Middle East & North Africa

In a prime time interview with "Kurd Connect", a joint program between Voice of America's Kurdish Service and NRT, the independent Kurdish Satellite channel, Hassan underlined three conditions that would translate the military defeat of ISIS in Mosul into a lasting political settlement. Hassan made his comments as coalition forces are making gains in the offensive to recapture Iraq's second largest city from the terrorist organization.

Hassan said it was highly possible that ISIS would ultimately lose Mosul. But, he added, the bigger question was what would happen afterwards.

The liberation of Mosul, said Hassan, could lead to a new beginning for Iraq and the emergence of an inclusive Iraqi state provided three conditions were met: 

• Iraqi authorities should regain the trust of the Moslawis, the people of Mosul. This is important because the sectarian policies of Iraq's previous government and the collapse of the people's confidence in the Iraqi army and post-2003 Iraqi state led to the ISIS takeover in June 2014.  
• The United States, United Nations, European Union, donor countries and regional states should set up a special fund for the stabilization and reconstruction of Mosul. The humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Mosul are immense. The international community and regional states can play a positive role in rebuilding Mosul by committing to financial resources. This will send a signal to the Moslawis that they will not be abandoned once ISIS is defeated. 
• International and regional powers should play a positive role in bridging the divide between the diverse Iraqi communities to reach mutual compromises regarding territorial disputes, distribution of wealth and power sharing.

Hassan's comments can be accessed in full here, beginning around the 6:45 mark. The interview is in Kurdish.

Early in 2006, I volunteered to head the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq. As an American diplomat then serving in Europe, I was hardly an expert in overseeing development in a combat zone. But I believed, along with others, that it was unfair (and ultimately, counterproductive) to ask the U.S. military to lead the task of nation-building in Iraq. Whatever the merits of the U.S. incursion there, we the civilians owed it to our colleagues in uniform to step forward and become a practitioner of applied diplomacy on the ground.

I headed a team of 50, dedicated to job creation, promotion of good governance, infrastructure development, and rule of law. We sought to protect the extraordinary historical heritage of Mosul: its architecture, its markets, its meeting places. We worked with dedicated Iraqi colleagues in what was then a diverse and largely undamaged and yet crumbling city, trying to find common ground among Sunni Arabs, Kurds, various Christian and other minority groups. I remember most of all a cultured, wise, and modest engineer named Omar, who gently but firmly led efforts to rebuild bridges that had decayed under the sanctions of the Saddam Hussein era or redesign roads to meet new needs of citizens. There was little, if any, tradition of democratic governance at the provincial level at that time. But Iraq was a place of sophisticated persons like Omar, well trained and hard working, and Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, was home to many of them.

In the background was the violence: the bloody fight for Tal Afar, west of Mosul. There were attacks in the countryside, in places like Sinjar, now famous for the predatory behavior of Daesh. There were sullen resentments, usually between the mainly Arab inhabitants west of the Tigris in the old city (some of them deeply hostile to us) and the well organized Kurds on the east bank (usually more supportive of our efforts). The provincial governor, an Arab who sought Kurdish backing, survived any number of assassination attempts, though many of his family members perished. Things were especially tense after the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra that year, but we pushed ahead and sought to make a difference for the people of Mosul.

I departed from Mosul before the "surge" of 2007. Unfortunately I've lost track of former colleagues like Omar. Now, after the capture of the city two years ago by Daesh, I can only hope that he made his way to Irbil or Baghdad. But in the charged politics of Iraq these days, I wonder if a thoughtful, secular Sunni professional can find his place in the main city of the Kurdish region or in the now overwhelmingly Shia capital. Still, I have hopes that he's safe, and the monuments of Mosul still stand, despite the terrible stories of the dynamiting of the tomb of Jonah by Daesh.

Now the battle to recapture Mosul from Daesh will begin this month. I think of the scenes from Aleppo, another once beautiful ancient metropolis in the region. I fear that the fighting will be bitter, and that, once again, it will be the people caught in the crossfire who will suffer worst. I fear that any prospect for partnership, even under the most difficult of circumstances a decade ago, that we found with Iraqi citizens of talent and goodwill will disappear.  

The liberation of Mosul will be a major step in the fight against Daesh. But I do hope that the efforts of EWI and other global institutions will lessen the chances that such a potentially awful battle will need to take place. In our determination to prevent conflict before it starts, it's sometimes necessary to take an unblinking look at what happens when we fail: I think of my friends in Mosul and hope that, from their suffering, we learn anew the patience, character, and hope so necessary to our own work.

Munter argued that, in Syria, Russia was trying to be taken seriously as a global power.

"I think it's an overarching goal of the Russians to make sure that they're seen as taken seriously throughout the region, that they're present throughout the region, and they're recognized as being there throughout the region. So they're going to, I think, make it clear to the public even at the risk of maybe ticking off the Iranians that they have influence throughout the region, "said Munter in an interview with VOA's International Edition on August 23. 

