Middle East & North Africa

Today, terrorism and the global refugee crisis are two of the world’s most daunting challenges, seemingly with little end in sight. While the correlation between extremism and the refugee crisis is complex, history indicates that people will rely on desperate measures in desperate times of need; and these actions may, or may not, be aligned with those desired of stable nation states.

With terrorist attacks raging across Europe, refugee-filled boats sinking in the Mediterranean and the Middle East suffocating in the large influx of refugees caused by the six-year-old Syrian crisis, the United States and other world leaders have an opportunity to engage in counter extremism efforts that can simultaneously tackle the refugee crisis at hand. These can be measures that take root in preventing the growth of radicalism, the deepening of sectarian and socio-economic divides in host countries, as well as suppressing the popularity of Jihadist narratives in some of the most economically vulnerable and war-torn regions in the Middle East.

Success will require a combination of long-term and short-term strategies; and no long-term effort will have more positive impact to our security than responding correctly to the refugee crisis under the lens of the fight against terrorism.

The Plight of Refugees

In 2015, the United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that each minute, “24 people were forced to flee their home—a number that is four times greater than a decade earlier.” The numbers displaced by war and persecution rose from 59.5 million to 65.3 million worldwide from 2014 to 2015 alone. Syria, under the Presidency of Bashar Al-Assad, leads the way in generating the largest number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) in the world—an ongoing conflict that has created the worst humanitarian crisis since the Second World War—a catastrophe not only affecting those internally displaced inside Syria and the refugees fleeing their homes, but also the host countries struggling to handle this unforeseen population influx.

According to the UNHCR, there are over 6.5 million internally displaced people (IDP) inside Syria, making it the largest IDP population in the world. This is while half of the country’s 22 million pre-war population is in desperate need of humanitarian support in addition to the five million refugees scattered across the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. According to many non-governmental organizations working on the ground in these host countries, however, the actual tally is much higher than official reports when considering the number of individuals not registered with the agency.

In dealing with the refugee crisis, it is critical to recognize that host countries—involuntarily forced to handle this large influx—are, themselves, bearers of massive infrastructural, economic and political challenges.

Currently, millions of Syrian refugees and IDPs are growing up without access to education or prospects of economic independence and growth. In addition, millions of them are suffering from massive trauma and psychological wounds caused by this ongoing war. Today’s Syrian children make up half of the IDP and refugee population, where 40 percent are under the age of 11. Save The Children recently reported that a large population of Syrians, particularly children, are suffering from “toxic stress” as a result of a prolonged exposure to war; where at least 3 million children under the age of six know nothing but war.

In a region where extremism lives and breathes, this calamity is building up to shape a volatile, depressed and disenfranchised future generation. If this pattern continues, in a few short years, the world will face millions of teenagers and adults who lack adequate education, vocational skills and who suffer from massive psycho-social instability. This will not only affect their own livelihoods, it will impact host countries and their communities at large.

Extremism and Terrorism

In its simplest form—whether nationalistic, religious or ethnic—terrorism is a struggle for legitimacy focused on achieving political ends. While we can measure terrorism by many factors, fatalities is the key metric. In the past 15 years, terrorist related deaths worldwide have increased by a factor of nine from less than 3,000 in 2000 to nearly 30,000 by 2015.

The United States makes up just over four percent of the world’s population, but it has experienced over 10 percent of the world’s deaths to terrorism in the past 15 years. The United States, however, is not alone as last year, Europe—with France and Turkey in the lead—bore the brunt of both homegrown and foreign terrorist attacks. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index report, the number of deaths from terrorism dramatically rose in 2015 after a 650 percent increase compared to the year before.

France has seen an uptick in homegrown terrorism from disenfranchised actors in the recent years. Turkey, however, presents a much more complicated scenario; attacks often stem from a variety of actors, including those disenfranchised people-turned-terrorists as a result of the instability in neighboring Syria, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Both countries are poignant examples of how radical groups such as ISIL target some of the most vulnerable, disenfranchised and economically challenged migrant youth for recruitment. In most cases, these are young men who are often in search of a defined purpose and a sense of belonging, in addition to an ingrained desire to fulfill their socio-economic, cultural and psychological voids.

