political will to solve these problems. It is worth noting that there are [at times] calls for decentralization and even federalism in Southern Iraq. Iraqi leaders should [heed popular calls for redistribution of political and economic powers] through establishment of a state based on real citizenship and respect for the diversity of Iraqi society regardless of religion, sect and ethnicity.

We don’t have enough information as to why Macron didn’t visit the Kurdistan Region; perhaps it was due to time constraints or political reasons. Macron did meet with the President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani in Baghdad, however, as there is a history of good relations between France and the Kurdistan Region. But while many Kurds have a romantic view of French support for the Kurdistan region, at the end of the day, sober and strategic interests guide and define France’s Kurdish policy, not emotions. France supports a stable, federal Kurdistan Region within a united and stable Iraq.

Sudan’s recent measures to decrease strict Islamic restrictions clearly show the country’s break from a radical form of Islamic ruling associated with the former president Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019. This article will focus on the relationship between political Islam and extra-regional actors in Sudan, arguing that external influences could negatively affect Sudan’s transition towards a democratic government in the face of increased economic and social pressure.

Islam, the Sudanese Revolution, and External Actors

Although the break from a strict Islamic rule stems from the decades-long political mismanagement by al-Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP), it should not be seen as independent of Sudan’s political environment, in which extra-regional powers use an Islamic political narrative to advance their geostrategic interests. As such, Turkey and Qatar are considered backers of political Islam and are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Sudan’s al-Bashir was an offspring. By contrast, the UAE and Saudi Arabia oppose Islamic political ideologies. These intra-Sunni politics are played out among others in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. 

Click here to read the full article on African Liberty.

Click here to read an Indonesian translation of the article on Republika.co.id.

Speakers included Yasir Zaidan, lecturer of international affairs and security studies at the National University of Sudan, and Dr. Annette Weber, senior fellow at the Africa and Middle East division of the German Institute for International and Security Studies (SWP) in Berlin. EWI’s Vice President of the MENA program, Kawa Hassan, served as moderator.

What started in Sudan as a demonstration against austerity measures in December 2018, turned into a mass peaceful revolution that led to the ousting of long-ruling president Omar Al-Bashir on April 11, 2019. Military and civilian leaders signed a power-sharing agreement in August 2019, initiating a transition towards a democratic government under the guidance of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Chairman of Sudan's ruling Transitional Military Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The military members are to lead the council for the first 22 months, followed by civilian leadership, with elections scheduled for 2022.

However, as the speakers remarked, to successfully complete the transition in the face of political and economic challenges, Sudan needs the support of the international community. It was pointed out during the briefing that the military still holds much of the economic power and is interfering in civilian portfolios, such as foreign affairs. Due to the dire economic situation and the serious health challenges presented by COVID-19, the transitional government lacks the means for many of its policy initiatives. One speaker noted the lack of resources needed to create institutions that support the democratic process, such as an electoral institution.

In this respect, the speakers pointed out that the Sudan Partnership Conference co-hosted by Germany, the EU, the UN and Sudan offered some solace. The donor conference, held virtually from Berlin on June 25, included the financial support of delegations from 40 countries and 15 international organizations. Although the conference did not reach the financial goals hoped for by the Sudanese transitional government, both speakers stressed that the conference led to several breakthroughs.

One speaker observed that the conference brought international attention to Sudan and the EU’s political support of protesters’ demands was perceived positively by Sudanese civilians. Others highlighted the important steps made by international financial institutions towards debt relief, despite Sudan remaining on the U.S. “State Sponsor of Terrorism” list. Lastly, the discussants noted that the conference acknowledged the measures taken by the Sudanese transitional government towards progress in economic reform, such as setting up anti-corruption commissions and freezing bank accounts linked to the former regime.

Despite these important breakthroughs, the discussants pointed to several areas in need of further attention, both from the international community and within Sudan. As the experts noted, it is important that the transitional government communicates its achievements, such as its positive economic reform policies, to its citizens. Furthermore, there is a need for a broader representation within the transitional process. Another finding drawn from the briefing is that the youth, a driving force in the revolution, need to translate their political movement into political influence.

As for the international community, the speakers concluded that there must be common understanding among external actors—from Gulf countries to the EU—and the Sudanese transitional government on key concepts such as democracy, economic reform and security. This need is urgent, considering the fragility of Sudan’s transition in a region full of unrest.

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth round-table discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, September 8, 2020: (topic tbd)

Event Reports from Previous Briefings:

"A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood" (June 2020)

"The Status Quo of the Libya Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete?" (May 2020)

"Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges" (April 2020)

"Iran After Parliamentary Elections" (March 2020)

Other speakers included Sajad Jiyad, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations' (ECFR) Middle East and North Africa programme, and Kirsten Fontenrose, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. The webinar was moderated by Louisa Loveluck, Baghdad bureau chief for The Washington Post.

Kawa Hassan highlighted several key takeaways from EWI and CARPO's ongoing joint project: "Iraq and Its Neighbors." Based on intensive engagement and partnership with officials and experts from Iraq, Hassan said it has become clear that Iraqis trust the EU and do not percieve it as a threat. He believes that the EU can assist Iraq to become a center for regional dialogue and cooperation in many areas, including addressing the impacts of climate change, economic and energy cooperation and people-to-people exchanges.

Click here to watch the webinar.

The webinar brought together four high-ranking female business leaders, two each from Algeria and Morocco, to take part in a cross-border business dialogue aiming to promote greater economic connectivity between the two countries. It marked the second event in a year-long project, which commenced with an initial conference early this year on “Food Security and Agriculture” in Berlin.

Funded by the German Foreign Office, the project seeks to promote a climate of trust by bringing pragmatic business professionals together to identify creative solutions for circumnavigating the closed border currently preventing the two countries from conducting greater cross-border trade.

During the two-hour discussion, participants highlighted the shared economic complementarity from which both countries could and should profit. A border closure since 1994 is the chief reason behind both countries’ inability to tap into this economic potential. All parties participating in the webinar argued the political standstill behind the installation of the closure is the primary trade complication that unnecessarily drives the business communities on either side of the border to export to third countries in Europe rather than with each other.

Even during these unprecedented times of the COVID-19 crisis, the political situation between Algiers and Rabat continues to prevent both countries from governing in more practical terms, as personified by the fact Moroccan-made face masks and other PPE are still mainly exported to Europe rather than across the border, despite a huge demand in Algeria.

A particularly noteworthy topic during the debate centered on female cooperatives and women’s business organizations, with participants noting these types of female associations are much more prevalent among rural women in Morocco than in Algeria. Participants from both countries agreed that a much more intense exchange between female-run cooperatives at this level would greatly benefit rural communities on either side of the border by providing employment, as well as special know-how and marketing for region-specific agricultural products. Furthermore, all parties identified trade fairs as a unique platform for entrepreneurs to work closer together and exchange ideas.

Finally, towards the end of the discussion, the German-Algeria Chamber of Commerce AHK, together with German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), launched the creation of a business platform for the regional medical sector. This initiative is a first step in generating greater contact between business professionals from Algeria and Tunisia (with the hope of eventually incorporating Morocco) to exchange information, experiences and modes of best practice as a catalyst for greater cooperation and regional integration.  

EWI’s Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue is an ongoing project within its Middle East and North Africa program and its next conference is scheduled to take place in October this year either in Berlin or via video conference. 

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.