Middle East & North Africa

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325 (2000)) on Women, Peace and Security, formally acknowledging the changing nature of warfare and the disproportionate and differential impact of conflict on women. This resolution affirmed the importance of the participation of women and the inclusion of gender perspectives throughout all aspects of conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, particularly in peace negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict peacebuilding and governance. In the 18 years since this resolution was adopted, seven subsequent resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council on this agenda, further recognizing gender equality and women’s empowerment as critical to international peace and security.

Yet, the participation of women in peace processes is still lagging globally, despite qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrating that security efforts will be more sustainable—and peace has a better chance of lasting longer—when women contribute to conflict prevention and early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict resolution and rebuilding. This is not simply a matter of representation, where women have a seat at the table because they constitute fifty percent of the world’s population. Rather, it is a matter of operational effectiveness: when women play meaningful roles in these processes, societies are more stable, secure and less likely to relapse into conflict.

Laurel Stone’s quantitative analysis of 156 peace agreements from 1989 to 2011 has demonstrated that peace agreements have a 35 percent chance of lasting fifteen years or longer when women are included in the peace process, in stark contrast to half of all such initiatives that failed within five years during the 1990s. Further, the meaningful participation of women contributes to both the longevity of the peace, as well as to the achievement of the peace agreement itself. These findings follow from a qualitative analysis of forty peace and constitution-drafting negotiations since the 1990s, which found that parties were significantly more likely to agree to talks and subsequently reach an agreement when women’s groups exercised strong influence on the negotiations, as compared to when they had little or no influence.

Why does women’s participation matter at the peace table?

It is widely accepted that women experience conflict differently than men. This understanding of the disproportionate and differential impact of war on women was codified in UNSCR 1325 (2000). Research from the International Peace Institute draws on the work of Pluemper and Neumeyer, reminding us that “men make up the majority of combatants during conflict and are more likely than women to die from war’s direct effects. Women are more likely to die from war’s indirect effects after conflict ends—from causes relating to the breakdown in social order, human rights abuses, economic devastation, and the spread of infectious diseases.” As such, women who have had the chance to meaningfully participate in peace negotiations often broaden the range of topics being discussed at the table, from one of security, to wider issues of human rights and development.

Further, as peace processes evolve from outlining ceasefires, dividing territory, and power-sharing, and to further incorporating the elements that make up a society’s architecture—education, healthcare, infrastructure, access to justice—women’s participation is critical, as they bring to the table a unique set of perspectives based on their life experience.

In peace processes, women are perceived by both men and women as honest brokers; tend to reach across religious, ethnic, cultural and party lines; promote trust; raise issues critical to achieving a positive, durable peace; and prioritize issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment both in the peace agreement and its implementation.

Strategies and Modalities of Women’s Participation in the Peace Process

In this context, women can play a multitude of roles. Women can be mediators; delegates to negotiating parties or members of all-women negotiating parties representing a “women’s agenda;” signatories; witnesses; representatives of women’s civil society with an observer role; in a parallel forum, consultation or movement; as gender advisers to mediators, facilitators or delegates; members of technical committees; or part of informal and/or grassroots groups advocating for peace and mobilizing communities throughout the peace process.

It is in this latter category that women tend to be disproportionately represented, pushing for peace at the margins, as they are often excluded from the formal peace process. In some cases, informal participation has proven to be the most accessible way to exert influence. Research from the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative has found that the main factors enabling or constraining women’s participation and influence are elite support, public buy-in and the influence of regional and international actors in peace processes. Therefore, it is incumbent upon these parties to enable women’s meaningful participation.

A sustainable, durable peace

Peace processes can be defining moments in a country’s history, where new political structures, institutions and often constitutions are re-written and re-imagined. This is a critical juncture where the perspectives and needs of all members of the population must be addressed if the method and outcome is to be truly inclusive.

