Middle East & North Africa

In the interview, Hassan highlighted the reasons that led to the fragmentation of the opposition.

"First of all, there is a historical factor, namely the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime. The Assad regime, father and son, killed politics and civil society which made it extremely difficult for a strong opposition to emerge. Second, the intervention by regional and international powers in the conflict who have no interest in the emergence of a democratic Syria. Third, there is an objective factor that has to do with the nature of the opposition.

The democratic national opposition leaders were either marginalized, killed or fled the country. As a result, the more militaristic, radical Islamic fundamentalist groups prevailed.

The scorched earth policy by the regime partly led to the militarization of the uprising. But the absence of real opposition leaders who are capable of reading and understanding the complex geopolitics of the uprising has led to the empowerment and the prevailing sectarian and fundamentalist armed groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. As a result, it is almost impossible to go back to the peaceful phase of the uprising. 

Assad is winning battles but he is not winning the peace. Assad has succeeded in destroying Syria. But there are no winners in this conflict, only losers. And the biggest loser is the Syrian people." 

Access the interview here (in Arabic).

Photo: "Syria 2007 190 Palmyra تدمر" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by David Holt London

We are witnessing the dawn of a new “Great Game” in the Middle East. The turmoil that has engulfed the Middle East since the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011 brought about the collapse of the regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, as well as catastrophic upheavals in Syria and Iraq. The collapse of state power in the region, the rise and fall of Islamic State (ISIS) and the realignment of tribal structures are just a few of the more immediate consequences.

This ongoing turmoil combined with the perceived waning of great power influence has opened the doors to the gradual reemergence of two regional powers with imperial pasts and contemporary aspirations to restore their glorious heydays: Turkey, the heir to the once might Ottoman Empire, and Iran, the Old Persian Empire.

Both countries have long and well established administrative and governance experience, as well as traditions accumulated through generations and now find themselves at the prospective forefront  of new regional opportunities. Arguably, both countries endeavor to extend their spheres of influence by restructuring the most destabilized parts of the Middle East region: Iraq and Syria in the North; and Yemen, which is guarding the southern approaches to the Red Sea in the south.

Naturally, this new regional power rivalry has deepened mistrust between Ankara and Tehran, underlined by the deep historical Sunni-Shia divide pitting Sunni-dominated Turkey against the Shia-dominated Islamic Republic of Iran.  

For example, the recent Turkish military activity in Afrin in Northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch), under the pretext of chasing terrorists and checking the Kurds along its southern flank, was met with suspicion by Iran, which saw it as an attempt to infringe on Syria’s territorial integrity and establish a permanent Turkish presence there. Conversely, Turkey has watched with misgiving Iran’s ongoing attempt to establish a land corridor stretching from Iran via Iraq and Syria, both weakened states, to the Mediterranean Sea either in Syria or Lebanon. (This land corridor is sometimes dubbed “The Shia Crescent”.)

Iranian and Turkish interests are also clashing in Northern Iraq, where Iran has encroached on Turkey’s historic and economic interests, especially when it comes to its relationship with the Turkmen minority and the export of natural resources from the oil rich province of Kirkuk. If Iran will manage to establish the intended land corridor to the Mediterranean it will have an impact on Turkey’s economy, which earns revenues from the oil pipelines passing through its territory.

The latest competition between the two regional powers is likely to occur in the south. The Iranian involvement in the current war in Yemen has by now been well documented. Among other things, Iran has been sending advanced weapons and military advisors to its Shi’ite ally, the Houthi movement, which recently threatened to disrupt navigation at the southern tip of the Red Sea. The Ottoman Empire ruled Yemen for several centuries and understands the perils of pro-Iranian regime there.

