Middle East & North Africa

Executive summary of the brief:

Falling oil and gas prices and shrinking demand across global energy markets pose enormous challenges for energy exporting countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia and lead to decreasing revenues from this sector. Despite differences in the structures of their respective national economies, both countries share common challenges in adapting to this new situation. High youth unemployment rates, an underrepresentation of women in the workforce, a public sector unable to absorb the high numbers of university graduates as well as environmental degradation and pollution, all constitute major problems for both countries and their economies. But, while solving many of these issues would ideally demand bilateral cooperation, a political climate of mutual mistrust and enmity currently inhibits such a process.

CARPO and the EastWest Institute initiated a meeting of experts from Saudi Arabia and Iran as part of their ‘Iran-Saudi Track 2 Initiative.’ The stated aim was to shed light on the challenges and opportunities a ‘post-oil’ era might bring as well as to explore potential areas for cooperation between both countries. While participants agreed on the necessity of cooperation for creating strong and less oil-dependent economies, from which both countries as well as the whole region would benefit, their assessments varied on where this could begin.

The report can be downloaded here.

Related:

Know Your Enemy — Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on ISIL

Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Refugee Crisis

The EastWest Institute’s Brussels Center hosted Dr. Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour, Deputy Foreign Minister for Research and Education of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Iranian Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS), at a roundtable on “Iran's Perspective on Future Relations with Its Neighbors” on April 4, 2017.

Participants attended from Brussels-based European institutions, academia, and think tanks. Dr. Sajjadpour outlined the principles of Iranian relations with its neighboring states and focused on the question of how and in which terms these can be understood, explaining the multidimensionality of the Islamic Republic’s relationships with its neighbors and stating the need of realistic assumptions on Iranian foreign policy. Dr. Sajjadpour’s presentation was followed by a Q&A session focusing on potential areas of further regional and global cooperation as well as the Iranian view on regional conflicts and the country’s bilateral relationship.

Click here to read Sajjadpour's last visit to EWI's Brussels Center in 2014.

Jordan, a country founded in 1921, has, in its short history, been at the mercy of regional trends and ideologies over which it had little control. Its most recent regional adversary—both ideological and political—is the Islamic State. While the Islamic State appears to be nearing defeat militarily, owing to the increasing efforts by the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, the transnational terror group might pose a more severe threat to the Hashemite Kingdom once its forces are defeated on the battlefield and dispersed.

Radicalization and Jordan’s Internal State of Affairs

For many years the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Islamic Action Front, was the strongest and most organized opposition group in the kingdom. But, in the beginning of 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood faced the most severe crisis in its history. Status weakened, it has largely been supplanted by more militant Sala jihadists, the natural allies of entities such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

According to the Islamic State, Syria and Iraq are Dar al-Tamkin (the “enabling region,” i.e., one that allows for the organization’s expansion) en route to Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria), an entity that also includes Jordan. Nonetheless, the immediate threat to Jordan is not conquest by the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra, but rather a slow subversion of the Jordanian state within its own borders by these terror groups based in Syria and Iraq. This problem will become more acute once Islamic State forces, defeated on the battlefield and severely lacking in territory, return to Jordan and begin to implement insurgency and terror campaigns as seen in Iraq prior to 2014.  

Is Jordan vulnerable?

The Islamic State’s interests in the Jordanian Kingdom are rooted in the internal vulnerabilities of the Hashemite monarchy, which rules on the basis of a delicate balance of power between the various Jordanian tribes.

The sizable influx of refugees from Iraq and Syria, which threatens the economic and social order in the country, is liable to upset this delicate balance. Jordan is currently home to over 650,000 refugees, which amount to 10 percent of the population.  

According to a poll published in September of 2014 by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, only 62 percent of Jordanians view ISIS as a terrorist organization. In fact, more than 1,500 Jordanians have reportedly joined the Islamic State over the last two years.

The Islamic State and Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate) have found a base of support in Jordan’s Salafist population as well as the country’s poorest areas. Economically depressed regions like Rusayfa, Zarqa, and Ma’an have become a fertile breeding ground for Jordanian jihadists looking to extend the chaos of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Zarqa and terrorism

Zarqa, an industrial city with a population of 800,000, is best known as the birthplace of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the group that later became the Islamic State. In his early years, Zarqawi was a petty criminal in Hai Masoum, a mostly-Palestinian neighborhood before becoming Iraq’s terrorist mastermind.