It remains critical for parties to reach a sustainable peace that not only addresses the short-term cessation of hostilities, but also the longer-term sustainability of the peace—a peace that is not solely considered the absence of violence, but one that aims to rebuild society. Women’s participation has proven to be critical to creating a lasting, durable peace.

The peace process also provides a unique inflection point where existing power structures can be challenged, and gender equality provisions can be written into and adopted by different structures. This is a vital step, as evidence has shown that societies with higher rates of gender equality are less likely to break out into and/or relapse into conflict. An inclusive peace process has the ability to truly transform a society. 

Hannah Beswick is the Women, Peace and Security Adviser and Gender Adviser at the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations in New York.

Read the full publication here:

English: http://www.eda.ac.ae/images/pdf/EDA_Insight_Women_in_Peace_Processes_EN.pdf
Arabic: http://www.eda.ac.ae/images/pdf/EDA_Insight_Women_in_Peace_Processes_AR.pdf

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, an autonomous federal entity, of the UAE Government, or the EastWest Institute.

Image: "Workshop on UN resolution 1325" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by UNAMID Photo

19 members of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) will meet during Israel’s Cyber Week in Tel Aviv from 17-21 June.

This informal, consultative meeting will build on the results of the last meeting in Bratislava, during which the Commission proposed a norm prohibiting cyber disruptions of technical infrastructure that supports elections. The Commissioners present in Tel Aviv will engage with key stakeholders on the Commission’s current and future work including norms on:

• Barring the insertion of vulnerabilities into essential cyberspace products and services
• Advocating for governments to actively consider disclosing software and hardware vulnerabilities to vendors
• Further defining the elements of the public core of the Internet

In preparation for the upcoming meeting in Singapore, Commissioners will also explore norms related to private sector cybersecurity practices and the creation of a mechanism for further developing the international cyber security architecture.

Several Commissioners will also participate during the ongoing Cyber Week. Chair Marina Kaljurand will speak at the Cyber Leaders Forum and a fireside chat on norms of behavior in cyberspace, while Co-chair Latha Reddy will deliver a plenary speech on shaking up defense strategies. Jim Lewis will discuss the future of great power cyber conflicts. Alexander Klimburg will be speaking on a panel on emerging technologies in great power competition. Joseph Nye will speak at several sessions on topics including fake news, evolving norms in cyber conflict, and U.S.-China competition. Isaac Ben-Israel is one of the hosts of Israel’s Cyber Week and will moderate a number of sessions.

After Tel Aviv, the next full Commission meeting will take place on September 19-20 in Singapore in the margins of Singapore International Cyber Week.

Members of the EastWest Institute's Board of Directors met with His Majesty King Abdullah II on May 9, in Amman, as part of EWI's Spring Board Meeting 2018.

During this occasion, the EWI delegation and King Abdullah exchanged many ideas in a substantive discussion about regional and global issues, including the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis. The King also underlined the role Jordan plays in addressing these important subjects.

The EWI Directors expressed their appreciation for Jordan's pivotal role in its efforts to bring about peace, security and stability in the region, as well as commended the Kingdom’s humanitarian efforts towards refugees.

The Spring Board meeting took place May 7-9 to review the institute's programmatic impact last year, and to discuss new initiatives for this year.

Below are links to more coverage of the meeting:

1. Petra.Gov.Jo

2. Jordan Times

3. Ammon News

Meeting photo courtesy of the government of Jordan

Banner photo: "Jordan" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by visitor99_99

Dr. Parker discussed the latest developments in Syria following strikes by the United States in response to a suspected chemical attack on civilians in the conflict-ridden nation.

Listen here.

