The UN-facilitated peace negotiations aimed at ending the civil war in Yemen are showing slow progress as the warring parties—as well as their regional backers—seem willing to stop the fighting and invest in a political, power-sharing solution instead.

The military confrontation between the forces of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by a Saudi-led intervention force, and the Houthi rebels and other local factions propped up by Iran and Hezbollah, has devastated the country. However, many of Yemen’s problems predate the war and, if left unaddressed, competition for ever scarcer resources, damaging corruption and social inequality will keep fueling conflict.

Thus, to make any sort of political deal viable and sustainable, it will have to go hand-in-hand with tackling Yemen’s extremely vulnerable socioeconomic situation. To (re)gain trust and to keep momentum, the Yemeni authorities should generate quick, tangible and positive results. Keeping the long-term challenges in mind, they could start with launching a set of early economic recovery initiatives.

Keeping in mind Yemen’s long term challenges

The list of fundamental, long-term challenges facing Yemen is long. Early recovery initiatives should take into account the following conditions:

• A young and rapidly growing population. Between 1990 and 2015, Yemen’s population grew from 12 million to 26.2 million people. Population pressure will impact Yemen’s infrastructure, its education and health care systems, its labor market and its adaptability to climate change.
• Steady depletion of energy reserves. Approximately three-quarters of Yemen’s economy is dependent on revenue from the oil and gas sector, which makes up about 90 percent of Yemen’s exports. Without new discoveries, the oil fields will be depleted within several years and with oil prices forecasted to remain low, companies are unlikely to consider Yemen as a lucrative place for investments.
• The potential increase in water and food scarcity. Water governance is weak and has contributed to depletion of this vital resource. Available groundwater is unable to support fast-paced population growth. Some experts predict that Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, could run out of viable water supplies as soon as 2017. Of all irrigated lands, 40 percent is used for the cultivation of Khat, a mild narcotic that contributes immensely to the unproductivity of Yemen’s work force.
• Unsustainable fiscal and external balances. With international oil prices expected to remain relatively low, Yemen will keep running structural deficits and will struggle servicing its international debts. Additional income for individual families from large scale remittances dried up back in the 1990s, due to the expulsion of Yemeni expat workers by other Gulf countries. That situation is unlikely to change anytime soon.
• Weak local governance and limited absorption capacity. Much of Yemen’s territory remains under de facto local and tribal rule. Years of mismanaged of state resources have soured relations between national, regional and local authorities. This has translated into a trend towards federalism and created room for more extremist actors to take root. 

Finding suitable early recovery initiatives 

With the above constraints in mind, recovery initiatives ideally would contribute to de-escalation, promote peace and move local economies (and young men, in particular) away from relying on combat or criminal activities. Relevant policy objectives could include:

• Increasing monetary and fiscal stability. Yemen’s authorities will need to bring down prices, secure vital imports and restore confidence in the local currency. Direct budget support, when earmarked and monitored adequately, can help. In addition, a serious discussion needs to be held about the economics of reconciliation and potential federal models that would regionalize income sources.
• Initiate labor-intensive reconstruction projects. Infrastructure works can provide large-scale employment for unskilled (male) youth, help reinsert ex-combatants into society and rebuild and redesign infrastructure and public services. These projects can also be tools for reconciliation, as jobs in reconstruction can help build a sense of joint ownership and a stake in regional recovery.
• Restore the agricultural base. Agricultural and fishery activities constitute 22 percent of Yemen’s GDP and provide formal and informal professional activities for around 54 percent of the population. Maintaining this base will make Yemen less dependent on external aid and relief efforts. Yemen could implement a robust, incentives-based substitution strategy towards crops that use less water and are less harmful than Khat.
• Provide relevant, skills-focused education initiatives. Education creates alternatives for ex-combatants and the unemployed, while promoting schooling for girls will have a decelerating effect on unsustainable population growth. Education efforts should be aligned with the needs of Yemen’s future job market. Training programs could include basic health care and primary schools supporting teaching, administrative, agricultural, social entrepreneurial and de-mining skills.

