Middle East & North Africa

BY: SASKIA VAN GENUGTEN

Politicians and commentators commonly mention the need for “stability” and “stabilization” when referring to the current situation in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For the policy community concerned with Afghanistan and Iraq, this has been true for over a decade. Now, key international actors, regional players and local constituencies alike are similarly consumed with the question of how to put an end to the years of revolutionary uncertainty, upheaval and conflicts in several countries in the region—sparked by the 2011 Arab uprisings and exacerbated by domestic infighting and foreign meddling.

Indeed, most pundits agree that stabilization is what the broader MENA region desperately needs. Policymakers seem willing to work towards that goal of stability. But at the same time, a lack of consensus around what stability entails and how to get there keeps fueling instability instead.

When assessing international actors’ ideas concerning the meaning of “stability” and the process of “stabilization,” it generally is agreed that stability can be understood as an environment that is reasonably predictable and non-violent, while stabilization is a process that entails the blending of military means with other tools of statecraft and foreign policy. It brings together different, overlapping and interacting policy dimensions, which in institutionalized settings often is referred to as a “whole of government” or comprehensive approach.

Starting with the international reaction to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, experiments with blending military, political, economic, humanitarian and developmental tools—as well as elements of transitional justice and reconciliation—became the norm. In the past decade, Afghanistan has served as the most important litmus test for this approach. But unfortunately, for all the tryouts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, the stated ambitions versus realities on the ground have remained far apart and the few success stories, such as in Iraq’s Anbar province, short-lived.

The problem is that beyond the common, basic understanding of the two buzzwords, ideas differ regarding which non-military policy instruments should be part of the stabilization tool box, which instruments are priority, what the priorities are and whether a specific sequencing is appropriate. This already holds true when comparing approaches to stabilization within the West, and even within the different policy communities of a specific country. Military actors, for example, come to the table with different professional cultures and priorities from those working on the humanitarian and development aspects of stabilization.

Most importantly, with an increasing number of external actors, ideas about what the end state should be and what acceptable forms of stability are also have started to differ. Indeed, the number of voices and ideas increases significantly when actors from other parts of the world are equally involved with “stabilization operations.” The West might have an ideal society in mind while others, including Russia and the Gulf countries, have their own vision, reflecting what they believe makes for a stable situation.

Current developments in the MENA region, where the West is no longer the only cook in the kitchen, are shaped by this mismatch of explicit and implicit objectives and the differentiation in views regarding acceptable paths towards stability. Reflecting on recent experiences of stabilization efforts in the MENA region, Western policymakers can learn several lessons, including:

1. Democratization does not necessarily increase stability in the region. For Europe and the U.S.—the two dominant forces of stabilization efforts in the broader MENA region until several years ago—the envisioned end state tends to be one of increased democracy and liberal market economic practices. Initially, the ideas were derived from democratic peace theories in vogue in the 1990s, which argued that democratization and open markets would lead to more sustainable forms of peace. While potentially true in the long-run, in the short-term, political elections in conflict and transitional situations are likely to spark more violence and civil wars. The MENA region has been a case in point, with Libya and Iraq being prime illustrations.
    
2. Stabilization takes time and aftercare, with change needing to happen at many levels. Removing an undesired regime or throwing money at development projects, does not miraculously create a more stable and secure political environment. Corruption, radicalization and imperfect information play their respective roles and are difficult to tackle, with long-term root causes such as population growth, adverse effects of climate change and low oil prices compounding the precarious situation. While President Trump’s recent line on Afghanistan might sound appealingly simple (“killing terrorists” instead of focusing on nation-building), it is unlikely to be a winning strategy.
    
3. Europeans and Americans are no longer the only kids on the block. In recent years, many other actors have become actively involved in the MENA region. As they come in with different histories and different economic and political systems, their views on what stability should look like and the preferred path toward stabilization, also differ. New powers including Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are increasing their presence, while a resurgent Russia is trying to assert itself in the region. Competition between the permanent members of the UN Security Council illustrates this change. And in contrast to the West, these new powers do not yet suffer from “intervention fatigue” or squeezed defense budgets.

Renowned pundit Dominique Moisi, in a recent article, states the following:

Today, too, mainly European, or Western, approaches to ensuring stability in the Middle East no longer work. As a top European diplomat told me recently, the Middle East crisis is in desperate need of fresh thinking and new leadership.