Turkey’s involvement in the countries neighboring the Gulf of Aden is also on the rise. Following the rift between Qatar and its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf, Turkey hurried to dispatch an extra military contingent to its forces, which have been stationed there since 2014. The recent visit of Turkish President Erdogan to Sudan resulted, amongst other things, in an agreement which will allow Turkey to restore the old Sudanese port of Suakin. This port, during Ottoman rule, was the main departure point of Muslims from Africa to the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

The new Sudanese-Turkish agreement allows the presence of the Turkish Navy in the port. Needless to say, that is not welcomed by neighboring countries and regional rivals such as Iran. Turkey is building a military presence both in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the west and east of the watchful Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is also a factor that cannot be ignored as the Kingdom is immersed in an intense dispute with Iran. Interestingly, the move coincides with Houthi threats to shut down the Red Sea and interrupt shipping in the Gulf of Aden.

Both Iran and Turkey already have a naval presence in the region under the umbrella of the international anti-piracy naval task force patrolling the Horn of Africa. As in Qatar, Turkey has maintained a military presence in Somalia since 2014. A serious disruption of the maritime routes in the Red Sea and its environs may have a tremendous impact on the oil supply from the Middle East to Europe. It is of little surprise than that both Turkey and Iran are maintaining a naval presence around the Horn of Africa. Interestingly, one may observe that this jockeying for strategic interests has resulted in an almost symmetrical positioning of Turkish and Iranian forces or proxies in the area facing off against one another.

Although history never repeats itself exactly along the same lines, it is recommended that this growing competition between Iran and Turkey for regional influence be closely observed for it is slated to increase in intensity. Both countries will certainly need local partners and proxies as sub-contractors to counter each other and effectuate their respective strategies. Turkey is counting on the Sunni Arabs while Iran is counting on the pro-Shia elements. But in the shifting sands of the region there might be other configurations that will require or compel other parties to join in and select sides bringing even more complexity to the region, and risk. This is especially the case when the southern approaches of the Red Sea and their oil supply routes will be in danger. The Middle East’s new great game is on.

Ambassador (ret.) Jacob Rosen-Koenigsbuch served as Israel's ambassador in Jordan (2006-2009). He is currently an independent consultant on demographic mapping and collects books about "Lawrence of Arabia." 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "The Middle East" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Big Richard C

On February 23, the EastWest Institute hosted Ambassador Burak Akçapar, Director General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, for a frank and informative discussion on the country’s growing political and economic roles, as well as numerous challenges and current events unfolding in the region.

Akçapar, who served in Washington D.C. from 2004 to 2008, also spoke at length about the currently strained relations between his country and the United States, Turkey’s place within NATO, as well as its relationships with countries like China and India.

Discussion also focused on the Turkey’s engagement with Syria and ongoing conflict with the YPG militia, as well as its role as the largest host country of registered Syrian refugees at over 3.5 million.

EWI Chief Operating Officer Dr. William J. Parker III moderated the discussion.

Photo: "Turkish flag (2006-10-248)" (CC BY 2.0) by Argenberg

On January 10, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Moscow to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war and U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to suspend the Iran nuclear deal. After their meeting, Zarif praised Russia’s resolute support for the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, and reiterated both countries’ shared willingness to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria.  

Even though Zarif’s recent meeting with Lavrov aimed to showcase the strength of the Russia-Iran alliance to the international community, the long-term sustainability of the Moscow-Tehran alignment remains unclear. The uncertainty surrounding the survival of the Russia-Iran partnership can be explained by both countries’ conflicting strategic visions for the Middle East regional system.

Russia’s strategic vision is chiefly focused on eliminating sources of instability and preventing U.S.-led military interventions, which from Moscow’s perspective facilitate the creation of failed states. The Russian government justified its September 2015 military intervention in Syria as a necessary measure to restore stability to the country, and to deter Washington from using force to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia views its Syria campaign as an integral step towards achieving its broader goal of establishing itself as an indispensable guarantor of collective security in the Middle East.  

Although Iranian policymakers frequently tout Tehran’s role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, collective security promotion is only a peripheral goal in Iran’s strategic vision. Iranian policymakers are primarily focused on expanding Tehran’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and containing Saudi Arabia’s power projection capacity across the Arab world. These expansionist objectives have caused Iran to cooperate more extensively with belligerent non-state actors than Russia and engage in military activities that undercut the effectiveness of Moscow-backed political settlement initiatives.

