Middle East & North Africa

The webinar—organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)—will also feature Sajad Jyhad, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Middle East and North Africa programme; Kristen Fontenrose, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative; and will be moderated by Louisa Loveluck, Baghdad bureau chief for The Washington Post.

Click here to register and to learn more. 

Speakers included Sajad Jiyad, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and former managing director of the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies based in Baghdad, and Daniela Verena Huber, head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Program of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). EWI’s Vice President of the MENA program, Kawa Hassan, severed as moderator.

On May 6, after nearly six months of political deadlock, Iraq swore in a new government headed by Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, chief of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. Both speakers stressed the new prime minister would seven daunting challenges in his new role: collapsing oil prices; the COVID-19 pandemic; meeting protesters’ demands for an early election; tackling rampant corruption of ruling elites; holding government officials and paramilitaries responsible for the violent crackdown of the October uprising accountable; addressing the proxy conflict between the U.S. and Iran in Iraq, as well as developing balanced relations with the two external powers; and increasing ISIS attacks.   

Concerning Iraq’s internal socio-economic and political challenges, the experts elaborated on the EU’s potential role in supporting the development of a welfare state that would increase the government’s legitimacy, helping it tackle ubiquitous corruption. In addition, an Iraqi welfare state could provide an alternative to ethno-sectarian identity politics, which have often been instrumentalized for political advantages by both internal and external forces. Furthermore, the briefing shed light on the significance of the EU’s support of Iraq’s territorial integrity and ability to carry out federal solutions within a unified country. 

Since 2003, Iraq has been a battleground for the U.S.-Iran proxy conflict. Experts noted that Iraq must formulate a policy to maintain good, diplomatic relations with both powers, pointing to the June 11 U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue as an example forward. One speaker highlighted that this dialogue might help the U.S. to facilitate the process of Iraq acquiring loans from the IMF and World Bank to tackle the current economic crisis. Others argued that Iraq needs to start a similar, parallel dialogue with Iran, given the importance of the bilateral relationship for Iraq’s stability and security.

Following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani in January, experts observed that while Iran is taking increasing stock of the situation in Iraq, Iraqis are aiming to minimize and manage tension on their own soil—just as they did in the period of 2015-2017, when both Iran and the U.S. supported Iraq in its fight against ISIS.  

The discussants mentioned that the EU has historically engaged in “bandwagoning” with the U.S. when it comes to its approach toward Iraq. This has left the EU without a strong policy of its own. However, with the U.S. stepping out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the nuclear agreement between the EU/E3+3 and Iran—and its tensions with Iran rising, the EU is forced to revise and develop its own position towards Iraq and the MENA region as a whole. A priority in this respect, as mentioned in the briefing, is for the EU to understand its capabilities and strengths. The discussants pointed to several policy areas where the EU could best offer its assistance.

When it comes to Iraq’s relationship with its neighbors, the EU could provide diplomatic assistance by persuading external actors to refrain from interfering in Iraqi affairs. The EU could also play a role in defining norms for interaction and negotiations, since the region lacks its own mechanisms for dialogue and conflict resolution. Furthermore, the EU could offer diplomatic offices that support Iraq in serving as a contact point between states, rather than as a theater for proxy wars. This diplomatic support could provide the groundwork for Iraq to engage in win-win relations with its immediate neighborhood.

The speakers concluded the briefing by recommending that the EU develop a comprehensive security strategy that combines both the traditional security concept and a human security approach. The EU can begin to implement this strategy by focusing on “low-hanging fruits” projects in the trade, health and environment sectors.  

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are in-depth roundtable discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region hosted by EWI and CARPO bimonthly, the first week of every second month. As in-person-briefings are impossible due to COVID-19, EWI and CARPO have temporarily turned this series into a monthly webinar. Please note that attendance is by invitation only.

Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, July 7, 2020: How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process

Tuesday, September 8, 2020: (topic tbd)

Event Reports from Previous Briefings:

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete?  

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

Upon the request of the NATO’s principal military Headquarters (SHAPE), EWI's Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program Kawa Hassan has joined the NATO Mission Iraq Strategic Assessment Capability (NMISAC) as of May 2020. This Independent Advisory Group supports the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI). It aims to provide strategic, systematic, independent, evidence-based advice and insights to senior NATO Commanders to support existing assessments of the situation in Iraq and the region.