Moisi makes a very important point: the first step Western policymakers need to take is to reevaluate their own thinking, reflect on their own definitions of stability and stabilization of the MENA region, as well as on how these might differ from—and, in particular, how these interact with—other important international approaches to stabilization in the region.

Only by thoroughly understanding the world views, objectives and approaches of other external (and domestic) actors involved, as well as by appreciating the changing balance of powers between these key external actors, can the West expect to promote its own “ideal” in the Middle East’s increasingly crowded marketplace of ideas.   

Saskia van Genugten is Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy and co-director of the Academy’s “Stabilization Research Initiative.”

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo credit: "Flag of Egypt all over Tahrir Square" (CC BY 2.0) by RamyRaoof

Kawa Hassan, who leads the institute's Middle East and North Africa Program, said in Bloomberg that the Iraqi Kurds should have held formal talks instead of holding a referendum on September 25.

“The risk of confrontation is big, and nobody will benefit from a new round of war,” he said.

Read the full article in Bloomberg here.

In an interview with Christian Science Monitor, Hassan said that holding the vote amid heightened internal, regional, and international opposition would fragment and weaken the Kurdish position.

Read the full article here.

Voice of America (VOA): On Monday, August 21, Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, gave a speech on the Kurdish referendum scheduled for September 25. In this speech, he gave mixed messages about postponing the referendum. On one hand, he said there would be no postponement. On the other hand, he says that postponement is possible if there are guarantees from the U.S. and the UN about relations with Baghdad. What do you make of these mixed messages?

Kawa Hassan (KH): In this interview, Barzani gave his analysis about the referendum. He seems to aim at strengthening the "yes camp,” those who want to vote in favor of the referendum should it be held as planned on September 25. 

VOA: Recently a Kurdish delegation visited Baghdad and discussed the referendum issue with Iraqi Prime Minister, political parties, and U.S. and Iranian diplomats. The delegation came back to Erbil and the visit was not seen as successful because the meetings didn't yield any results. Baghdad is opposing the referendum. Can Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) hold the referendum without the approval of Baghdad? Will the referendum be legitimate?   

KH: According to some sources, this meeting is the start of some sort of negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil on the referendum. The delegation also met with the ambassadors of Iran, the U.S., the EU and the UN. Both the U.S. and Iran are heavily engaged behind the scenes in mediating between both parties. Therefore it is too early to say the visit was a failure. The Iraqi government clearly said this referendum is unconstitutional and that they oppose it. The KRG says Baghdad didn’t implement the constitutional clauses that deal with the status of disputed areas (article 140), oil and gas law, and some other issues. Theoretically KRG can hold the referendum. But the question is what would be the implications for relations with Baghdad if Iraqi authorities will not accept the result of the referendum? Will Baghdad's refusal be beneficial or negative for KRG?      

VOA: Those Kurds who would vote yes in the referendum say once the referendum is over, and a de facto independent state is declared, Iraq and other states will accept the new de facto state. They cite the examples of Kosovo and South Sudan which gained international recognition after referendum. To what extent is Iraqi Kurdistan's situation similar to South Sudan and Kosovo? 

KH: Each region [in the world that wants to hold referendum and declare independence] has a unique situation and therefore we cannot make generalized analysis and assessment. This holds true to both Kosovo and South Sudan cases. The South Sudanese referendum and subsequent independence was one of the results of the 2005 agreement between the Sudanese central government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Upon the declaration of independence in 2008 [by the Assembly of Kosovo], Kosovo was soon recognized as a sovereign state by many countries in the world. And in other cases, where regions hold referendum and announced independence, they were not recognized (by the overwhelming majority of international community).

To listen to the full interview (in Kurdish), click here 

BNR: What is EastWest Institute and what does it do? 

Kawa Hassan (KH): EastWest Institute (EWI) is an American organization—its headquarters is in New York with offices in Brussels, Moscow and San Francisco. It focuses on trust building and resolution of conflicts through Track 2 diplomacy. One of the main projects of the institute’s Middle East & North Africa Program is the Iran Saudi Dialogue. As you know both countries are engaged in proxy wars in the region. Our initiative aims at improving relations between both countries through discreet meetings between experts, ex-officials and opinion makers. These meetings focuse on issues of common interest such us ISIS, the refugee crisis, the impacts of climate change on regional dynamics and prospects for regional cooperation. The participants have their own networks back home so that they can inform and influence policy makers back home on the perception of their country in the eyes of their rival and share the knowledge. 
 