These divergent objectives threaten to unravel Russia-Iran cooperation in Syria, as the conflict transitions from the military to diplomatic phase. Even though Russian military officials have praised the effectiveness of Hezbollah troops during pro-Assad military operations, Iran’s use of Syrian territory to create a permanent transit point of weaponry to Hezbollah has alarmed Russian policymakers who seek to preserve strong relations with Israel.

Iran’s unwillingness to suspend military operations in Syria until Assad has completely vanquished opposition forces also deviates from Russia’s more limited objective of ensuring that Assad controls enough territory to negotiate with Syrian opposition factions from a position of strength. Iran’s belief in the feasibility of a military solution in Syria has made it less willing than Russia to diplomatically engage with Syrian opposition or Kurdish factions during diplomatic negotiations, limiting the scope of the Moscow-Tehran partnership.

Prospects for constructive cooperation between Russia and Iran on resolving other regional conflicts, like Yemen and Afghanistan, also appear dim. In Yemen, the already-strained relations between Russia and Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have deteriorated further since the assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 5. These tensions have prompted Moscow to establish stronger lines of communication with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on resolving the crisis.

A similar divergence in objectives restricts the potential for Russia-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan. Russia is seeking to implement an Afghan political settlement, which includes the Taliban, as swiftly as possible. While Iran wants a peace settlement in Afghanistan to be achieved in the long-term, it is unwilling to suspend military action until anti-U.S. forces have gained a position of primacy in western Afghanistan. As Iran continues to provide military assistance to Taliban forces near its borders, Russian policymakers are concerned that Tehran will obstruct the Afghan peace process to advance its own objectives.

Although divergent interests make the Russia-Iran partnership weaker than many analysts have assumed, U.S. policy choices could also profoundly impact the strength of the alliance. As former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul noted in a August 2017 interview, the re-imposition of a stringent U.S. sanctions regime against Iran by abandoning the nuclear deal could cause Tehran to pivot strongly towards Moscow. If the United States decides to militarily retaliate against Assad’s use of chemical weapons, it will likely re-awaken Russia and Iran’s long-standing opposition to U.S. military interventions, further strengthening their partnership in Syria.

Although a marked improvement in Washington’s relationships with Russia or Iran is unlikely to occur in the near-term, U.S. policymakers can influence the trajectory of the Russia-Iran relationship. To capitalize on disagreements between Russia and Iran’s Afghanistan strategies, U.S. diplomats could re-establish diplomatic dialogue with the Taliban, which would provide a genuine basis for U.S.-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan and isolate Iran’s support for a military solution from the international consensus.

U.S. policymakers could also attempt to strengthen dialogue between Geneva and Astana talks participants in Syria. This move would give Russia the status recognition it desires, and weaken the Moscow-Tehran partnership, as Iranian policy makers remain concerned that heightened Russia-US cooperation will cause Moscow to distance itself from Tehran, like it did during the early years of the Obama administration.  

Even though the Russia-Iran alliance appears robust, both countries’ divergent strategic visions could render the partnership unsustainable in the long-term. To weaken the Russia-Iran alignment, U.S. officials should refrain from implementing overly hawkish retaliations to Moscow and Tehran’s destabilizing conduct, and look to expose cracks in the partnership through targeted diplomatic engagement with Russia. If U.S. policymakers implement this strategy, the Moscow-Tehran partnership could weaken considerably once military operations in Syria draw to a close, potentially strengthening Washington’s influence in the Middle East for years to come.   

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a regular contributor to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and The National Interest. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/IR/events/50770/photos/42565

On January 18, the EastWest Institute and the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) hosted a closed roundtable discussion with Dr. Mustafa Al-Hiti, Chairman of the Iraqi Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terrorist Operations (REFAATO), and Mr. Ramon Blecua, the European Union Ambassador to Iraq. The round table focused on the challenges and opportunities for a new political order in post-ISIS Iraq. 

