Middle East & North Africa

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in partnership with the European Commission and in collaboration with the EastWest institute, will present the Arab Human Development Report 2016 (AHDR): Youth and the Prospects of Human Development in a Changing Reality, on Thursday, April 6, 2017 in Brussels. Watch the livestream here.

The event in Brussels aims to highlight the opportunities and challenges that are outlined in the ADHR. The formal launch and presentation of report will be followed by a panel discussion involving representatives of the EU institutions, the United Nations, the Islamic Development Bank and Middle East experts and analyst, with a focus on youth and conflict prevention as an entry point to the discussion.

The Arab Human Development report is a holistic and comprehensive overview of the situation of youth and the prospects for human development in a constantly changing environment and reality that started with the wave of protests across the region in 2011. The point of departure of the report is the demographic fact that the current youth generation is the largest youth cohort this region has had over the past 50 years, making up 30% of its population of 370 million. The report argues that Arab countries can achieve a great leap forward in development, reinforce stability and secure such gains in a sustainable manner, if they adopt policies that give youth a stake in shaping their societies and put them at the center—politically, socially and economically.

The AHDR 2016 calls upon Arab countries to invest in their young people and empower them to engage in the development process as an urgent and critical priority in its own right and prerequisite to achieving sustainable development—a call that is particularly timely as Arab countries embark on formulating their plans to meet the goals of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030. The report also calls for a youth-oriented development model that focuses simultaneously on building young people’s capabilities and expanding opportunities available to them, considering the achievement of peace and security at national and regional levels as a prerequisite for a future fit for youth.

The discussion will aim to make the link between the current priorities of the European Union, the individual institutions, and member states, and the opportunities and challenges posed by the situation of youth in the Arab region.

The focus of the discussion will be on the following areas of the ADHR 2016:

• The Effects war and violent conflict on youth
• Public services in health and education
• Exclusion, mobility, and migration
• Education and transition to work
• Looking forward: building on the youth’s capabilities and expanding their opportunities

Providing a cost-benefit analysis for target audience:

• Provide financial figures to outline the best and worst case scenarios in cases of intervention and nonintervention from the side of the EU.
• Address demographic change and rapid urbanization in the Maghreb and the effect on possible migration patterns, using concrete figures and forecasts.
• Link demographic shifts and state and institutional fragility to aid in early conflict anticipation
• What solutions and actions are required from the EU side to avoid worst case scenario?

The patterns of migration and profile of young migrants to the Western OECD countries will be of high interest for the EU, in light of the large influx of refugees in 2015-2016. Given the complexity of conflicts and lack of sustainable solutions, it is expected that refugee and migration waves will continue in the years ahead. The AHDR examines youth’s reasons to migrate and possible exclusion factors, and envisages the role of migration policies in receiving or sending states, before emphasizing the role of inclusion in the migration process. Better understanding of the problems and challenges in sending states can help the EU in its cooperative efforts with regional governments to counteract the reasons (root causes) for conflict and migration, and presenting a cost-benefit analysis with potential ‘worst-case scenarios’ can serve as an alarm signal.

Agenda for the event in Brussels:

Presentation of the Arab Human Development Report

Mr. Adel Abdelllatif, Senior Strategic Advisor, Bureau for Arab States, UNDP

Discussion Panel

Mrs. Marjeta Jager, Deputy Director General, DG DEVCO

Mr. Maciej Popowski, Deputy Director General, DG NEAR

Mr. Mourad Wahba, Regional Director of the Bureau for Arab States, UNDP

Mr. Ahmed Hariri, Regional Manager - Middle East, Islamic Development Bank

Ms. Rosa Balfour, Acting Director of the Europe Program, German Marshall Fund

Moderator

Mr. Kawa Hassan, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program, EastWest Institute

Event details and Registration.

The EastWest Institute is proud to release its 2016 Annual Report, highlighting last year’s programmatic activities, achievements and new initiatives.

The impact of the institute across the globe is a testament to the talented and diverse staff working across five offices, our distinguished Board of Directors and a profound global network of decision makers and experts that help facilitate our mission.

EastWest Institute (EWI) Director of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program, Kawa Hassan, will be speaking at the 2017 Global Peace Convention in Manila, the Philippines. 

Hassan will deliver his insight on root causes of the emergence of extremist organizations, particularly the Islamic State, with focus on the Middle East and North Africa regions. Hassan will join the panel for “Dialogue & Trust: Real Lessons in Countering Violent Extremism” on March 1. 