Hassan's previous accomplishments include: 1) serving as the lead-author of the SIPRI research report “Iraq, Climate-Related Security Risk Assessment,” which was used in the July 2018 UN Security Council debate on the nexus between climate change and security, brought forward under the Swedish Presidency of the Council; 2) serving as a member of the Atlantic Council’s Task Force Report on the Future of Iraq “Achieving Long Term Stability to Ensure the Defeat of ISIS;” and 3) co-leading the Working Group Rights & Protection of Minorities in the Middle East, Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH).

NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) is a non-combat training and advisory mission founded on partnership and inclusivity as well as on full respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. NMI’s advisory activities are conducted in Baghdad, including in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Advisor and relevant national security institutions. NMI training activities are carried out at the Iraqi military schools in the Baghdad area, Taji and Besmayah. NMI is a new iteration of a long-standing relationship between the Alliance and Iraq, providing expertise and best practice in security/defense sector reform, institution building and training and education from the entire Alliance and its partners from all over the world.

Click here to watch the interview. Hassan's comments begin at 17:09. Read a paraphrased summary of his remarks, below.

Finally, there is a new government in Iraq and that is good news. Whether Al-Kadhimi will be able to solve all the problems Iraq is facing is a big question mark. This is a provisional government—probably for one or two years. Al-Kadhimi said his aim is to prepare the ground for an early, free and fair election, ensure Iraq is not a theater for proxy wars between Iran and the U.S., that the Iraqi state has a monopoly of violence and that all militias will be under the control of the state. There is a good opportunity for Al-Kadhimi to achieve the last aim by gradually bringing militias under state authority, since there is consensus and support among the key Iraqi players. More importantly, Iraq’s lack of a strong state, which controls the means of violence, is one of the reasons for the nation’s current instability. It is a big question whether he [Al-Kadhimi] will succeed in bringing to justice those [officials, leaders] who were responsible for the killing of demonstrators and address the corruption of the ruling establishment.   

Recent ISIS attacks are alarming and worrying. The terrorist organization was weakened in 2018 and 2019, but now, it made a comeback [in rural areas] because of the fragile state of Iraqi institutions, the fragmentation of the political scene and the lack of a national plan for the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and reconstruction of liberated areas. The fact that ISIS is “resurging” [in rural areas] means that the political establishment failed to learn lessons from the previous expansion of the terrorist organization [in 2014]. 

The problem of the corruption of the ruling elite is as strong and destructive as ever. Yes, there has been some progress in terms of the resettlement of the IDPs—so far, 4.6 million IDPs have been resettled. But there are still almost 1.4 million IDPs that remain. IDP camps are an excellent place for the expansion of the sectarian and destructive ideology of ISIS—in a way, these camps could be the ideal "university" for the "graduation" of [future] ISIS militants because of a lack of national consensus and strategy on how to reconstruct the liberated areas, lack of proper coordination between the different intelligence and security services responsible for preserving security in those areas and, more importantly, lack of a security structure trusted by the local population. 

There is a new dynamic [with respect to the proxy conflict between Iran and the U.S.]. At the moment, Iran is preoccupied with dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. Iran is still trying to fill the void left by the killing of General Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. Soleimani had enormous influence and relations with key political players across the board. At the same time, the U.S. administration is preoccupied with addressing the spread of coronavirus in the U.S.; also, you hear in certain conservative circles in Washington that there is an Iraq fatigue—that we have been helping Iraqis for the last seventeen years, but look at the situation today, where powerful pro-Iran groups [have gained influence]. As a result, there is a space for the new Iraqi government to take initiative and try to build balanced relations with these two powers—these two key players have two different strategic aims when it comes to Iraq and how they view security and stability in the country.

Collapsing oil prices have a destructive impact on Iraq's economy. It is worrying that there is less and less international interest in fighting ISIS and to help Iraq economically, partly, because of Iraq's structural problems and the corruption of the ruling elite that came to power in 2003. 

Invited speakers were Dr. Yousuf Hamed al Balushi, CEO of Smart Investment Gateway and Dr. Cinzia Bianco, Visiting Fellow on Europe and the Gulf at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Senior Analyst at Gulf States Analytics. The Briefing was held online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and moderated by Kawa Hassan, EWI’s Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa program.

Under the late Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id al-Sa’id, who ruled Oman for 49 years, the country maintained good relations with regional and international powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and Israel. It has always been seen as a beacon of neutrality in a turbulent Middle East. It used its position of neutrality to mediate several conflicts in the Gulf region, among backchannel dialogues between the U.S. and Iran, which ultimately led to the historic nuclear deal (JCPOA), sealed by the EU/E3+3 and Iran.