Hard-line Salafist groups have succeeded in gaining ground in Jordan, particularly in the country's poverty pockets of which Zarqa is one of the worst—the governorate of the city has the second-highest rate of unemployment anywhere in Jordan.

According to Amer Sabaileh, a Jordanian researcher who was raised in the same neighborhood as Zarqawi, things have gotten worse in many respects there despite government attempts to prevent youth from joining jihadist groups. Over 60 of the population is under 30, while the official youth unemployment rate (ages 15 to 24) stood at 28.8 percent in 2015.

As a result, the city of Zarqa continues to serve as one of the central points in the region for furnishing foreign fighters to the Islamic State and the recruitment of young Jordanians —encouraged vicariously  by religious authorities.

Within Jordanian society, religious leaders are playing a prominent role in shaping public debate and perception. While forbidden from giving overt support to what is considered terrorism, they are quite free in what they can say and some of them are followers of an ultra-conservative stream of Islam preaching Jihad. Their extremist position was exemplified in January 2017, when Jordan's Religious Affairs Ministry dismissed 15 mosque preachers for their refusal to pray for Jordanian troops killed fighting ISIS-inspired militants.

Nevertheless, as of now, Salafi-jihadists in Jordan remain a small group. Estimates are between 5,000-10,000, although quantifying their size is difficult. Oraib Rantawi, the director of the al-Quds Center for Political Studies, a think tank in Amman, recently said: "It's not just about the military or security approach. (…) We are good enough at that already. But with the second track—to create generations of Jordanians who are immune to the extremism wave—we are not good at all.”

Time and again, the Islamic State has shown an ability and willingness to adapt its ideology and carry out its plans through independent or loosely connected groups and cells while still fulfilling the Caliphate’s agenda. Jordan is not immune from these mushrooming, semi-independents groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.  

As ISIS is fighting for its survival in Iraq and Syria, it is likely that what we will see more independent terror groups with ties to the Islamic State emerging in Jordan and the wider Middle East. Countries such as Jordan will need to be ready to effectively combat these groups, eliminate their safe havens and drain their support base through a combination of economic, political and military means. Without addressing some of the root causes—including Jordan’s poverty and high unemployment rates, as well as religious indoctrination—these efforts are bound to fail in the long run.

Lucrezia Savasta is a PhD Student in Political Science and a Research Assistant Higher School of Economics—National Research University in Moscow.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Petra, Jordan" (CC BY 2.0) by eviljohnius

Brussels, 6 April 2017 –The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission (EC) and the EastWest Institute (EWI) discussed today the development challenges and priorities in the Arab region, in particular the importance of youth empowerment as a new area of development cooperation in the region. Representatives of EU institutions, Arab Ambassadors to EU and members of the Brussels-based policy, development, and think tank community participated in the debate.

Anchored in the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 2016: Youth and the Prospects of Human Development in a Changing Reality, which UNDP published in November 2016, the debate examined links between the current priorities of the European Union, its individual institutions, and its member states, and the opportunities and challenges posed by the situation of youth in the Arab region.

Sixth in the series of AHDRs that UNDP has published since 2002, AHDR 2016 provides an evidenced-based overview on youth in the region. It underscores the demographic reality that the current youth cohort is largest the Arab region has ever witnessed. With two thirds of its 370 million inhabitants under the age of 30 and young people aged 15-29 years making up 30% of the Arab region’s total population of, this youth cohort is expected to dominate the development scene in the region for at least the next two decades.

“Our report argues that Arab countries can achieve a great leap forward in development, reinforce stability and secure such gains in a sustainable manner, if they adopt policies that give youth a significant stake in shaping their societies and put them at the center—politically, socially and economically,” stressed Mourad Wahba, Director of UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Arab States. “Arab countries will need significant assistance to pursue such an ambitious development agenda. We are looking to our European partners to support this pursuit, which we believe aligns very well with current EU policy priorities and interests with regards to the Arab regions.”