"Whether or not that has a strategic goal—that is whether they're better at fighting the rebels, whether that makes more of a difference—seems to me to be less important than the message that Russia's there, Russia's there to stay and Russia has a wide reach."

Russia last week revealed that a number of their fighter bombers had taken off from Hamadan, south-west of Tehran, to carry out strikes in Syria. It was the first time a foreign state had used Iranian territory to attack a third country since at least the second world war.

Munter also believed the armed conflict, which is in its fifth year and has killed hundreds of thousands, could be resolved.

"Any situation like this can be resolved but it's a question of people making choices or being compelled to make choices. It's a question of with whom do people ally themselves ... People make choices because they see things change or they feel their own ability to affect things changes. And when the right constellation of change takes place, this war can be solved," said Munter.

To listen to the full interview, click here. Munter's segment starts at the 11:45 mark.

In the discussion, held on August 3 in London, Hassan shared his insight:

• All Kurds agree on one thing and principle: Kurds are entitled to statehood. This is a dream of every Kurd, but there is a difference between dream and reality.  
• After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and Syrian revolution in 2011, new political realities emerged in Iraq and Syria. Both countries are collapsing due to the war against ISIS, civil war and infighting. Political parties and societies in Iraq and Syria are fragmented. This creates opportunities for more Kurdish rights, self rule, federalism and con-federalism. 
• But just like Arabs, Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds also are deeply fragmented and divided. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the issue of independence has become a factor in further dividing rather than uniting the Kurds. The political parties have different views on the timing and the way independence issue has been pursued by Maosud Barzani, whose term as president has expired but still is in power.
• In the four countries where Kurds live—Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran—sadly there is a kind of Kurdophobia, an asusmption that granting rights to Kurds will lead to the partitioning of these countries. There is not one major Kurdish party that calls for the establishment of Grand Kurdistan. What Kurds want are equal political, economic, cultural rights. More Kurdish self rule will strengthen these countries and societies since Kurds will feel they are equal citizens. 
• The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq faces serious challenges: economic downturn, political paralysis, paralyzed government, social disintegration. Due to these problems and challenges at the moment, the conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan are not ready for the establishment of an independent state. Instead, Iraqi Kurdish parties should first put the Kurdish house in order, then set up a common vision and plan for their relations with Federal Iraq. They should engage in serious, strategic and deep negotiations with Baghadad about their demands but also about what they can offer to Iraq. There is a need for creative ideas to reach agreements on oil and gas revenues, disputed territories and economic relations.   
• Given the complexity, fluidity and dynamism of developments in Iraq and Syria, it is very difficult to predict future prospects and scenarios of the Kurdish issue. 

To watch the program (in Arabic), click here.

On July 13, Hassan exchanged views with the Security and Defense subcommittee of the European Parliament on the security challenges in the conflict-ridden Middle East nation. The director of EWI's Middle East and North Africa Program spoke during a session in Brussels. 

Below is the text of his address. The session was streamed live and can be accessed through this link.

Dear Mrs. Chairman, 

Dear esteemed members of the Subcommittee on Security and Defense, 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good Afternoon. Thank you very much for this kind invitation; it is an honor to be back at the European Parliament and exchange views with you on the security situation in Iraq. 

With the liberation of Falluja and recapturing of the Qayara air base 50 miles south of Mosul, the war against Daesh is entering an extremely critical phase. According to HIS Conflict Monitor, as of 4 July 2016, ISIS controls roughly 68,300 square kilometer in both Iraq and Syria, which is roughly the size of Ireland or the U.S. state of West Virginia. In 2015, ISIS lost 14% of its territory, and over the past six months its territory was further reduced by an additional 12 percent. 

Without doubt this is welcome news and must be hailed and celebrated. But as Iraqi forces prepare for the crucial battle for Mosul, daunting political and military challenges lie ahead for Iraq and the Global Coalition against ISIS.      

First, even though our meeting is about security challenges in Iraq, it is imperative not to lose sight of the battle of ideas between ISIS and the rest of the world. The recent horrible and heinous attacks in Baghdad, Balad, Daka and Istanbul are terrible reminders of the tenacity and resilience of the ideology of ISIS. In short, ISIS is losing territorially but winning ideologically, at least for the time being. The most monumental mission after the military defeat of ISIS will be how to provide an alternative narrative to the foot soldiers of ISIS, who come from more than 100 countries. The brutality and appeal of ISIS is not only an Iraqi or Syrian problem, it is in fact a global problem. The globalization of ISIS should be tackled through globalization of solidarity with all victims of ISIS’ barbarism. One of the most powerful messages on Iraqi social media after the terrible Karada attack almost two weeks ago was questioning the lack of mass solidarity rallies and moments of silence in the West for Iraqi victims in light of memorials and recognition for ISIS victims in Paris and Brussels.   

Second, alleged human rights violations were committed by Popular Mobilization Forces and Federal Police during the liberation of Falluja. According to Human Rights Watch, an Iraqi government investigation into alleged abuses against civilians during military operations to retake Fallujah is being kept under wraps. Serious and transparent investigations into these abuses should be conducted. Those who committed these violations should be held accountable and justice should be provided to victims and their families.      