Photo: "Palmyra, Temple of Bel and Great Colonna" (CC BY 2.0) by Arian Zwegers

A Colossal Miscalculation at the Worst Time

Given the very public regional and international opposition, the botched independence referendum will enter the history books as a colossal miscalculation by the Kurdish leadership. To be fair, Masoud Barzani is not the only one to be blamed for this strategic blunder. His Kurdish allies from the PUK, KIU and smaller parties, his local and international advisors, the opposition, an army of co-opted & profiteering journalists/writers, and the party and shadow media all share responsibility — to varying degrees — for this failed gamble. The writing was on the wall but key Kurdish players stubbornly refused to see it. This disaster couldn’t occur at a worse time for Iraqi Kurds. The division and fragmentation between and within the main parties runs deep. Due to the economic crisis, the KRI is almost bankrupt. When Iraqi troops, supported by Iran and facilitated by the withdrawal of the Talabani faction of the PUK, retook Kirkuk and other areas, the KRG lost 50 percent of the disputed territories and half its oil revenues. Yet it didn’t need to come to this tragic end.

Pre-Referendum Political & Economic Gains

The KRG is known for its inherent and notorious lack of transparency and accountability, particularly in the oil sector. It lacks basic financial planning and has a large democratic deficit. The KRG has not had a budget since 2014. It has not submitted end of year financial reports for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 to the Parliament. As such it is impossible to get an accurate idea regarding the revenues and expenditures of the KRG since 2014. This being said, the KRG should nevertheless be credited with its relatively successful post-2003 diplomatic and investment policies. Today over 37 countries and international organisations have a diplomatic mission of one form or another in the region. Despite some setbacks, oil and gas multinationals have made major investments in unexploited fields. These efforts, along with the fight against ISIS, further bolstered the KRG’s role in Iraq. Paradoxically, the diplomatic achievements were made possible partly by the Iraqi constitution of 2005 (despite its ambiguity over jurisdiction in foreign relations) and partly by the energetic diplomatic drive of the KRG.

Turkey’s Reaction: “We Have the Tap”

Turkey publicly and staunchly opposed the referendum — with perhaps his misreading of Erdogan’s position one of the major miscalculations of Masoud Barzani. Barzani may have thought that their economic “interdependence” would in the end push Erdogan to accept the new reality. True, Turkey did not close the oil pipeline and border crossing, even though Erdogan made it very clear on the day of the referendum that Turkey was willing and able to do so. But an independent Kurdistan on Turkey’s southern border would have been hard to stomach, and this message was conveyed to Barzani more than once.

Iran’s Reaction: A Chill but Firm “No”  

In the run-up to the referendum, senior Iranian officials – including the Revolutionary Guards’ Special Forces commander Qasem Soleimani — delivered tough warnings to Kurdish leaders, including Barzani, not to hold the referendum. In contrast to Turkey, Iran did close the three border crossings only to reopen them in October, December and January respectively. Iran also supported Iraqi troops — with the help of the Talabani faction of the PUK — to retake Kirkuk and other disputed territories. While there was no pause in Turkey’s economic relations with the KRG while political relations deteriorated, the opposite happened in relations with Iran. The closing of the border crossings did hurt Iranian provinces bordering the KRG, but despite its tough stance on the referendum, Iran has been very careful to sustain political relations with the KRG.

The KDP’s U-Turn towards Iran

Realising its weakened position and deteriorated ties with Turkey, the KDP has started a quiet rapprochement with Iran. This is a remarkable development given its strong economic and political relations with Turkey since 2009. Over the past four months, key KDP personalities visited Iran and reportedly told Iranians they would like to improve economic relations and even explore the possibility of exporting Kurdish oil through Iran rather than Turkey. Furthermore, it has been reported that the KDP has conveyed to the Iranians that it could be a substitute for the PUK as Iran’s strategic Kurdish partner, given the paralysis and internal fragmentation of the PUK.