Oman’s new Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, pledged to maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors and international powers. However, as our briefing highlighted, internal and external challenges, in addition to the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the current drop in oil prices, beg the question of how long Oman can retain its neutrality and remain resilient to the polarization and fragmentation of the region. In this respect, it was suggested that Oman can benefit greatly from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to develop its technical and financial knowledge.

While Oman’s economy has significantly progressed in the past decades, reliance on oil revenues, the threat of the "Dutch Disease" and a dependence on imports for consumption have forced the country to reform its economy and explore alternative avenues of financial investment, such as developing the private sector by creating jobs in strategic sectors such as tourism and fisheries. The Oman Vision 2040 aims to diversify the economy away from overreliance on oil revenues by becoming an attractive and competitive destination for FDI.

It was argued by both speakers that the fact that the political succession from Sultan Qaboos to Sultan Haitham went smoothly indicates the resilience of the political system. At the same time, the financial vulnerability of the Sultanate has strongly increased. Oman’s discrete engagement in backchannel diplomacy stands unique in a region that does not possess regional conflict resolution mechanisms. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA led to deep disappointment in Muscat. There was hope that an economically-strengthened Iran would become an important trade partner of the Sultanate. Instead, it took the blame for what the Trump administration and its regional allies called a “historic mistake.” It was highlighted during the briefing that Omani officials have started asking themselves what will be the cost of maintaining neutrality if they end up being torpedoed by other players. Oman’s geographical position furthermore exposes it to potential spill-overs from neighboring conflicts, such as the war in Yemen. This political and geographical context makes it increasingly challenging for Oman to remain neutral.

In light of the increasingly polarized regional environment, as well as the internal and external obstacles to reforms, the EU can play a crucial role in supporting Oman’s ongoing transformation in accordance to its Vision 2040. This would not only be in the interest of Oman, as was discussed, but equally beneficial for the EU, which has a vested, strategic interest in the stability of the Gulf region. It would help the EU and Oman support backchannel diplomacy to resolve regional conflicts, such as the conflict in Yemen, as well as to de-escalate regional tensions, in particular, in the strategic Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf. In this regard, it was suggested that the European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) could be scaled up by exploring certain confidence building measures related to maritime security. It was highlighted, furthermore, that a strategic partnership between Oman and the EU—with the aim to support strategic sectors including tourism and fisheries—would contribute significantly to the financial resilience of Oman and bolster its role as a mediator in regional conflicts.

About the Brussels MENA Briefings

The Brussels MENA Briefings are a bimonthly format of after-work in-depth roundtable discussions on topics of current significance in the MENA region that EWI and CARPO host in the EWI Brussels office in the first week of every second month. Please note that attendance is by invitation only. Should you be interested in being considered for the invitation list, kindly send an email to Desirée Custers mentioning your name, affiliation and geographical or thematic area of interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Dates for the upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

May 5, 2020 (topic tbd)

July 7, 2020 (topic tbd)

September 8, 2020 (topic tbd)

Click here to read the interview on EL MUNDO (in Spanish). Click here to read a translation of Hassan's comments in Arabic.

Read an English tranlsation of Hassan's comments, below. 

Recent ISIS attacks against Iraqi security forces and civilians are worrying, yet, they haven't gained sufficient media and policy attention due to the preoccupation of the world with the spread of COVID-19.

In this regard, ISIS is benefiting from four factors. First, coronavirus has forced the government and security forces to focus on containing the spread of the virus. Second, lack of coordination and cooperation between federal security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga have created a security vacuum in the disputed territories—after the Kuridsh referendum in 2017, Iraqi security forces and the paramilitary Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) regained control of these territories and the Pehmerga were forced to withdraw to the Kurdistan region. Third, military attacks by paramilitaries against the U.S.-led international coalition have forced the coalition to scale down their support to the operations of Iraqi forces against ISIS. Fourth and final, due to the fear of being infected with coronavirus, the U.S.-led international coalition and NATO training mission suspended their operations [for two months).

Taken together, these developments have given ISIS a new lease of life. According to some Iraqi media, ISIS has changed its tactics. Now, they operate in small groups in the disputed territories, they conduct long term surveillance of Iraqi security forces and then wait for the right time to attack by taking advantage of bad weather and relaxing posture of Iraqi forces.

By convening sector-specific meetings between local business people from both countries, the project aims to produce a concrete set of feasible recommendations to encourage greater bilateral trade. 

The inaugural January meeting brought together small to medium-sized business leaders from the agricultural sector to consider boosting greater trade on a micro level, as well as discuss the shortcomings and challenges of each countries’ agricultural and trade policy. 