The debate examined findings of the AHDR 2016 on the effects of conflicts raging across many of countries in the region, as well as barriers hindering youth’s enjoyment of essential basic services in education and health, and access to decent employment, on the overall prospects for the future of youth in the Arab region.

“This forum has offered interesting insights into how conflict and exclusion are the key drivers of youth mobility in the region, compelling young people to seek a safer and better life elsewhere,” said Marjeta Jager, Deputy Director General for International Cooperation and Development in the EC. “The new European Consensus on Development considers youth as a key driver for achieving SDGs. We also encourage our partners to further invest in education, and use it as a tool for promoting peace, tolerance and cultural diversity. With a total portfolio of EUR 5.4 billion, the EU is a key donor in supporting the achievement of SDG4.”

The debate also considered means to operationalize the report’s call on Arab states to invest in a new youth-oriented development model that simultaneously builds young people’s capabilities and expands opportunities available to them, while prioritizing the achievement of peace and security at national and regional levels.

“The development model that the report suggests for youth empowerment makes sense, but it requires structural changes that may prove difficult for many Arab countries to implement,” explained Kawa Hassan, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program in EWI. “European experiences in making public policies more youth-friendly and in formulating specific youth-oriented policies, may prove useful to Arab countries that are interested to heed the call of the AHDR 2016. Many European institutions will be happy to facilitate such critical experience exchange.”

For more information, please contact:

UNDP    

Ludmila Tiganu, Communications Specialist, UN/UNDP Brussels. E-mail: ludmila.tiganu@undp.org  Tel: +32 2 213 82 96

European Commission

Jörel Strömgren, Team leader, Communication and Transparency unit, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development. E-mail: joerel.stroemgren@ec.europa.eu  Tel: +32-2-295 69 39

EastWest Institute

Lana Schmidt-Goertz, Program Assistant. E-mail: lsg@eastwest.ngo Tel: +32 2 743 46 22

About the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDRs)

The AHDRs engage institutions and citizens in Arab countries in analysis and discussion about factors which shape the choices and freedoms available to people across the region, so as to foster understanding and consensus around regional and national development priorities. They identify disadvantaged groups within the region, and suggest policies, strategies and opportunities for their empowerment. The Reports spur public debates and mobilize support for action and change through processes of consultation, research and report writing. They target policy-makers, opinion leaders and civil societies. AHDRs have helped to articulate perceptions and priorities in the region, and have served as a source of alternate policy opinion for development planning across varied themes.

About UNDP

UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in some 177 countries and territories, we offer a global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations.

About the European Commission

The European Commission is the executive institution of the European Union, responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the EU treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the EU. The Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is responsible for designing European international cooperation and development policy and delivering aid throughout the world.

About the EastWest Institute

The EastWest Institute (EWI) is an independent NGO that works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. EWI is recognized and trusted for its unique capacity to bring together key policymakers, experts, business leaders and ground-breaking innovators—forging new connections, driving dialogue and introducing sustainable solutions.

The roundtable was attended by representatives of think tanks, NGOs, NATO and EU institutions, diplomatic delegations to the EU, as well as Belgian police representatives.

Since establishing the “caliphate” in 2014, ISIS has unleashed an unprecedented social-media recruiting drive that has attracted more than 30,000 foreign fighters from over 100 countries. The terrorist group has mastered the art of video-based propaganda and online recruitment—attracting the curious and then “swarming” those who engage or endorse their online products. As ISIS continues to stretch its reach through recruitment beyond borders, discrediting the group’s ideology is essential and may be the most influential tool for preventing and dissuading others from joining ISIS.

To that end, over the past one and a half years Dr. Anne Speckhard and her colleagues at ICSVE have conducted more than 40 interviews with ISIS defectors from Syria, Western Europe, Central Asia and the Balkans, as well as 12 European parents of those who went to ISIS and shared personal horror stories of ISIS brutality and hypocrisy, most captured on video. ICSVE is taking the raw interview material and editing them down into short video clips that mimic ISIS propaganda, naming them with pro-ISIS titles and opening screens that look like ISIS, to load on the internet to fight the group’s online recruiting. The clips have been successfully focus-tested in Central Asia, the Balkans, Western Europe and the U.S., as well as in interventions on Facebook with ISIS endorsers and in ISIS Telegram chat rooms. 