Last year, Abed, a 16-year-old boy fled his hometown of Raqqa—ISIL’s stronghold in Syria—and is now living in of the most disenfranchised slums of Beirut in Lebanon. Before their escape, Abed’s right hand was chopped off by ISIL militants. A young team of psycho-social workers in Beirut came across Abed in the Fall of 2016. They welcomed him into their center, where they help Syrian refugees overcome some of the trauma, PTSD and psychological wounds caused by war. Maya Yamout, one of the forensic psycho-social workers at the center, said that the teenage boy suffers from a tremendous amount of PTSD mixed with feelings of shame and guilt. “Abed told us he is not sure if he should live here or go back home and join ISIL; he feels what happened was his fault,” said Yamout.  

While suggesting that all vulnerable youth will engage in terrorist activities or that all terrorism stems from disenfranchised environments is not a black and white argument, but addressing the plight of vulnerable youth in the region and the damaging role extremism plays in their outlook is a critical step.

Near-Term, Long-Term Outlook

The longer conflicts such as Syria continue to fester, the greater probability of a rise in further destabilization and extremism, and subsequently, greater security challenges related to terrorism. It is pivotal for the global powers to realize that the stakes are much higher than ever before—on the humanitarian, social-economic and security levels. The world community has an obligation to develop and execute a strategic plan to correct these issues—taking a robust stance to help address the burgeoning refugee problem in parallel to counter terrorism efforts.

Looking at Syria, this unspeakable crisis needs an immediate stop to civilian deaths and bloodshed; development of secure and permanent “provinces” inside Syria; development of safe transit corridors and means of transportation to move refugees from their point of crisis or refugee camp to their permanent “province;” and ultimately, a focus to resolve the root causes of the crisis to prevent and minimize future potential conflicts. In the interim, it is also crucial to support grassroots and non-governmental work on the ground in the Syrian border regions, through bilateral cooperation between the world’s leaders and local governments, particularly in efforts to temporarily-assimilate the refugee population—many of whom want to go back home to Syria.

Looking more broadly, assimilation of refugees in new host communities is critical, requiring education and vocational training. Doing so will also help boost the economic potential and self-worth of many individuals, thus eliminating the prospect of disfranchisement and minimizing the potential for extremist influences taking hold.

If properly implemented, the above recommendations should result in decreased numbers of refugees (as regards Syria), while helping to address many of the underlining factors behind the potential recruitment of vulnerable individuals targeted by extremist groups.   

Today, the world stands at a fork in the road. We either move towards peace and stability by addressing the factor conditions that breed extremism and terrorism—while offering a long-term solution to the refugee crisis—or we let these two interrelated challenges spiral out of control. The answer is not more refugee camps or softer worldwide immigration policies. The answer lies in ensuring the peace and stability of the lands from which the refugees originate and the host countries they inhabit, by choice and by circumstance.

Dr. William J. Parker III is the Chief Operating Officer at the EastWest Institute

Tara Kangarlou is an International Journalist and a Visiting Scholar at The EastWest Institute

Given the extent of the structural shifts in politics in post-2003 Iraq, the level of destruction in the liberated areas and the depth of distrust among communities, the challenge of post-ISIS recovery could not be greater.  To create an inclusive political order in Nineveh and provide a successful model for other parts of Iraq, policy- and decision-makers must engage in constructive debate, share visions and develop strategies tailor-made for the province.

To facilitate such debate among local, national and international stakeholders, the EastWest Institute co-organized a dialogue and workshop with the Middle East Research Institute (MERI). Held in Loosdrecht, Netherlands on May 31 to June 1, the event brought together representatives of Nineveh’s ethnic and religious communities, members of the Nineveh Provincial Council, the Iraqi Federal Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and a selection of international donor countries and international non-governmental organizations.