EWI partners with the Global Peace Foundation to organize the four-day convention, bringing together leading global experts and practitioners to share best practices and develop multi-sector partnerships for sustainable peace and development and the achievement of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A combination of plenary and parallel sessions will provide an opportunity for participants to share, learn and collaborate on achieving a collective impact.

In September last year, Hassan delivered remarks on "How to De-glorify and Discredit ISIS" at the the Global Peace Leadership Conference in Belfast organized by the foundation. He also participated in the panel on "Ethical Leadership in Action." 

Click here to see the full schedule of the Manila convention.

The Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH) in Paris has selected Kawa Hassan, Director of Middle East and North Africa Regional Program at the EastWest Institute, to serve as co-project leader of a working group to support the "rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East”. This working group is part of a new initiative established by FMSH—the International Panel on Exiting Violence (IPEV).

"We take great pride in knowing that Kawa Hassan has been selected to head up this working group for the FMSH, a recognized interdisciplinary research institute,” said Dr. William J. Parker, COO of the East West Institute. "As a highly respected expert on the issue of countering extremism in the Middle East, Kawa will bring his unique knowledge, perspectives and management skills toward the benefit of this very important and timely effort.” 

Hassan will co-lead the group along with Orit Bashkin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at Chicago University. Together, they will coordinate and supervise a group of global experts to assess existing obstacles to the rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East. This working group represents one of ten such groups of researchers and experts under the IPEV initiative.  

Over a near two-year period, the IPEV will gather an international community of outstanding scholars to examine the issues of violence and exiting violence, with a focus on the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Specific issues to be addressed include the aspects of failed states, new forms of authoritarianism, proliferation and the metamorphosis of jihadism in the Middle East, and the integration of migrants, presence of Islam and the crisis of political systems in Europe. Issues will be explored in-depth both at the local and regional levels, and by conducting comparative experience analyses of other regions, such as Latin America. This effort will conclude with the publication of a comprehensive report with policy recommendations intended for local, national, and international institutions, NGOs, policy makers and other stakeholders. 

The IPEV was established by the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Conseil Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégique (CSFRS, Paris) and the Dabran Foundation (Iraqi Kurdistan). 

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will likely have little time to celebrate his inauguration. The President will inherit a world with numerous foreign policy challenges. High on the list remains defeating terrorism and realizing a stable post-ISIS Iraq.  

During the election campaign, then presidential candidate Trump stated emphatically that he will defeat ISIS by "bombing the hell out of them." This traditional security focused strategy will simply not work. On the contrary, it will prove counter-productive, giving ISIS and al Qaeda a new lease of life and providing the perfect context for further radicalization of a disgruntled Sunni community in Iraq and beyond.

The military campaigns against ISIS are making some tangible progress. The terrorist group is losing territories in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Yet this is neither the military end nor the political and ideological defeat of ISIS. This apocalyptical and genocidal menace is a consequence and not a cause of the current catastrophe in Iraq and Middle East. The root causes that led to its emergence are:

• Sectarian, political and economic exclusion and marginalization of Sunnis by the post-Saddam political order;
• Systemic corruption, lack of good governance, rule of law, transparency and accountability;
• Saddam Hussein’s despotism and horrible human rights violations that created the natural and perfect habitat for ISIS’s genocidal mindset and strategy;
• Intolerant and exclusivist educational curriculum pre- and post-2003;
• Political and military miscalculations and overreach by the U.S.; and
• Geopolitical jockeying by regional and international powers for influence. 

The only way to defeat ISIS entirely is by addressing these root causes in a comprehensive manner. On a macro and conceptual level this begins with a thorough understanding of the factors that lead to radicalization. On a policy level, there is a need for developing the right strategy that should support true and real reforms in Iraq. To be fair to the new U.S. administration, it is the responsibility of Iraqi authorities, especially the ruling Shia majority, to build a truly inclusive state in which Sunnis, Kurds and other communities feel as equal citizens with equal rights. But President-elect Trump can play a crucial role in this process given the political and military leverage of the U.S. in Iraq. While already endorsing a wider approach, Trump’s strategy for Iraq should take into consideration the following components:

• Realization that a traditional and exclusive  security approach will not fully tackle, but rather aggravate root causes of the conflict; ideally an approach that combines military, political and development aspects is required ;
• U.S. should take the lead and cooperate with the EU, UN and other actors in mediating between Iraqis and initiating short-, mid- and long-term political, military and economic measures. The objective is to encourage Iraqi leaders to find common ground and reach painful but vital, historic and much-needed mutual compromises on existential topics, including the form of state governance, power sharing, fair redistribution of wealth and resources, and resolving conflicts over disputed territories; and
• Establishment of a long-term international fund for recovery and reconstruction of post-ISIS Iraq.