In many respects, 2017 was a remarkable year for Iraq. ISIS has been militarily weakened and most urban areas have been liberated from the terrorist organization. For the first time since 2013, the number of internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin has surpassed the number of those displaced. Furthermore, the Iraqi government and political forces started a rapprochement process with the Arab Gulf neighbors.

Yet, Iraq will face daunting challenges in the coming years and maybe even decades: (re)building a new political order that meets the demands of Iraqi citizens for real reforms, fair redistribution of revenues and power, good governance, transparency, accountability, reconciliation, restructuring of the relations between Baghdad and Kurdistan Regional Government, recovery of ISIS-liberated areas, and relations with neighboring states.

Dr. Al-Hiti (left) highlighted the need to put human development and peaceful coexistence at the center of the reconstruction process, for recovery is more than rebuilding roads, hospitals and restoring services. Reforming the education sector is key to long term stability and peaceful coexistence. A reformed education system should reflect the diversity of the Iraqi society and hence ensure peaceful coexistence, pluralism, rule of law and good governance. This is a generational project and hence will take decades to produce tangible impacts. In addition, Dr. Al-Hiti said one of core problems of pushing ahead with reforms is the fact that laws are not always implemented. Thus, priority should be given to the implementation of laws dealing with good governance, power sharing and redistribution of revenues.

Ambassador Blecua (right) stressed the need to capitalize on the historic momentum generated by the military weakening of ISIS. Iraq could become a bridge to decrease regional rivalry and contribute to the emergence of an inclusive, security structure that ensures regional stability and prosperity, economic cooperation, and complementarity. Furthermore, he referred to the new EU Iraq Strategy and reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to cooperation and a strong EU-Iraq partnership.  

Photo: "U.S., Iraqi Soldiers Conduct Cordon and" (CC BY 2.0) by DVIDSHUB

BBC Arabic: Are Bread Revolutions a new phenomenon?

Kawa Hassan (KH): Bread revolutions or uprisings [linked to food insecurity], are not new. These kinds of popular protests have occurred throughout contemporary history and in the distant past. For instance there were food uprisings in the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20 centuries. Perhaps one of the most famous bread revolutions is the Women's March on Versailles that started on October 5, 1789. The French women were protesting against high prices and the scarcity of bread- it influenced and intertwined with the French Revolution. In the 20th century, the Middle East was the scene of numerous bread revolutions- Egypt in 1977, Tunisia in 1984, Algeria in 1986, Jordan in 1989- to name a few. 

 BBC Arabic: Why there is a strong link between bread and uprisings? 

KH: As we know bread is a basic staple food for human beings, therefore it is not a surprise that there is an organic link between [the availability] of bread and the outbreak of revolutions. Bread revolutions happen as a result of an economic crisis, food shortages, corruption and mismanagement, harvest failures, food speculation, etc. In some cases the root causes are structural economic crises, in other instances both political and economic factors lead to food uprisings. In theory we may differentiate between the economic and political causes, but in reality it is difficult to decouple the economic and political systems that both produce systemic crises [and eventually lead to social and political protests].   

 BBC Arabic: So the term bread revolution is used to refer to all kinds of food uprisings? 

KH: Indeed bread [is often] used as a symbol to refer to different types of protests against rising food prices and the imposition of taxes. An interesting example is the so called Salt Riot in Russia in 1648. This was triggered by the imposition of a universal tax on salt- it led to an increase in salt prices and subsequent violent protests. Another example would be the potato riots in Russia in the 19th century.  

Listen to the full interview in Arabic here. Hassan's remarks starts around the 4:58 mark and ends at 9:00.