The aim of the workshop was to:

• provide a platform for strategic, thought-provoking and action-focused dialogue on the process of post-ISIS reconstruction in Nineveh over the short, intermediate and long-term.
• support the development of coherent policy responses to the most pressing issues facing Nineveh whilst taking into account the political, sectarian, and ethnic diversity of the province.

The EastWest Institute and MERI will publish a policy report from the event.

EWI Chief Operating Officer Dr. William J. Parker III hosted the event and the three panelists—Dr. Zaher Sahoul, Colonel Patrick J. Mahaney, Jr. and Loubna Mrie—provided their insights during the lively and substantial conversation moderated by EWI Visiting Scholar and journalist Tara Kangarlou.

The discussion centered on identifying key contributing factors to the Syrian conflict, the ongoing humanitarian crisis and an examination of the actors involved in this very complex landscape. There was a strong emphasis on the plight of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons, the challenges imposed on host communities and the impact extremism plays on the most vulnerable, disenfranchised and under-served individuals, which, based on current studies and demographics, paint a potentially dire picture for the next generation of Syrian youth.   

Dr. Sahoul is a senior advisor and past president of the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) and currently leads SAMS Global Response to address the refugee crisis in Europe and provide medical relief in disaster areas. Colonel Mahaney is a U.S. Army Special Forces Officer who has served as a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and as a commander of the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group. Mrie is a Syrian activist and photojournalist who has closely covered the ongoing conflict in her country.

The reelection of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani as President emphasizes the support for stability and re-engagement with the international community—something that will be a relief for China.

Hassan Rouhani’s clear win in the Iranian election bodes well for the region, as well as for China’s interests. This reelection ensures a level of continuity that would have been difficult to retain under his opponent Ebrahim Raisi, who, in general, appeared to want a return to Ahmadinejad’s Iran. While China’s relationship with Iran would likely have remained similar under either leader—the stability brought by Rouhani is clearly preferred.  

The Campaign

The uncertainty of the campaign and global trends towards populism worked together to make the Iranian election nearly impossible to predict.  Generally, it was described as a ‘referendum on Rouhani’s job performance.’ With many Iranians dissatisfied with the growth of the economy since the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a Rouhani win was never a sure thing.  Shortly before the election, one of the other major conservative candidates dropped out and endorsed Raisi, making it seem like the conservative vote would all go for Raisi. If Raisi would have won, Iran would likely have to turn away from international investors and eventually moved away from the nuclear deal.

Raisi’s campaign underscored that he was a nationalist – focused on Iran solving its own problems, while Rouhani highlighted that he was a globalist—seeing the benefit of a more open economy. Part of Raisi’s campaign platform hinged on voters believing that the promised benefits of the JCPOA had not materialized and that the Iranian economy would benefit more from his guidance.  His campaign was filled with populist rhetoric claiming that he could improve the economy better than Rouhani.  Aspects of the campaign mirrored the election in 2005—when a populist Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani faced off—but Raisi’s message seems to have not had the expected impact.

Raisi’s campaign also made China into a scapegoat of sorts, as it has in the past, for a reason that Iran’s economy is not doing as well as it could—a doubling of the import of Chinese-made goods. This, however, works both ways—both imports from China and non-oil exports have increased since Rouhani started his term—66.5 percent and 73 percent respectively. Oil, still the major export, rose modestly by 4.3 percent. Compared to Ahmadinejad’s second term, in Rouhani’s first term non-oil exports have grown from 18.7 billion USD to 32.4 billion USD. Unemployment has also decreased from 15 percent when he took office to 10 percent last year.

Even though it was not clearly fleshed out, Raisi’s foreign policy left something to be desired. Overall, he told reporters that he would ‘establish ties with every country except Israel.’ Some reports, however, viewed his key policy advisor (and at that point potential foreign minister) to be Saeed Jalili, a frequent critic of the JCPOA who wants Iran’s foreign policy role to be more revolutionary—challenging perceived hegemony in the world.  Jalili was a nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad from 2007-2013.