The need for a social awareness campaign

The country is in dire need of success stories; early recovery initiatives should tie into a general public awareness campaign aimed at providing Yemeni youth a sense of purpose and ownership. A large-scale campaign could make Yemen’s challenges explicit and emphasize the social behaviors that positively or negatively affect Yemeni communities, such as unsustainable population growth, corruption, etc.

Funding and the role of external donors

Local revenue will not cover any of the above mentioned initiatives, and external donors will be called upon to fill the gaps. The international community could consider preparing for a new international conference on rebuilding Yemen, taking the outcomes of the 2012 Yemen Donor Conference as a starting point. The related 2012-2014 Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development could be reviewed and deepened for this purpose.

Any international initiatives should avoid aid-dependency when focusing on incentivizing individuals and communities, while also remaining mindful of the limited absorptive capacity of local institutions.

Conclusion

A political deal between the warring parties will be an important step towards sustainable peace in Yemen. Nevertheless, post-war Yemen will continue to face extreme difficulties, many of which are rooted in longer-term trends and developments. In the short-term, authorities should strive to implement a selection of strategic initiatives, incentivizing individuals and communities towards a productive path. This selection should focus on addressing current conditions and impediments, creating a more positive environment that emphasizes opportunity and empowers a new generation of Yemenis.

Dr. Saskia van Genugten is a senior research fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy and author of Post-Conflict Yemen: Early Economic Recovery Initiatives. She tweets at @svgen.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

More than four decades have passed since Brian Jenkins, an expert on security, first represented “terrorism as theater” in a report for the RAND Corporation. Yet, to this day, leaders and policymakers countering terrorism implement strategies composed mostly of military and police actions—little is done to oppose the theatrics. Taking theater as a model, terrorism relies on live performers and unwitting live participants to present the experience of an imagined event, an event in which the perpetrators wield power over the victims. Each piece, or attack, is not meant to appeal to thought, but to feeling. The influence of emotion, is the true asymmetric power of terrorism and is key to developing effective strategies to prevent acts of violence.

The American public may identify terrorism as the most important problem facing the United States, but it is in fact a nominal risk in the U.S. and other advanced countries. Over the course of more than 40 years, from 1968 to 2010, terrorist incidents killed just 258 people in the U.S. (excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks, an outlier in both national and international data sets). By way of comparison, motor vehicle accidents killed more than 35,000 people in 2013 alone. In terms of reducing the national mortality rate, American policymakers would do significantly better to re-allocate resources to the prevention of texting and driving. For many people, however, this alternative use of resources simply would not feel right. What is this intuitive sense that the risk of terrorism should merit a substantial response?

In his 1994 book, Descartes’ Error, neurologist António Damásio wrote: “We are not thinking machines. We are feeling machines that think.” Damásio proposed that emotions guide, or bias, behavior and decision-making. As performance, terrorism uses killing in sensational and unpredictable ways to communicate threat. It appeals directly to emotion. Take as an example the decision-making of a Parisian, before and after the November 2015 Paris attacks by Islamic State. Before the incident, a Parisian would be unlikely to assess the probability of death prior to visiting a local café, restaurant, or theater, as their emotional input would simply be the desire to enjoy a pleasant evening out. After the terrorist attacks, even with the knowledge that the risk of an incident is negligible, a Parisian could find their rationality skewed by the specter of threat. Terrorism as performance is successful when a hum of uncertainty pervades society and causes people to think twice before behaving in ways typical of la vie quotidienne (everyday life).