Third, although ISIS certainly committed the Karada bombing, it can still be considered a consequence of the fragmentation and deep division of Iraqi security forces. In Bagdad these forces are divided between the Iraqi army, ministry of interior, two intelligence services, Popular Mobilization Forces from different backgrounds who answer to different commanders, and neighborhood patrols. All of these forces are tasked with the same objective, namely defending Baghdad. The multiplicity of agencies and at times overlapping responsibilities create confusion and chaos due to a lack of coordination.  As a result this makes it difficult, at times, to hold agencies responsible when there is a terrorist attack. The security situation in the Kurdistan region is better than federal Iraq, but it suffers from somewhat similar structural security problems. Despite reform promises and plans by the Kurdish leadership to transform security services and peshmarga into professional, non-partisan and institutionalized forces, they remain divided along party lines between KDP and PUK. This is due to a lack of political will. Kirkuk and other disputed territories between Bagdad and Erbil also face the problem of proliferation of security forces. In the liberated Sinjar where ISIS committed genocide against Yezidis, the KDP and PKK are engaged in a potentially disastrous power struggle that has divided the already-traumatized Yezidi community. The Kurdish infighting between these two parties has resulted in an economic siege and blockade of Yezidis who returned to Sinjar. This is not what the Yezidis expected to face when they decided to return home. These structural divisions do not bode well for future battles against ISIS, in particular for the liberation of Mosul. Existential questions regarding Post-ISIS Mosul must be addressed now: Which force will control which part of the city? Which forces acceptable to local communities should provide security? Which donors will provide reconstruction funds and which Iraqi groups will control them? What would be the future of disputed territories between the Kurds and Sunni Arabs?           

Fourth, the military division is compounded by and is indeed a reflection of political fragmentation. The major Iraqi communities and parties are deeply divided about the future of Iraqi state. The post-2003 political system that emerged after the fall of Saddam Hussein is collapsing. Communities are divided internally and externally. Internally there is no consensus within communities about what kind of Iraqi state they want to see in the post-ISIS period. Externally there is no consensus with other communities about the form of the future state. The unprecedented protests and storming of parliament over the past two months in Bagdad are about both pushing for genuine reforms and at the same time a real, albeit for now political, infighting between major Shiite forces for what will be left of the Iraqi state. The Sunni forces are deeply divided about their vision for post-ISIS Sunni areas and Iraq as a whole. The political process in the Kurdistan region is facing a crippling stalemate: the parliament is paralyzed; the parties cannot agree on a joint vision and plan for the region’s future with federal Iraq. Furthermore they cannot agree on a transition plan until the next election, expected to be held in 2017 to solve the expired presidency of Barzani and the future form of the political system, namely whether it should be a parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential system. Despite promises by Kurdish leadership to implement overdue and urgently needed reforms and tackle structural corruption, no serious, real or meaningful actions have been taken to date.          

Fifth, due to the falling oil prices, structural corruption, mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism that have marked the post-Saddam era, Iraq is facing its worst economic crisis since 2003. The economic downturn is impacting the war against ISIS. As a result Iraq is in a dire need of international financial aid to support and return millions of internally displaced persons to their places of origin and implement reconstruction projects.           

In conclusion, even if ISIS is militarily defeated, there will be no sustainable security if these military, political and economic problems are not addressed and firmly resolved. It is the responsibility of Iraqi leaders to care for their country and come up with inclusive solutions that aim at crafting a new political pact. The European Union can and should be a relevant actor in this process. It should support Iraqis in their efforts to defeat ISIS and establish a new Iraq. The EU should join the U.S., UN and other international actors in mediating between Iraqis by initiating short, mid and long term political, military and economic initiatives with the aim to encourage Iraqi leaders to find common grounds and reach painful but vital, historic and much-needed mutual compromises. However this support should be conditional. It has to be based on basic democratic principles, namely: true power sharing, peaceful transfer of power when office terms come to an end, implementing real reforms, rule of law, human rights and addressing human rights violations, transparency and accountability. Without this new pact, the new Iraq will be the old Iraq, and ISIS will be back, probably even with more brutality and vengeance.      

Thank you very much for your kind attention. I look forward to your questions and comments. 

Hassan recently spoke of the state of Kurdistan for an article titled "Out of Iraq’s ashes, Kurdistan grows."

Some of his comments are:

• "At the moment, Baghdad is weak and cannot impose its will. But whether they would accept Kurdistan having Kirkuk as a province—I really doubt it.
• He says that if the KRG attempts to unilaterally secede with Kirkuk, “there will definitely be war.”
• But an independent Kurdistan would be entering into economic relations with its neighbours from a position of relative weakness, says Hassan. “If tomorrow an independent Kurdistan will be declared, it will be independent of Baghdad but dependent on Ankara.” 

To read the complete article, go here.

Hassan has spoken at length about the future of Kurdistan. More of his insight on the topic is available here, here, and here.