As a result of the Ayatollah’s approval of the nuclear deal, it would be difficult for anyone to unilaterally move Iran away from it. Raisi ‘express[ed] respect for the nuclear deal,, but made it clear that it was not the solution to Iran’s economic problems—as it had been marketed. Essentially, Raisi’s foreign policy agenda would have been similar to Ahmadinejad’s.

Rouhani won—now what?

Realistically, Rouhani’s win means that we should expect to see a continuation of his current policies—and that’s a good thing for almost everyone involved. China, in particular, will view this positively as it will all but ensure that regional stability is maintained—at least by Iran. Stability is continually preferred by Beijing as it allows for more political predictability and maintains stable economic conditions. During his term, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric became trying and stability was constantly threatened, so a similar administration would be disastrous—especially with the Trump administration. After Rouhani won his first term, he began a refreshing process of reengaging with the international community. Rouhani’s reelection with 57 percent of the vote will give him further support as he moves ahead with reforms and continues to further Iran’s ties with the rest of the world.  

Even as the Trump administration moves to ‘review’ the JCPOA, the vote of the Iranian people shows the world they have clearly chosen to support the process and gives China a strong reason to continue to support the JCPOA. This should be a clear sign that Iran wants to keep progressing under the agreement—any move away from full implementation would be squarely on the United States.  Reengagement with the U.S. will likely be difficult, but beneficial in the long run.

The main result for Sino-Iranian relations will be a continuation and possibly intensification of current relations. More infrastructure investments will likely be made—given Iran’s enthusiasm with the One Belt, One Road concept. In general, though, deals made before the election—such as China’s redesign of the Arak nuclear reactor as well as whatever OBOR projects already underway—will continue as scheduled. Overall, this election shows that continued stability and reform is important to Iran, something that China will be happy with.

Daniel Johanson is a PhD candidate at King’s College London focusing on Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea, Iran and Sudan.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

The Task Force on the Future of Iraq, convened by the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, has completed its year-long project to identify ways to support the Iraqis in stabilizing their state, facilitate the defeat of extremist groups like ISIS and building the basis for long term stability in the country.
 
Kawa Hassan, director of the EastWest Institute’s Middle East and North Africa program, was one of 20 experts invited to take part in the Task Force on the Future of Iraq. The Task Force was chaired by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Executive Professor, Texas A&M University; Former Ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon.
 
“It has been a tremendous honor to represent the EastWest Institute in this distinguished, policy-oriented group of recognized Iraq experts,” said Hassan. “It is with great pride that our recommendations on the paramount importance of good governance and real reforms—as preconditions to defeat ISIS and violent extremism—may add value to the security goals of Iraq and the wider region.”
 
Over the course of 2016, the task force brought together the world’s leading Iraq scholars, experts, and former policy practitioners to conduct a rigorous inquiry into how the United States could best protect its national security interests and promote Iraqi interests through targeted and effective engagement in Iraq. Task force experts traveled to Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaimani, Najaf, Amman, Berlin, and twice convened in Washington, D.C. to engage with Iraqi policymakers, civil society actors, and religious leaders. 

Download the full report here.

Photo credit: "Kalar Castle" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Joshua Zakary

Similar to the United States and France, Iran is to set to have a new President in what’s shaping up to be a polarized election between current moderate President Hassan Rouhani and his conservative counterpart—Ebrahim Raisi—who is also custodian of the wealthiest charity and business conglomerate in the Shia world. On Friday May 19, over 50 million eligible voters in Iran will take to the polls.  
 
The Iranian election will have a profound socio-political impact domestically. Even after the much celebrated 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers, the country continues to suffer from a stagnant economy and unemployment. The Rouhani administration inherited former President Ahmadinejad’s broken economy of negative three percent and lifted it to a 26 percent growth rate since 2013. However, one of Rouhani’s biggest promises in the 2017 election is the lifting of the “non-nuclear” sanctions. Ahead of Friday’s election, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that “the Supreme Leader regards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a test for our counterparts, and if our counterparts show interest to find resolution we have the readiness to enter other stages.”
 