Leaders are no less affected by terrorism’s appeal to emotion and may in fact be more vulnerable to bias in behavior. The assumption underlying most policy is that rational information properly structured can guide decisions and achieve rational, desirable outcomes. There is little room in the policy-making process for the consideration of emotional input, an absence that has persistently undermined the best intentions of leaders. On November 16 of last year, three days after the Paris attacks, President François Hollande addressed a special congress of both houses of parliament. There, he stated that France was “at war,” extended a state of emergency, and proposed security measures. While his measures were certainly more constructive than those of former U.S. President George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks, who declared an impossible, abstract “war on terror,” President Hollande’s statement inadvertently strengthened Islamic State’s emotional appeal. A Parisian guided by the fear that the prospect of war elicits would be rational to think: “If my president is declaring war, then surely there must be reason to fear for my safety.”

The strategy of Islamic State and other groups that commit terrifying acts of violence is to leverage fear and uncertainty to influence societies to act in ways that, while rational, are contrary to defining values and ideals. Executed successfully, this strategy bolsters ideological narratives that support the recruitment, retention, and performance of operatives. In this regard, al-Qaeda was immensely successful after September 11. The perception of threat compelled American policymakers to support practices that the U.S. constitution was written to protect against—unreasonable searches and seizures, due process of law, and cruel and unusual punishment. As they implemented a cellular organizational structure, al-Qaeda was able to point to purportedly random searches, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, and enhanced interrogation practices to substantiate their narrative and numbers as they set up in new locales. Fortunately, terrorist groups do not have exclusive domain over theatrics. Leaders too can use performance as a counter strategy to influence emotion and upstage would-be perpetrators of violence.

First, leaders should understand that by definition they are “always on.” In this regard, President François Hollande responded well to the Paris attacks. He was proactive on both the national and international stage. It is important for people to see their leaders, military, and police take action. Second, leaders should consider the probable emotional, and then rational, interpretation of their communication. Messages of war elicit fear and incomplete frames elicit uncertainty, playing into the hands of terrorist groups. Leaders should speak to national values, providing powerful, relatable examples of those values realized. This would communicate assurance and certainty. (It must be noted, though, that a fine line exists between messages of national solidarity and pacification.)

Last, leaders should allocate time and resources to regularly assess the pathos of their communication about terrorism. This would enable them to realize what messages inspire confidence and outline future responses. Leaders are hardly new to theatrics, particularly in countries where a voting public determines political tenure. But performance has taken on a new significance and, now more than ever, strategic showmanship matters.

Gregory Daniels is an American-Canadian information and communication strategist. Gregory holds an M.S. in international affairs from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

To read this article on The Diplomat, click here. 

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As part of his recent visit to Moscow and engagement with leading thinkers on key issues that can help re-build trust and cooperation between Russia, United States and its European partners, Dr. William Parker, COO of the EastWest Institute, was interviewed by Sputnik Radio. Here, Dr. Parker shared his insights on areas where the United States and Russia, building on mutual interest, can find additional scope for cooperation, in particular in the fight against ISIS.

Click here to listen to the complete interview. 

In the interview, held on January 15, 2016 in Washington DC, Hassan discussed the latest developments on ISIS and the Kurds in Iraq. Speaking in Kurdish, here are some of Hassan's comments:

• Indeed ISIS has been weakened in both Iraq and Syria, but far from defeated. The world is dealing with an ideological, barbaric and highly efficient terrorist organization. 
• Unless the root causes that gave rise to ISIS are addressed, a defeat of ISIS will not herald a new era of global security. It will be a victory with the taste of defeat. This means Post-ISIS phase will not be that much different from ISIS era. Therefore, the international community must address the political, economic and social grievances, radical religious doctrines and horrible human rights violations committed by both 'secular' and religious regimes in the MENA region.     
• Kurdish independence from Iraq is a tough task. Kurdish ruling elites in Iraqi Kurdistan should address this issue through an inclusive process. No single Kurdish political party and leader can achieve independence alone. Kurdish ruling elites, especially Kurdistan Democratic Party and its leader Barzani should treat the struggle for independence as a national and non-partisan issue rather than as a personal and partisan project. 