Post-Referendum Para-Diplomacy: Back to Baghdad, But…

Faced with an existential crisis of its own making, the KRG had no choice but to try to repair relations with Baghdad. Far from leaving Iraq, the KRG’s short term hopes and para-diplomacy are focused on persuading the federal government to pay the salaries of public employees and reopen regional airports for international flights. Last month the KRG and the Iraqi government reached an agreement on both issues — Baghdad sent partial salary payments to public employees and reopened the airports. It is not, however, clear for how long this agreement will last, also in light of the upcoming Iraqi elections and the uncertainty over who will form the new government and what its policy towards the KRG will be. More complicated is the extent to which the new Iraqi government will be able to reach settlements for the complex outstanding issues of revenue allowances and power-sharing, and the final status of disputed territories. The U.S. does not seem interested, at least for now, in pressing Baghdad to start serious negotiations and meet any of the Kurdish demands on the aforementioned complex issues. The same holds true for Iran- the only regional player with real leverage over Iraq, and despite  the KDP’s attempts to improve relations with Tehran. Turkey has not closed the oil pipeline but is adamantly against Kurdish independence. As such, it seems the KRG has lost its hard-won relative de facto independence. It is weaker, more fragmented than ever and dependent on Iraq, Iran and Turkey for its survival. It has no option but to put its own house in order, implement long-overdue real political and economic reforms, combat corruption at the top and hope for better historic circumstances to achieve independence if and when the regional balance of power changes. Will the KRG take these existential steps? Time will tell.

Click here to read on LSE.

Photo: "Peshmerga | Kurdish Army" (CC BY 2.0) by Kurdishstruggle

Voice of America (VOA): France, the UK and the U.S. have said the strikes were successful. But the majority of Syrians, and even the Syrian opposition, say these strikes haven't changed the situation on the ground. What is your assessment?

Kawa Hassan (KH): Indeed the Western powers said they achieved their goals. But from a strategic perspective, these strikes did not change the balance of power on the battlefield. Part of the reason for the strikes was the West's guilty feeling towards the Syrian people because the West has consistently failed to stop regime brutality and chemical attacks on Syrian civilians. It is as if Western powers wanted to tell Assad that "we raid these facilities yet you can continue your conventional bombings and barrel bombs on your opposition and civilians."

VOA: Last year, the U.S. struck suspected chemical sites in Syria. What is the difference between that and the latest raids? 

KH: There is a difference between the two. Last year, the U.S. was on its own in striking the Shayrat air base. This time around,  theUK and France joined the U.S. There were concerns that Russia would retaliate but it didn't happen. Neither the West nor Russia wants a direct military confrontation. It seemed that the U.S. informed Russia in advance about the sites they would attack. Also the Syrian regime evacuated those sites in advance. 

VOA: Will the new U.S. sanctions against Russia lead to a war between the West and Russia? 

KH: No, they will not lead to a military confrontation or World War III between both sides. Neither side will gain from a direct military confrontation. Perhaps the sanctions will hurt Russia but this will not lead to any change in Russia's policy towards the Syrian war. Russia and Iran have a clear policy on the Syrian conflict, while the U.S. and the West don't possess a clear-cut strategy and vision. As a result the balance of power will not change on the ground.

Click to listen to the interview.

Photo: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1144601/trump-orders-missile-attack-in-retaliation-for-syrian-chemical-strikes

Munter's remarks begin around the 13:20 mark.

Listen here.

Photo: "2008-XI-A Okina" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Mr. Theklan

In the interview, aired on March 19, Hassan said President Putin perhaps will not try to play new political cards in that region.

He said Putin will keep using the threat of radical Islamist groups and the efforts to destroy them as ways to strengthen Russia's relations with regimes in the Middle East.

"Russia is trying to compete with the U.S. in Iraq through investment in oil fields [in the Kurdish region]. In the coming years, the [geopolitical] equation in the Middle East might not change against the interests of Russia particularly in Syria. The growing Russian influence there right now is less the result of Russian leverage and more due to the lack of clear U.S. strategy and vision, as well as to the fact that the EU is currently consumed with internal problems. But if Russia poses a threat to vital Western interests in Syria, that may lead to an escalation [of the rivalry]."  

Listen to the interview (in Arabic).

Photo: "G20 Leaders’ Summit" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Herman Van Rompuy