Photo: "DSC_0754.jpg" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by dirk.hofmann

Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, is a civilian-run organization that according to their code of conduct aims to provide “disaster and war response in Syria, to carry out search and rescue operations and to save the maximum number of lives.” The organization was founded in 2013, two years after the civil conflict broke out in Syria. To date, the organization has saved 60,000 lives and currently has 3,600 members that carry out its mission primarily in Hama, Daraa, Aleppo, Homs, Al Qusayr, and Damascus among other cities across this war-torn country.

In 2016, the organization was the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award, recognized for “outstanding bravery, compassion and humanitarian engagement in rescuing civilians.”

Munir Mustafa is the Deputy Director of the Syrian Civil Defense. Prior to the civil war, Mustafa was a firefighter in his hometown of Aleppo who decided he no longer wanted to serve the Syrian government and instead started  a “civil defense” unit in 2012. He is among the first civilians who joined the White Helmets. According to Mustafa, since 2013, the organization has lost 207 of its members in the line of duty. He recently sat down with EWI Fellow Tara Kangarlou to discuss the work of the SCD and lessons from a war-torn Syria.

Q: Raqqa and Deir ez Zor are among the two recently liberated cities in Syria that are no longer controlled by ISIL forces. However, there is ambiguity and struggle over the political governance of these liberated areas. As a humanitarian organization, what’s the best governing solution that would help maintain the safety of the citizens in these two areas?

MM: We are an impartial organization and our sole mission is humanitarian support. We provide rescue services and much needed relief for people and neither care nor can we influence which political party or country or government has governance over the region or a city, but trust that consideration will be given to the welfare. As per our mission, what matters is if we can support the people.

Q: How difficult is it for the White Helmets to work in places like Raqqa or Deir ez Zor?

MM: White Helmets is not allowed to operate in the areas that are controlled by the Assad regime or Russia and their allies; but if we were allowed access into those areas we would have no problem providing support for the local population. The White Helmets first operated in groups and missions but later joined forces and the organization was formally founded in 2013-2014, a few years after commencement of the war,and that’s why the Assad regime sees us as part of the opposition and deems us illegitimate. They don’t recognize us. We offered multiple times to go into different areas that can benefit from our support—areas that are controlled by the regime, like suburbs of Damascus, parts of Aleppo—but they rejected us every single time.

Q: Considering that the majority of ISIL strongholds are being liberated inside Syria, what are some of the immediate threats that Syrians face? How is White Helmets responding to ISIL liberated areas?

MM: While Daesh (ISIL) is gone, there are other groups and militias—including the Shia and “Zeynabis” emerging in these areas that will ultimately lead to clashes; so not all those liberated places can be considered as secure. On the other hand there are other areas that were liberated by Daesh, like Jarablus and Al baab that are controlled and supported by the Turkish government, where we have been successful operating in and have opened three more centers there.

Q: There are multiple besieged areas inside Syria that have faced horrific humanitarian conditions and shortage of food, healthcare, and are denied basic necessities. Many UN and international relief agencies have not been able to access these areas. How successful has the White Helmets been in operating in besieged areas?

MM: It’s incredibly difficult to operate in these areas. We can’t transport any needed equipment in these areas, including much needed medicine, medical and rescue equipment that would make a tremendous difference on the ground; so instead, where can make an impact, and the only thing we can do in this circumstance, is to transfer funds to trusted, local contacts who are operating there.  However, the process is not easy as it takes a lot to channel funds into those areas—more than 10 percent gets cut out in fees and commissions along the way. The besieged areas are the most difficult places to work in and support, but this is the price we have to pay to ensure some degree of impact.

Q: There have been talks and also some steps forward creating “safe zones” inside Syria. How successful can this idea be towards stopping the bloodshed?

MM: The creation of safe zones is in theory a great idea. If you have safe zones where you can start running a political dialogue then you may then have a possibility to reach a political solution for the crisis. Conversely, if you have safe zones where airstrikes are still ongoing—as is the case presently—then there is no point. For safe zones to be successful there needs to be a system of international monitoring and supervision that can guarantee safety.