Just like other brands, ISIS provides a lifestyle to its believers. In the words of Dr. Speckhard, “if you buy a Coca Cola, you buy a lifestyle.”  But ISIS is more than a brand. In a world where grand narratives have collapsed, ISIS presents itself and is seen by its true and die-hard believers as an alternative governance.

Is it possible to break the ISIS brand? This is a daunting task but not impossible. Local and international stakeholders that work on de-radicalization should, among other things, focus on the identity, social, political, and economic needs of vulnerable communities. Setting up helplines for vulnerable families can be very effective. In fact, this method has been applied with success in Germany. Western countries with vulnerable Muslim communities need to initiate overdue open, peaceful, and transparent debates on the thorny topic of identity. Furthermore, successful role models from migrant backgrounds can and should play transformative roles in providing an alternative lifestyle for the ISIS brand.

Hassan was part of the panel for “Dialogue & Trust: Real Lessons in Countering Violent Extremism” on March 1. EWI partnered with the Global Peace Foundation to organize the four-day convention, bringing together leading global experts and practitioners to share best practices and develop multi-sector partnerships for sustainable peace and development and the achievement of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Organizers said the event drew 3,500 participants representing over 100 organizations from 42 countries.

Below is Kawa's remarks, beginning around the 6:00 mark.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends and Colleagues good morning, 

Thank you so much for the kind invitation to speak at the Global Peace Convention 2017. It is an honor to speak again at an event organized by Global Peace Foundation and its partners. I had the honor to speak at the last conference in Belfast in September. 

The questions we are asked to address at this session are immensely crucial and relevant. Yet I think they are more or less the same questions we discussed in Belfast. This doesn’t mean they are not important; on the contrary, they deal with one of the core issues of our time, which is at the same time at the heart of what my organization EastWest Institute is addressing, namely how to counter violent extremism and make our world a safer place. But in order for these questions to be dynamic and responsive in the face of rapid political changes in the West and the Middle East, I would like to connect countering violent extremism to two transformative phenomena that would impact peace building in the coming years, namely authoritarianism in the Middle East and populism in the West.    

How much a difference six months can make! Last time we met in Belfast. Back then Brexit was a fact but the U.S. (and with it the world) was engulfed in an existential election campaign that had the potential to change world politics with wide ranging implications for the fight against ISIS and other extremist groups. 

The election of Donald Trump and possible victories of populist and far-right parties in upcoming elections in France and the Netherlands may reshape the fight against violent Islamic groups such as ISIS. This will definitely impact the work of peace building organizations. While ISIS and other radical Islamist groups who are committing horrible crimes against Muslims and non-Muslims should be defeated, the key questions are: what is the best approach, and who are the best strategic and sustainable allies in this tectonic battle? 

Geopolitical shifts and populist surges in the West alongside fatigue with complex conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and beyond strongly suggest that a hard-core security approach and alliance with authoritarian regimes in Middle East perhaps will be the most dominant strategy in the coming years. This would result in the rehabilitation and resilience of repressive regimes such as Syria’s Assad and authoritarian and corrupt leaders in Iraq and other countries in the region. This strategy might yield military successes in the short term but in the long run will only strengthen apocalyptic groups like ISIS. To make matters worse, it will give autocrats a new lease on life. This means the Middle East could be condemned for the foreseeable future to a vicious cycle of violence committed by autocrats and apocalyptic ideologues. The civilian population and peaceful activists who want a dignified and democratic rule will be caught in between and will continue to remain the real victims as is the case at the moment. Going back to the topic of our session, namely root causes of violent extremism, what is the link between Jihadi Salafi terrorism and authoritarianism?          

In my view, one of the structural reasons for the rise of groups like ISIS is the systemic use of violence by the so called “secular” and religious regimes alike to quell dissent. The history of post-colonial states in Iraq, Syria, Libya and most other countries in the Middle East is a history of horrible human rights violations against civilian people, peaceful protests, and armed groups including public executions- even stoning and beheadings- and use of chemical and biological weapons. 