BNR: In addition to your work at EWI, you were also a member of an American Task Force that has advised the U.S. administration on Iraq. You were not only an adviser but you also have a personal  connection to Iraq. What is your own background? 

KH: I am Dutch of Iraqi Kurdish origin. I was born and raised in Sulaimanyah, a big city in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and studied at the university in Baghdad. I fled Iraq at the age of 22 and sought asylum in Holland in 1992. I studied political science at the University of Amsterdam. After graduation I worked for the United Nations and NGOs in Sri Lanka as well as in the Netherlands. Since August 2015, I have been working for EWI in Brussels. Therefore, my engagement with Iraq is both professional and personal given my background. 
 
BNR: Mosul has fallen, ISIS is more or less defeated. Iraq may have won the battle but it paid a heavy price for it. What is the situation right now in Iraq? 

KH: ISIS is partly defeated from a military aspect in significant areas of Mosul (province). ISIS still controls parts of Mosul province, it also has sleeper cells inside the city. In addition, it still controls areas in the West and North of Iraq. As it has been weakened in Mosul, ISIS has moved fighters to other parts of Iraq. ISIS is not only a brutal enemy, but is also a formidable, smart and violent group—its ideological appeal is still very strong. You are right that Iraqis paid a very heavy price for the liberation of Mosul but this was an inevitable sacrifice. The destruction in Mosul is perplexing, particularly in the right side of the city where most of the heavy fighting occurred. Therefore the reconstitution and humanitarian needs are enormous. Tens of billions of dollars will be needed for reconstruction and safe return of internally displaced people. The Iraqi government cannot fundthe required reconstruction, it simply doesn't have that money.   
 
BNR: Do you mean money is needed only for the reconstruction of Mosul province or also for other areas? 

KH: Indeed. I have focused only on Mosul province but we shouldn't forget that there is also a need for reconstruction in parts of western Iraq that was liberated from ISIS in 2016. The issue of recovery and reconstruction is a complicated one. On the one hand the Iraqi government with the support of the U.S. and other countries is engaged in an inevitable tough battle against ISIS. In addition to a lack of money, the Iraqi government still doesn't have a detailed and clear vision or policy with regard to the return of refugees and how to provide hope to the innocent people that they will be reintegrated into society as equal citizens (and hence will not be marginalized again).
 
BNR: You say Iraq needs billions to reconstruct liberated areas. Some say Iraq perhaps needs 90 billion USD for reconstruction. Furthermore Iraq is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Also the Kurds want to hold an independence referendum on Sept 25. Taken together this is a very complicated cocktail, isn't it? 

KH: Not only a complicated cocktail, but also an explosive cocktail for now and the future. Indeed Iraq will need tens of billions of dollars for reconstruction. At the moment the Iraqi government doesn't have the money due to corruption within the post-Saddam political order and low oil prices. Furthermore, we can argue that there is an Iraqi government but not an Iraqi state—many Shiite militias that played a crucial role in the battle against ISIS are not under the control of the government. Yet there is also a single reason for hope and optimism: the government, international partners and the general population are very well aware that probably this is the last opportunity to save Iraq. 
 
BNR: You were one of top 25 experts that advised U.S. administration on Iraq. In your view how the international community can help Iraq now? 

KH: The international community can do a lot to help Iraq. But I have to stress that reconstruction and reconciliation is first and foremost is the responsibility of Iraqi leaders; and the international community can definitely help the Iraqis. First, Iraq should be and remain a top priority for the international community, not only at present owing to the war against ISIS, but also in the coming years and decades. This is a dilemma—there are many problems in the world that need attention and the support of the international community. My fear is that after the military defeat of ISIS, the attention of the world will turn to other problems. That is why it remains crucial that both the international community and media continue to focus  on Iraq, so that it remains a priority for policy makers and global public opinion.     
 
BNR: You mean there is a need to develop now a long term plan to support Iraq, But what would be your advise for the international community?

KH: My advice is as follows. First, organize an international donor conference to be led by the UN, the European Union or the US for the reconstruction and reconciliation of post-ISIS Iraq. Major Iraqi groups, and both international and regional powers should take part at such a conference. Donors can pledge financial and capacity building support in return for assurances of good governance, combating corruption and respect of human rights and democracy—in other words conditional support. Special focus and support should be given to the nascent civil society. Second, the intentional community should utilize public diplomacy and communicate directly to Iraqi society to inform them about its support and make sure that the wider population will hold Iraqi leaders accountable with respect to the transparent utilization of all provided funds.  
 