Hassan, who leads track two initiatives on countering violent extremism for EWI, was in Washington DC to attend the launch of The Task Force on the Future of Iraq. This high-level task force aims to provide specific recommendations to the incoming American administration's transition team in late November 2016. 

Click here for further information about the task force.

Click here to watch the full interview with KURD CONNECTION.

New York (February 19, 2016) - The Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East has invited Kawa Hassan, the EastWest Institute's Director of Middle East and North Africa's Regional Program, to join The Task Force on the Future of Iraq. This Task Force will bring together 25 top Iraq experts from around the globe who will make specific recommendations to the incoming American administration's transition team in late November 2016.

"We're delighted that Kawa has been selected to contribute to this important project," EWI CEO and President Cameron Munter said. "Kawa Hassan's work at EWI has been informed and nuanced, and I'm sure he'll bring these qualities to the Atlantic Council study. Kawa is one of the most promising voices speaking on the Middle East today."

The Task Force will convene four times in 2016 to analyze the drivers of instability and sources of opportunity in Iraq and devise policy recommendations for Baghdad, Erbil and regional and international partners. Besides the Rafik Hariri Center, supporters of the Task Force include the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani and the Bayan Center.

Among other Task Force initiatives, Hassan will be drafting a paper on governance in the Kurdistan Region, as part of his participation.

"I am honored and thrilled to join this timely, needed initiative and to be a member of a team of internationally renowned Iraq experts," Hassan said.

"Iraq, the Middle East and the wider world are at a crossroads. In order to defeat ISIS and build new and inclusive political contracts, the root causes that led to the emergence of this Frankenstein and apocalyptic actor that calls itself the Islamic State should be addressed through fresh perspectives and new policies. This lies at the heart of EWI's strategy that aims at addressing seemingly intractable problems and anticipating tomorrow's security challenges."

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DW: This year's Munich Security Conference is taking place in turbulent times. What do you see as the key issue that participants will be dealing with when they gather in the Bavarian capital?

Wolfgang Ischinger: The boundlessness of current conflicts makes conflict management so challenging. The war in Syria, which has turned into a regional conflict, the refugee crisis, cyberthreats, jihadist terrorism - all these issues transcend borders, and we struggle with how to work together to deal with them effectively. Some try to look for national solutions, but there really aren't any.

DW: NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently advocated reinstating the NATO-Russia council, a move you supported. The ball is now in Russia's court. Do you think Moscow will agree given the fact that Germany announced a steep increase in military spending and the US also upped its investments into European defense?

Why wouldn't Russia agree? It cannot surprise anyone in Moscow that NATO members are now beginning to invest more in their militaries. This is long overdue.

DW: Europe's refugee crisis is not only still unresolved, but EU members are still deeply divided on the issue. What could a solution look like?

There are three different levels we need to tackle. On the distribution of refugees, everyone will need to compromise. We also need to agree on a strategy to stop the war in Syria. This will only be possible with a common understanding with all key parties, including Moscow, Tehran and Riyadh. The EU has been inactive far too long and should play a more central role. Finally, we also need much more refugee assistance on the ground.

DW: While the grip of the "Islamic State" on Syria and Iraq has apparently been reduced, the group has gained traction in Libya and elsewhere. How big of a threat is IS today for the region and beyond?

IS has successfully filled power vacuums throughout big parts of the Middle East and is stronger than al Qaeda has ever been, especially with its network in Europe and its digital prowess when it comes to propaganda and recruitment. The group will be a huge challenge for Europe for a long time. In Libya, for example, the EU may not have a choice but to engage militarily if the IS continues its advance there. This, by the way, is just one reason why the EU needs the necessary capacities to be able to present a credible common security and defense policy.

To read this interview on DW, click here. 

Hassan was quoted on Al Jazeera America on January 15.

As published:

Critics, however, accuse Barzani of mounting a renewed independence campaign precisely in order to distract attention from these more pressing internal questions. He has already used the fight against ISIL as justification for remaining in his post past his scheduled term limit, stoking a succession debate that briefly erupted into violence in August. As Kawa Hassan, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the EastWest Institute, put it, “Iraq is a failed state, but Kurdistan is also a failed region.” 