With just a few months into Donald Trump’s presidency, the Iranian election will also have significant implications on the United States, as well as its regional neighbors. It remains to be seen how President Trump will address Iran. All this while Europe has already shown vested interest in a post-sanctioned Iran and is welcoming to what can be a promise of an open Iran. More importantly the majority young population of Iran—with 50 percent of them under the age of 30—the Iranian people strive to belong to an international community and they will choose whoever can deliver them a glimpse of that hope.
 
To further unpack the 2017 Iranian presidential election and its regional and global implications, EWI Visiting Scholar Tara Kangarlou spoke with Dr. Sadegh Kharazi (pictured), one of Iran’s most prominent diplomats who served as the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations and France under President Mohammad Khatami. 
 
Q: The election is shaping up to be a close race between President Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi—who many in the West suspect to be a favorite among the conservatives. How do you evaluate the Rouhani-Raisi match? What are some of the key make or break points for both candidates?

Kharazi: “There has been no insignificant election in Iran; because each election is a reflection of the country’s foreign policy and domestic political climate, while being entwined with an element of surprise and an unpredictable result. This time around, the elections are even more important because of the unfinished implementations of JCPOA, Trump’s election in the U.S., and unique regional conditions in particularly with Syria, Iraq, and the hostile behavior of Israel and Saudi; and its result will no doubt affect the region.”

Q: One of the biggest success stories under President Rouhani was the nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers back in 2015. Do you think that’s a big enough score to gauge people’s vote for the second term?

Kharazi: “The nuclear deal removed a huge dam that was in front of the nation and the people of Iran; and today it needs to be mended, taken care of, and honored by its foreign signatories. This can indeed help Rouhani’s re-election.”

Q: You are a diplomat, a politician, and a strong voice among the moderates and the reformist majority in Iran. Which candidate do you think will help Iran’s economic boost, global engagement, and strength in supporting regional stability? Why?

Kharazi: “I consider Rouhani an appropriate choice at the moment who can help economic growth, diplomatic openings, and renewed political opportunities for Iran. Rouhani’s motto is ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the international community. This will ultimately lead to economic progress and growth under a calm and stable umbrella that’ll be a direct result of a better international cooperation.”
 
Q: Some regard Iran as one of the very few actual Democracies in the Middle East, while many others in the West—especially the United States and its allies doubt the “electoral process” in Iran and argue otherwise. How much influence do people’s votes truly have?

Kharazi: “Take a closer look at the United State’s allies in the region. Are any of the Saudi, Bahraini, or Qatari systems of governance based upon any sort of “election?” Let’s not go far and just look at what happened in Turkey recently—why has there been no criticism from the U.S. toward Turkey’s referendum? One of the biggest indications of a Democracy in any country is the election of an “opposite party” to that of the ruling government. For example, after Khatami there came Ahmadinejad and after Ahmadinejad you had Rouhani elected. You can also look at the shake up of our conservative parliament into a reformist one. Also, the excitement and prowling of the candidates and their supports to gain majority votes—in and of itself—is a loud indication of the power of the people’s vote.”
 
Q: When running for president, candidate Trump expressed criticism of the nuclear deal. How do you think Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy approach will be toward the U.S. and preserving the JCPOA? How will Rouhani’s be?

Kharazi: “All Presidential candidates have accepted JCPOA as an international agreement. Disagreement in reaching our demands falls in the helm of our Western counterparts.” 

Q: Today the Middle East region is suffering from multiple unrests in Yemen and the six-year-old crisis in Syria. There is a great opportunity for regional powers (Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Saudi Arabia) to work together in resolving some of these matters) but just this past week, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Price, Mohammed Bin Salman said that Saudi won’t engage in any dialogue with Iran, accusing it of following an “extremist ideology.” How would you comment on the Saudi position?