BNR: Talking about conditional support, I have to bring in Afghanistan to our discussion. After the partial withdrawal of the international community in Afghanistan, "thieves" are again ruling the country. How can international community impose its conditions on Iraqi leaders? 

KH: This is possible—it worked also in other parts of the world. Iraq badly needs support and only Iraqis will shape the future of their country. But they cannot achieve this on their own. I would like to refer to the decision of President Obama to withdraw U.S. troops in 2011. This premature withdrawal and lack of U.S. pressure on then Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki, strengthened Al-Maliki's sectarian and authoritarian policies which in turn strengthened ISIS. Hence the role of international community is essential in helping Iraqis to rebuild their countries and make sure funds are well spent. 

BNR: Would you advise to hold elections as soon as possible?  

KH: This is a very difficult question. How can you hold elections in areas which are devastated, and in refugee camps? There are plans to hold elections in April 2018. But perhaps it would be better first to mediate between Iraqis to agree on badly needed political and economic reforms and then hold elections. 
 
BNR: So where does the legitimacy of the current government come from? Who is the Iraqi interlocutor of the international community? 

KH: The international community deals with the Prime Minister Al-Abadi. But there are also other players such as the Shiite militias and Iran. To conclude, despite all these problems Iraq is not a lost cause as yet. Iraqis are sick and tired of terrorism, violence and the corruption of the ruling elites. Iraqi civil society is very active in its struggle for a better Iraq. There are many hopeful stories of Iraqi civil society that strive for human rights, women's rights and combating corruption but unfortunately they don't get the attention of the international media. Simply, Iraq is much more beyond reporting solely about ISIS and corruption of ruling elites.   
 
BNR: Where do you pin your hope on? 

KH: I pin my hope on the resilience of Iraqi society as evidenced against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, as well as against the authoritarianism and corruption of post-Saddam elites. 
 
BNR: Thank you. 

KH: My pleasure.

To listen to the full interview (in Dutch), click Part One and Part Two.

BY: DR. SASKIA VAN GENUGTEN

The Head of Libya’s Presidency Council, Fayez al-Serraj and his rival, the head of the Libyan National Army, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, recently agreed to call a ceasefire and hold elections as a way out of the current political and security crisis. Yet, despite the recent announcement, it remains to be seen whether unity amongst Libyans can be found on political matters. Any renewed dialogue focusing primarily on politically contentious issues and on dividing positions of power is likely to lead to failure in the short-term. 

However, what Libyans most likely can agree on is that a concerted effort needs to be made to stabilize their country’s economy. Indeed, more than a year and a half after the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement, large parts of the country suffer from suboptimal basic services and witness inflation above 15 percent, while dealing with limited liquidity and a steadily weakening currency in parallel markets. Indeed, the precarious situation has negatively impacted citizens’ trust in Libya’s struggling state authorities. Thus, Libyan and international policy-makers alike are looking for a solution to the crisis, should cling to that glimmer of unifying hope that can be found in economic revival. 

In broad terms, building consensus around economic objectives could start with problem-solving workgroups aimed at reversing the detrimental economic developments over the past six years of civil war and political strife, in order to find shared and inclusive solutions to the following issues:  

• How to optimize and secure oil production and exports? State revenues have decreased due to severe disruptions to oil production and lower global oil prices. Lately, oil production has rapidly increased again, but equipment, pipelines and terminals have been damaged and are in need of repair. At the same time, when oil production rises, OPEC members might demand Libya to be included in current production capping agreements.  
• How to spend the limited resources fairly and effectively? A significant share of the central (emergency) budget is being spent on public sector wages. This includes a good number of ‘ghost employees’ and in the aftermath of the 2011 civil war, a large number of revolutionary combatants were added to the state’s wage bill. Due to suboptimal bureaucratic practices, what were believed to be a few thousand beneficiaries, rose to more than 200,000 citizens claiming funds. 
• How to curb inflation, ensure liquidity and stabilize the currency? As a result of the continuous budget deficit, international reserves have dwindled. In 2012, reserves stood at 118 billion USD, in 2017, the amount was 67 billion USD. Banks have suffered liquidity problems. While lately an upward trend is seen due to increased oil production, there remains pressure on the currency peg, with increased inflation making imports difficult to obtain. 
• What can be done to transform the criminal economy?  Illicit trade is growing and there is a risk that illegal and harmful activities are being ‘normalized’ due to the security situation and a lack of governance and regulation. Growth is caused by flaws in border controls, an abundance of weapons, generous subsidies that allow for a thriving black market, and a lack of alternative economic activities. The smuggling industry has offered attractive employment opportunities – with fast money and limited risks. 
• How to bolster the unity and independence of national economic institutions? Since the onset of the 2014 civil war, Libya has witnessed the establishment of several parallel and competing branches of, among others, the National Oil Company (NOC), the Libyan Central Bank (LCB) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). Most of the breakaway entities have little control over oil and state funds and tendencies are currently towards cautious reunification.