The barbarism of the henchmen of Abubakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, does not originate from a vacuum. They build on, are the logical conclusions of, and even refine the unimaginable brutality of the human rights violations of Saddam Hussein, Hafez & Bashar Al Assad, Gaddafi and other dictators. ISIS is an authoritarian byproduct, a consequence and not a cause of the current catastrophe in the Middle East. The overall extremely violent political culture and prisons were and are top universities for the graduation of the leaders as well as rank and file fighters of ISIS and other extremist groups. The only difference between ISIS and dictators is that ISIS meticulously documents and broadcasts its barbarism with a showcase of pride.

The most recent report of Amnesty International on Syria entitled “Human Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison, Syria” is a gruesome reminder of the terrible human rights violations committed by the regime and a warning of what may yet still happen. These regimes create the right environment for the birth of barbaric leaders like Abu Bakr Albaghdadi rather than Nelson Mandela. 
Political violence and human rights violations are related to economic corruption. By corruption I don’t mean petty corruption of low-mid level bureaucracy but rather systemic corruption at the highest echelons of power. Despite their many historic, political, economic and social differences Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Nigeria and some other countries, they share one common curse and that is the ubiquitous, exorbitant and unprecedented corruption of ruling elites that creates failed states and provides the perfect habitat for the emergence and advancement of violent extremism. Perhaps one of the books that pays sufficient attention to this global problem is the one aptly entitled “The Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security” by Sarah Chayes. To quote Ms. Chayes, “Since the late 1990s, corruption has reached such an extent that some governments resemble glorified criminal gangs, bent solely on their own enrichment. These kleptocrats drive indignant populations to extremes―ranging from revolution to militant puritanical religion.” 

The political order that emerged in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein dismally failed to produce an inclusive political pact in which all groups and citizens see the state as ‘their Iraq’. When Mosul fell to ISIS in June 2014, Iraq's national budget was over 141 billion USD. Ruling elites from Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish backgrounds have used these billions to enrich themselves and their cronies, strengthening party militias instead of building inclusive national institutions including professional armies.

The outrageous carelessness and scandalous double-standards of the international community towards the Syrian conflict has led to Syrian heartbreak, the worst refugee crisis since World War II and a protracted state of violence with no end in sight. Al-Assad's chemical weapons were destroyed by the UN, but his barrel bombs were left untouched only to wreak death and destruction in Syrian cities. Thus, it is no surprise that ISIS and other radical groups are mushrooming in such a conducive and ideal habitat. The Trump administration’s ban on Syrians and nationals from seven Muslim majority nations is the latest example of the rehabilitation of the Assad regime. U.S. immigration authorities barred entry to a 21-year-old Syrian cinematographer, even though he had a valid visa, who worked on a harrowing film about his nation's civil war, "The White Helmets”. This 40-minute documentary gives a window into the lives of the group's volunteers as they scramble to pull people from the rubble of buildings flattened in bombing raids. According to the founder of white helmets Khaled Saleh, the group saved 82,000 lives, including children and babies. I urge everyone to watch this documentary (which won an Academy Award in this year's ceremony). 

President Trump’s travel ban will only strengthen Assad, al Qaeda and ISIS. We live in an extremely dark time. Middle Eastern despotism, violent Jihadi Salafism and Western populism strengthen each other with disastrous consequences for the world. One way to counter this terrible trend is to link the struggle for dignity and democracy against Middle Eastern authoritarianism and terrorism to the new struggle against populism in the West. We need, though, to distinguish between the majority of voters who vote for populist and far right parties and those who are xenophobic. People are genuinely, rightly and truly terrified by the threat of terrorist attacks by ISIS in the West. It is this social base and fear that needs to be addressed in order to make the world a safer place and help peaceful protesters against autocrats in their long march for a dignified and democratic existence in Middle East. In these dark times this is a tall order. But we don’t have an alternative. More than ever we should commit to energized activism, new and transformative ideas, and above all hope. To quote Raymon Williams: “To be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than despair convincing.”

Thank you very much for your attention.