Kurdistan watchers say there are too many wild cards to know for sure where this current sovereignty push is heading. Hassan, who is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said he saw a “fragmented future” for the KRG. But he has learned at least one lesson from the past year and a half. “I don’t dare to make any predictions,” he said. “Who thought a couple of months back that Russia would enter the war in Syria? That Turkey would down a Russian jet? Who thought Saudi [Arabia] would start a war in Yemen or build a new coalition against [ISIL]?”

“The Middle East is changing so rapidly and so fundamentally,” he said. “And this provides an opportunity for the Kurds to try and push for independence or at least some kind of confederation between Kurdish areas. If they are united, they can capitalize on this opportunity.”

To read the full article, click here.

The roundtable, under the Chatham House Rule, was attended by representatives of think tanks and NGOs, EU institutions, diplomatic delegations to the EU, Belgian miniseries and police, as well as consultancy companies. 

ISIS is the most powerful, ruthless and well-funded terrorist group in recent history. Not only has ISIS managed to take and control a significant swathe of territory, it has become a de-facto state and a powerful foe. While a political solution in the war-torn areas of Syria and Iraq is a necessary precondition to the total defeat of ISIS, discrediting the group's ideology is also essential. Defectors from ISIS are among the most powerful first-hand voices to speak out against the group. Indeed a disillusioned cadre who can speak from experience and tell their authentic stories about life inside ISIS may be the most influential tool for preventing and dissuading others from joining ISIS.

The discussion revolved around ISIS’s attraction, induction and ideology, Sharia- and military training, as well as diverse motives to join the terrorist group, which include discrimination and marginalization in their societies as well as individual and family grievances. Based on her most recent published research, Speckhard delved deeply into the inner working of ISIS and explained that all ISIS cadres undergo Shariah training where they are imbued with a Takfiri ideology that enables them to deem all others, including Muslims, who disagree with ISIS’s extreme ideology, as apostates who should be killed. 

Despite this indoctrination, all defectors (all are Syrians) experienced their Shariah trainers as a positive influence since they allowed them to deepen their own religious understanding. In this sense, Speckhard noted, these disengaged defectors remained radicalized “true believers.” They also had been given military training to handle weapons, explosives, and undergo exercises. Following these compulsory courses, these new members were sent to the front. 

Syrians who join ISIS are rewarded with salaried jobs, which for young men translates into the ability to marry and for young women the money allows them to save their families from literal starvation. Foreign fighters receive additional rewards: wives, sexual slaves, and sometimes homes and cars. Daily life is punctuated by brutal practices—including floggings, torture and beheadings. Defections are the result of exposure to extreme brutality, disgust over the slave trade, observations of deep hypocrisy—a total mismatch between the words and deeds of Islam. Charges of corruption and complaints about battlefield decisions that produced unnecessary deaths in their own ranks were also causes of disillusionment. Speckhard concluded her presentation by saying that all interviewed defectors had come to hate ISIS and warn others not to join what they gradually came to see as a totally disappointing, ruthless and un-Islamic organization.

The participants reflected on these rare and fascinating first-hand stories as potentially very influential tools for preventing and dissuading others from joining ISIS, along with the necessity of comprehensive unorthodox de-radicalization programs that combine fair punishment and psychological treatment: rehabilitation and reintegration into society; and constant reassessment of the defectors’ steps in psychologically processing their often traumatizing experiences. Law enforcement and judiciaries in western countries will have to reform their policies regarding returnees, in order to contribute to their gradual reintegration into society, and use their stories to dissuade disgruntled and disenfranchised youth from joining ISIS. In addition, NGOs and civil society are indispensable partners for governments in de-radicalization and reintegration of ISIS defectors. 

 
Anne Speckhard and Kawa Hassan