Kharazi: “It’s mind boggling that the Saudi’s accuse Iran of having ‘extremist ideologies’. Do we see any other outcome in their support of radical religious groups other than fostering hostility and terrorism? Let’s remember which country supported ISIS in Iraq and Syria and which country fought against ISIS. Throughout history, Iran has always been in support of the middle ground and tolerance. Even the Islamic Revolution of 1979 falls within the more peaceful revolutions in history. Unlike the classic revolutions in history we didn’t see rivers of blood or massacres. The Saudi’s comments are humorous to me. I encourage your readers to read and study the history, implications, and ideologies of Wahhabism; and also do a bit of research on Shiism. Then they will be able to see the truth behind such remarks.”

The EastWest Institute (EWI), in partnership with the Tehran-based Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office, convened a dialogue in Tehran in December 2016 as part of EWI’s “Afghanistan Reconnected Process;” a multi-year program aimed at contributing to Afghanistan’s future stability by encouraging regional cooperation.

The Tehran dialogue extended to both policy makers and the business community to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing Iran as an essential neighbor of Afghanistan. The dialogue aimed to deliver relevant policy recommendations that have a reasonable prospect of implementation. Specifically, discussions focused on identifying obstacles to trade, transit and energy cooperation between the two countries, and proposing viable solutions to these obstacles. The present briefing, jointly issued by EWI and IPIS, is intended to highlight the findings of the dialogue and the resulting recommendations. 

Executive Summary 

Iran’s re-entry into the global fold presents a number of unprecedented opportunities, positioning the country to contribute considerably to the development of neighboring Afghanistan in the coming years. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s strategy of fostering regional economic cooperation as the linchpin for long-term growth and stability in Afghanistan will encourage and even necessitate Iranian participation. As a vital neighbor emerging from global isolation, Iran can serve as a critical partner in this long-term plan, and also in the efforts of the international community.  

Tremendous opportunity exists to increase trade and economic cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan. Sharing a 936km border with trading routes through Herat in Afghanistan’s north, water sharing agreements on the Helmand River, and mutual opportunities for resource development, Iran is well-positioned as an integral member of Afghanistan’s regional development sphere. The India-supported construction of Iran’s Chabahar port represents an important step toward taking advantage of Iran’s access to deep water points. Opportunities also arise in addressing the massive trade imbalance between the two countries. At the end of the Iranian calendar year in March 2016, Afghanistan exported less than 26 million USD in non-oil trade to Iran, while importing only 2.5 billion USD from its neighbor in return. 
Iran stands ready to increase its role in Afghanistan, but there are clear obstacles to maximizing the potential of the Iranian/Afghan relationship: namely, poor connectivity and infrastructure, a deteriorating security situation, endemic corruption in Afghanistan, an absence of contacts and networks between Iranian and Afghan business people operating in either country, unfavorable visa policies and tariffs, and a lack of trust in the Afghan market.

Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan to create a more secure environment is vital to long term economic growth in both countries. Iranian influence both in western Afghanistan and in a broader regional context can serve to improve security, assist Afghan governance improvements, and implement long term regional economic plans grounded in trusted agreements. A genuine partnership between Afghanistan and Iran, as well as strengthened regional and international efforts toward cooperation, will be crucial for future prosperity in the coming decades.

Download the full report here.

The two groups from Iran and Saudi Arabia were composed of former diplomats, senior analysts, security and environmental experts. In addition, a group of distinguished experts from think tanks, academia, and the UN contributed with their input and analysis.

Held under strict Chatham House Rule, the dialogue aimed at gaining insights on how Saudi Arabia and Iran view the environmental challenges they face in their respective countries and the region, how future cooperation in the fields of environment could look like, and what impediments to cooperation need to be overcome. 

The participants discussed the most pressing environmental issues facing West Asia, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, including the economic and political consequences of long term drought, water scarcity, air pollution, and sand and dust storms, and how to tackle those issues on a national, bilateral, and regional level. The participants also discussed the possible consequences of non-cooperation on those matters in the future, and what implications that might have on migration, radicalism, employment, and habitation in those two countries and the region. Beyond the conversation on the environmental challenges, the current geopolitical impediments to cooperation were also highlighted. 

A comprehensive policy brief of EWI and CARPO will follow in June.