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.

On January 29, the EastWest Institute (EWI) hosted a roundtable discussion with Ali Borhani, managing director of 3Sixty Strategic Advisors, on “Climate Change: Rethinking the Footprint of Military Operations & Destruction: The Role, Weight and Responsibility of Conflicts and How to Prevent Them.” The discussion was moderated by EWI’s Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa program Kawa Hassan.

Borhani opened the discussion by pointing to a void in the debate on climate change where most attention centers on the carbon footprint of industries and much less is given to armed conflict. He explained the undeniable consequences of wars and the impact of foreign military interventions that result in the destruction of infrastructure, outlining the climate costs of mobilizing military assets and personnel overseas—the value chain of which includes the movement of manpower, millions of tons of hardware and equipment, food supplies and related services. The primary, secondary and tertiary carbon footprint of destruction is embedded throughout the demolition of infrastructure, industry and housing, cities and countries. Furthermore, the use of airspace above conflicted areas is radically constrained, increasing the use of jet fuel to bypass these geographies. Lastly, Borhani pointed to the carbon footprint of attending to and dealing with migration and refugee crises caused by conflict.  

Borhani believes it is necessary to make the whole value chain of this carbon footprint accountable by requiring actors to compensate for their effect on the climate. He suggests the need for a model that measures the carbon footprint which can then be translated into clear and tangible, preventive financial measures. If the carbon footprint is emphasized in the public eye, it is possible to minimize, mitigate and prevent future conflicts.

Although Borhani’s suggestion resonated with the audience, several participants posed challenges to the model, particularly the political will needed to institutionalize and implement such an accountability system, highlighting the paradigm shift that will be required for widespread adoption by the defense sector. Others pointed to the danger such a model could present to the legitimization of conflicts, either by militaries presenting their operations as "climate friendly," or simply by paying off their carbon emission. In response, Borhani acknowledged the necessity of having an entity not dissimilar to the World Trade Organization, perhaps a WEO (World Emissions Organization), which can monitor the carbon footprint of conflicts and military interventions and hold the responsible states and actors accountable.

Borhani affirmed that his proposal should be considered as an unconventional and innovative solution. He states that it is most important to ensure that the carbon footprint of military operations and the climate impact of war and conflict-related destructions are on the agenda. To that end, Borhani believes that the 26th session of the 2020 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26)—expected to take place from November 9-19, 2020 in Glasgow, UK—should take this proposal into serious consideration, debate and discussion as part of its main agenda.  

Click here to listen to the Business Families Foundation's "Round Peg Podcast" on the subject: “Climate Change: The Untold Story of the Carbon Footprint of Destruction & Conflicts."

The interview focused on a policy recommendation that Hassan presented at a recent policy dialogue panel at European Policy Center about the consequences of the U.S.-Iran conflict in Iraq.

Click here to watch the interview on VOA (in Kurdish).

Read an English summary of Hassan's remarks, below:

Despite repression and intimidation, the protests continue in Iraq. The government and ruling class, particularly the Shiite parties, can't find a reasonable solution for the crisis. The result is a dangerous political stalemate. Day by day, the conflict gets bloodier and more complicated. If the current repression continues, which I am afraid will be the case, the peaceful protest movement—or part of it—might decide to take up arms to defend unarmed demonstrators, causing the situation to spin out of control.

The fragmentation of political forces, especially the Shiite parties, makes it extremely difficult to find a political solution that can be accepted by all parties and the protest movement. To break the deadlock, there is a need to pressure and persuade the most influential Shiite parties and government to accept international mediation.

The idea I suggested at the EPC policy dialogue event is to organize an international conference akin to the recent Berlin Conference on Libya. All the key actors should participate in this conference, including the Iraqi government, representatives of the protest movement, Iran, the U.S. and other relevant regional and international powers and institutions. Through EWI’s engagement with Iraqi and regional actors over the past seven months, we know that to a large extent the EU is considered a neutral player. This neutrality would allow the EU—in partnership with key European countries and the UN—to take the lead in organizing this international conference.

I know this is not an easy task given the internal fragmentation inside Iraq coupled with external intervention. Furthermore, I am mindful of the fact that decision-making within the EU is a slow process, and it takes time for the member states to arrive at a common policy. However, we don't have the luxury of time or chance; we cannot say "let's wait and see." The situation is deteriorating very rapidly. Now is the right time to act and initiate an international mediation process for the Iraqi crisis.