However, this recommended support strategy should be conditional. It has to be based on basic democratic principles, namely: true power sharing, peaceful transfer of power when office terms come to an end, implementation of real reforms, rule of law, human rights and addressing human rights violations, transparency and accountability.   

Without such a long term strategy, the new Iraq will be the old Iraq, and ISIS will be back, probably even with more brutality and vengeance. The consequences for Iraq, U.S. and the rest of the world will be destructive and far-reaching.      

Kawa Hassan is EWI’s Director of the Middle East & North Africa Program and a member of Atlantic Council’s Task Force on the Future of Iraq, which is making policy recommendations for the Trump administration on how to deal with the Iraq conflict.  

Photo: "010720-F-8217W-002" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by U.S. Army Korea (Historical Image Archive)

Kawa Hassan, Director of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program at the EastWest Institute, discusses the chances of independence for millions of Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran in a recent interview with OpenCanada.

Although the Kurdish nationalists believe that a fragile Iraqi government may enable a transition to independence, Hassan argues that it will be very difficult for the Iraqi government to reconcile with the Kurds in accepting an independent state.

“At the moment, Baghdad is weak and cannot impose its will. But whether they would accept Kurdistan having Kirkuk as providence – I really doubt it”.

Hassan concludes with a warning that there may be ramifications should the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) unilaterally secede from Iraq with Kirkuk, stating that “there will definitely be a war”.

Founded in June 2011 by the Canadian International Council, OpenCanada is a digital publication on public policy, scholarship and journalism.

Read the full article here. 

The operation “Nainwa We Are Coming”, which aims to defeat ISIS in Mosul, began on the 17th of October. Almost 100,000 Iraqi troops—ranging from the army, counter-terrorism service, police, Kurdish Peshmerga, Shiite Popular mobilization units and Sunni Tribal mobilization forces—are participating in the fight against 5,000-6,000 ISIS fighters. These forces are supported by the U.S. and other Western countries that make up the Global Coalition against ISIS. According to Iraqi military sources, Iraqi troops have regained 50 percent of the total territory of Nainwa Province that ISIS had captured during its blitzkrieg in 2014. According to U.S. sources, Iraqi troops recaptured 25 percent of the Mosul city. Indeed, Iraqi troops have achieved considerable military success.

But the fight is far from over. In fact we may witness a terribly bloody and protracted war with far-reaching regional ramifications. It might not be an exaggeration to say that the outcome of the Mosul offensive might shape the future of Iraq. Monumental military challenges and daunting political problems lie ahead.

The military obstacles are as follows:  

First, Iraqi forces face a paradox as they intensify the battle against ISIS. The more territories they liberate, the closer they get to the power base of ISIS—namely the western part of Mosul city and Tal’Afar. Urban warfare against a brutal, smart and adaptive enemy like ISIS, particularly in a city where more than a million people live, is a true nightmare for Iraqi troops. This slows the advance of anti-ISIS troops. These forces have to take back territories from ISIS and at the same time make sure they don’t target civilians or get hit by Islamic State attacks.

Second, the city of Mosul is now encircled to the north, south and east. This encirclement greatly limits the freedom of movement of ISIS fighters in and out of Mosul. More importantly, it cuts ISIS’s supply route from the rest of Iraq and its other major stronghold in Raqqa, Syria. But ISIS still controls the 60-kilometer strategic road between Mosul and Tal Afar as well as the strategic Tal Afar itself. This prevents advancing troops from completely encircling the city from the west.

Third, ISIS is using civilians as human shields and is dug in among the population. Daesh militants move around the city in tunnels; drive suicide car bombs into Iraqi troops and make use of sniper and mortar fire.  

Fourth, anti-ISIS forces have one common enemy but not one common agenda. They are united by their anger at ISIS and the crimes it committed against different sectarian, ethnic and religious groups. But their unity stops there. Shiite Hashd wants to retake Tal Afar, Kurdish Peshmerga want to keep and expand pre-2014 territories, Sunnis are divided between diverse groups, PKK wants to keep control of part of Sinjar, troops of the religious minorities (Yezidis, Shabaks and Christians) want to retake their territories and perhaps to punish the local Sunni population, whom they see as ISIS collaborators. The multiplicity and diversity of aims and objectives enormously complicate the military battle as well as future political deals.