All the above are issues that, after years of damaging conflict, require immediate action. At the same time, Libyan policymakers should keep in mind the fundamental medium and long-term challenges that were lingering even before the fall of Qaddafi’s regime. Several of these structural economic issues were partly responsible for putting Libya in such a precarious situation in the first place as they allowed someone like Qaddafi to use and abuse income from oil to buy loyalty and legitimacy. Supporters could receive cash, public sector jobs, subsidies and other benefits, while disobedience could be punished at will. 

Many of the fundamental, systemic economic issues Libya struggles with reflect those generally associated with oil exporting countries. These range from a large public sector wage bill, a lack of incentives for private sector activities, high spending on subsidies to a suboptimal human capital base. Oil still generates 95 percent of total government revenues, but only 2 percent of local employment as the industry relies heavily on expat technical staff. In 2012, explicit state subsidies amounted to 11.5 billion USD, which translated into 13.8 percent of GDP. Already under the Qaddafi regime, it was acknowledged that to remain sustainable, Libya’s economy needed urgent diversification, subsidy and banking reforms and private sector development. 

Tackling real-life economic problems, without getting lost in political zero-sum games, could allow for: 

• A functioning, inclusive economic model which will raise the profile of Libya as a possible investment destination, to start with, a return of investments in the oil and gas industry. 
• The release of significant government tenders in the field of reconstruction, development and advisory projects and the stability to attract companies for such projects.
• The return of expat workers from neighboring countries to the resource-rich country, thereby adding to much needed regional employment opportunities. 
• A better management and scaling back of the illicit economy, which is particularly of interest to European actors greatly concerned with human smuggling and trafficking activities.

Reconciliation and ending the feud should largely be a Libyan endeavor, but given the international stakes in Libya’s economy and the country’s stability, the international community should apply the pressure needed to bring the different Libyan sides to the negotiating table. The agreement between Serraj and Haftar is an excellent start. 

Dr. Saskia van Genugten is a Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy and author of “Libya: Building Political Consensus around Economic Objectives.” Follow her on Twitter at @svgen.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

In an article for RealClearDefense, EWI President and CEO Cameron Munter writes that the international community—triumphant following the defeat of Islamic State (IS) forces in Mosul—should not forget the city's pressing humanitarian catastrophe. During the course of a three year siege, IS struck a heavyhanded blow to the socio-historical fabric underlying Mosul—numerous cultural markers have been systematicaly destroyed, neighborhoods have been left in shambles, and nearly a million people have been left displaced.

Now that IS has been pushed back, Munter contends that it is necessary for Mosul to be rebuilt in order to prevent further anarchy and human tragedy. Although it will not be an simple task to coordinate multilateral efforts to ease the suffering of the city's citizens, such efforts could provide a positive example of how the international community can work together in the aftermath of destructive terrorism. Eradicating the remants of IS is, of course, still critical, but not addressing Mosul's problems could bring only greater instability to an already afflicted region. 

Read the entire article at RealClearDefense here. 

Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute, joined a panel discussion on July 24 in Belgrade to talk strategies and challenges facing America, Russia and the Middle East. The discussion, organized by the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), also touched on the refugee crisis, Syria as well as volatile U.S-Russia relations.

Joining Munter were Vitaly Naumkin, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, and Vuk Jeremić, President of CIRSD.

Asked about what "went wrong" in Iraq and past U.S. policies in the region, Munter said that America used to see itself back then as the only superpower in a unipolar world. Munter said some really believed in the prospects of bringing democratic governance to the Middle East even if the idea seemed like an almost impossible undertaking.

Munter remarked that although some believe Americans went into Iraq for oil, numerous tenders had been issued following the fall of Saddam Hussein and none of which were won by U.S. companies. “Other conspiracy theories suggest that that our goal was to weaken the influence of Iran, whereas in reality, this influence has only increased,” he added.

For more details about the event, click here.

While in the region, the former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia also made a number of media appearances including TV station N1 and Danas.