Q: Seven years into this crisis, over 16 million people are internally displaced and five million are scattered across the Middle East as refugees. How do you view the prospect of a political transition in Syria ending the crisis?

MM: Syrian people won’t ever accept Bashar Hafez al-Assad as their President—especially after all the attacks we’ve seen—including the chemical massacres. In particular, they consider him a criminal, and therefore they can't acknowledge his leadership. The International Criminal Court and United Nations condemned the Syrian regime for his responsibility for many massacres, most recently the Khan Shaykhoun massacre which involved the use of  chemical sarin gas that killed more than 90 people and caused many injuries. There have been numerous massacres by the use of barrel bombs in Aleppo city and many hospitals and civil defense centers were targeted because they were providing assistance and medical treatment to civilians. All this is part of a systematic criminal mentality on the part of the Syrian regime. Theoretically and practically Assad remaining in power is an impossible notion. I do not believe the Syrian people will ever accept him for the the degree of sadness and despair he has inflicted on every single household. How can he possibly remain as president?

Q: How can the international community and the United States help stop the bloodshed? And then support a political transition?

MM: First, if you want to stop the bloodshed, you have to understand the cause of this bloodshed. Most of the bloodshed is caused by airstrikes. On a percentage basis, I would project airstrikes account for approximately 70% of the deaths, as conducted by the Asaad regime and Russia. If the flights can be stopped, then the damage will be reduced to the approximately 30% caused by the mortar shells and rockets that cannot reach far distances but are on the frontliones of the fighting. In order to stop this we need to deploy peace teams and monitoring forces under the auspices of the United Nations. To stop the air war over Syria we need international agreements that will exert pressure on Russia and the Assad regime.

Q: Based on your first-hand work on the ground, what are the three mains things Syrians need in Syria?

MM: First, stop the fighting and bloodshed. Then, find a political solution, and finally a plan of reconstruction, which includes allowing the safe the return of displaced persons and refugees. However, we cannot talk about any negotiation or peace plans without stopping the killing inside Syria, and aircraft targeting of civilians. Only then we can talk about sitting at the negotiating table, followed by a process to hold accountable individuals  accused of war crimes, and Bashar Al-Assad should be the first one of them. Finally, we can talk about the political solution and actual reconstruction to rebuild Syria again.

Q: You were a fireman before the war broke in Syria. What made you resign from your post and join the White Helmets? Aren’t you afraid of living inside Syria especially given the work you do?

MM: I was a fireman and yes, my work was a humanitarian effort, but after the war broke out, it became political and I was no longer serving people and community. Rather, I was dispersing protesters and people who opposed the regime. It was then that I decided that I no longer want to serve as a fireman and have my role be politicized. If one day, firefighters once again become a humanitarian organization that it was previously, then I will proudly go back to this profession.

As regards my personal welfare regarding the work I do—Syria is home, and you can’t leave home, regardless of the circumstances.

Q: If you could have a message for the U.S. President, on behalf of the White Helmets and the Syrian people, what would you tell President Trump?

MM: The United States is one of the strongest—if not the strongest country in the world—and I would ask President Trump to use all this power and weight to exert pressure on the Assad regime and Russia to end the bloodshed. I would ask him to help stop the conflict immediately  and push toward a political solution. President Trump recently helped Syria greatly in defeating ISIL, and I believe he has the same capacity to end the bloodshed caused by Assad and Russia.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Palmyra - تدمر" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by J_Llanos

The East West Institute is mentioned in a Huffington Post article regarding its Track 2 work with Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO). In the article, CARPO's head Adnan Tabatabi shares the joint effort by the two organizations to bring together a group of influential figures from rivaling neighbors Arab Saudi and Iran on a regular basis. The meetings are confidential.

The collaboration between EWI and CARPO has so far produced four policy reports: Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on ISIL, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Refugee Crisis, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Post-Oil Economy, and Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Risks of Climate Change and Ecological Deterioration.

Click here to read the article on Huffington Post.

Photo: "Wadi Rum" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by twiga_swala