Now I will address the post-ISIS political scene both in Mosul and Iraq in general.

Let me first explain that post-ISIS Mosul doesn’t mean ISIS will be completely defeated. As has been the case in other liberated areas such Anbar, Salahadin and Diyala, ISIS is successful in mounting “traditional” terrorist attacks against civilians and military targets. This threat will not go away after it has been driven out of Mosul. Despite successive military defeats, Islamic State retains resilience and the capacity to remain a mortal terrorist organization. It seems that ISIS has multiple operational centers capable of acting independently to launch deadly attacks. As was the case with its predecessor Islamic State in Iraq, after military defeat in Mosul, Islamic State will go back to the desert. The vast desert border areas between Iraq and Syria are ideal locations for Daesh to retreat, retaliate, avenge, recruit and capitalize on potential political failures to tackle structural problems of exclusion, lack of rule of law, and exclusive politics.

The Mosul battle might shape the future of Iraq but the fate of Tal Afar might decide the future of the Mosul offensive. This town has a population of 100,000 people and lies 60 kilometers to the west of Mosul. Before 2003, it had a population of 200,000 Turkmen, of which approximately three-quarters were Sunni and one-quarter Shiite, in addition to Kurds. In the 1980s, Saddam Hussein favored the Sunni Turkmen and gave them lands in the north of the town, while the Shiite Turkomen were marginalized. Sunni Turkmen were also prominent in the army and security services. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, these divisions turned into sectarian strife between Shiite and Sunni Turkmen. Tal Afar became a beacon for the predecessors of ISIS,  Alqaeda in Iraq and Islamic State in Iraq. According to the Analyst Gareth Stansfield, given its strategic proximity to Syria, Tal Afar became a Jihadist highway for AQI, ISI and ISIS.

After its takeover by ISIS in 2014, ISIS killed or expelled the Shiite Turkmen and Kurds. Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces retook villages and now push towards the city itself. Tens of thousands have fled the town, some to the Syrian border, and other towards Iraqi Kurdistan, while others flee to ISIS-held areas. The actions of Shiite militias will decide the fate of this town and with it the fate of Mosul. If they exact widespread revenge against the Sunnis and expel them, this might create a conducive environment for ISIS to come back and for a potential regional conflict with Turkey, and between Turkey and Iran. But if they show restraint and let the Iraqi army, special forces and moderate Shiite militias liberate the town and apply rule of law, the worst case scenario might not happen.           

The topic of disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil and future relations in general will come to the forefront once Mosul is liberated. Kurdish authorities maintain that they will not leave pre-October areas they took before the latest offensive but they will be ready to negotiate about territories they liberated post-October 17. Iraqi authorities disagree with the Kurdish position. For now Kurdish and Iraqi forces fight side by side against ISIS. Yet it is difficult to predict what will happen in the days after defeat of ISIS. The potential for military conflict is definitely present.

Given the fragmentation of Sunni political parties, it is very difficult to predict which Sunni faction will control Mosul in the aftermath of an ISIS defeat.

It might take months to drive ISIS out of Mosul. But the biggest question is what would happen afterwards.

The liberation of Mosul could lead to a new beginning for Iraq and to the emergence of an inclusive Iraqi state provided three conditions are met: 

• Iraqi authorities should regain the trust of the Moslawis, the people of Mosul. This is important because the sectarian policies of Iraq's previous government and the collapse of the people's confidence in the Iraqi army and post-2003 Iraqi state led to the ISIS takeover in June 2014.  The Iraqi government will be judged by its actions, not its words. Will they succeed in providing good governance and rule of law, and revitalize institutions such as universities? 
• The United States, United Nations, European Union, donor countries and regional states should set up a special fund for the stabilization and reconstruction of Mosul. The humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Mosul are immense. The international community and regional states can play a positive role in rebuilding Mosul by committing to financial resources. This will send a signal to the Moslawis that they will not be abandoned once ISIS is defeated. 
• International and regional powers should play a positive role in bridging - rather than broadening and deepening- the divide between the diverse Iraqi communities to reach mutual compromises regarding territorial disputes, distribution of wealth and power sharing.

Click here to watch the full speech. Hassan's remarks begin around the 54:45 mark.

The military campaigns against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) are making some progress, the ongoing offensive against ISIS in Mosul is representative of the trend showing ISIS is losing ground and territory. This however, is neither the military end nor the political and ideological defeat of ISIS. Should the current trajectory continue, it is expected that ISIS will be further weakened and contained in both countries.

While national, regional and international actors are mainly focused on the military battle, there is an urgent need to address the aftermath of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, as well as the structural failures and societal grievances that have allowed the rise of ISIS in the first place. Further, it is paramount to place post-ISIS scenarios in Syria and Iraq in the right regional context by addressing the impact key regional states such as Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Iran, and Turkey, will have on post-ISIS geopolitics and geo-economics, as well as how these countries will in turn be impacted.  

Against this background, the EastWest Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Gulf States Regional Program and Syria/Iraq Office organized a confidential roundtable discussion to develop strategic track II measures for Syria and Iraq.

The two most important points stressed throughout the discussion were 1) the only way to bring an end to the bloodshed sustainably in the region is to address and tackle structural problems that created a conducive context for the rise and rapid expansion of ISIS, and 2) a sustainable solution will require the involvement and commitment of all regional and international actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S. and Russia.

The experts from 10 countries, also debated different state-forms and scenarios for both Iraq and Syria, including federal and confederal models and solutions, as well as the future of the Kurdish regions, and their relations to the central government and to regional actors. The regional rivalry and tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia remain a central theme, and they play out in both Iraq and Syria. The participants also discussed the impact of the US presidential elections on the US’s relations with Russia, and what effect it could have on attempts to settle the conflict in Syria.

The EastWest Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation will publish a joint report outlining the main findings of the discussion and policy recommendations.

Read more here.

The liberation of Mosul may be at hand. Elements of the Iraqi Army move slowly on Mosul from the south, Kurdish peshmerga cross the Ninewa Plains and approach Mosul from the east. And to the west, there are reports of Shia militia units moving on Tal Afar, a strategic town between Mosul and the Syrian border.  No one claims Mosul's fall is imminent, but with the help of American air strikes and advisors, the advance is steady.

Let's not assume the fighting will be easy. But another task will be difficult as well: the task of governance once the battle is won.

This will be a key test in the fight against ISIS: can the government of Iraq, in concert with its domestic partners from the Iraqi Kurdistan (the KRG), as well as the cooperation of international supporters, show itself capable of bringing peace, prosperity, and rule of law to this city of nearly two million when the fighting stops?

Many speculate about a "post-Wesphalian moment" in the Middle East: they speculate that the states whose borders were drawn in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 must somehow demonstrate that they can serve the needs of the population if these states are to survive. This concern may be overblown, but in the long run, ISIS will be defeated only when the alternative presented by established authorities is attractive, credible, and realistic.

The government of Iraq will need to provide a framework for some autonomy to this mainly-Sunni city. It will have to demonstrate its ability to protect those minorities who survive (many fewer than before ISIS arrived two years ago), such as Christians and Yazidis; it will have to work with the Kurdish inhabitants and their protectors from the KRG. In Tal Afar, to the west, it will need to address the needs of the largely Turkmen population, and cooperate their friends across the border in Turkey. It will need to restore institutions that were anchors of prosperity in Mosul in the past, such as its university. And it will need to create prospects for long-term economic viability throughout the province of Ninewa if the immediate project of pacification is successful.

So while many look at the battle for Mosul in the larger framework on the war against ISIS — that is, mainly as a military target that's a necessary prerequisite for ultimate victory that would drive a vulnerable foe from the regional — what happens after the fighting stops is perhaps even more important. During my own time supervising U.S. assistance in Ninewa in 2006, our traditional efforts at job creation, infrastructure development, strengthening of governing and juridical institutions as well as security forces were simply not adequate. Post-hostilities Mosul will need much more than we were able to muster at that time. Let's hope that the Iraqi leadership is marshaling its reconstruction forces and planning the next, post-hostilities actions.

It will take generosity, patience, and cooperation from Baghdad's leadership, and much of the same from those in Irbil and even Ankara, for a start.  But if those who win the battle of Mosul are unable to demonstrate that they can govern effectively, it will be an enormous setback for all who fight against ISIS and what it stands for. Conversely, if Iraqi authorities succeed in liberated Mosul, it can serve as a model, evidence that stability is still possible in that troubled region.